SUDHIR NARAIN, J. The petitioner seeks writ of certiorari quashing the judg ment and decree dated 8-2-1992 passed by the Judge Small Causes Court, Meerut, respondent No. 2 and order dated 5-4-1997 passed by respondent No. 1 dismissing the revision against aforesaid judgment. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that respondent No. 3 filed suit No. 538 of 1984 for recovery of arrears of rent, ejectment and damage for use and occupation of the disputed premises against the petitioner on the allegations that a notice was sent to the petitioner demanding arrears of rent from 20- 12-1981 to 26-9-1984 at the rate of Rs. 55/- per month, on 22-8-1984. The notice on him was served on 27-8-1984. But inspite of service of said notice he did not comply with the same. He committed default in payment of arrears of rent and was liable for eject ment. 3. The petitioner contested the suit. It was stated that rent was deposited in the proceedings under Section 30 (2) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short referred to as the Act ). He did not commit any default. The owner of the premises in dispute was respondent No. 3 and his mother Smt. Neelma jointly, and both having not joined, the suit was not main tainable. The number of the shop in ques tion is 231 while it has been wrongly men tioned as 232 in the notice. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit on the finding that deposit under Section 30 (2) of the Act was made after service of the notice and, secondly, there was no material to show that there was any bonafide dispute regarding the title of the property in be tween the alleged co-owners. Notice was held to be valid and it was found that respondent No. 3 was sole landlord. The petitioner filed revision against the judg ment and decree of the trial Court which has been dismissed by impugned order dated 5. 4-1997 of respondent No, 1. 5. Shri P. K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged that the petitioner had not committed default in payment of arrears of rent as after receipt of notice he had deposited the amount under Section 30 (2) of the Act. 6. 4-1997 of respondent No, 1. 5. Shri P. K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged that the petitioner had not committed default in payment of arrears of rent as after receipt of notice he had deposited the amount under Section 30 (2) of the Act. 6. The tenant is entitled to deposit the rent in the Court under sub-section (1) when the landlord refuses to accept the rent and under sub-section (.) where any bonafide doubt or dispute his arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive rent in respect of the building under the tenancy of the applicant. In case the landlord sends the notice to the tenant demanding rent from him, the tenant after receipt of such notice is bound to pay rent to the landlord. He is not entitled to deposit the rent under Section 30 (1) of the Act after receipt of the notice and any deposit made by him after receipt of the notice shall not be treated as valid. The landlord by giving notice signifies that he is prepared to accept the rent and after receipt of the notice there is no justification for the tenant to deposit rent in Court under Sec tion 30 (1) of the Act. 7. Where any bonafide doubt or dis pute arises as to the person who has to receive the rent in respect of any building, if the tenant receives notice from any of the landlords, he can deposit the amount in the Court under sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Act within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice. After making such deposit he can intimate to the landlord who is claiming rent from him that he has deposited rent in Court under Section 30 (2) of the Act within the time given in the notice. If the tenant inspite of receipt of the notice does not deposit the rent in the Court within 30 days from the date of service of notice, he cannot claim the benefit of such deposit as it was not made within 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. 8. If the tenant inspite of receipt of the notice does not deposit the rent in the Court within 30 days from the date of service of notice, he cannot claim the benefit of such deposit as it was not made within 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. 8. The tenant is liable to pay rent to the landlord within one month from the date of service of notice as provided under Section 30 (2) (a) of the Act and on his failure to do so he shall be defaulter. The tenant, to avoid such default, if wants to take benefit of deposit under Section 30 (2) of the Act on the ground that there is dispute between the landlords or bonafide doubt as to whom the rent is payable, he has to deposit the amount within one month from the date of receipt of notice under Section 30 (2) of the Act. The deposit of rent under Section 30 (2) of the Act, after expiry of 30 days from the date of service on the tenant is of no consequence as Section 30 (6) of the Act itself provides that the date of deposit shall be deemed as the date of payment to the landlord. Admitted ly, the petitioner was served notice on 27- 8-1984, but he deposited the rent under Sec tion 30 (2) of the Act on 24-11-1984. Secondly, the Courts below have come to the conclusion that there is no dispute be tween the landlords. He in these cir cumstances, was not entitled to the benefit of deposit under Section 30 (2) of the Act. 9. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there were two owners of the property in dispute name ly respondent No. 3 and his mother Smt Neelma. The Court below have considered this point and finding has been recorded that father of respondent No. 3 was owner of the property. After his death respondent No. 3 and his mother Smt. Neelma inherited the property. Thereafter, a family settle ment took place and it was settled that plaintiff and his mother both would be owner of the disputed premises. In case his mother Smt. Neelma remarries, respondent No. 3 will become sole owner. Smt. Neelma remarried and thereafter respondent No. 3 became sole owner of the property in dis pute. Thereafter, a family settle ment took place and it was settled that plaintiff and his mother both would be owner of the disputed premises. In case his mother Smt. Neelma remarries, respondent No. 3 will become sole owner. Smt. Neelma remarried and thereafter respondent No. 3 became sole owner of the property in dis pute. Further, it has been found that Jagdish Prasad, grandfather of respondent No. 3was realising the rent on behalf of respondent No. 3 and his mother. Jagdish Prasad still continues to be guardian of respondent No. 3 and after remarriage of Smt. Neelma he continued to realise the rent on behalf of respondent No. 3. Considering this aspect, it was held that respondent No. 3 was acting as sole landlord and notice was sent validly. This finding does not suffer from any il legality. 10. The third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the dis puted property was mentioned as 231 in the notice, but in fact it was 232. The petitioner never stated that he was tenant of any other premises numbered as 231. There was no confusion in his mind that notice did not relate to the premises taken by him. He never stated in his statement that he was misled by wrong mention of premises in question. 11. In view of the above, there is no merit in this writ petition and it is accord ingly dismissed. 12. In the end, the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that some time may be granted to vacate the premises in question. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner is granted three months time to vacate the disputed premises provided he gives written under taking on affidavit within ten days from today before respondent No. 2 that he would vacate the premises in question and handover its peaceful possession to the landlord-respondent No. 3 within the time granted by this Court. .