R. K. DASH, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants were charged under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34, IPC for having committed murder by intentionally causing death of Dikesan Digal (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') in furtherance of their common intention and thereafter buried the dead body of the deceased in order to screen themselves from legal punishment. Upon trial, learned Sessions Judge, Phulbani found the appellants guilty of the charges and. consequently convicted and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 and rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence under Section 201, IPC. It was ordered that both the sentences shall run concurrently. ( 2 ) PROSECUTION case, briefly stated, was that on 29-7-90 at about 10 a. m. while the inmates of appellant Khadal Digal were absent, the deceased entered inside his house, stole the food staff and consumed the same. Meanwhile appellant Khadal Digal came in side and at his sight, deceased started fleeing away, but both the appellants chased and intercepted him near the house of Zora Pradhan, P. W. 6 and assaulted him. Thereafter they brought him to the house of appellant Khadal Digal and assaulted him again, as a result he succumbed to his injuries. The appellants then removed the dead body and buried inside the forest. On a report being lodged by Raman Parichha P. W. 2, Niranjan Tripathy, Officer-in-charge, Daringibadi P. S. (P. W. 11) registered a case and proceeded with investigation. He arrested both the appellants, who while in custody led P. W. 11 and the witnesses and pointed out the place where the dead body of the deceased had been buried. Thereupon the dead body was exhumed and sent for postmortem examination. On completion of investigation, P. W. 11 placed charge-sheet against both the appellants to stand their trial under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34, IPC. ( 3 ) THE plea of the appellants was denial simpliciter. ( 4 ) THE prosecution in order to bring home the charges to the appellants examined 11 witnesses of whom P. W. 1 is the brother of the deceased, P. W. 2 is the informant, P. W. 3 is the autopsy doctor P. Ws. 4 and 5 are witnesses leading to the alleged discovery of the dead body of the deceased, P. Ws. 4 and 5 are witnesses leading to the alleged discovery of the dead body of the deceased, P. Ws. 6, 7 and 8 are the alleged eye-witnesses to the incident, P. W. 9 is the constable who carried the dead body for postmortem examination, P. W. 10 is the A. S. I. attached to Rest House of Daringibadi P. S. who received the F. I. R. and forwarded the same to the police station for at registration of a case and P. W. 11 is the Investigating Officer. Learned trial Judge mainly relying upon the eye-witness account of P. Ws. 6, or 7 and R and the medical evidence of the doctor P. W. 2, convicted and sentenced the appellants as hereinbefore stated. Learned counsel Shri L. Pradhan appearing for the appellants while challenging the impugned judgment and order, raised the following contentions :- (1) That there was long delay in lodging of the F. I. R. and the same having not been satisfactorily explained, serious doubt casts on the truth of the prosecution. (2) That the evidence of eye-witnesses, P. Ws. 6, 7 and 8 being not cogent and convincing, it would be unsafe to rely upon the same to hold the appellants guilty of the offence. (3) That from the facts and circumstances of the case as projected by the prosecution it is not proved beyond doubt the appellants had common intention to commit murder of the deceased and in absence of any evidence to show as to who gave the fatal blow, both the appellants cannot be held guilty of murder punishable under Section 302 with the aid of Section 34, IPC. ( 5 ) THE informant P. W. 2 who happens to be the brother-in-law of the deceased was not an eye-witness to the occurrence. The prosecution story as stated in the F. I. R. (Ext. 1) is that P. W. 2 had been to the house of the appellant Khadal Digal where his son, Biswanath narrated that the deceased had been done to death by both the appellants. In the meantime wife of Khadal Digal who arrived there asked P. W. 2 not to disclose the matter to anybody. 1) is that P. W. 2 had been to the house of the appellant Khadal Digal where his son, Biswanath narrated that the deceased had been done to death by both the appellants. In the meantime wife of Khadal Digal who arrived there asked P. W. 2 not to disclose the matter to anybody. But some days after P. W. 2's wife coming to know that the deceased had been murdered by the appellants, abused him as to why he did not inform the matter to police and it was only thereafter that he lodged the report. The reason for delay as aforesaid has also been explained by P. W. 2 while being examined in the Court. There is no serious challenge to his such evidence by the defence except giving him a valid suggestion that being in inimical terms with the appellants he lodged a false report against them. District Phulbani is inhabited mostly by the people belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Many of them are illiterate and are unconcerned with what happens around them. Therefore, it would be travesty of justice if in every case delayed lodging of report is considered as a circumstance to doubt the prosecution case. True it is, delay often results in embellishment, which is creature of afterthought and on account of delay the F. I. R. not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of coloured version or exaggerated story, but if the eye-witnesses' account of the incident is found to be cogent and convincing to sustain the prosecution case, then delayed lodging of the report pales into insignificance. In the present case, keeping in view the community to which P. W. 2 belongs, his social background coupled with the reason for the delay as explained by him, we cannot persuade ourselves to accept the defence contention to reject the prosecution version on the ground of delay in lodging of report to the police. ( 6 ) THAT the deceased died a homicidal death as deposed to by the autopsy doctor, P. W. 3 was neither challenged during trial nor in the course of argument in the present appeal. ( 6 ) THAT the deceased died a homicidal death as deposed to by the autopsy doctor, P. W. 3 was neither challenged during trial nor in the course of argument in the present appeal. It would appear from the evidence of P. W. 3 that the deceased sustained three external injuries - two lacerated injuries on the left supra-orbital region and left parietal region and one bruise on the left side neck. On dissection he noticed fractures on the frontal bone of the supra-orbital region and thyroid bone and injury on tracheal rings and largeal cartilage. The cause of death according to him was due to asphyxia associated with head injury. ( 7 ) COMING to the factual aspect of the incident, we may now turn to the evidence of P. Ws. 6, 7 and 8. P. W. 6, one of the eye-witnesses, sated that both the appellants assaulted the deceased with lathis on his head in front of his house and thereafter carried him to the house of the appellant Khadal Digal. His evidence is, however, silent as to the second part of the incident which, according to the prosecution happened near the house of the aforesaid appellant. P. W. 7 spoke in the same manner that the appellants assaulted the deceased with lathis near the house of P. W. 6 and when he tried to intervene they threatened him for which he could not come to the rescue of the deceased. To the same effect is the evidence of P. W. 8. According to him, both the appellants after having assaulting the deceased dragged him to the house of appellant Khadal Digal where they too also assaulted him again. These three eye-witnesses being the co-villagers, their presence at the scene of occurrence cannot be doubted. They were subjected to cross-examination at length, but it did not yield any response favourable to the defence. On a close scrutiny of their evidence, we find that they are the witnesses of truth and have given a true account of the incident that happened in their very presence. We are, therefore, of the view that it was the appellants who assaulted the deceased with lathis, as a consequence he succumbed to the injuries. On a close scrutiny of their evidence, we find that they are the witnesses of truth and have given a true account of the incident that happened in their very presence. We are, therefore, of the view that it was the appellants who assaulted the deceased with lathis, as a consequence he succumbed to the injuries. ( 8 ) IN view of the background facts and the evidence as discussed above, the most crucial question that crops up for consideration is whether both the appellants had the common intention to cause the death of the deceased. 'common intention' within the meaning of Section 34, IPC implies prearranged plan and the criminal act was committed pursuant to the said plan. So before a man can be vicariously liable, it must be proved that the act has been done in furtherance of common intention of all the persons involved in the incident. It is, therefore, to be established that there had been prior meeting of minds and that all participated in commissions of the offence. Constructive liability of each one can be established if the act was done in pursuance of the common intention of all. Sections 34 and 149, IPC deal with the liability for constructive criminal activity. Section 34 has enacted a rule of co-extensive culpability when offence is committed by common intention by more than one accused. Section 149 creates a specific offence and postulates an assembly of five or more persons having common object. Before these Sections can be applied, the Court must find with certainty that there are two persons sharing common intention and five persons sharing common object. In order to bring the case within mischief of Section 34, IPC conduct prior and subsequent to commission of the offence, nature of injuries inflicted, the manner of causing injuries and seat of assault, are some of the salient features which are to be conclusively established by the prosecution. In the present case, as stated earlier, the deceased sustained three injuries of which injury to the head according to the doctor, P. W. 3 proved fatal. But evidence is lacking as to who of the two appellants gave the fatal blow. Besides, it docs not appear from the circumstances and the available materials that the accused persons had the intention to cause he death of the deceased. But evidence is lacking as to who of the two appellants gave the fatal blow. Besides, it docs not appear from the circumstances and the available materials that the accused persons had the intention to cause he death of the deceased. What is deducible therefrom is that in order to teach him a lesson for his committing theft they gave him a good beating. Therefore, they can at best be attributed with the knowledge that their act was likely to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. In our opinion, therefore, the offence would squarely fall under Section 304, Part-II, IPC. ( 9 ) COMING to the other offence under Section 201, IPC, the prosecution relied upon the evidence of P. Ws. 4 and 6 as also the evidence of the Investigating Officer, P. W. 11. On scrutiny of the evidence of P. Ws. 4 and 5, we find that both the appellants had buried the dead body of the deceased at a far off place for causing disappearance of the evidence with intention to screen themselves from legal punishment. In that view of the matter, we concur with the findings and the ultimate conviction recorded by the trial Court for the said offence. ( 10 ) IN view of discussions made above, while upholding the conviction of the appellants under Section 201, IPC, we reduce the sentence to two years rigorous imprisonment and alter their conviction from Sections 302 to 304, Part-II, IPC and sentence each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for eight years. We direct that both the sentences shall run concurrently. The appellants, if in the meantime, have undergone the period of imprisonment as imposed by us, including the pre-trial detention period, they shall be set at liberty forthwith. ( 11 ) P. C. NAIK, J. , I agree. Order accordingly. .