ORDER S.C. Pandey, J 1. This revision is directed against the order dated 19.8.1996, passed by the District Judge, Bilaspur exercising his power of the 'appellate officer' under section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (henceforth 'the act'), whereby the District Judge has dismissed the appeals filed by the appellants against the order dated 19.1.1988, passed by the Estate Officer, appointed by the non-applicant under 'the Act', evicting the applicant from public premises belonging to the non-applicant, Union of India. The disposal of this revision shall govern the disposal of connected civil revisions as mentioned below:- (1) C. R. No. 1534/96. Radha Mohan Agrawal Vs. Union of India. (2) C.R. No. 1578/96. Ramnarayan Agrawal Vs. Union of India, (3) C.R. No. 1601/96. Krishna Narain Agrawal (since deceased), through L. Rs. Gopal Agrawal and others Vs. Union of India. (4) C.R. No. 1602/96. Naresh Chandra Agrawal Vs. Union of India. (5) C.R. No. 1605/96. Mohandas V, Union of India. (6) C.R. No. 1606/96. Baldeo Kumar Vs. Union of India. (7) C.R. No. 1609/96. Roopchand and three others Vs. Union of India. (8) C.R. No. 1610/96 Premchand Gangwani Vs. Union of India. (9) C.R. No. 1621/96. Nemamal Vs. Union of India. (10) C.R. No. 1622/96. Chelan Das Vs. Union of India. (11) C.R. No. 1623/96. Vishnumal Vs. Union of India. (12) C.R. No. 1624/96. Tilakraj Vs. Union of India. (13) C.s R. No. 1625/96. Shambhulal Vs. Union of India. (14) C.R. No. 1626/96. Ravinath Prasad Vs. Union of India. (15) C.R. No. 1627/96. Sadilal Vs. Union of India. (16) C.R. No. 1639/96. Prilamadas Vs. Union of India. (17) C.R. No. 1662/96. Khiyaldas (since deceased) through L. Rs. Girdharilal and live others Vs. Union of India. (18) C.R. No. 1663/96. Tolaram (Since deceased) through L. Rs. Sugnamal and another Vs. Union of India. (19) C.R. No. 1666/96. Mst. Zeenat Bano Vs. Union of India. (20) C.R. No. 1668/96. Tirathram Vs. Union of India. (21) C.R. No. 1669/96. Saiyad Anwar Bakshi Vs. Union of India. (22) C.R. No. 1670/96. Motilal (since deceased), through L. Rs. Kamlabai and three others Vs. Union of India. (23) C.R. No. 1671/96. Kishanlal (since deceased through L. Rs. Niranand and five others Vs. Union of India. (24) C.R., No. 1672/96. Finn Bakhiram Gurumuk Rai, through Partners Ram Kishan and another Vs. Union of India. (25) C.R. No. 1673 /96. Lalta Prasad Vs. Motilal (since deceased), through L. Rs. Kamlabai and three others Vs. Union of India. (23) C.R. No. 1671/96. Kishanlal (since deceased through L. Rs. Niranand and five others Vs. Union of India. (24) C.R., No. 1672/96. Finn Bakhiram Gurumuk Rai, through Partners Ram Kishan and another Vs. Union of India. (25) C.R. No. 1673 /96. Lalta Prasad Vs. Union of India. (26) C.R. No. 1781/96. Kishansingh and two others Vs. Union of India. (27) C.R. No. 2048/96. Hundrajmal and three others Vs. Union of India. (28) C.R. No. 2049/%. Mohd, Arif and three others Vs. Union of India. (29) C.R. No. 2103 /96 Jagdish Chand Chhabada Vs. Union of India. (30) C.R. No. 2144/96. Gaya Prasad Gupta Vs. Union of India. (31) C.R. No. 2147/96. Nanakram and four others Vs. Union of India. (32) C.R. No. 2214/96. Smt. Kusum Tiwari Vs. Union of India. (33) C.R. No. 2235/96. Smt. Kusum Tiwari Vs. Union of India. 2. It is necessary to decide the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Union of India, the non-applicani in all above cases. Shri S. K. Mukherjee learned counsel for the non-applicant argued that the revision lies against the order of appellate officer in view of the fact that the appellate officer cannot be said to be a Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The District Judtge of the concerned jurisdiction has been named an "appellate officer' under section 9 of "the Act". The powers of hearing the appeal have not been conferred on the District Court or the District Judge directly. The use of words 'an appellate officer' excludes all other powers, a 'District Judge' may have as a Judge of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the meaning of section 3(17) of a General Clauses Act as demarcates him from District Court. The words "District Judge, in the context refers to the person who is the head of the judiciary in the Civil District. It excludes other judges who may be exercising similar powers under the provisions of the M. P. Civil Court Act, 1958 read with the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel pointed out that section 9(6) of "the Act' makes the Chief Judge or the principal Judge of City Civil Court a "District Judge' and a presidency town, a "District" by a deeming fiction. The learned counsel pointed out that section 9(6) of "the Act' makes the Chief Judge or the principal Judge of City Civil Court a "District Judge' and a presidency town, a "District" by a deeming fiction. For this reason, the chief or principal Judge of City Civil Court in a presidency town shall been appellate officer' under Section 9 of the Act. The learned counsel further argued that the appellate officer' appointed under Section 9 of 'the Act' did not exercise the same powers as the District Judge constituted under the M. P. Civil Courts Act, 1958 would do. The powers of District Judge exercising the powers of District Court limited by M. P. Civil Court Act. 1958 and also by the Code of Civil Procedure. On the other hand, by virtue of specific powers conferred upon the appellate officer under Section 9 of 'the Act' he can designate any other judicial officer in the District of not less than the years "standing, an appellate officer' under the Act. Such delegation of powers of the appellate officer are in the discretion of the District Judge. He can canfer the power of the "appellate officer' on any of the judicial officer serving under his central in the District by passing the officers, who may be senior in rank or exercising higher jurisdiction by virtue of provisions of M.P. Civil Courts Act, 1958 read with the Code of Civil Procedure, as presiding officers of superior Courts. Learned counsel for the non-applicant further argued that Section 9(2) of 'the Act provides various periods of limitation for appeal against orders, passed by the Estate Officer under Sections 5, 5-D, 5-C and 7 thereof and confers the power on the 'appellate officer' to condone the delay. In filing the appeal as per proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 9 of 'the Act'. Section 9(3) of 'the Act' provides that the 'appellate officer' shall have power to stay enforcement of an order under appeal subject to proviso to that section. It was sub-section (5) of Section 9 of the Act' which conferred power on the 'appellate officer' to grant costs of appeal. The leanred counsel, therefore, argues that the Legislature has deliberately made the District Judge an 'appellate officer' with powers to delegate the authority of the 'appellate officer' in his discretion to a Judge of standing of at least ten years in the District. The leanred counsel, therefore, argues that the Legislature has deliberately made the District Judge an 'appellate officer' with powers to delegate the authority of the 'appellate officer' in his discretion to a Judge of standing of at least ten years in the District. This departure from usual language by conferring power of hearing the appeal, on the District Judge is very significant. According to the learned counsel for the non-applicant, nothing prevented the Legislature from conferring the powers of hearing appeal on the District Judge as a Court and the rest would follow. There would be no need to provide for special powers under 'the Act' for condoning delay. In case, the Legislature had chosen to confer appellate powers on the District Judge. There was no need to confer power of granting stay in such case. Nor was it necessary to confer the power of awarding costs, in case, the 'appellate officer' be construed as a Court. The learned counsel argued that Section 9 of the Act conferred upon the District Judge powers of statutory Tribunal and not of a Court. The learned counsel for the non-applicant brought to the notice of the Court Section 10 of the Act' and argued that it makes interalia, the appellate order final save as otherwise expressly provided in 'the Act' and bars the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in respect of the subject matter of appeal in an original civil suit, application or execution proceedings and restrains the Civil Court or any other authority from granting any injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken against the powers conferred on an 'appellate officer' or Estate Officer' under the Act. The leanred counsel for the non applicant argued that lull ef lect should be given to the words of Section 10 of 'the Act'. It should, therefore, be held that the finality attached to order passed by the appellate officer cannot be given a go by, by construing the words 'final' be limited to 'the Act' itself and not to alter statutes. The learned counsel for the non-applicant elaborates that the order of the appellate officer cannot be questioned by - (i) an original suit (ii) any application or (iii) in execution proceedings (iv) nor can be restrained from exercising the power under 'the Act'. The learned counsel for the non-applicant elaborates that the order of the appellate officer cannot be questioned by - (i) an original suit (ii) any application or (iii) in execution proceedings (iv) nor can be restrained from exercising the power under 'the Act'. The learned counsel for the non-applicant submitted that the "appellate officer' is a Tribunal constituted under the Act and it cannot be deemed to be a "Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That Section applied to a Court in a limited sense, i.e. Court constituted under the provision of Civil Procedure Code and the M. P. Civil Courts Act, 1958. It relates to normal hierarchy of Courts. In the submission of learned counsel for the non-applicant, the conclusion of the learned single Judge of this Court, interpreting analogous provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 in the case of Hargovind Sharma Vs. Divisional Engineer, Railway Administration, South Eastern Railway Bilaspur and anothers A.I.R. 1966 M.P. 7, appeared to be correct. The learned counsel for the non-applicant cited the following other decision in support of his contention:- (1) Yashwant Rao Vs. Sampat, A.I.R. 1979 M.P. 21 (F.B.) (2) M/s. Pitman's Shorthand Academy Vs. M/s. Lila Ram & Sons, A.I. R. (37) 1950 E.P. 181 (F.B.) (3) Omkar Dutta Shastri Vs. The Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board, Patna, A.I.R.1960 Pat 164. (4) South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. S. B. Saru Singh and others A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1442 (5) Aundal Ammal Vs. Sadasivan Pillai A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 203; and number of other cases. 3. The learned counsel for the applicants. Shri Ravindra Shrivastava on the other hand, contended that the powers of the appellate officers are conferred on the District Judge in his capacity as a presiding officer of the principal Civil Court or original jurisdiction in view of definition of District Judge as per Section 3(17) of the General Clauses Act. The District Judge does not act as a persons designata but as a Court under Section 9 of "the Act". The learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the deicison of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Ayodhya Prasad Vs. The District Judge does not act as a persons designata but as a Court under Section 9 of "the Act". The learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the deicison of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Ayodhya Prasad Vs. Union of India and another A.I.R. 1983 M.P. 39 and has argued that the learned Single Judge of this Court has already held in that case, that the earlier decision of this Court in Hargovind Sharma case (supra) was of doubtful import in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case Thakur Das (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1 and the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of National Council, Khandwa Vs. Santosh Kumar and others A.I.R. 1975 M.P. 36. The learned counsel for the applicant cited a number of decision is support of his contentions. They are as follows:- (1) Chagan Lal Vs. The Municial Corporation, Indore A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1555. (2) Vareed Vs. Mary(F.B.) A.I.R. 1969 Ker 103, (3) Kailashchandra and others Vs. District Judge, Bhopal and others 1963 M.P.L.J. 270. (4) Arumugham and others Vs. Manager Jawahar Mills, Ltd. A.I.R. 1956 Mad 79 (5) M/s Shartiya Hotel and others Vs. Union of India and anothers A.I.R. 1968 Pat 476 (6) Maharaja Dharmendra Prasad Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others A.I.R. 1969 All. 474. (7) Union of India Vs. Kundan A.I.R. 1977 J&K. 38 (8) Central Talkies Ltd. Vs. Dwarka Prasad A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 600. (9) Shyamraju Hegde Vs. If. Venkatesha Bhat and others A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2323. In the opinion of this Court, despite (he different of opinion of the In hared Judges of this Court, it would not be necessary to refer these revisions to a larger Bench especially, in view of subsequent decision of the Full Bench of this Court and certain legislative changes which shall be considered during the course of discussion. 4. Before beginning to embark upon the discussion of the case, it is necessary to notice that the Act so for as property of Union of India in concerned, falls within the ambit of entry No. 32 of List I (Union List) of Schedule 7. This entry empowers Parliament to frame laws in respect of property of Union of India and revenue therefrom. This entry empowers Parliament to frame laws in respect of property of Union of India and revenue therefrom. This power is subject to legislation by the State in respect of property of Union of India, save in so far as Parliament by law otherwise provides. Apart from supremacy of power of Parliament on the subject-matter of entry, the State of Madhya Pradesh has not framed any law like 'the Act It is well established that the Act falls within this entry. In the case of Shrimati Saiyada Mossarrat Versus Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai (M.P.) and others, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 406 the Supreme Court held that 'the Act' is covered by Entry No. 32 of List I of Schedule 7 so far as the law relates to property of Union of India and it was stated at page 411 that:- .....Under the circumstances it is futile to contend that the Parliament has no legislative competence to legislate in respect of providing for a speedy remedy for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the Union of India. Entry 32 is wide enough to cover all legislations pertaining to the property of the Union of India including the legislation for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the Union of India..... In the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd and another Vs. Punjab National Bank and others A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 855 this view was reaffirmed by the constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in which, at page 876 it was held that: The Public Premises Act deals with Government property as well as property belonging to other legal entitles mentioned in Cls. (2) and (3) of S.2(e) of the Public Promises Act, in so for it relates to eviction of unauthorised occupants from premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government' the Public Premises Act would fall within entry 32 of List I being law with respect to a property of the Union...... However, the enactment in respect of the property of the Corporation belonging to the Union of India, the legislation was justified on the basis of the entries 6, 7, and 46 of List III and not on the basis of entry No. 97 of List 1 of Schedule 7. However, the enactment in respect of the property of the Corporation belonging to the Union of India, the legislation was justified on the basis of the entries 6, 7, and 46 of List III and not on the basis of entry No. 97 of List 1 of Schedule 7. Be it as may the Act mainly related to property of the Union of India, and threfore, this Act can be held to be covered by entry No. 32 of List I of Schedule 7. Now we must look into entry No. 95 which authorizes Parliament to frame laws in respect of jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Supreme Court in respect of mailers in this list. Therefore, the law which is in pith and substance, is a law made by Parliament in respect of property of the Union of India, which provides for the procedure to be followed by Courts in respect of property of the Union of India. Here, the word 'Court' in this entry No. 95, ibid must be given the widest amplitude to include the Tribunals which exercise the sovereign judicial powers of the State under an enactment. The entries made in a list must be widely interpreted unless tile context otherwise requires. Otherwise, the power of legislation shall be unduly restricted. The entries arc merely headings or rubrics for guidance in respect of power to legislate. They cannot be interpreted in a narrow and pedantic manner. Once the aforesaid matter is realised, it follows that law made by Parliament under 'the Act' is supreme and the procedure provided under 'the Act' would override other enactments in respect of subject-matter of 'the Act'. The same principle would apply to entry No. 46 of list HI unless there be a law amending the law of procedure made by local Legislature which was reserved for assent of the President of India. 5. Now, we have to concentrate our attention to section 115 of the Code of Civil Proceudre. The Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was the existing law prior to commencement of the Constitution. So far as Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code is concerned, it was amended by the Parliament by Section 43 of the Amendment Act of 1976. The original Section 115 was renumbered as sub-section (1) and a proviso was added to it. A new sub-section (2) was added to it alongwith an Explanation. So far as Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code is concerned, it was amended by the Parliament by Section 43 of the Amendment Act of 1976. The original Section 115 was renumbered as sub-section (1) and a proviso was added to it. A new sub-section (2) was added to it alongwith an Explanation. Parliament derives its power of ligislation in respect of the Code of Civil Procedure from entry No. 13 of the List HI of Schedule 7 of the Constitution. It is clear from Article 254 of the Constitution that in the matters reserved for legislation in the concurrent, List both the Union Legislature and the State Legilature have power to make laws. The State Legislature can amend a law made by Parliament, provided, it obtains the assent of the President of India. So, in Madhya Pradesh, the State Legislature amended the Code of Civil Procedure, interalia in respect of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the Madhya Pradesh Act No. 29 of 1984. This was known as 'the Code of Civil Procedure (Madhya Pradesh Amendment Act of 1984)'. It received the assent of the President of India on 31st July, 1984 and the assent was published in the M.P. Gazette (Extraordinary), dated the 14th August, 1984. By section 4 of the aforesaid amendment Act, the original Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as the amended Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure stood amended in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the State amendment, is being reproduced for the purpose of ready purusal, hereunder:- 115. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the State amendment, is being reproduced for the purpose of ready purusal, hereunder:- 115. Revision - The High Court, in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand rupees and above, and the District Judge in any other case may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court or District Judge, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies there to, and if such subordinate Court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity: the High Court or the District Judge, as the case may be, make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the Distt. Judge, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section: Provided further that the High Court or the District Judge shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order including an order deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where,- (i) the order, if so varied or reversed, would finally dispose of the suit or other proceeding; or (ii) the order, if allowed to stand.would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the parly against whom it was made. Explanation. - In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding. 6. Thus, from 14th or August, 1984, the power of revision against the order of a Court subordinate to District Judge was vested in District Court in respect of suits valued below Rs. 20.000/-. The High Court was given power to revise the order of any suborbital Court when the valuation of the subject-matter of the suit was Rs. 20,000/- or more. 20.000/-. The High Court was given power to revise the order of any suborbital Court when the valuation of the subject-matter of the suit was Rs. 20,000/- or more. By proviso No. 1, however, it was made clear that in case of suit or proceedings of any valuation which was decided by the District Judge, the High Court alone had power to decide the revision against any order passed by the District Judge. 7. It appears that this amendment made by the local legislation in the year 1984 was not fond satisfactory and therefore, the law was ream ended to by State Legislature for reverting to the original position, as it obtained on 1st February, 1977. This amendment was made in the year 1994, after ten years. This amendment is styled as The Code of Civil Procedure (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act 1994 (No. 4 of 1994). This amendment received the assent of the Governor on 15th of March. 1994 and the assent was first published in M.P. Gazette (Extraordinary) on 16th of March, 1994. The result of this amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure is that now the section 115, as amended upto 1976, was reintroduced as follows :- 115. Revision. - (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that the High Court shall not under that Section, vary or reverse any order made or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where - (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for the revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or proceeding; or (b) the order if allowed to stand, would occasion, a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to party against whom it was made. (2) The High Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. Explanation. - In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" included any order made, or any order deciding on issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding. 8. From the above narration of the facts, it would be clear that 'the Act No. 4 of 1994' was not reserved for the assent of President of India for the reason that the State Legislature was amending the local law in respect of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e. Act No. 29 of 1984 and not a law made by Parliament or the Central legislature. Thus, the newly inserted Section 115 has not status of a law made by Parliament. The Act No. 4 of 1994 makes only local amendment. This local amendment may not have made any difference so far as smooth working of the Civil Procedure Code is concerned, but as far as other enactments arc concerned. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has the effect of the State law and since it was not reserved for the assent of the President of India, it cannot override or amend the law made by the Parliament even if it be held that the law made under 'the Act' derives partial power under the concurrent list merely because properties of certain Corporations are included in 'the Act'. 9. In neither of the case before the two learned single Judges who decided Hargovind Sharma's case (supra) and the case of Ayodhya Prasad, (supra), such a situation was existent. Therefore, in view of the new state of law, it is not necessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench. This Court shall, therefore, take upon itself the task of interpreting the scope of locally amended Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. It may not be forgotten that the Courts in India are enjoined to look to the Constitution of India as the basis law. It is repository of power of all the law and they are made under the Constitution not over and above it. It is the Bible of the law-maker as well as that of the person whose task to interpret the laws. It is repository of power of all the law and they are made under the Constitution not over and above it. It is the Bible of the law-maker as well as that of the person whose task to interpret the laws. Every Court has to interpret a provision of law with a view to constitutionalist it. Therefore, care should be taken that the construction of statute by a Court may not make the statute invalid. Unlike England ours is a Federal Constitution and the legislative powers of the Union Legislature and the State Legislature have been carefully distributed by the founding father. Therefore, the precedents under the common law of England may not have their pristine force in our country in the context of Federal powers of Union and the State Legislatures. We must interpret our law under the canopy of our Constitution. 11. Now, we have seen that the Act' derives its power from entry No. 32 of List I of Schedule 7 and the procedure prescribed in 'the Act' for deciding the cases derives it force from Entry No. 95 of List I of Schedule 7, so far as the property of the Union of India is concerned. It is true that so far as the property of the Corporation and companies, belonging to Central Government, it has been held by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd, and another Vs. Punjab National Bank and others (supra) that legislation dealing with the premises of companies or Corporations referred to under the Act' fall within the entry No. 6, and 7 and 46 of List III of Schedule 7. Nevertheless, this is a law made by Parliament and no local law can prevail over the law made by Parliament in view of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution of India unless the State law made under a concurrent list was reserved for the assent of the President of India. Thus, even in respect of aforesaid Corporations and Companies the law made by Parliament is Supreme and the entry No. 46 of List III of Schedule 7 authorises Parliament to legislate in respect of procedure and powers of Court under the Act. In the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, the decision, of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of L.S. Nair Vs. In the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, the decision, of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of L.S. Nair Vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai and others A.I.R. 1980 M.P. 106 was approved and the legislation in respect of leases and business of aforementioned company or Corporation was not justified on the basis of entry No. 97 of List I. 12. The position that emerges is that 'the Act' looked as whole in a law made by Parliament. The procedure prescribed for deciding the cases is justified under entry No. 95, List I in respect of property of Union of India and entry No. 46, List III of Schedule 7 of Constitution in respect of companies or corporation belonging to Union of India. Such a law is not liable to be amended by any law made by the local legislation which was reserved for assent of the Governor, it is apparent that so far as the legislation falling within entry No. 32, List I and entry No. 95, List I is concerned, the law made by the Parliament is supreme. 13. For the reasons aforesaid. Section 9 and Section 10 of 'the Act' have to be interpreted along with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, as we have always seen, has the statutes of a local law. There is presumption that the words used in this section have to be interpreted in such a manner that they do not impinge upon the law made by Parliament. Therefore, the word 'Court' used in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by the Act No. 41 of 1994) has to be given narrow meaning as not covering 'the Courts in generic sense established by the Act'. Assuming for a moment that the law made by 'the Act' gives the power to District Judge as Persona designate, even then the powers exercised by District Judge under 'the Act' are those exercised by a tribunal under the law made by Parliament'. If we give wider interpretation to word 'Court' under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in Madhya Pradesh, then it is likely to impliedly amend Section 9 and Section 10 of 'the Act' giving power to High Court to entertain revision against the order passed by the District Judge in exercise of powers under Section 9 of 'the Act'. Different considerations would arise when the Court is called upon to interpret an existing law or the law made by Parliament. The Court can employ the rule of harmonious construction where both.' the Code of Civil Procedure and 'the Act' were enacted by Parliament or in case of an existing law by a competent, legislature, equivalent in status to Parliament and recognised as such by Article 372 of the Constitution. Such is not the case here. The powers given by the local legislature under Sea(sic) 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be unduly widened to interfere with the scheme of 'the Act'. Otherwise interference by a Court constituted under ilk-local law, shall be deemed to have power to interfere, with a judicial authority constituted under 'the Act. Such a construction of statutes avoided by the Courts interpreting the law. It is to be presumed that the enactment of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by M.P. Act No. 4 of 1994 is valid piece of legislation. Utres mogis valeat quam percept. The presumption is that the Legislature did not exceed its jurisdiction. 14. There is no compelling reason in the language of Section 115 (ibid) to construe the word 'Court' widely. The principle underlying the aforesaid construction was examined by the Federal Courts in its opinion. In Re Hundu Womens' Rights to Property Act. A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 72 page 75 Sir Mourice Gwyer, the learned Chief Justice observed at page 75 that:- ......There is a general presumption that a Legislature does not intend to excess its jurisdiction: Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (Edn. 8) P. 126: and there is ample authority for the proposition that general words in a statute are to be construed with reference to the powers of the Legislature which enacts it...... and construed the words the general words "properly" in the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act 1937 to narrowly to mean property other than the agricultural land as it was not within the competence of the Central Legislature to frame a law in respect of agricultural land. This principle is firmly in the saddle. The exception to the aforesaid rule was noted by Sir Mourice Gwyer himself in Re. Hindu Women's Righs to Property Act A.I.R. 1941 Fc. 72 at. This principle is firmly in the saddle. The exception to the aforesaid rule was noted by Sir Mourice Gwyer himself in Re. Hindu Women's Righs to Property Act A.I.R. 1941 Fc. 72 at. p. 75 when he said that the narrow construction would not be accepted in a particular case when the result of construction will render the statutes construed nothing or next to nothing or an act different in kind and not merely in degree Such is not the case here. In fact, applying the principle of ut reas mogis valeat quam pereat the majority of Judges in Supreme Court, in the case of The Corpn, of Calcutta & anr. Vs. Liberty Cinema A.I.R. 1965 S.C 1107 construed the word 'fee' as Max' because in the-opinion of the majority there was not provision for rendering any service in respect of licence fee recorded from the owner of a cinema house under Section 548 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. It is of no use multiplying the authorities because the Courts have moulded the word used in a statue with a view to constitutionalist it. The examples of such exercises on the part of the Court can be found in number of cases. Recently, in the case of Anirudha Bedekar, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 503 the Supreme Court interpreted Section 13 (1) (c) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) widely in respect of persons residing in the premises to mean both residential as well as non-residential premises in order to avoid the attack on the statute under Article, 14 of the Constitution. It appears that similar View was taken by the Privy Council in the case of Attornay General of the Gambia Vs. Momodou Jobe, (1984) A.C. 689 702, and in the case of Rector Vs. Attorney General of Antigua, (1990) 2 All E. R. 103 In the last case this principle was stated as follows at page 107 of the report :- . . . . This requires that, if it is possible to read the statutory language as subject to an implied term which avoids conflict with constitutional limitations, the Court should be very ready to make such an implication..... 15. In the case of Yeshwant Rao Vs. . . . This requires that, if it is possible to read the statutory language as subject to an implied term which avoids conflict with constitutional limitations, the Court should be very ready to make such an implication..... 15. In the case of Yeshwant Rao Vs. Sampat, A.I.R. 1979 M.P. 21 decided by a Full Bench of this Court, the Court was required to answer the question if the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was "Court" within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it stood there. The Court was interpreting Section 115 of the Code as it stood after amendment made in the year 1977, that is to say after the amendment made by 1976 Amendment Act by the Parliament. Thus, this Court was interpreting the law as made by Parliament without the limitation pointed here after passing of M.P. Act No. 4 of the 1994. This Court unanimously, took the view that the word "Court" as used in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in narrow sense, a civil Court in hierarchy of Courts as distinguished from a judicial tribunal. Speaking for the Full Bench, Hon'ble G.P. Singh. C.I. stated as follows in paragraph 4 of page 23 :- 4. Using word Court used in a generic sense, will include a tribunal. Indeed, the features of a Court and a tribunal are very much similar. Both are vested with the judicial powers of the Slate. Both are empowered to give binding decisions. The procedure is also similar except this that the procedure of a Court is regularly prescribed, whereas the procedure of tribunal may not be that strictly prescribed: but the approach adopted by a tribunal is the same as adopted by a Court. The main distinction between a Court and a tribunal is that a Court is a tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts. A tribunal, on the other hand, is constituted under a special Act to exercise some special jurisdiction. and in paragraph 8 at page 29 that:- 8. In our opinion the word "Court" as used in S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedures is used in a narrow sense, meaning only a Civil Court in the normal hierarchy of Courts. A tribunal, on the other hand, is constituted under a special Act to exercise some special jurisdiction. and in paragraph 8 at page 29 that:- 8. In our opinion the word "Court" as used in S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedures is used in a narrow sense, meaning only a Civil Court in the normal hierarchy of Courts. This word "Courts'" as it occurs in S.115 will not include tribunals which are established under special Acts and exercise special jurisdiction....... 16. In the opinion of this Court, the view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case rifled the correct legal position and the narrow interpretation given by the Full Bench is all the more applicable because of the constitutional constraints imposed upon the interpretation of Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as per M.P. Act. No. 4 of 1994. 17. Thus, once it is held that Section 115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure uses the word "Court" in a narrow sense as opposed to a tribunal, this Court must interpret sections 9 and 10 of the Act to decide if power was conferred by Section 9 of the "the Act" to decide if [lower was conferred by Section 9 of 'the Act' 'the Court' as defined above or on a judicial tribunal. 18. Before entering into the thicket of the controversy, it is necessary to analyze section 9 of the Act. Section 9(1) of the Act' has the following ingredients - (i) An appeal lies (ii), against every order- (iii) passed by Estate Officer in respect of public premises. (iv) Under Section or Section 5-B or Section 5.C or Section 7 of the Act'- (v)to an appellate officer (vi), who shall be the District Judge of the district in which the premises are situate, or (vii) to such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten year's standing, or (viii) as the District Judge may designate in this behalf. 19 the aforesaid analysis of Section (1) of 'the Act reveals its crucial features. The power to hear appeal is given to the 'appellate officer' The use of these words is significant. 19 the aforesaid analysis of Section (1) of 'the Act reveals its crucial features. The power to hear appeal is given to the 'appellate officer' The use of these words is significant. It is trite law that the Court must not treat the words used by Legislature in an enactment as of no consequence, Why appoint an appellate, officer if the powers could be delegated to the District Judge It appears to this Court that these words were used deliberately by the draftsman in order to signify that powers are not being delegated to District Judge in the capacity of presiding officer of a Civil Court. The capacity here was as on 'appellate officer of a tribunal. The definition of "District Judge in Section 3 (17) of the General Clauses Act only identifies him as a Judge of Principle. Civil Court of original jurisdiction but it is that person who has been made the 'appellate officer. Thus, the words "District Judge merely establish the identity of the appellate officer. In the context of the use, of the words appellate officer, the only conclusion that can be drawn that power is not conferred upon District Judge qua District Court but as an appellate Officer of the tribunal hearing appeals against the orders passed by the Estate Officer. The words 'appellate officer' are definitely apposed to word "Court. Under Section 139 (1) of M.P. Municipalities Act, an appeal was provided to Civil Judge Class I or Class II under the circumstances mentioned in the section; from an order passed by the Municipal Authorities in respect of dispute regarding the assessment or amount of tax on building or land and Section 139 (5) of the aforesaid Act provided that decision of the Civil Judge, in appeal, shall be subject to a decision in revision by Court to which appeals against the decisions of such Civil Judge ordinarily lies. It was also provided that the decision in appeal shall be final subject to revision. In this particular case the law under the Municipalities Act was clearly to the effect that revision shall lie to a Court competent to hear appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the ''Court' mentioned in Section 139 (5) of the Municipalities Act is a "Court" within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the ''Court' mentioned in Section 139 (5) of the Municipalities Act is a "Court" within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is in accord with the definition of "Court" given by Yashwant Rao Vs. Sampat (supra) and, therefore, the word final' in Section 139 (5) of 'that Act' was read down as confined to the proceeding under Section 139 alone. Consequently, the decision rendered by the Full Bench in the case of National Council Khandwa Vs. Santosh Kumar and others, (supra) is of help to this Court. Similarly, the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Chhagan Lal Vs. The Municipal Corporation, Indore A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1555 is of no help as the power to hear the appeal from the order of Corporation authorities is specially conferred on District Court and for this reason the word ' final" used in that Section was confined to proceedings under Section 149 of Municipal Corporation Act. The use of the words 'District Court' in Section 149 of the Municipal Corporation Act indicated that power of hearing appeal was delegated to District Court which formed one of Civil Courts in the hierarchy of the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure and the M.P. Civil Court Act, 1958. The learned Single Judge in Ayodhya Prasad's case (supra) could not have relied upon the case of National Council Khandwa. (supra) in view of the difference ol language. 20. On the other hand, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Thakur Das (dead) by L. Rs. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and anothers (supra) on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the applicants, is clearly distinguishable. I n that case, the 'Judicial Authority' constituted under Section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 was notified as District and Sessions Judge. This judicial authority was authorised to hear the appeal against the order of Collector/Licensing Authority. The Supreme Court, after an elaborate discussion regarding the meaning of the words "Judicial Authority", held that Sessions Judge was a Court and not a persona designate. Here also delegation to the District and Sessions Judge was apparent as a member of hierarchy of Criminal Court. The Supreme Court significantly, pointed out to the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor (A.P. Vs. L. Ramayya, 1975 Cri. (2)144 para 10 page 8 and held in that:- .. .. Here also delegation to the District and Sessions Judge was apparent as a member of hierarchy of Criminal Court. The Supreme Court significantly, pointed out to the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor (A.P. Vs. L. Ramayya, 1975 Cri. (2)144 para 10 page 8 and held in that:- .. .. While summing up its conclusion the Court held that when a judicial authority like an officer who presides over a Court is appointed to perform the functions, to judge and decide in accordance of with law and as nothing has been shined about the finality or other-wise of the decisions made by that authority, it is an indication., that the authority is to act as a Court in which case it is not necessary to mention whether they are final or not as all the incidents of exercising jurisdiction as a Court would necessarily follow. We are in broad agreement with this conclusion. 21. Thus, the Supreme Court broadly agreed with the conclusion that there be no finality clause in the statute then it is ail indication that power is conferred as a Court. Thus, this Case is distinguishable as there is finality clause in this case which shall be discussed in sequel and also on the ground that appellate powers were directed to be delegated by the State to Judicial Authority as distinguished from an executive authority. 22. Before we enter into discussion regarding Section 10 of 'the Act', some important points have to be noted indicating that the appellate officer was not required to function as a Court. The power to delegate to any judicial officer of ten years' standing in the discretion of the appellate officer breaks the chain of hierarchy of Court. The discretion here is not regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure by the provisions of M.P. Civil Court Act, 1958. The District Judge has full discretion to appoint a junior officer of ten years standing as an appellate authority despite the fact there are other officers in the District exercising superior powers of hearing appeal against the orders or judgment and decree passed by that officer, so appointed by the District Judge. The very fact that the District Judge was authorised to ignore the leachy of Courts under the general law would indicate that he did not act as a Court. The very fact that the District Judge was authorised to ignore the leachy of Courts under the general law would indicate that he did not act as a Court. Moreover, no Court is authorised to impinge upon the jurisdiction and power of judicial officer of higher rank in favour of a junior officer having inferior jurisdiction. This fact also indicate that the appellate officer act as a 'tribunal' and not as a Court. If we examine Section 9, then we find that apart from special limitation for appeal, there is provision for condonation of delay. This is also indicative of the fact that "appellate officer" does not act as a Court. Otherwise, Section 5 of Limitation Act would have applied in ordinary course in view of Section 29 (2) of Limitation Act. The Legislature was also not required to authorise the 'appellate officer' to impose the cost, if he was to act as a Court. The power to grant stay need not be given by the Act' if the appellate officer was synonymous with the District Court. 23. Now, we come to Section 10 of 'the Act' It provides. (i) save as otherwise expressly provided by 'the Act' (ii) an order passed. (iii) by Estate Officer or Appellate Officer, (iv) under the Act, (v) shall be final and shall not be called in question, (vi) in any original suit, application or execution proceedings, (vii) no injunction shall be granted in respect of any action taken under the Act. 24. The scheme of Section 10 of 'the Act' itself indicates that the order passed by Estate Officer/Appellate Officer shall be final and shall not be called in any original suit or application. Now the finality attached to proceedings before the 'Estate Officer' or Appellate Officer are not confined to the proceedings under 'the Act' but the Legislature goes a step further to bar the jurisdiction of civil Court in the suit or application. The words used by the Legislature themselves are eloquent. If appellate officer was to act as a civil Court, there was no need to bar the jurisdiction of Civil Court. It would be mere tautology because the jurisdiction of Civil Court would be impliedly barred under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Legislature has further taken care indicate that the order shall tot be questioned by way of application or execution proceedings. It would be mere tautology because the jurisdiction of Civil Court would be impliedly barred under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Legislature has further taken care indicate that the order shall tot be questioned by way of application or execution proceedings. It is also important to bear in mind the words 'Save as expressly provided by the Act'. These words totally bar the-application of another enactment to proceedings before the Appellate Officer. Thus, application of Section 115 of the Code, of Civil Procedure is hatred. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Madhya Pradesh is no longer a law made by Parliament. Therefore, there is no question of reading the word "lined" in the section narrowly to confine it to "the Act' and not applicable to other enactments. For all these reasons, the conclusion is reinforced that the proceedings under Section 9 of 'the Act' arc that of tribunal and not that of a Court. This Court strongly relics on the decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Court is Yashwant Rao's case, (supra). Apart from the use of words 'judicial authority' under the section ft (c) of the Essential Commodities Act. 1955 and the District Judge in the published notification there was no section like Section 10 of 'the Act' in the Essential Commodities Act in the case of Thakur Das. (Supra). 25. There is another aspect of the matter which has to be borne in mind. In the case of Ashoka Marketing, Ltd. (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has found that the legislation under 'the Act' is a special legislation. In that Case, both 'the Act and Rent Control Legislation made by Parliament in respect of Union territories of Delhi were held to be special legislation. It was observed in paragraph 61 at page 879 that:- 61 1. The principle which emerges from these decisions is that in the case of inconsistency between the provisions of two enactments, both of which can be carded as Special in nature........ 26. In view of this matter the law of procedure under 'the Act' shall prevail over the general law of procedure made under the Code of Civil Procedure. This aspect of the matter is clear from Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 26. In view of this matter the law of procedure under 'the Act' shall prevail over the general law of procedure made under the Code of Civil Procedure. This aspect of the matter is clear from Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 10 of 'the Act' breaker the order of Estate Officer, final subject to appeal before the appellate officer. It bars filing of a Civil suit or an application for challenging that order. Thus 'the Act' is a provision inconsistent with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 'the Act' would Override the Code as there is no express contrary provision in it. 27. The matter under consideration can be examined from another point of view. We have already noticed that Section of 'the Act read with Section 10 thereof forms a self contained Code so far as the powers of the Estate Officer and the "Appellate Officer" ale concerned. Section 9 provides for recitation of appeal, for condonation of delay initialing of appeal and for imposition of costs in ravine of Successful party. Section 10 inter alia makes the power of the appellate officer final save as otherwise provided, in 'the Act'. This Act is self-contained Code, so far as the powers of the 'Estate Officer' and the Appellate Officer' are concerned, Such a comprehensive Code by itself would indicate that the general law shall not apply. 28. Now, coming to a question of persona designate it is true that when a powers conferred upon a person by name, as opposed to his office, it is clear indication that the person has to act as in a private capacity. However, the converse of this proposition is, not always true. The Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Public Prosecutor (A.P.) Vs. L. Ramayya, (supra) quoted the prvailing law; in the United States as per American Jurisprudence as follows :-In paragraph 15 at page 148 :- . . . . While (here is a well defined and generally recognized, distinction between a judge and judicial tribunal arid while it takes more than a presiding officer to constitute a Court, yet the Judge of a Court while presiding over it by common courts called the Court and the words "Court" and 'judge' and frequently used in the statutes of various Stales an synonymous an convertible terms. Such terms are not however, strictly synonymous and the Judge alone docs not necessarily constitute a Court, for while the Judge is an indispensable pan he is only a part of the Court. Whether an act is to be performed by the one or the other is generally to be determined by the character of the Act rather than by such designation. Whenever the power or duty imposed is found from a consideration of the object and purpose of the act to be one which is some properly the function of t he Court, it will be so construed, and whenever it is manifest that the Legislature meant the Judge and not the Court, that meaning will be applied to the words in order to carry out the Legislative intend; "Court" will always be construed to mean "Judge" and "Judge" to mean "Court" wherever either construction is necessary to carry into effect the obvious intent of the Legislature. and proceeded to summarise the legal position as follows :- 16. Therefore when a reference is made to the presiding officer of a Court whether it meant to refer to the Court of to him personally arid refer to the fact of his presiding over a Court simply to describe or identify him depends upon the intention to be gathered from the nature of the act he had to perform and other surrounding circumstances. 29. The learned counsel for the applicants, when questioned, if it is possible to appoint a person in his personal capacity by referring to his officer of a judge replied emphatically in negative. The above question would show that a presiding officer of a Court is it Judge is riot always synonymous with a Court. He may be must of time indispensable part of a Court. Therefore, perhaps most of the tithe, the judge and the Court are treated as synonymous, However, when it is manifest that the Legislature meant the words 'District Judge' not to mean the District Court, the intention must be given effect to. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants take the extreme position. In his submission, in no case, a person holding the officer of Judge could be appointed otherwise that in the capacity of court, if Legislature chooses to name him by officer. In the opinion of this Court, this extrems arguments is not tenable. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants take the extreme position. In his submission, in no case, a person holding the officer of Judge could be appointed otherwise that in the capacity of court, if Legislature chooses to name him by officer. In the opinion of this Court, this extrems arguments is not tenable. It is to be noted that a person, holding an officer, can be identified by name and also by virtues of the officer he holds. Infact as a person he wears two masks. One characterises him by his name and another his office, that is to say, by what he does as a professional. It will be impossible to designate all the District Judge throughout India by name for hearing the appeal. Moreover their sojourn is particular place is temporary and transitory it compared to the life of 'the Act'. It would have been very cumbersome to delegate the appellate powers upon them by name. The draftsman of 'the Act' therefore, used the legislative device of appointing a District Judge as an 'appellate Officer's so as to distinguish him from presiding officer of a Court, which is the judicial function of District Judge. The Legislature merely borrowed the name of officer hut not the function of District Judge for the purpose of 'the Act'. Therefore, there is much force in the argument of of the learned counselor the non-applicant that the District Judge, under Section 9 of 'the Act' acts as a persona designate. However, even if these arguments may not be accepted then also the words used in Sections 9 and 10 read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure would rule out the case of the applicant that the District Judge acts as a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not act a 'tribunal', hearing the appeals. This Court relies strongly on the interpretation of the word 'Court' given by the Full Bench of this Court in Yashwant Rao's Case, (supra). 30. The view of this Court is supported by the decision of Supreme Court in the case of South Asia Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. This Court relies strongly on the interpretation of the word 'Court' given by the Full Bench of this Court in Yashwant Rao's Case, (supra). 30. The view of this Court is supported by the decision of Supreme Court in the case of South Asia Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. S.B. Sarup Singh, (supra) when the Supreme Court construed Section 39 and Section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and held that no Letters Patent Appeal lies from the decision of a Single Judge in appeal under Section - 39 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 19,58 in view of language of Section 43 thereof, which is reproduced as follows:- Section 43. Save otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. 31. It may be really seen that draftsman of Section 10 of the Act has copied the language of Section 43 verbatim and has added the further part regarding injunction. For this reason also the conclusion of this Court in supported by the decision of Supreme Court. The aforesaid decision was approved by the Supreme Court in Aundal Animal's Case (supra). The decision of Supreme Court in the case of Shyamaraju Hegde Vs. Vo Venkatesha Bhat and others (supra) is not applicable for the reason the Supreme Court upset the decision of subsequent Full Bench of Karnataka High Court on the ground that on the basis of decision on different enactment the subsequent Full Bench has been overruled particularly when the Supreme Court itself in S. L. P. No. 913/1978, dated 13.2.78, Krishnadas Bhatia Vs. A.S. Vankatachalia Shetty, approved the decision of earlier Full Bench. The majority decision in the case of M/s Jetha Bai & Sons, Jow Town, Cochin, etc. Etc. Vs. M/s Sunderdas kathenai etc. A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 812 has confirmed the decision in the case of Anudal Animal, (supra). However, the decision of Supreme Court in this case is based in peculier language of Karnataka Rent Control Act. No assistance can be derived from the decision of Supreme Court on the point involved in tins case. However, in the case of Commissioner of Sales Fax, U.P. Lucknow Vs. However, the decision of Supreme Court in this case is based in peculier language of Karnataka Rent Control Act. No assistance can be derived from the decision of Supreme Court on the point involved in tins case. However, in the case of Commissioner of Sales Fax, U.P. Lucknow Vs. M/s Suprer Cotton Bowl Refilling Works A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 922, it was held that word 'final' under Section 35 of the U.P. Sales Tax must be given effect to. The order under that Section was held final. The decision in M/s Jatha Bai's case (supra) was approved. A number of authorities were cited by the learned counsel for the applicants as well as the non-applicant. It is not necessary to consider them in great detail except to say that in none of the cases similar situation arose as in this Case. In none of the cases cited at the Bar the Court was required to consider Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as inserted by the local Legislature which was pitted against the law made by Parliament. Therefore, tins Court can take assistance of only those cases which apply directly. Tins Court relied on the decision in the case of South Asia Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra) for the reason Section 10 of 'the Act' utlizes similar language as Section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. 32. The learned single Judge has observed in the case of Ayodhya Prasad, (supra) that since the rendering the decision in the case of Hargovind Sharma (supra) much water had Mown, it appears that His Lordships meant that on account of flow of time precedents had changed. The Greek Philosopher Heracleitus has been quoted to say "upon these who step in to the same rivers different and even different waters flow down". Such is the quality of life in relation to time. However, apart from time and the precedents, the human agency also changes the law by legislation. Such change is brought in by the Amendment Act no, 4 of the 1994 in the Code of Civil Procedure. Here the human social engineering has changed the course of river. The new Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as applicable to State of Madhya Pradesh is altogether different in status and quality. For this reason without giving 'Nelsonian Eye' to previous precedents of this Court, a fresh interpretation was called for. Here the human social engineering has changed the course of river. The new Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as applicable to State of Madhya Pradesh is altogether different in status and quality. For this reason without giving 'Nelsonian Eye' to previous precedents of this Court, a fresh interpretation was called for. That is what this Court has done. In the case of Yashwant Rao, (supra) (F.B), and authorities attempt was made to interpret the word Court as against the tribunal. It was unanimously decided that the word 'Court' shall be given narrow meaning. This Full Bench decision was not cited before the learned single Judge. This construction of original Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure tallies with the status and quality of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it obtains now in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Moreover, in the decision, in the case of Thakurdas, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1 the Supreme Court itself had expressed its agreement with the view of Full Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in the case of Public Prosecutor (A.P.) (supra), in paragraph 10 at page 8 that if there be finality clause in an enactment, then even in cases where the power was delegated to 'Judicial Authority' an inference can be drawn that intention of the Legislature was not to confer the powers as a "Court" Learned Single Judge did not consider Section 10 of 'the Act' from the point of view of the Legislature indicated its intention in Section 10 of to bar a revision. The attention of the learned Single Judge was confined to the question of persona designata. In the case of National Council, Khandwa, (supra) (F.B.) on which the learned Single Judge relied, revisional powers were conferred on District of Civil Courts. The finality attached to the orders passed under Section 139 of Municipalities Act, did not bar any specific proceeding. The view of the Court in the case of National Council, Khandwa (F.B.) (supra) seems to be in accord with the view of subsequent Full Bench, in the case of Yashwant Rao Vs. (Sam pat) (supra). It is true that during the course of judgment there is discussion that the 'Appellate Officer" cannot be deemed to be a 'persona designata'. The view of the Court in the case of National Council, Khandwa (F.B.) (supra) seems to be in accord with the view of subsequent Full Bench, in the case of Yashwant Rao Vs. (Sam pat) (supra). It is true that during the course of judgment there is discussion that the 'Appellate Officer" cannot be deemed to be a 'persona designata'. However, the discussion made in this judgment is made with a view make it complete without meaning or showing any disrespect to the learned Single Judge. In the opinion of this Court the conclusion recorded by learned Single Judge in Hargovind Sharma's case, (supra) appeared to be correct for the reasons already given hereinabove. 33. The learned counsel for the applicants finally argued that the decision of this Court in the case of Ayodhya Prasad Vs. Union of India and another tsupfa), should be uphold on the principle of stare decisis. This principle is not attracted in this case. Firstly, because the law now changed so far as section 11.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is concerned. Secondly, after rendering of the aforesaid decision, the Legislature had brought in Madhya Pradesh, Act No. 29 of 1984, Thereupon, following the view of Supreme Court rendered in the case of Vishesh Kumar Vs. Shanti Prasad A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 892, it was held by this Court that no revision lay wherein one appeal was provided. Therefore, the parties had filed petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. They were not thus governed by the decision of this Court for number of years for applying the principles of stare decisis. Thirdly, it appears that in this decision the attention of the learned Single Judge was not directed to the case of Yashwant Rao Vs. Sanipat, (F.B.) (supra). For all these reasons, it is held that the principle of stare decisis would not apply. 34. Having held that these revisions do not lie, it would nor be proper to consider the merits of the cases of the parties as this Court was initially inclined to do. Upon reflection, it appears that decision on these revisions on merits would be without jurisdiction and further that rights of the parties are likely to be affected. The result is that nil these revisions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed, No costs.