JUDGMENT - S.S. NIJJAR, J.:---This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed with a prayer for quashing the order passed by the Revenue Tribunal after remand in Revision Application No. M.R.T. N.S. VII/1/80 dated 21-1-1984 and the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Satara Division, Satara in Tenancy Case No. 84/1 of 71 dated 1st June, 1974 and for restoration of the judgement of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, hereinafter referred to as "the M.R.T.", in Revision Application No. M.R.T. N.S. VII. 18/74 (TEN. AP. No. 96/74) dated 16-10-1974. 2.The facts as narrated in the writ petition may be briefly noticed. The dispute concerns about half the suit land on the Southern side of Gat No. 1253 admeasuring 4 hectares 46 acres i.e. 11 acres, one guntha and assessed at Rs. 74.75 situated at village Chikhali, Tal. Karad, Dist. Satara. The land hereinafter referred to as "the suit land". The suit land originally belonged to Onkareshwar Devasthan and respondent Nos. 2 to 4 are the Wahiwatdars. It is the case of respondent No. 1 that the entire suit land was leased out to him only by respondent Nos. 2 to 4 and he was exclusively in possession and cultivation of the entire land and the petitioner was taken by him only as a co-sharer perekari i.e. partner in cultivation for many years. However, the petitioner got his name entered in the extract of Record of Right with regard to half of the suit land and, therefore, the respondent No. 1 complained to the revenue authorities in R.T.S. proceedings. These proceedings were initially decided in favour of the petitioner. Against the said judgment and order, respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal being Appeal No. 25/67. The aforesaid appeal was dismissed. However, respondent No. 1 was directed to make an application under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for getting a declaration that the petitioner is not a tenant of the suit land. Instead of filing an application under section 70(b) of the Act, respondent No. 1 chose to file an application under section 84 of the Act for summary eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner is unauthorisedly in possession of the suit land. This application was filed on 7th April, 1971. Instead of filing an application under section 70(b) of the Act, respondent No. 1 chose to file an application under section 84 of the Act for summary eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner is unauthorisedly in possession of the suit land. This application was filed on 7th April, 1971. By an order dated 13th July, 1971, the Assistant Collector exercising his powers under section 84 of the Act referred the matter to the Mamlatdar for sending a report as to the status of the petitioner on the suit land. By his report dated 5th June, 1972 the Mamlatdar reported that : "In view of the evidence discussed above it appears that Opponent No. 4 (petitioner herein) has not satisfactorily proved his allegation about tenancy in half portion out of the suit land. Opponent No. 4 is in possession of the suit land unauthorisedly and further action under section 84 may be taken if approved." Relying upon the aforesaid report the Collector by his order dated 1st June, 1974 allowed the application under section 84 of the Act and directed restoration of possession to respondent No. 1. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed Revision Application No. M.R.T. N.S. VIII.18/74 (TEN. AP. No. 96/74) in the M.R.T. By its order dated 16th October, 1974, the revision application was allowed and the application of respondent No. 1 before the lower Court was held to be not maintainable. The petitioner was also held to be a tenant in the suit land. Aggrieved against the said order respondent No. 1 filed Special Civil Application No. 859 of 1975 under. Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This Special Civil Application came to be decided on 4th April, 1979. This Court remanded the matter back to the M.R.T. It was held that the M.R.T. had failed to apply his mind to each and every aspect of the case and decide the points involved in the revision application. It was also held that the M.R.T. had come to the conclusion that respondent No. 4 (petitioner herein) is a tenant. Therefore, the judgement is without jurisdiction. It is held that what the Tribunal has to consider is whether the possession of the petitioner is lawful or unauthorised. It was also held that the M.R.T. had come to the conclusion that respondent No. 4 (petitioner herein) is a tenant. Therefore, the judgement is without jurisdiction. It is held that what the Tribunal has to consider is whether the possession of the petitioner is lawful or unauthorised. It is also directed that the M.R.T. has also to consider as to whether the use and occupation of the disputed land by the petitioner is not permitted under the provisions of the Act and as to whether or not the provisions of the Act do not provide for the eviction of such a person and as to whether there is no remedy available to the petitioner therein except to invoke the provisions of section 84 of the Act. It is categorically directed that the tribunal shall come to the conclusion as to whether or nor respondent No. 4's possession is authorised and lawful. It is directed that if the tribunal comes to the conclusion that the possession of respondent No. 4 is lawful then the application under section 84 shall be dismissed. It is further directed that it shall not be necessary for the M.R.T. to decide as to whether or not respondent No. 4 therein is or was a tenant. These directions are given as the High Court held that the tribunal had not applied its mind to the provisions of section 84 of the Act. It is also held that it appears that he has not applied his mind to the material evidence which has been placed by the parties on the record. The High Court then refers to various pieces of evidence. It is held that this voluminous evidence does not appear to have been considered by the M.R.T. Therefore, the matter is remanded to the M.R.T. to decide afresh. It is directed that the M.R.T. shall exercise all the powers that are available to the Revisional Court under section 76 of the Act. The Tribunal was directed to consider the material evidence on the record and the provisions of section 84 of the Act and then decide as to whether the possession of the petitioner of the disputed land is unauthorised or unlawful. The Tribunal was directed to consider the material evidence on the record and the provisions of section 84 of the Act and then decide as to whether the possession of the petitioner of the disputed land is unauthorised or unlawful. A direction is given that if the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that respondent No. 4's possession is unauthorised and unlawful, it will pass the order as contemplated by the provisions of section 84 of the Act. If it comes to the conclusion that the possession of the petitioner is not unauthorised or unlawful it will dismiss the application filed by the petitioner therein. In view of this order of remand the M.R.T. passed an order dated 21-1-1984. In this order it has been held that the petitioner is in unauthorised occupation of the suit land and, therefore the revision application is dismissed. It has been held that the order passed by the Collector on 1st June, 1974 is correct and is, therefore, affirmed. It is in these circumstances that the present writ petition has been filed. 3.The submissions made by the Counsel for both the sides may be noticed. Mr. Rane has submitted that in remanding the matter the High Court has not recorded any findings on the issues arising in the case. The High Court has merely set aside the order of the M.R.T. on the ground that the order is perfunctory and suffers from non-application of mind. Thus the matter was left open to be decided by the M.R.T. The directions were to record a finding as to whether or not the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation of the land. The direction to the M.R.T. not to decide the question of tenancy was appropriately given in view of the provisions of section 84 of the Act. It is submitted that under section 84 of the Act, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy. This question could only be decided by the Mamlatdar in the first instance under section 70(b) of the Act. Keeping these facts in view it had been submitted before the M.R.T. that in view of the unreported judgment cited which has been noticed by the Tribunal, the matter ought to be remanded back to the Mamlatdar for decision under section 70(b) of the Act. Keeping these facts in view it had been submitted before the M.R.T. that in view of the unreported judgment cited which has been noticed by the Tribunal, the matter ought to be remanded back to the Mamlatdar for decision under section 70(b) of the Act. It is submitted that the M.R.T. has wrongly distinguished the aforesaid judgment by holding that the issue of tenancy had already been decided. Unless the Collector comes to the conclusion that the plea put forward is patently false, frivolous and mala fide, the issue of tenancy could only be decided in an application made under section 70(b) of the Act. If the Collector comes to the conclusion that the plea is false, frivolous and mala fide on the face of it then there is no question of referring the matter to the Mamlatdar for a report. The jurisdiction given to the Collector is very limited as no appeal is provided from the decision. Therefore, the Collector would not enter into complicated questions of fact and law with regard to title. These matters are best left either to the Mamlatdar under section 70(b) of the Act or the matter ought to be referred to the Civil Court. Any other interpretation, according to the Counsel, would mean that the Collector would have dual jurisdiction i.e. the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar as also the jurisdiction of the Collector. Secondly it has been submitted by Mr. Rane that a bare perusal of the judgment of the M.R.T. shows that complicated questions of law and fact were involved in order to decide whether or not a valid tenancy existed in favour of the petitioner. It is submitted that the M.R.T. has given the judgment by ignoring the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Mallasha S. Mangonda v. Khadir A. Aherwad)1, reported in 71 Bom.L.R. 523. 4.Mr. Hombalkar on the other hand has submitted that the Collector has the jurisdiction to decide whether or not the petitioner was a tenant even under section 84 of the Act. Counsel further submits that the decisions cited by Mr. Rane rather supports the case of the respondent. Making reference to various paragraphs of the judgment it is submitted that since the Mamlatdar had already decided that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation of the land the Collector has merely ordered his eviction under section 84 of the Act. Counsel further submits that the decisions cited by Mr. Rane rather supports the case of the respondent. Making reference to various paragraphs of the judgment it is submitted that since the Mamlatdar had already decided that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation of the land the Collector has merely ordered his eviction under section 84 of the Act. Even if there were any complicated questions of law and fact those had been answered by the Mamlatdar on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties. In view of the above it is submitted that the judgment given by the M.R.T. is perfectly in according with the order of remand passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 859 of 1975. It is further submitted that this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India will interfere with the orders of the Tribunal only if it comes to the conclusion that there is an error apparent on the face of the record. In the present case the M.R.T. has merely passed an order on directions of this Court. Therefore, any finding of fact given by the M.R.T. cannot be labelled to have been given beyond the jurisdiction of the M.R.T. under section 76 of the Act. 5.I have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by both the Counsel. A perusal of the order of this Court is Special Civil Application No. 859 of 1975 shows that this Court even at that stage had come to a conclusion that there are voluminous evidence which had been ignored by the Tribunal. Therefore, direction was given to the Tribunal to consider the voluminous evidence. It had also been directed by this Court that the Tribunal is to restrict its enquiry merely to the question as to whether or not the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation of the land. Thereafter the Tribunal was directed to consider the various provisions of the Act with particular reference to section 84 of the Act. It is in this context that the order of the Tribunal has to be examined. A perusal of the order of the M.R.T. dated 21-1-84 shows that the Tribunal has noticed the facts leading upto the order of remand passed by this Court. It is in this context that the order of the Tribunal has to be examined. A perusal of the order of the M.R.T. dated 21-1-84 shows that the Tribunal has noticed the facts leading upto the order of remand passed by this Court. After noticing the argument of the Counsel to the effect that the question posed is to be determined under section 70 (b) of the Act, the same has been rejected. The unreported judgment of this Court given in (Special C. A. No. 3990 of 1958 dated 19th September, 1959)2 has been distinguished. This judgment has been distinguished on the ground that in the present case the question of tenancy is already decided by the Tenancy Aval Karkun, Karad. The observations of the M.R.T. in this respect which are relevant may be reproduced as under: "7. It is true as held in Spl. C. A. No. 3990 of 1958, Dt. 19-9-1959 relied upon by Mr. Avhad and referred to above by me the application under section 84 of the Tenancy Act should be kept pending till the decision of the question about tenancy. However, it appears that in the present case before us the question about tenancy is already decided by the Tenancy A.K. Karad. After Vishnu Kundlik filed before the Collector, Satara an application under section 84 of the Tenancy Act, the Asstt. Collector, Satara by this order Dt. 13-7-71 forwarded that application to the Tahasildar, Karad for enquiry and detailed report. Accordingly the Tenancy A.K. Karad, heard the application. He recorded the evidence and gave his finding. In that he held that Bandu Yesu Mali opponent No. 4 in the original application is not a tenant for the suit land. He accordingly made a report to the Asstt. Collector, Satara Dn. vide pages 243 to 255 of file No. 1 of the Trial Court's record. So the Tenancy A. K., Karad has already decided the question about tenancy and has held that Bandu Yesu Mali is not a tenant for the suit land. It is, therefore, not necessary to refer again to the Tenancy Court that question about the tenancy of Bandu Yesu Mali. I, therefore, do not accept the submission made by Mr. Avhad in this respect." The aforesaid finding is clearly against the directions given by the High Court in the order of remand passed in Special Civil Application No. 859 of 1975. I, therefore, do not accept the submission made by Mr. Avhad in this respect." The aforesaid finding is clearly against the directions given by the High Court in the order of remand passed in Special Civil Application No. 859 of 1975. In my view, on this ground alone the order of the M.R.T. is liable to be set aside. However, the M.R.T. thereafter considered the merits of the case. Again it is held that even on merits the petitioner has failed to prove his tenancy. For coming to the aforesaid finding the M.R.T. notices that the petitioner could not prove that he took on lease the land from the landlord. The discrepancies in this evidences are noticed. It is held that except his bare word there is no evidence to show that the land was leased out to him by the landlords. It is further held that the landlords themselves do not support the case of the petitioner. Thereafter the Tribunal considers the evidence with regard to Record of Rights. These entries are discarded on the ground that they have been made behind the back of respondent No. 4. The M.R.T. notices that in the RTS proceedings a direction was given to respondent No. 1 to take out an application under section 70 (b) of the Act. Even then the entries are discarded on the ground that the entries in Recorded of Rights cannot establish the title of the petitioner as a tenant. It is matter of record that proceedings in the Record of Rights were commenced by respondent No. 1. It was complained by respondent No. 1 that the petitioner has wrongly got himself his name entered in the Record of Rights. This Record of Rights proceedings came to be decided in favour of the petitioner. Appeal No. 25 of 1967 filed by respondent No. 1 was dismissed. There was no revision filed against the said order. Therefore mutation entry in the name of the petitioner came to be certified after following the procedure under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. The certification of the mutation entry was not challenged. Inspite of all this, the M.R.T. says that except the statement of the petitioner to the effect that he is a tenant, there is no evidence to establish that he is a tenant. There is another piece of evidence which has again been ignored by the Tribunal. The certification of the mutation entry was not challenged. Inspite of all this, the M.R.T. says that except the statement of the petitioner to the effect that he is a tenant, there is no evidence to establish that he is a tenant. There is another piece of evidence which has again been ignored by the Tribunal. Proceedings were taken before the Charity Commissioner. These proceedings are held to be of no importance. Even the rent receipts and the payment of Revenue receipts which are produced by the petitioner were discarded on the ground that they do not relate to the suit land. Even in these circumstances it is submitted by the Counsel for the respondent that the findings returned by the M.R.T. are within his jurisdiction under section 76 of the Act. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the Counsel for the respondent. No doubt this Court will not interfere with findings of fact if there is some evidence to support the same. This Court while exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India will certainly interfere with findings of fact which are perverse and it appears to the Court that no reasonable Tribunal could have come to a conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal. Even the remand order passed on the ground that the order passed by the M.R.T. earlier had failed to take into account voluminous evidence. This voluminous evidence is enumerated by this Court in the remand order. A perusal of the judgment of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 859 of 1975 clearly shows that it is held that if the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the petitioner is a tenant, the finding would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Thereafter a direction is given to examine the issue purely from the point of view as to whether or not the petitioner is an unauthorised occupant for the purpose of section 84 of the Act. With regard to the evidence which have been led by the parties this Court has observed that: " It appears that he has not even applied his mind to the material evidence which has been placed by the parties on the record. There are mutation entries, there are entries in the Record of Rights, there are some money order coupons and there is also oral evidence given by the parties . There are mutation entries, there are entries in the Record of Rights, there are some money order coupons and there is also oral evidence given by the parties . There is also the evidence of the Wahiwatdar. I am told that there are rent receipts and also revenue receipts on the record filed by the parties. This voluminous evidence does not appear to have been considered by the learned Member of the Tribunal. In view of this it is necessary to remand the matter to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to decide afresh the revision application filed by respondent No. 4." From what has been narrated above it appears that these observations have not been kept in view at all. The oral evidence, the evidence in the Record of Rights, the evidence given before the Charity Commissioner have all been discarded on wholly falacious grounds. On this ground also I find that the order of the M.R.T. deserves to be set aside. 6. The question which now remains to be examined is as to whether under section 84 the Collector had the jurisdiction to decide as to whether or not the petitioner was a tenant. Here again the M.R.T. has committed an error of law. On the one hand he has discarded the whole evidence and held that the petitioner is not a tenant. On the other hand a clear cut finding is given to the effect that it is not necessary to decide as to whether or not the petitioner is a tenant as the Mamlatdar has already decided that he is not a tenant. The circumstances in which the Mamlatdar in this case came to give his report has already been noticed above. The Mamlatdar was required only to submit a report to the Collector under section 84 of the Act. The Mamlatdar was not required to give a finding as to whether or not the petitioner is a tenant. The finding, if any, had to be given by the Collector. The relevant portion of the report submitted has been extracted above. The Mamlatdar has clearly held that the petitioner is not a tenant. In these circumstances can it be said that the decision given by the Collector is the decision given by the competent authority under section 84 of the Act? The relevant portion of the report submitted has been extracted above. The Mamlatdar has clearly held that the petitioner is not a tenant. In these circumstances can it be said that the decision given by the Collector is the decision given by the competent authority under section 84 of the Act? If the Collector is to give a decision under section 84 of the Act, the decision has to be his and his alone. It cannot be based on a finding given by the Mamlatdar. The finding of the Mamlatdar given under section 70(b) of the Act can be confirmed by the Collector only when he is acting as an Appellate Court. In the present case it appears that the Mamlatdar has acted in the capacity of a Collector and the Collector has acted in the capacity of a Mamlatdar. Keeping these facts and circumstances in view we have to examine the submission of the Counsel for the parties. 7.A perusal of Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Kashiram S. Doble v. M.R.T. Nagpur and others)3, A.I.R. 1970 Bombay 366 clearly shows that the Collector does have powers to decide incidental questions as to whether or not a person is in unauthorised occupation of the suit lands. In other words the Collector has the power to examine the issue if it is found that on the face of it the plea raised by the alleged tenant is frivolous or mala fide. Reference in this connection may be made to paragraph 18 of the said judgment which is quoted as under : "We have already said that section 124 does not apply in the instant case and there is no express exclusion of jurisdiction by the provisions of section 100 so far as the Collector's powers under section 120 are concerned. Thus here we have two provisions in the Act of equal force, one giving jurisdiction to the Tahsildar to decide whether a person is a tenant and the other giving jurisdiction to the Collector to decide whether any person is unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land. Thus here we have two provisions in the Act of equal force, one giving jurisdiction to the Tahsildar to decide whether a person is a tenant and the other giving jurisdiction to the Collector to decide whether any person is unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land. It seems to us that where such a conflict arises in an application under section 120, the Collector will have to see whether in substance the application before him is an application complaining of unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession of any person in the first place and if he comes to the conclusion that such a person is unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession he would have jurisdiction under section 120 even if that person raises the plea that he is a tenant. The mere raising of the plea would not as in the case of the Civil Court, oust the jurisdiction of the Collector. The Collector will have to look to the substance of the matter and decide whether it is a dispute regarding unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession or it is in substance a dispute regarding tenancy. If the latter, he must refer the matter to the Tahsildar. If the former, he will have jurisdiction to decide it. It will not be sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the Collector for a person to say that he is a tenant if on the face of the material before the Collector it appears to him that the plea of tenancy is one which cannot reasonably be raised or is not bona fide or the Collector comes to the express conclusion that it is raised mala fide. This may be difficult to decide in given cases, but in the absence of specification by the law as to whose jurisdiction is to prevail, that appears to us to be the only test to indicate the dividing line between two over lapping jurisdictions. The Collector must of course also see that the following conditions (which we have already discussed above) are fulfilled. The Collector must of course also see that the following conditions (which we have already discussed above) are fulfilled. (1) that a person is unauthorisedly in occupation or wrongful in possession; (2) that the other provisions of the Act do not provide for the eviction of such a person and (3) that the conditions required by clauses (a), (b) and (c) are fulfilled; (4) in deciding the application the Collector must apply his mind to the material before him and because the remedy is summary it will not be enough for him to say "sic Volo, sic Jubeo ("I wish it therefore it shall be"). He must consider such material as he has before him and write an order giving his reasons. (5) the Collector must also bear in mind that the power which he exercises is a very drastic power and we have no doubt that he will exercise it with care, construing the provisions strictly in case of doubt. (6) In cases where complicated questions of law and fact arise the Collector moreover has a discretion to refer the parties to the Civil Courts or leave them to take any other remedy that they may be entitled to." These observations in my view do not help the submissions of the respondent at all. Consequently I am of the view that the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the order passed by the M.R.T. dated 21-1-1984 deserves to be quashed and set aside. At this stage, Counsel for the petitioner has requested that the matter ought to be remanded back to the Mamlatdar. This submission is made on the basis that the petitioner has taken out an application under section 70(b) of the Act being Tenancy Case No. 70 B/4/79. In view of the pendency of this application the present proceedings can also be disposed of along with the said application. I am not inclined to remand the matter back. The present proceedings have arisen out of an application filed under section 84 of the Act. Thus the matter cannot be remanded back to the Mamlatdar. If the remand was to be made it would have to be made only to the Assistant Collector with a direction to decide the matter in accordance with observations made above. In my view, even that would be a fruitless exercise. Consequently the writ petition is allowed. Thus the matter cannot be remanded back to the Mamlatdar. If the remand was to be made it would have to be made only to the Assistant Collector with a direction to decide the matter in accordance with observations made above. In my view, even that would be a fruitless exercise. Consequently the writ petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute and the impugned order of the M.R.T. dated 21-1-1984 and the order of the Collector dated 1-6-74 sic (84) are hereby quashed and set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. Certified copy expedited. Petition allowed. *****