Judgment :- SATHASIVAM J. Against the order of the second respondent dated January 12, 1996, holding that the first respondent company has ceased to be a sick industrial undertaking, the petitioners, Madras Labour Union and B and C Mills Staff Union, have filed the present writ petition to quash the said order and also for further direction directing the second respondent to exercise due powers of supervision and control over the first respondent for the proper implementation of the rehabilitation scheme dated June 13, 1994. By order dated January 30, 1997, this court has admitted the above writ petition and ordered notice to the respondents. The petitioners have also filed W.M.Ps. Nos. 2013 and 2014 of 1997 for appropriate direction and stay of the impugned order of the second respondent respectively On the date of admission, this court has ordered notice in the said W.M.Ps. When the above applications came up for further hearing after service of notice to the first respondent, even though the first respondent has filed a counter-affidavit in the main writ petition, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners insisted on orders only in the above mentioned writ miscellaneous petitions for the present. Hence, arguments were advanced only for disposal of the writ miscellaneous petitions. The case of the petitioners is briefly stated hereunder : The petitioners who are labour unions of the first respondent company challenge the decision of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) by which it closed its proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 Even though in W.M.P. No. 2013 of 1997, initially the petitioners have prayed for injunction, it is seen that subsequently the petition has been corrected as interim order of direction to the first respondent company not to take any further action contrary to the BIFR scheme dated June 13, 1994, in Case No. 48 of 1993, pending disposal of the writ petition. Except the correction in the petition, there are no corresponding corrections in the original affidavit, nor in the copies of the petition and affidavit. The other petition, viz., W.M.P. No. 2014 of 1997, is for stay of operation of the impugned order of the second respondent dated January 12, 1996.The first respondent, namely, Binny management, have filed counter-affidavit in the main writ petition. The other petition, viz., W.M.P. No. 2014 of 1997, is for stay of operation of the impugned order of the second respondent dated January 12, 1996.The first respondent, namely, Binny management, have filed counter-affidavit in the main writ petition. The contentions raised in the counter-affidavit of the first respondent are briefly stated hereunder : In the year 1981-82, the first respondent company started a new line of business, viz., dealing in real estate and a real estate division was created. As a result, the real estate of the first respondent company was treated as stock in trade and formed part of the assets in reckoning the net worth. When the company made the reference to BIFR on July 7, 1993, on the basis of the materials placed before it, the second respondent, on October 15, 1993, made a declaration that the first respondent was a sick company within the meaning of section 3(1)(o) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 As stated earlier, both counsel advanced their elaborate arguments even for disposal of the above said writ miscellaneous petitions. Now, I shall consider whether the petitioners have made out a case for direction as well as an order of stay of operation of the order of the second respondent dated January 12, 1996. Learned counsel for the petitioners has taken me through the rehabilitation scheme framed by the second respondent, the order of the Supreme Court with reference to the order of the BIFR and the order of the Division Bench of this court approving the scheme framed by the second respondent. Since those proceedings are part of the records, I am not incorporating them once again in the present order. However, learned counsel for the petitioners highlighted the salient features of the rehabilitation scheme framed by the second respondent and the approval order of this court dated August 26, 1994. Since those proceedings are part of the records, I am not incorporating them once again in the present order. However, learned counsel for the petitioners highlighted the salient features of the rehabilitation scheme framed by the second respondent and the approval order of this court dated August 26, 1994. Learned counsel by pointing out the impugned order submitted that the first respondent has not at all made out any case for coming out from the BIFR scheme and the consequential order of the second respondent passing an order that the first respondent company has ceased to be a sick industrial undertaking within the meaning of section 3(1)(o) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is useful to see the impugned order of the second respondent and the relevant portions are extracted hereunder : "Whereas the company has submitted its latest audited accounts and the balance-sheet for the financial year ended March 31, 1995, along with unaudited financial results for six months ended September 30, 1995, and urged that on account of its net worth having become positive as on March 31, 1995, it may be released from the purview of the provisions of the Act being no longer a sick industrial undertaking ; and Whereas on consideration of the foregoing we find that as a result of improved performance the company has succeeded in making its net worth exceed the accumulated losses as on March 31, 1995, when its net worth stood at Rs. 4, 321.24 lakhs (equity share capital of Rs. 2, 211.14 lakhs and free reserves of Rs. 2, 110 lakhs) as against its accumulated losses of Rs. 2, 716.04 lakhs ; Now, therefore, we find that the company has ceased to be a sick industrial undertaking within the meaning of section 3(1)(o) of the Act and its reference is no longer required to be dealt with by BIFR and the proceedings in the case are accordingly closed. We also hereby discharge the special director appointed by us on the board of directors of the company. (Sd.) Place : New Delhi Date : 12-1-1996. We also hereby discharge the special director appointed by us on the board of directors of the company. (Sd.) Place : New Delhi Date : 12-1-1996. Certified to be true copy (Sd.) Deputy Director, Bench I Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction." * No doubt, a reading of the above portions of the order of the second respondent above that the first respondent company has submitted its latest audited accounts and the balance-sheet for the financial year ended March 31, 1995, as well as unaudited financial results for six months ended September 30, 1995. On the basis of the above records, the first respondent urged before the second respondent that since its net worth having become positive as on May 31, 1995, it may be released from the purview of the provisions of the Act being no longer a sick industrial undertaking. The impugned order further shows that the first respondent company has succeeded in making its net worth exceed the accumulated losses as on March 31, 1995, when its net worth stood at Rs. 4, 321.24 lakhs as against its accumulated losses of Rs. 2, 716.04 lakhs. It is seen that the second respondent was satisfied with the above statement and, thereafter, passed the impugned order releasing the first respondent company from the purview of the provisions of the Act. At this juncture, Miss R. Vaigai by pointing out the various statements of the auditor's reports submitted that prima facie the impugned order cannot be sustained.On the other hand, Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, learned counsel for the first respondent, also took me through the auditor's report, balance-sheet, etc., and submitted that since the first respondent had proved its comfortable position before the second respondent, the order of the second respondent releasing the first respondent company from the purview of the Act cannot be said to be either erroneous or improper. No doubt for the sake of repetition, I am pointing out that both counsel took pains to demonstrate the status and financial position of the first respondent company by placing many materials before me. After carefully considering their submissions, in the light of the above said particulars, I am of the view that without deciding the main writ petition, it would not be proper on the part of this court to give any finding even the prima facie finding at this stage in the above said writ miscellaneous petitions. After carefully considering their submissions, in the light of the above said particulars, I am of the view that without deciding the main writ petition, it would not be proper on the part of this court to give any finding even the prima facie finding at this stage in the above said writ miscellaneous petitions. I hereby give the following reasons for my above conclusion. There is no dispute that the order of the second respondent is dated January 12, 1996. Though learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners were not given any opportunity by the second respondent before passing the impugned order, learned counsel for the first respondent brought to my notice that the impugned order of the respondent has been communicated to both the petitioners. In those circumstances, I do not understand why the petitioners have not approached this court immediately if they have any grievance against the impugned order either before this court or before the appellate authority as per section 25 of the Act. The fact remains they have filed the present writ petition only on January 28, 1997, after nearly one year. While considering the interim order as claimed by the petitioners, it is useful to mention the subsequent developments that had taken place after January 12, 1996. It is seen that the first respondent company suspended its operation from June 15, 1996, and made an application for closure before the competent authority. By a settlement dated July 16, 1996, entered into between the petitioners and the first respondent as well as by the order dated September 5, 1996, the Commissioner of Labour directed the first respondent to reopen the mills on November 1, 1996. The said order was challenged by the first respondent in Writ Petitions Nos. 15547 of 1996 and 15889 of 1996. It is further seen that by order dated November 29, 1996, both the writ petitions were dismissed. The first respondent preferred Writ Appeals Nos. 127 and 136 of 1997, before the Division Bench of this court. While considering the prayer in the civil miscellaneous petitions in the said writ appeals, the first Bench of this court keeping the interest of the workers and the first respondent company directed the Government of Tamil Nadu to convene a meeting of all the parties to find a solution to the pending issues. While considering the prayer in the civil miscellaneous petitions in the said writ appeals, the first Bench of this court keeping the interest of the workers and the first respondent company directed the Government of Tamil Nadu to convene a meeting of all the parties to find a solution to the pending issues. In pursuance of the directions of the Bench of this court on February 23, 1997, a meeting was convened by the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu in whose presence, an understanding was reached. As per the terms of the understanding, the mill will be reopened on March 1, 1997, and the Government of Tamil Nadu will appoint a Special Officer, who will run the mills for four months and if during the said period of four months, the mill was not able to achieve the level of production as was obtaining in April and May, 1996, the matter will be referred to the decision of the court, whose decision will be binding on the parties. It is also very relevant to note the understanding or agreement reached by all the parties concerned in the presence of the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and the same is extracted hereunder :The above referred tripartite agreement was signed on February 23, 1997, wherein the representatives of the workers as well as the Labour Commissioner, Madras, have signed in token of their agreement. It is also admitted that in pursuance of the said tripartite agreement, the first respondent has reopened the Perambur mills on March 1, 1997, and as on date, the same is functioning. Nearly a month has gone after reopening of the mills and all the parties to the tripartite agreement are taking their efforts for smooth running of the above said mills. In such circumstance, knowing that the very same petitioners were also parties to the above said amicable agreement dated February 23, 1997, this court is not inclined to interfere or disturb the said functioning of the mills. This court also apprehends that if any interim order is given with reference to the impugned order of the second respondent dated January 12, 1996, and the position prior to January 12, 1996, is restored, there is a possibility of altering the present situation. This court also apprehends that if any interim order is given with reference to the impugned order of the second respondent dated January 12, 1996, and the position prior to January 12, 1996, is restored, there is a possibility of altering the present situation. In those circumstances, in the interest of all the parties concerned, I am not inclined to go into the merits and demerits of the elaborate contentions made by both the parties for the disposal of the said writ miscellaneous petitions. It is needless to mention that the court has to consider the subsequent developments also, more particularly, when the petitioners themselves after deliberation and participation agreed for an amicable solution as seen from the tripartite agreement dated February 23, 1997, and it is not safe to pass any order in the above said miscellaneous petitions. Reserving all the contentions raised by both the petitioners as well as the first respondent, the interest of justice would be set by fixing an early date for the disposal of the main writ petition instead of passing any order in the writ miscellaneous petitions.Under these circumstances, and in view of the reasons stated above, reserving all the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the first respondent, I hereby direct the registry to post the main writ petition along with W. M. Ps. Nos. 2013 and 2014 of 1997 for final hearing on June 23, 1997.