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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1997 DIGILAW 505 (MP)

Pushpa Wd/O Virendra Kumar Yadav v. Jiya Bai Wd/O Babulal Yadav

1997-08-21

DIPAK MISRA

body1997
ORDER Dipak Mishra, J. 1. In this appeal under Section 384 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') challenge is to the order dated March 31, 1995 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Mandla in Succession Case No. 14/92 granting Succession Certificate in favour of the appellant as well as the sole respondent. 2. The facts as have been unfolded are that the appellant had married one Birendra Kumar, son of the respondent in the year 1986 and the marriage was solemnised according to the Hindu rites. Said Birendra Kumar was working as an Electrician, Grade- II at Malajkhand Copper Project. While in service Birendra Kumar expired on October 2, 1992. There were deposits under Employees' Provident Fund Scheme. He was also entitled to gratuity. As no child was born in their wedlock, she being the sole successor filed an application for grant of a Succession Certificate so as to enable her to receive the amount in question. 3. The aforesaid application was resisted by the respondent, Jiyabai, the mother of the deceased, contending, inter alia, that the deceased had chosen the mother as nominee to receive the amount. It was also stated by the mother that she was entitled to 50% of the deposit as a Class-I heir. 4. The applicant-appellant examined herself and proved that the deceased Birendra Kumar was her husband who had expired on October 2, 1992. The death Certificate (Ex. A.1) was brought on record. She had also admitted in her evidence that she had stayed with her husband only for four years and her husband used to get drunk and assault her. The mother deposed that as the torture by the wife appellant became insufferable, her son committed suicide. It is admitted by both the parties that the mother had been nominated as nominee by the deceased. One Dhiraj Kumar Dongre the Senior Assistant who was examined as PW-2 produced the record to show that the deceased had Rs. 30,000/- in the Provident Fund and was entitled to receive gratuity amounting to Rs. 35,800/-, Malajkhand Death benefit amounting to Rs. 17,000/- H.C.L. Death Benefit amounting to Rs. 61,750/- and Insurance on other heads amounting to Rs. 25,500/-. The nomination has been brought on record as Ex. A. 4. 5. 30,000/- in the Provident Fund and was entitled to receive gratuity amounting to Rs. 35,800/-, Malajkhand Death benefit amounting to Rs. 17,000/- H.C.L. Death Benefit amounting to Rs. 61,750/- and Insurance on other heads amounting to Rs. 25,500/-. The nomination has been brought on record as Ex. A. 4. 5. It was contended before the learned trial Judge that the appellant was exclusively entitled to the dues of her husband and the mother was only the nominee to receive the amount and her status is that of a trustee but she has no right to it. The learned Additional District Judge, on consideration of the materials on record came to hold that both the wife and mother were entitled to get the succession certificate and accordingly, he directed the stamp-papers to be submitted by both of them for preparation of the succession certificate. 6. Assailing the aforesaid order Mr. R. D. Hundikar, learned counsel for the appellant has raised a singular contention that as per the definition of the term 'family' finding place under Employees' Family Pension Scheme, 1971, a mother is not included, and therefore, she is not a member of the family of the deceased and, is not entitled to succeed to estate of the deceased. Mr. Kumaresh Pathak, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the definition where the term 'family' in the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 is applicable to the present case which does not destroy the right of succession by the mother who is a Class-I heir. 7. To appreciate the rival contention raised at the Bar it is essential to refer to the relevant schemes where the term 'family' has been denied. 7. To appreciate the rival contention raised at the Bar it is essential to refer to the relevant schemes where the term 'family' has been denied. Under para 2(g) of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 the word 'family' has been defined in the following manner - "2(g) "Family" means- i) in the case of a male member, his wife, his children, whether married or unmarried, his dependent parents and his deceased son's widow and children; Provided that if a member proves that his wife has ceased, under the personal law governing him or the customary law of the community to which the spouses belong, to be entitled to maintenance she shall no longer be deemed to be a part of the member's family for the purpose of this Scheme, unless the member subsequently intimates by express notice in writing to the Commissioner that she shall continue to be so regarded; and ii) in the case of female member, her husband, her children, whether married or unmarried, her dependent parents, her husband's dependent parents and her deceased son's widow and children; provided that if a member by notice in writing to the Commissioner expresses her desire to exclude her husband from the family, the husband and his dependent parents shall no longer be deemed to be a part of the member's family for the purpose of this Scheme, unless the member subsequently cancels in writing any such notice; Explanation - In either of the above two cases, if the child of a member, or as the case may be, the child of a deceased son of the member has been adopted by another person and if, under the personal law of the adopter, adoption is legally recognised such a child shall be considered as excluded from the family of the member". On a plain reading of the aforesaid definition it is clear as day that the dependent parents are included. Para 61 which deals with nominee reads as follows: " (57. Nomination. - (1) Each member shall make in his declaration in Form 2, a nomination conferring the right to receive the amount that may stand to his credit in the Fund in the event of his death before the amount standing to his credit has become payable, or where the amount has become payable before payment has been made. Nomination. - (1) Each member shall make in his declaration in Form 2, a nomination conferring the right to receive the amount that may stand to his credit in the Fund in the event of his death before the amount standing to his credit has become payable, or where the amount has become payable before payment has been made. (2) A member may in his nomination distribute the amount that may stand to his credit in the Fund amongst his nominees at his own discretion. (3) If a member has a family at the time of making a nomination, the nomination shall be in favour of one or more persons belonging to his family. Any nomination made by such member in favour of a person not belonging to his family shall be invalid. (4) If at the time of making a nomination the member has no family, the nomination may be in favour of any person or persons but if the member subsequently acquires a family, such nomination shall forthwith be deemed to be invalid and the member shall make a fresh nomination in favour of one or more persons belonging to his family. (4-A) Where the nomination is wholly of partly in favour of a minor, the member may, for the purposes of this Scheme, appoint a major person of his family, as defined in Clause (g) of Paragraph 2, to be the guardian of the minor nominee in the event of the member predeceasing the nominee and the guardian so appointed: Provided that where there is no major person in the family, the member may, at his discretion, appoint any other person to be a guardian of the minor nominee. (5) A nomination made under sub-paragraph (1) may at any time be modified by a member after giving a written notice of his intention of doing so in form 8 annexed hereto. If the nominee predeceases the member, the interest of the nominee shall revert to the member who may make a fresh nomination in respect of such interest. (6) A nomination or its modification shall take effect to the extent that it is valid on the date on which it is received by the Commissioner". On a fair reading of the aforesaid paragraph it is clearly perceptible that if a member has family the nomination has to be in favour of a person belonging to the family. (6) A nomination or its modification shall take effect to the extent that it is valid on the date on which it is received by the Commissioner". On a fair reading of the aforesaid paragraph it is clearly perceptible that if a member has family the nomination has to be in favour of a person belonging to the family. Paragraph 70 provides for payment to a nominee if nomination has been made by the member in accordance with paragraph 61. From the scheme of things it cannot be said that mother is not a member of the family under the Scheme. In fact, the statutory authorities have accepted the nomination of the mother. 8. The definition on which the learned counsel has placed reliance and also which finds place in the memorandum of appeal relates to the definition occurring in paragraph 2(b) of the Employees' Family Pension Scheme which reads as follows: "2(b) 'family' means- i) wife in the case of male member of the Family Pension Fund; ii) husband in the case of female member of the Family Pension Fund; and iii) minor sons and unmarried daughters of member of the Family Pension Fund. Explanation.- The expression "sons" and "daughters" shall include children adopted legally before death in service". It is also worthwhile to refer to paragraph 29 of the Employees' Family Pension Scheme, 1971. The same is quoted hereunder:- "29. Family Pension to whom payable.-Subject to the provisions of Paragraph 28 of this Scheme, the family pension is payable :- (a) to the widow or widower up to the date of death or remarriage whichever is earlier; (b) failing, (a), to the eldest surviving minor son until he attains the age of 21 years; and (c) failing (a) and (b), to the eldest surviving unmarried daughter until she attains the age of 24 years or marries whichever is earlier. The Family Pension shall not be paid to more than one person at a time. Notes. - (i) In cases where there are 2 or more widows, family pension shall be payable to the eldest surviving widow. On her death, it shall be payable to the next surviving widow, if any. The term "eldest" would mean seniority with reference to the date of marriage. Notes. - (i) In cases where there are 2 or more widows, family pension shall be payable to the eldest surviving widow. On her death, it shall be payable to the next surviving widow, if any. The term "eldest" would mean seniority with reference to the date of marriage. ii) In the event of remarriage or death of the widow or widower, the pension will be granted to the minor children through their natural guardian. In disputed cases, however, payments will be made through a legal guardian". Thus, there is clear distinction between the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme and Employees' Family Pension Scheme. 9. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that a mother is not entitled to get succession certificate in respect of the dues; namely Provident Funds dues, gratuity and such other benefit which are the subject-matter of the present litigation. At this juncture I may point out that a mere nomination does not negative the rights of other successor. The nominee is only entitled to receive the amount but he cannot claim absolute right. In this context I may refer to a decision rendered in the case of B.L. Singh v. R.P.F. Commissioner, 1992 (64) FLR 206, where in a Division Bench of this Court relying on the ratio laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Usha Devi, AIR 1984 SC 346 , held as follows: - "..... Although a nominee under Section 39 of the Insurance Act is authorised to receive the amount from the insurer giving a valid discharge to. the aforesaid insurer but that amount can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with law of succession governing them. We have already held above in paragraph 7 that the provisions in the Insurance Policy or Provident Fund amount of the member. Therefore the ratio of Smt. Sarbati Devi's case (supra) is fully applicable for determining the extent of the right of the nominee over the Provident Fund amount. It, therefore, follows that the Regional Provident Fund and the Employer cannot be held to be at fault in refusing to give the amount to the petitioner on the strength of a mere succession certificate. It, therefore, follows that the Regional Provident Fund and the Employer cannot be held to be at fault in refusing to give the amount to the petitioner on the strength of a mere succession certificate. Actually according to para 70 of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 they are under a legal obligation to pay the provident fund amount to the nominee who has been nominated by the member in accordance with paragraph 61 of the aforesaid scheme. As such the nominee is the person authorised to receive the amount of the provident fluid of a member and it is only he who can give a valid discharge to respondents Nos. 1 and 3 of the payment of the provident fund. However, as held by the Supreme Court the nominee cannot claim the absolute right to that amount excluding the rights of the heirs which the heirs may have according to the law of succession governing them." This being the position of law of the mother and the daughter-in-law do have their shares and accordingly the learned 1st Additional District Judge has granted the succession certificate. This is not a case where the family pension of a deceased employee under the Employees' Family Pension Scheme, 1971 is the subject-matter of the controversy. What would be the effect of the definition of the family occurring in the said scheme is not relevant for the decision of the present appeal. I have only referred to them to indicate that there is distinction between the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme and the Employees' Family Pension Scheme. As a dependent parent comes within the definition of the family and a nomination in her favour was accepted by the competent authority, and there is no evidence on record to remove her from the fold sweep of the definition. I am of the considered view the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant does not have merit and hence the impugned order does not warrant any interference. 10. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.