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1997 DIGILAW 511 (GUJ)

Jyoti Switchgears Ltd. v. Workman Kheda Jilla Factory Kamdar Union

1997-09-22

S.K.KESHOTE

body1997
S. K. KESHOTE, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, Jyoti Switchgears Ltd. , Mogar has filed this special civil application challenging, the award of the Industrial Tribunal, at Ahmedabad, dated 25th July, 1983 in Reference (IT) No. 155 of 1976 by which the petitioner was directed to pay all its workmen, working in its factory, bonus for the accounting year 1974 at the rate of 20% of their annual wages. For that accounting year the Company paid bonus at the rate of 4% of the annual wages of the workmen and as such the Tribunal directed the petitioner to pay balance amount of bonus. ( 2 ) THE respondent-Kheda Jilla Factory Kamdar Union, raised industrial dispute regarding bonus to be paid to the workmen working in the petitioners establishment for the accounting year 1974 and demand was raised for payment thereof at the rate of 20% of their annual wages. This industrial dispute has been referred by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal at Ahmedabad for adjudication. Under the impugned award, the tribunal decided the reference in favour of the respondent. Hence this special civil application. ( 3 ) THE counsel for the parties made manifold contentions in support of their case. But i do not consider it necessary to advert to all those cotentions as in my considered opinion the matter deserves to be remanded back to the Industrial Tribunal for fresh decision. ( 4 ) WHILE dealing with the dispute the Industrial Tribunal has not accepted the amount of royalty paid by the company to Jyoti Limited, Baroda, to be deductible as revenue expenditure. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the aforesaid amount has been accepted to be revenue expenditure by the Income Tax Department for all the years including the disputed financial year. Those orders of the Income Tax authorities including the decision of the Income Tax Tribunal were produced before the industrial Tribunal, but that material evidence has not been considered in its correct perspective. This evidence has altogether been excluded from consideration by the tribunal by holding that it is not bound by the decision of the Income Tax Officers. Those orders of the Income Tax authorities including the decision of the Income Tax Tribunal were produced before the industrial Tribunal, but that material evidence has not been considered in its correct perspective. This evidence has altogether been excluded from consideration by the tribunal by holding that it is not bound by the decision of the Income Tax Officers. ( 5 ) RELYING on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Crompton parkinson vs. Its workmen, reported in AIR 1959 SC 1059, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the decision of the Income Tax Department allowing the amount of service fees as legtimate revenue expences is relevant and material evidence to be considered. However, it may not be binding, but that evidence has to be considered and the reasons have to be given by the Industrial Tribunal where it is not accepting the decision of the Income Tax Department on this issue. He further submitted that the income Tax Department has to see that any profit of the company cannot be taken away as a revenue expense. Mere demand of the (sic) will not be accepted by the Income Tax department unless it is satisfied that it is in fact a revenue expenditure. On the other hand shri Dave, learned counsel for the respondent fairly submitted that the Tribunal may not be correct in its approach, but only on this ground the judgment is not. The Tribunal has given out other cogent and justified reason for not accepting this amount to be deductible revenue expense while determining actual profit of the company for Bonus payment purposes. ( 6 ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submission made by the counsel for the parties. In the case of Crompton Parkinson (Supra) the Supreme Court held as under: "the test of "commercial necessity" applied by the Income-Tax authorities for (sic) allowable under Sec. 10 (2) (xv) of the Indian Income-Tax Act could not be applied by the Tribunal. The Income-Tax authorities were entitled to apply the test of commercial necessity by reason of the express provisions of Sec. 10 (2) (xv) which authorised them to arrive at the taxable income, profits and gains after making allowance for expenditure laid out and expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. There was no such provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act. There was no such provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act. A conclusion drawn by the Tribunal without adverting to the evidence before it amounts to an error of law and cannot possibly be sustained. " ( 7 ) IN that case the Tribunal has paid no attention to the fact that appearing in the evidence on record before him, that the Income-Tax department had allowed the service fee as legitimate revenue expense and the entire amount of the service fee was allowed as a deduction by income-tax authorities every year as a revenue expenditure wholly and exclusively incurred as a matter of commercial necessity of the companys business. So the Honble Supreme Court has taken that this evidence to be taken into consideration by the Industrial Tribunal while dealing with the question of rates at which bonus is to be paid by the employer to the employees in a given acounting year. In this case the company was not liable to pay bonus to its employees for first five years from the date of commencement of its production. But during these five years also the petitioner has claimed the service fees expenses paid to Jyoti Limited, Baroda, as revenue expenses and the Income-Tax authorities have allowed that to be deductible revenue expenses in the income-tax. Thereafter for all subsequent years this amount is claimed by the petitioners as revenue expenditure which has been accepted. The matter has gone to the stage of income-Tax Tribunal and there also, as it is apparent from the decision, though may be of the assesment year 1975-76, it was accepted to be a revenue expenditure. That decision of the Income-Tax Tribunal has been affirmed by this Court in the income-tax reference. Learned counsel for the petitioner is correct to say that the Tribunal excluded this material evidence from consideration on altogether irrelevant consideration. The decision of the income Tax Department may not be binding, but nevertheless it has persuasive bearing more so where the matter has been decided this Court in reference, then it has to be considered, though for the reasons recorded it could have not been accepted by the industrial Tribunal. But only by saying that the decision of Income-Tax Department is not binding is nothing but only excluding from consideration relevant piece of evidence. Only on this short ground this Special Civil Application deserves to be allowed. But only by saying that the decision of Income-Tax Department is not binding is nothing but only excluding from consideration relevant piece of evidence. Only on this short ground this Special Civil Application deserves to be allowed. ( 8 ) IN view of the fact that on the aforesaid short ground the petition succeeds I do not consider it necessary to deal with other contentions raised by the counsel for the parties, as it shall be open to both the parties to make their submission on all the points before the tribunal on the basis of whatever evidence which is already there on record of the industrial Tribunal. It is made clear that neither the petitioner not the respondent is at liberty to produce any further evidence oral or documentary on the record of the Industrial tribunal. The Tribunal has to decide the matter only on the basis of the evidence which has already been produced by the parties, after hearing both parties. However, both the parties are entitled to raise all the grounds available to them on the basis of the evidence which has already been produced on record of the case. ( 9 ) IN the result the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 25-7-1983 is quashed and set aside. It is an old matter and as such the same has to be decided at an early date. To avoid any further delay in service of notice of hearing, both the parties are directed to present themselves before the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat, Ahmedabad on 24th november, 1997. It is expected of the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad to decide the matter within four months thereafter. Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No order as to costs. .