JUDGMENT - S.S. NIJJAR, J.:---In this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it is prayed that the judgement and order dated 6th October, 1982 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Kolhapur, (hereinafter referred to as "the M.R.T.") in Revision Application No. M.R.T. KP. 58/77 be quashed and set aside and the order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer for Minor Irrigation Work, Kolhapur dated 16th October, 1976 in Tenancy Appeal Nos. 16 and 17 of 1973 be restored. 2.At the outset if may be noticed in the present writ petition with regard to the proceedings in Appeal No. 16 have been dismissed by the orders of the Additional Registrar dated 26th June, 1986 for non-prosecution. Thus, the facts relating to the case of the petitioner No. 1 are noticed only for completion of the narration. 3.The petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are real brothers and the suit lands situate at village Shinoli Khurd and at village Shinoli are the ownership of the family of the petitioners. On 27th November, 1956, there was a partition in the family of the petitioners and the shares of the petitioners were separated by metes and bounds equitably and the suit lands were allotted to the petitioners separately. These lands were in possession of the respondents as tenants. The petitioner No. 1 was born on 8th December, 1945 and the petitioner No. 2 was born on 28th December, 1942. The petitioners applied separately for the grant of exemption certificate under section 88-C of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in respect of the properties allotted to their shares. The petitioner No. 1 obtained the certificate on 24th April, 1966, but the actual certificate was issued on 18th April, 1967. Petitioner No. 2 obtained the certificate on 29th March, 1964. However, inspite of the fact that the order was passed on 29th March, 1964, the actual certificate was issued on 30th October, 1965, as there was an application filed by the tenant under section 88-D of the Act for revocation of the certificate granted to the petitioner No. 2. The petitioners, therefore, issued the necessary notices for termination of the tenancy of the tenants, and thereafter filed an application for possession of the suit lands under section 33-B read with section 29 of the Act. The petitioners, therefore, issued the necessary notices for termination of the tenancy of the tenants, and thereafter filed an application for possession of the suit lands under section 33-B read with section 29 of the Act. The application filed by the petitioner No. 1 was numbered as Case No. 471 of 1967. This application was filed on 18th July, 1967. The Tenancy Aval Karkun, Chandgad, granted the application and directed the possession to be delivered to the petitioner No. 1 in respect of the suit lands after evicting the respondents/tenants by his judgement and order dated 30th September, 1967. Aggrieved by the decision, the tenant preferred Tenancy Appeal No. 352 of 1968 in the Court of Special Deputy Collector, Kolhapur. This appeal was allowed on 2nd November, 1968. The matter was remanded back to the Tenancy Aval Karkun afresh. After the remand, the case was renumbered as 10 of 1970. By his order dated 31st March, 1971, the application filed by the petitioner No. 1 was dismissed. However, the Appeal No. 122 of 1972 filed by the petitioner No. 1 was allowed by the Special Deputy Collector, Kolhapur on 19th May, 1972, and matter remanded back to the Tenancy Aval Karkun. Again on 28th September, 1972, the Tenancy Aval Karkun dismissed the application of the petitioner No. 1. Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioner No. 1 filed Tenancy Appeal No. 16 of 1973. This appeal was allowed on 24th June, 1973 and again the matter was remanded to the Tenancy Aval Karkun. In the meantime, the petitioner No. 2 had also filed application under section 33-B read with section 29 of the Act, which was numbered as Tenancy Case No. 427 of 1966. This application was also dismissed by the Tenancy Aval Karkun by his order dated 26th April, 1966. Petitioner No. 2 filed an appeal, which was allowed and the matter was remanded back to the Tenancy Aval Karkun. On remand the case was numbered as Tenancy Case No. 9 of 1970. The Tenancy Aval Karkun again dismissed the application of the petitioner No. 2 on 31st August, 1972. Aggrieved, against this order, the petitioner No. 2 filed Appeal No. 17 of 1973. On remand the case was numbered as Tenancy Case No. 9 of 1970. The Tenancy Aval Karkun again dismissed the application of the petitioner No. 2 on 31st August, 1972. Aggrieved, against this order, the petitioner No. 2 filed Appeal No. 17 of 1973. Both the Appeals No. 16 and 17 of 1973, came to be decided by a common judgement on 24th June, 1973, as the points involved in both the appeals were common, and one of the excluded tenants viz. Gavadu Vithoba Patil was a common party in both the appeals. The matter was remanded back to the Tenancy Aval Karkun with a specific direction to enquire only in respect of the point about bona fide requirement of the landlord to resume the suit lands and about the holdings of the landlord. It was made clear that no other point was open for enquiry to the trial Court. This decision was challenged by the petitioners before the M.R.T. by filing two separate Revision Applications No. M.R.T. KP. 12/1974 and M.R.T. KP. 13/1974. These two revision applications were also heard together. By order dated 28th October, 1974, the Revision Applications were allowed. It was held that there was no need of remanding the matters to the Tenancy Aval Karkun and the two points which were then surviving in the matter could well be decided by the Appellate Court. After remand, the Tenancy Appeal No. 16 and 17 of 1973 were heard and decided together by the Appellate Court The appeals were allowed and it was directed that the lands be restored to the petitioners after evicting the respondents. This order was passed on 16th October, 1976. The tenants filed Revision Application No. M.R.T. KP. 58 of 1977 in the M.R.T. The M.R.T. by its order dated 7th April, 1978 again remanded the matter back to the Appellate Authority for re-consideration in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgement. This decision of the M.R.T. was ex parte in the absence of the petitioners. Aggrieved against the decision of the M.R.T., the petitioners preferred Special Civil Application No. 1447 of 1978 in this Court. The said Special Civil Application was finally heard and decided on 21st June, 1982. The matter was remanded back to the M.R.T. for deciding the same on merits. Aggrieved against the decision of the M.R.T., the petitioners preferred Special Civil Application No. 1447 of 1978 in this Court. The said Special Civil Application was finally heard and decided on 21st June, 1982. The matter was remanded back to the M.R.T. for deciding the same on merits. It was observed that since the matter has been remanded on so many occasions, the M.R.T. shall decide the case on merits one way or the other after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard. In view of this remand order, the M.R.T. decided the matter on 6th October, 1982. By this order, the M.R.T. has held that the order passed by the Appellate Court on 16th October 1976 is illegal and is, therefore, set aside, and the order passed by the trial Court is restored. In other words, the application filed by the petitioners have been dismissed. In these circumstances, the present writ petition has been filed by the landlord petitioners. 4.It is submitted by Mr. Godbole appearing for the petitioners that the entire approach of the M.R.T. is erroneous. The M.R.T. has overlooked the fact that the point in respect of the validity and equitability of the partition between the petitioners' family members had been concluded long back. The same could not be reopened. It is submitted that once a certificate is issued under section 88-C of the Act, it was not open to the authority to again examine the point of bona fide personal necessity of the petitioner for cultivation of the land. Nor could the courts examine that the partition was not in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act. It is submitted that the very purpose of the proceedings under section 88-C is to examine all the points in dispute before issuing a certificate under section 88-C. It is further submitted that a perusal of the order of remand dated 28th October, 1974 would show that this position had actually been accepted by the M.R.T. It had clearly been stated that only two points are left open to be decided on remand. It was observed that the points which need consideration are the bona fide requirement of the landlord i.e. whether the present application attracts the provisions of section 33-B(5)(b) and on the point of holding. It was observed that the points which need consideration are the bona fide requirement of the landlord i.e. whether the present application attracts the provisions of section 33-B(5)(b) and on the point of holding. In other words, all that was required to be done was to see whether the petitioners were holding any land other than the suit land and whether the suit land was required for personal cultivation. It is submitted that in view of section 88-C(5) this order of remand was correctly passed. That section provides that once a certificate is issued under section 88-C, the decision on the basis of which the certificate is issued shall be final and binding on the parties. It is further submitted by the Counsel that section 33-B(4) is attracted only in a case where a certificate is obtained under section 88-C during the disability and the application under section 33-B(1) is made during the disability. This application is made after the cessation of the disability. Section 33-B(4) will apply only in a case where the application under section 33-B is not made during the subsistance of disability, but is in fact made after the disability has ceased. In that case, an additional period is granted to such a landlord for making application. In these circumstances, the proviso to section 33-B(4) would apply. Since in the present case, the application for certificate under section 88-C was made when the disability had already ceased, in that the petitioners have become major, the provisions of sub-section (4) and the proviso to section 33-B would not apply. For making good these submissions, the Counsel has relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court given in the case of (Smt. Krishnabai Anaji Ghule and others v. Nivrutti Ramchandra Raykar and another)1, reported in A.I.R. 1983 Supreme Court page 1213. The Counsel has relied upon para 11, 12, 13 and 14. The Counsel has also relied upon un-reported case in (Special Civil Application No. 266 of 1967 decided on 5th April, 1972)2, and (Special Civil Application No. 505 of 1966 decided on 24th April, 1970)3. 5.Mr. The Counsel has relied upon para 11, 12, 13 and 14. The Counsel has also relied upon un-reported case in (Special Civil Application No. 266 of 1967 decided on 5th April, 1972)2, and (Special Civil Application No. 505 of 1966 decided on 24th April, 1970)3. 5.Mr. Rane on the other hand has submitted that the judgement of the Supreme Court given in Smt. Krishnabai Anaji Ghule and others v. Nivrutti Ramchandra Raykar and another can be distinguished on the ground that it did not deal with the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 33-B. It is also submitted by Mr. Rane that the facts of the present case are squarely covered by the ratio given by the Division Bench of this Court in (1980 T.L.R. page 13)4. It is submitted by the Counsel that the provision of section 88-C is an exemption provision. As originally framed, the section did not make any provision for the contingencies which have been now provided for in section 33-A, 33-B and 33-C of Act. These provisions were introduced by an amendment, which was inserted by the Maharashtra Act No. 0 of 1961. It is further submitted that if the interpretation sought to be placed by the Counsel for the petitioners is accepted, it would render the provisions of section 33-A, 33-B and 33-C nugatory. It is submitted that it was always open to the Court to decide the questions of the bona fide of the petitioners when deciding the application under section 33-B. For deciding the bona fide, it was also necessary to see whether or not the petitioner had fulfilled the conditions prescribed in the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 33-B. It is submitted that the reasoning given by the M.R.T. for disregarding the partition allegedly made is perfectly valid. It is submitted that the enquiry under section 88-C is only to see that if the landlord has a title to the land. The enquiry under 88-C does not examine the question as to how the title was obtained. This question can only be examined when the application under section 33-B(4) is to be decided. It is also submitted by Mr. The enquiry under 88-C does not examine the question as to how the title was obtained. This question can only be examined when the application under section 33-B(4) is to be decided. It is also submitted by Mr. Rane that in view of the remand order of the High Court on the basis of which the judgements have been delivered by the M.R.T., it could not be held that the findings about the legality or otherwise of the partition had reached finality, on issue of a certificate under section 88-C. 6.I have carefully considered the arguments put forward by the Counsel. A perusal of section 88-C would show that it commences with a saving clause with regard to the provisions contained in section 33-A, 33-B and 33-C of the Act. The section aims to protect the title and interest of a small and petty land holder whose total income does not exceed Rs. 1,500/-. This protection is, however, made subject to the provisions of section 33-A, 33-B and 33-C. The section 33-A provides that certificated landlord means a person who holds a certificate issued to him under sub-section (4) of section 88-C. Excluded tenant means a tenant of land to which sections 32 to 32-R do not apply by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 88-C. In other words, the very valuable right of deemed purchase has been taken away from a tenant of a certificated landlord. Section 33-B provides that a certificated landlord may after giving notice and after making an application for possession as provided in sub-section (3), terminate the tenancy of excluded tenant, if the landlord bona fide requires such land for cultivating it personally. Sub-section (2) of section 33-B provides that a certificated landlord may make an application under sub-section (3) even though he may have earlier filed an application in accordance with section 31 sub-section (2) and the same is pending before the revenue authorities. The application can be made even if the same has been rejected by any authority before the commencement. Sub-section (3) provides that the notice to be given under sub-section (1) shall be in writing which shall be served on the tenant before the 1st day of January, 1962, but if an application under section 88-C is undisposed of and pending on that date then within three months of his receiving such certificate. Sub-section (3) provides that the notice to be given under sub-section (1) shall be in writing which shall be served on the tenant before the 1st day of January, 1962, but if an application under section 88-C is undisposed of and pending on that date then within three months of his receiving such certificate. Sub-section (4) provides an extended period of time in which the application can be made by a disabled landlord. It provides that in the category of these landlords, if no notice or application has been made as required under sub-section (1) and (3), then suit notice may be given within one year from the date of the cessation of the disability. In order to take advantage of this extension in time, this kind of a landlord has to satisfy the conditions stipulated in the proviso to the sub-section. In the present case, no application was made on behalf of the petitioners under sub-section (1) and (3). The petitioner No. 2 was a minor upto 20th December, 1960. The application was filed by the petitioner No. 2 in 1961. This is within the time prescribed under Rule 53 of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Rules 1956. This rule provides that an application under sub-section (2) of section 88-C shall be made on Form XXIV on or before 30th September, 1961. 7.If the arguments of Mr. Godbole are accepted, it would amount to deleting the provisions of section 33. Section 88-C before amendment had placed complete embargo on the tenant of a certificated landlord to the benefit of section 32 to 32-R of the Act. As a result, landlords were able to avoid the rigours of section 32 by resorting to paper partitions in the family. Keeping this in view, section 88-C was amended and section 33 was inserted in the Act. Proviso to section 33-B(4) is identical to the proviso to section 31(3), 32(F)(1). All these provisions ensure that the partition is genuine. In order to satisfy the provisions of the Act, each member of the family must get his equitable share. 8.The arguments raised by Mr. Godbole have been squarely answered by the Division Bench of this Court in (Special Civil Application No. 629-30/73 dated 10th March, 1978)5. The facts in that case are very similar to the facts in the present case. 8.The arguments raised by Mr. Godbole have been squarely answered by the Division Bench of this Court in (Special Civil Application No. 629-30/73 dated 10th March, 1978)5. The facts in that case are very similar to the facts in the present case. The first point raised before the Division Bench was whether it was open at all to the Revenue Tribunal to go behind the section 88-C certificate and to permit an enquiry before the Tahsildar as to whether the partition by which the minor landlords got title was of equitable type so as to fulfil the conditions mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 33-B. The second point raised was whether in an enquiry under section 33-B where a minor landlord applies through a guardian under sub- sections (1) and (3) thereof, is the proviso to sub-section (4) attracted at all. After analysing the relevant provisions, the Division Bench has held as follows : "After having provided this extended time for persons under disability, follows the proviso. This proviso then deals with these landlords who can be described as disabled landlords. If any of such disabled landlord is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply, if any one of the members of the joint family does not belong to any of the categories mentioned in this sub-section, unless the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds before the first day of March 1958 and the Mamlatdar on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated (having regard to the area, assessment, classification value of the land) in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property and not in a larger proportion. In other words, if a person under the disability is a certificated landlord who owes his title to a partition in a joint family, it must be shown that the partition was equitable and equal in all respects and not a colourable one made with a view to enable the disabled landlord to recover more land from the tenant, which he would have legitimately and equitably got to his share. In other words, inequitable partition with a view to permit the minor to recover more land from the tenant, which would otherwise be possible under an equitable partition, is the subject-matter of this proviso. It is the purpose of the proviso to prevent any such mechanism made available by an adult member of a joint Hindu family to enable a minor to obtain more land than which would equitably fall to his share. In fact the only facility that is given by sub-section (4) is to postpone the date of giving notice to be served and application to be filed are of the same type contemplated by section 33-B(3). The provisions of the Tenancy Act elsewhere also indicate the same proposition. For instance, proviso to section 31(3) as also the provisions of section 32-F(1) point out in the same direction and prevent an artificial partition permitting the minor to recover more land from the tenant than otherwise he would be entitled to a fair and equitable partition. If that has been the intention of the Legislature throughout the Act, it cannot be said that the proviso to sub-section (4), is to be confined only to a circumstance where the belated application under sub-section (4) has been filed and not to an application which is filed on behalf of a minor or a person under disability under the provisions of section 33-B(1) to (3). Eventhough the proviso is placed in sub-section (4), it has a universal application to section 33-B and it qualifies the entire section and not sub-section (4) only. Interpreting this proviso in this manner is the only way in which the real intention of the Legislature running throughout this Act could be properly enforced. We are, therefore, of the view that when a minor is taking advantage of a prior partition to base his title for recovery of possession as a certificated landlord, he must not only prove the bona fides of his requirement for personal cultivation, but he must also satisfy the provisions of the proviso to section 33-B(4)." 9.In view of the above, it has to be held that the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal is not open to interference by this Court. The judgement of the Supreme Court noticed above, is clearly distinguishable as the same did not deal with the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 33-B. Consequently, the writ petition is devoid of any merit. The same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Certified copy expedited. Petition dismissed.