Judgment :- 1. Tenant who was directed to vacate the premises by the Appellate Authority, has come to this Court, challenging the decision. Respondent herein filed R.C.O.P. No. 38 of 1986, on the file of Rent Controller, Dindigul. 2. In his Eviction Petition, respondent alleged that he is living in the upstair portion of his house with his family and children. His eldest son is a licensed stamp vendor, and his wife is also doing business in the upstairs portion, selling betel-nut leaves. The younger son is studying in school and the daughter is undergoing Teachers Training. It is alleged that the petitioner/landlords wife and son who are doing business in the upstairs portion find it very difficult to carry on their business, and there is no sufficient space for all the members of the family to live together. Children are also growing. The accommodation is insufficient. Hence the landlord filed the Eviction Petition. 3. Petitioner herein is a tenant in respect of a portion of the premises and, therefore, the same is required as an additional accommodation for the eviction petitioner and the members of his family for the purpose of residence as well as for doing business. A notice was also issued demanding vacant possession for which a reply notice was sent, refusing to comply with the demand, necessitating the filing of the Eviction Petition. 4. In the counter statement, the revision petitioner/tenant alleged that the claim for additional accommodation can be had only for the landlord and not for the members of the family, and it is something personal to him. It is further contended that an additional accommodation cannot be claimed for the purpose of business as well as residence, for, the landlord himself is not sure as to for what purpose the accommodation is required. He further said that the present accommodation of the landlord is more than sufficient for his requirement, and the claim is not bona fide. He further contended that if he is asked to vacate, he will be put to very great hardship. 5. Rent Controller, after taking evidence, came to the conclusion that a claim for additional accommodation is personal to the landlord and it cannot go to the members of the family, and since it is claimed both for residential and non-residential purpose, the claim is not maintainable. 5. Rent Controller, after taking evidence, came to the conclusion that a claim for additional accommodation is personal to the landlord and it cannot go to the members of the family, and since it is claimed both for residential and non-residential purpose, the claim is not maintainable. It further found that the claim is not bona fide, and the hardship that will be caused to the tenant will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. The Eviction Petition was dismissed. 6. Aggrieved the same, landlord filed R.C.A. 13 of 1990, on the file of Appellate Authority, Dindigul. The Appellate Authority reversed the finding and held that the expression ‘personal use’ referred to in Sec. 10 (3) (c) of the Rent Control Act enures to the benefit of the members of the family as well. The claim is bona fide, and the landlord is entitled to get possession. It further found that the hardship pleaded by the tenant is not true, and cannot be accepted, and the Appellate Authority also took notice of the fact that the tenant has got other accommodation under his control. The additional accommodation was urgently required for the requirements of the landlord. Eviction was, therefore, ordered. 7. In this Revision, the learned counsel for the tenant submitted that the finding of the Appellate Authority that additional accommodation enures to the benefit of the members of the family also is against the wordings of the Statute. According to the learned counsel, when eviction is claimed on the ground of additional accommodation, words in the Statute are for personal occupation. In the same Statute, in the same Section, if different wordings are used, according to the learned counsel, that must be with a purpose and, therefore, the benefit of personal occupation cannot go to the members of the family. In this case, the landlord is not claiming additional accommodation for his requirement, but, for the requirement of his wife and son, though they are members of the family. 8. I do not think such a contention could be accepted. 9. In (1979) 1 SCC 273 (Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahmad Khan (dead) by L.R.s. and others), their Lordships were considering a similar provision under the lammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966. 8. I do not think such a contention could be accepted. 9. In (1979) 1 SCC 273 (Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahmad Khan (dead) by L.R.s. and others), their Lordships were considering a similar provision under the lammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966. Section 11 (1) (h) of that Act provided that the landlord may seek eviction of his tenant, where the house or shop was reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or re-building, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house or shop is held’. The argument was that the said provision is meant for the benefit of the landlord, and that it must be construed so as to advance the object of the Act. The said argument was repelled by the Supreme Court, by holding thus: — “.The word ‘occupation’ does not exclude the possibility of the landlord starting a business or running a hotel in the shop which also would amount to personal occupation by the landlord. The sub-section contemplates the actual possession of the landlord whether for his own residence or for his business. “Even if the landlord is running a hotel in the house he is undoubtedly in possession or occupation of the house in the legal sense of the term. Moreover, the section is wide enough to include the necessity of not only the landlord but also the persons who are living with him, as members of the family.” (Emphasis) In view of the said finding, their Lordships held that the requirement of the members of the family is also personal to the landlord, and eviction was ordered. 10. Our High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in a Division Bench judgment reported in 1984 I M.LJ. 155 = (1983) 96 L.W. 618 (Sivasankaran v. Kacharial Sowcar). 10. Our High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in a Division Bench judgment reported in 1984 I M.LJ. 155 = (1983) 96 L.W. 618 (Sivasankaran v. Kacharial Sowcar). In paragraph 12 of the judgment (at pages 160 and 161), their Lordships held thus: — “On a consideration of the above decisions, we are of the view that the requirement of the landlord in Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act cannot be confined to his personal requirement, and the landlord will be entitled to maintain a petition for eviction for additional accommodation under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act, if he “requires additional accommodation for residential purpose of himself or for any member of his family or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on by himself or by any member o f his family. It has to be remembered that the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is a special law supposedly enacted for a temporary period which is in the nature of a limitation upon the ordinary law of property as contained in the Transfer of Property Act. In other words, as rightly pointed out by Veeraswami, J. in Kangu v. Ahmed Unnissa Begum, the Act being a restriction upon the ownership and enjoyment of house property has to pass the test of reasonableness and in fact it was on that ground, among others, the validity of the Act was upheld, and consequently what the Act protects is only against an unreasonable eviction. Therefore, the words ‘his own occupation’ cannot be given a restricted meaning. We are unable to share the view expressed by Ramaprasada Rao, J., in Muthukumamswami v. A. Devaraj, and by Mohan, J. in Ramalingam v. Kothandaraman, that the words his ‘own occupation’ occurring is Section 10(3) (c) of the Act should be given a restricted meaning in view of the fact that Section 10 (3) (a) of the Act has been amended by the Legislature at the same time leaving Section 10 (c) unamended. As pointed out by Ratnam, J. in Dharmalinga Mudaliar v. Annamalai, it must be remembered that in K.G. Davasay v. The State of Madras represented by Secretary , a Division Bench of this Court held even on the language of section 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act as it then stood, that the words ‘for his own occupation or for the occupation of his son’ would include his daughter as well. If that be so, we are unable to hold that the words ‘his own occupation’ occurring in Section 10 (3 (c) of the Act should receive a restricted meaning. We are of the opinion that the words ‘if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on should be interpreted liberally and cannot be confined to the needs of the landlord personally but would also take the purposes of any member of his family. However, the distinction between Section 10 (3) (a) and Section 10 (3) (c) has to be maintained. In other words, in order to attract Section 10 (3) (c) the landlord who filed an application for eviction must be in occupation of a portion of the premises for residential purposes or for purposes of business which he is carrying on. We therefore answer the first question in the affirmative and hold that a member of the family of the landlord can seek the benefit of Section 10(3)(c) provided the conditions therein are satisfied. Therefore, we are of the view that the decision in Dharmalinga Mudaliar v. Annamalai, is correct and that the decision in Muthukumaraswamy v. Devaraj, is not correct and we overrule the same.” 11. In 1991 (2) KLT 279 (Arjunan v. Eranu), Paripoornan, J., as he then was, has said thus: — “Under S. 11 (8) of the Act, the words “if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use” are not confined to the landlord alone, but will also include the use by the members of his family, who want to live with him. “Personal use” in the context does not necessarily mean use by the landlord alone, but also includes use by the members of his family who want to live with him.” 12. The said argument can also be met from another angle. The members of the family of the landlord cannot claim eviction by themselves. “Personal use” in the context does not necessarily mean use by the landlord alone, but also includes use by the members of his family who want to live with him.” 12. The said argument can also be met from another angle. The members of the family of the landlord cannot claim eviction by themselves. They depend on the landlord or they expect that the landlord will provide them with accommodation. It is also the duty of the landlord to provide a comfortable living to the members of his family. In such circumstances, if a duty is also cast on the landlord to provide a comfortable living, and the members of the family also expect the landlord that he will provide them with such thing, it is the requirement of the landlord. It is something personal to the landlord, as well. If so, the argument of the learned counsel that the requirement will not be the requirement of the family, cannot be accepted. 13. Landlord can also take into consideration the requirement of the members of the family and provide them with all comforts. If that is an obligation on the part of the landlord, the tenant cannot say that even without such comforts, landlord can adjust in the available portion. Landlord has to decide on that aspect, and the view of the tenant is irrelevant. Even without the additional accommodation, the landlord may be in a position to adjust himself. But that is not the way in which the point has to be considered. In a decision of this Court reported in 94 L.W. 487 R.V. Dharmalinga Mudaliar v. K. Annamalai), Ratnam, J., as he then was, held that ‘It is certainly open to a landlord to ask for additional accommodation in order to provide his son to live comfortably with the members of his family enjoying all facilities and it is not for the tenant to state that this should not be done on question of relative hardship ’. (Emphasis). Section 11 (8) of the Kerala buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with eviction on the ground of additional accommodation, and Section 11(10) of that Act says that all applications under that Act for eviction shall be with bona fides . (Emphasis). Section 11 (8) of the Kerala buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with eviction on the ground of additional accommodation, and Section 11(10) of that Act says that all applications under that Act for eviction shall be with bona fides . In 1991 (2) KLT 279 (supra), their Lordships, after approving the decision reported in 1981 KLT 167 (Lekshmana Naicken v. Gopalakrishna Pillai), held thus: — “May be he wants additional accommodation as facility for convenient living. But, it is difficult to say that what the landlord seeks is a mere luxury. Even in a case where an additional accommodation is sought as a luxury, it has been held that the relief under S. 11 (8) read with S. 11 (10) should not be denied to the landlord.” 14. In this case, the fact finding Authorities have come to the conclusion that the space now under the control of the landlord is very much limited. His children are growing. The elder son is doing stamp vending business. His wife is also having a small shop, and the space available to them is not sufficient to meet their requirement. The finding of the Appellate Authority that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, is, therefore, confirmed. 15. An argument was put forward by learned counsel for the petitioner that if the tenant is asked to vacate, the relative hardship that he will suffer will outweigh the advantage of the landlord, and this has not been taken into account by the Appellate Authority. In fact, learned counsel submitted that there is not even a pleading by landlord regarding the same. I cannot agree with the said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 16. The Appellate Authority has taken into consideration the fact that there will be no hardship to the tenant even if he is evicted. I askedlearned counsel for the petitioner as to the hardship which his client may undergo in case he is evicted. Learned counsel submitted that he will not be in a position to get a similar accommodation in the same locality on a similar rate of rent. According to him, he has been doing textile business for years back and that he has earned goodwill. That goodwill will be lost if he is asked to vacate. According to him, if the goodwill is lost, the entire business is also likely to collapse. According to him, he has been doing textile business for years back and that he has earned goodwill. That goodwill will be lost if he is asked to vacate. According to him, if the goodwill is lost, the entire business is also likely to collapse. 17. In (1979) 1 SCC 273 (supra), their Lordships, in paragraph 24 of that judgment, said that no tenant can insist that he should get a similar accommodation in the same locality, for, then he will be asking an impossibility. If he has got a case that he cannot get an accommodation in the City, that will amount to hardship, and not otherwise. In paragraph 24 of the judgment, at page 283, their Lordships have held thus:— “It was then submitted by Mr. Andley, counsel for the respondents that if the respondents are evicted they will be thrown out on the road; that the hotel is the only source of their sustenance and they are not likely to get any alternative accommodation on being evicted. If the defendants had proved that they will not be able to get any accommodation anywhere, in the city where they could set up a hotel, this might have been a weighty consideration, but the evidence of all the witnesses examined” by the defendants only shows that the defendants may not get alternative accommodation in that very locality where the house in dispute is situated. There is no satisfactory evidence to prove that even in other business localities there is no possibility of the defendants getting a house. To insist on getting an alternative accommodation of a similar nature in the same locality will be asking for the impossible. The defendants are tenants and had taken the lease only for 10 years but had overstayed for 20 years and they cannot be allowed to dictate to the landlord that they cannot be evicted unless they get similar accommodation in the very same locality.” 18. The said contention cannot be taken as a hardship. The Appellate Authority has further come to the conclusion that the tenant is in possession or having control of Other buildings in the same town and that too close to the demises premises and one shop building remains closed for years together. If the tenant has got other accommodation or has got control over other premises, he cannot contend that he will be put to great hardship. If the tenant has got other accommodation or has got control over other premises, he cannot contend that he will be put to great hardship. The Appellate Authority has entered a finding on the evidence before it, which can never be said as perverse. 19. In the result, I do not find any merit in the Revision and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.