JUDGMENT Being aggrieved by the preliminary order, the petitioner Party No. 1 filed this petition against Party No. 2. The case of the petitioner is that late Mithailal, father of the Respondent No. 1 and husband of respondent No. 4 sold the disputed house on 8.4.1985 by registered sale-deed (Annexure P-5) to one Maltibala, who in turn on 19.9.1996 sold the same to the petitioner vide registered sale-deeds (Annexures P-12 and P-13) and in this way, after 8.4.1985 Maltibai and after 19.9.1996 the present petitioner is owner and in possession of the house. As Respondent/Party No. 2 is not in possession of the house and has filed civil suit against Maltibai and the petitioner No. 1 asking for declaration, injunction and possession of the house. Therefore, now there is no apprehension of breach of peace. As civil suit is pending, there is no justification with proceedings u/s. 145 CrPC before the SDM. It is abuse of the process of the Court, therefore, the preliminary order be quashed. The case of the Respondent No. 2 is that house in dispute was not sold by Mithailal to Maltibala, the sale-deed are false and fabricated. The petitioner have got legal remedy against the preliminary order passed by the SDM, therefore, this Court should not exercise the extra-ordinary powers u/s. 482 of the CrPC. On 13.3.1997 before the preliminary order was passed on 25.3.1997, non-petitioner, Party No.2, filed Civil Suit (No. 30-N97) in Civil Court for declaration, injunction, mesne profits and possession of the disputed house against the petitioners and Maltibai. It is true that in case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1985 SC 472 ), relied by Shri Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner, it has been held -- "When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated, initiation of a parallel criminal proceeding under S. 145 of the Code, would not be justified. The parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil Court, the criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation". But the question is whether this Court should exercise its inherent power u/s. 482 of the CrPC and quash proceedings. It is trite position of law that powers u/s 482 CrPC can be exercised when other efficacious legal remedy is not available. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case of Madhu Limye v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1978 SC 47 laid down the following principles for exercise of power u/s. 482 of the CrPC :- (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. (2) That, it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code." In case of Bhupendra Shah and another v. Mahendra passed in Misc. Cr. Case No. 2006/92 in cases of dishonour of cheques, it has been held that -- "Power under section 482 CrPC can be invoked only when redress under any other provision was unavailable. The implication is that no one should have recourse to short-cut which is often a wrong cut in life as well as in law. The inherent power is certainly circumscribed and is intended to be used rather sparingly." In this case issuance of the process u/s. 420 of the IPC and 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was challenged u/s. 482 of the CrPC. The inherent power is certainly circumscribed and is intended to be used rather sparingly." In this case issuance of the process u/s. 420 of the IPC and 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was challenged u/s. 482 of the CrPC. This Court following K.M. Methew v. State of Kerala [1992 MPWN (1) 30] declined to exercise powers u/s. 482 of the Cr PC and held -- "It is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused." In the instant case the SDM passed preliminary order issuing notices to the Parties requiring them to in their written statements of their respective claims in respect to the fact of actual possession of the house in dispute. The petitioner has got remedy to make an application u/s. 145 (5) CrPC requesting the learned SDM to drop the proceedings against them. In view of above, as the petitioner has got remedy under section 145 (5) of the CrPC, this Court does not deem it fit to exercise powers under section 482 of the CrPC. The petitioner may make application for dropping the proceeding under section 145 (5) CrPC to the learned SDM, who shall decide this application in accordance with law. No opinion on merits is expressed lest it may prejudice the case of the parties. The petition is dismissed with the above observation.