Judgment M.Y.Eqbal, J. 1. This civil revision application is directed against the order dated 6.8.96 passed by 2nd, Addl. District Judge, Jamshedpur, in Misc. Appeal No. 7/95 whereby and where under the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal preferred on behalf of the defendant petitioner and confirmed the order dated 16.5.95 passed by the Munsif, Jameshedpur, in T.S. No. 7/95 by which the Learned Munsif, Jamshedpur, granted temporary injunction on the application filed by the plaintiff O.P. under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 and 2 read with Sec. 151, C.P.C. 2. The plaintiff O.P. filed the aforesaid T.S. No. 7/95 against the defendant for a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to restoration of the vehicle held by him under the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking possession or attempting to take possession of the vehicle in any manner. The plaintiffs case is that the vehicle was purchased by the defendant petitioner after taking loan from Union Bank of India and the vehicle was hypothecated with the said bank. The defendant started plying the vehicle as contract carriage but being unable to maintain the same and to repay the bank loan he approached the plaintiff for purchasing the said vehicle and both of them entered into an agreement on 4.8.92 and in part performance thereof the plaintiff respondent paid a cash of Rs. 20,000.00 to the defendant appellant. As per the terms of agreement the plaintiff respondent had to ply and run the vehicle and out of its income he had to pay regular instalments thereof to the bank. The defendant petitioner was required to execute a sale letter and to transfer ownership in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiffs further case was that on the basis of the said agreement the plaintiff came in possession and control of the vehicle and started plying the same after incurring expenditure and was making regular payment of instalments to the bank. On 8.10.94 the defendant with some ulterior motive and for wrongful gain lodged an F.I.R. at Potka P.S. making false allegation against the plaintiff of having not paid the Banks loan and for committing breach of trust and cheating. Accordingly a criminal case was registered against the plaintiff under Secs. On 8.10.94 the defendant with some ulterior motive and for wrongful gain lodged an F.I.R. at Potka P.S. making false allegation against the plaintiff of having not paid the Banks loan and for committing breach of trust and cheating. Accordingly a criminal case was registered against the plaintiff under Secs. 406 and 420 I.P.C. and during investigation the police seized the vehicle from the plaintiff and the same was lying in the police custody, It was further stated that after completion of the investigation a final report was submitted with the finding that the plaintiff had made payment of instalment of the bank. Taking advantage of the pendency of investigation of the criminal case, the defendant hurriedly obtained an order from the criminal court for the return of the disputed vehicle from the lawful possession of the plaintiff although such order had lost its force in view of the submission of final form by the police. The plaintiff, therefore, claimed that he is entitled to get back possession of the vehicle from the police custody but the defendant is making attempt to take possession of the said vehicle. Having reasonable apprehension the plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit for declaration and permanent injunction. A separate application for grant of temporary injunction was filed by the plaintiff under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. seeking an order of injunction restraining the defendant from attempting to take possession of the disputed vehicle from the police custody. 3. On being noticed the defendant petitioner appeared and filed his show cause to the injunction petition in which the defendant challenged the maintainability of the suit and made allegation against the plaintiff for suppressing the material facts from the court. It was stated inter alia that under the agreement there was a specific condition that in the event of default in making payment of three instalments to the bank the defendant shall be entitled to take the possession of the vehicle from the plaintiff and the plaintiff shall be liable for criminal act. It is alleged that the plaintiff was plying the vehicle without making proper instalments to the bank, a result of which the Manager of the bank issued notice to the defendant asking him to make payment to the tune of Rs. 1,83,230.60 which was lying due and also warned him of legal action in the event of non-payment of outstanding dues. 1,83,230.60 which was lying due and also warned him of legal action in the event of non-payment of outstanding dues. The defendant repeatedly requested the plaintiff to clear the Bank dues but nothing was done and the plaintiff was keeping the vehicle in his custody illegally. The defendant thereafter approached the criminal court and lodged an F.I.R. It was further stated that the learned C.J.M. Jamshedpur, released the vehicle in favour of the defendant by order dated 29.10.94. The plaintiff thereafter challenged the order of release in the High Court under Sec. 482, Cr.P.C. vide Cr. Misc. No. 5976/94(R). During the pendency of the said Misc. case the Investigating Officer submitted a final form. This Court, however, dismissed the aforesaid case and confirmed the order of release passed by the C.J.M. Jameshedpur. Even after the aforesaid order when the vehicle was not released by the police, the defendant was compelled to file Cr. Misc. No. 721/95(R) before this Court and an explanation was called for from the C.J.M., Jamshedpur, regarding non-release of the vehicle in favour of the defendant. The case therefore was that the prayer made by the plaintiff for the grant of injunction is illegal and mala fide. 4. The learned trial court after hearing the parties on the application for grant of injunction allowed the application and granted temporary injunction restraining the defendant petitioner from taking possession of the vehicle. By the said order the learned Munsif also directed both the plaintiff and the defendant to clear off the bank loan according to the terms and conditions of the agreement. Aggrieved by the said order the defendant petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Judge. Jameshedpur, being Misc. Appeal No. 7/95 which was eventually dismissed by the IInd Addl. District Judge, Jamshedpur, and the order of the Learned Munsif was confirmed, hence this application. 5. Mr. M.N. Banerjee, earned Counsel for the petitioner, assailed the orders passed by the learned court below as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. Mr. Banerjee firstly submitted that the suit itself was not maintainable and it was barred under the provisions of Specific Relief Act. Earned Counsel submitted that both the courts below have comitted serious illeglity in passing the orders inasmuch as both the courts have completely over looked and ignored the relevant facts disclosed by the petitioner and those facts were suppressed by the plaintiff. Earned Counsel submitted that both the courts below have comitted serious illeglity in passing the orders inasmuch as both the courts have completely over looked and ignored the relevant facts disclosed by the petitioner and those facts were suppressed by the plaintiff. Earned Counsel submitted that the vehicle was released in favour of the petitioner by the teamed C.J.M. Jamshedpur, in terms of order dated 29.10.94 The plaintiff challenged the aforesaid order before this Court in Cr. Misc. No. 5976/94(R) which was dismissed. The plaintiff then filed Cr. W.J.C. No. 13/95(R) challenging the order of release passed by the learned C.J.M. which too was dismissed by this Court. According to the earned Counsel the plaintiff O.P. suppressed further facts that before the order of injunction was passed by the trial court the vehicle was released in favour of the petitioner. The earned Counsel lastly submitted that in any event, in the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly when the ingredients of prima facie case of balance of convenience and irreparable injuries were absent, learned court below ought not to have passed the said order. 6. Mr. Devi Prasad, Earned Counsel for the plaintiff O.P. in support of the orders submitted that no illegality has been committed by the courts below in passing the impugned orders. Earned Counsel firstly submitted that even assuming that there is some error of facts or suppression of facts and even if the orders passed by the courts below are wrong, this Court should not interfere with the said order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 115, C.P.C. The earned Counsel put heavy reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of D.L.F. Housing etc. C. V/s. Sarup Singh -- ; Hindustan Aeronautics V/s. Ajit Prasad -- and Delhi Municipality V/s. Suresh Chandra AIR 1976 2621. Earned Counsel further submitted that the suit for declaration and permanent injunction was maintainable and it was well within the jurisdiction of the courts below to pass the impugned orders and there are neither any illegality nor any infirmity in the said orders. 7. There is no dispute in the submission of Mr. Devi Prasad, earned Counsel for the plaintiff O.P. that this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 115, C.P.C. normally does not interfere with the finding of facts in such matters. 7. There is no dispute in the submission of Mr. Devi Prasad, earned Counsel for the plaintiff O.P. that this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 115, C.P.C. normally does not interfere with the finding of facts in such matters. But if the courts have exercised its jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity while passing order of injunction then certainly this Court should interfere with the order of injunction in revision. 8. Admittedly, the vehicle was purchased by the defendant petitioner out of the loan taken from the bank and by virtue of an agreement it was handed over to the plaintiff with the specific condition that the loan amount shall be paid by the plaintiff in instalments and in default of payment of instalments defendant shall have every right to get back the possession of the vehicle. It appears that after the vehicle was seized by the police it was released in favour of the defendant by the C.J.M. in terms of order dated 29.10.94 i.e. much before the order of injunction passed by the trial court on 16.5.95. It further appears that the plaintiff O, P. has challenged the aforesaid order of release in this Court in Cr. Misc. No. 4976/94(R) which was dismissed. The plaintiff then again moved this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of release of the vehicle in Cr.W.J.C. No. 39/95(R) and this Court dismissed the same on 24.3.95. The trial court took the view that on the basis of the agreement the plaintiff has got a prima facie case and if the prayer for temporary injunction is not allowed the plaintiff will stand now where and all the investments made by him towards payment of loan, maintenance of vehicle will go in vain. The trial Court further held that if temporary injunction is not granted the plaintiff might lose the possession of the same vehicle. The appellate Court while dismissing the appeal affirmed the finding arrived at by the trial court. Both the courts have completely failed to consider the effect of the order of release of the vehicle in favour of the defendant and subsequent orders passed by the High Court. In my opinion, the learned courts below have misconstrued the meaning of balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The expression irreparable injury has got a definite connotation. Both the courts have completely failed to consider the effect of the order of release of the vehicle in favour of the defendant and subsequent orders passed by the High Court. In my opinion, the learned courts below have misconstrued the meaning of balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The expression irreparable injury has got a definite connotation. The courts have failed to consider that the injury, if any, which may cause to the plaintiff can be compensated in terms of money and, therefore, it cannot be said that it is an irreparable injury. Moreover, when the vehicle came in possession of the defendant by virtue of the order passed by the criminal court, the question of grant of temporary injunction in terms prayed for by the plaintiff is misconceived. There appears to be inherent defects in the orders passed by the learned courts below which cannot be sustained in law. 9. In the result, this application is allowed and the orders passed by the courts below are set aside. There shall be no order as to cost.