Honble TIBREWAL, J. – The Petitioner - Sri Gopal Gaushala, Jhunjhunu is a Charitable Institution established for the purpose of reception, protection and treatment of infirm, aged or diseased cows and buffaloes and also for the purpose of breeding, rearing and maintaining cows. It is registered under the Rajasthan Gaushala Act, 1960. (2). By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is seeking an appropriate writ, order or direction impugning the order dated, July 7, 1994 passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (for short the Commissioner) Rajasthan, Jaipur, under Section 7-A of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions, Act, 1952 (for short the Act) on the ground that pro-visions of the Act are not applicable to the petitioner-institution. The principal activities of the petitioner Gaushala are narrated in para No. 10 of the petition which are as under :– ``(i) keeping, breeding, rearing and maintaining old, infirm, blind, lame, crippled and dried cows; (ii) receiving, protecting and treating infirm, aged or disabled and diseased cows donated by individuals and others; (iii) improving cow breed. The averments of Para-10 are not denied by the respondents in their return. (3). The principal question which calls for consideration in this writ petitionrelates to construction of Section 1(3) (a) of the Act and its applicability to the petitioner Gaushala. The Commissioner determined the liability under Sec. 7-A in the tune of Rs. 3,84,226.50, as per Schedule given in the Order, presumably on the ground that the petitioner-Gaushala is covered and fell within the scope of Sec. 1(3) (a) of the Act. According to him, milk of some of the cows fit for yielding milk, wasbeing sold by the petitioner and getting income of Rs. 300/- per day approximately and there were 20 employees on its roll, as such, the establishment is covered under the head `Milk and milk products Industry specified in Schedule-I of the Act. (4). Before discussing the legal aspect, it would be convenient and fruitful to state that the petitioner Gaushala has filed copies of income and expenditure accountsof the last 26 years upto March 31, 1994, which are duly audited by the Chartered Accountant and approved by the State Government. They were also submitted before the Registrar of Gaushalas under the Gaushala Act. The correctness and authenticity of these statements of accounts is not disputed before me. They were also submitted before the Registrar of Gaushalas under the Gaushala Act. The correctness and authenticity of these statements of accounts is not disputed before me. A perusal of the same would reveal that expenses in running Gaushala are met mostly by donations. Income from sale of milk is quite insignificant in comparsion to total expenditure or even the amount spent on feeding the cows. After all the milk from some milk yielding cows, even in small quantity, cannot be thrown away and it has to be made used of by selling the same to the donors or even in market. From themere fact that milk of the cows, collected by the petitioner Gaushala, was sent for sale in the market, as argued by the learned counsel for the Commissioner, no such decisive presumption can be made that the establishment is engaged in the manufacture of `milk and milk products industry. The contention of the learned counsel for the Gaushala is that small quantity of milk, collected from some milkyielding cows, is made available to the donors in Gaushalas premises it self, though on payment basis. According to him this activity was not being carried with a view to earn profit but with an aim to see that the milk is not wasted without any use and whatsoever, amount collected by it may be used for running the institution. It is also contended that the petitioner is ready to close this activity also if it bringsthe institution in the fold of the Act. (5). The broad test in such cases, which may safely be applied in dealing with the question, as observed by the Supreme Court in the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Bombay vs. Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. Bhandara (1), should be whether or not the factory engaged in any industry specified in ScheduleI carries its activities from a business point of view? From the facts and material on record, it stands established that the primary or dominant activities of the petitioner – `Gaushala are reception, protection and treatment of infirm, aged and diseased cows and to maintain `Pinjrapole where cows are kept. The activity of selling milk is only an incidental or insignificant activity. In other words, the process of milkingis neither the principle activity nor it was being done from a business point of view like a dairy. (6). The activity of selling milk is only an incidental or insignificant activity. In other words, the process of milkingis neither the principle activity nor it was being done from a business point of view like a dairy. (6). In the back drop of the above factual aspect, a short question which arises in this petition is – whether the petitioner Gaushala can be said to be engaged in `milk and milk product industry as incorporated in Schedule-I appended to the Act.The Act has been enacted to provide for the institution of provident funds, family pension fund and deposit linked insurance fund for the employees in factories and other establishment to which its provisions apply. Section 1 (3) states the applicability of the Act as under :– (a) to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule-I and in which 20 or more persons are employees and; (b) to any other establishment employing 20 or more persons or class of such establishments which the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette specifies in this behalf. Sec. 2(g) defines `Factory means any premises, including the precincts thereof, in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on whether with the aid of power or without the aid of power. Sec. 2(i) defines `industry meaning any industry specified in Schedule-I and includes any other `industry added to the Schedule by notification under Section 4. Sectio-6 prescribes for the levy of contributions. (7). The question, therefore, is whether the petitioner Gaushala is engaged in the manufacture of milk and milk products industry. The answer depends on whether milking is a dominant activity from the business point of view or it is purelya subsidiary, incidental, minor or feeding activity. It is the primary or the dominant activity which determines the character of the establishment or factory U/s. 1(3) (a) of the Act. (8). In Regional P.F. Commissioner vs. Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. (supra), the expression ``engaged in any industry specified in Schedule-I was considered and interpreted by the Apex Court of the country. It is the primary or the dominant activity which determines the character of the establishment or factory U/s. 1(3) (a) of the Act. (8). In Regional P.F. Commissioner vs. Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co. (supra), the expression ``engaged in any industry specified in Schedule-I was considered and interpreted by the Apex Court of the country. It laid down that if the factory is engaged in several activities, one of which is its primary, principal or dominant activity and the other is a purely subsidiary, incidental, minor or feeding activity, then it is the primary or dominant activity which would determine the character of the factory U/s. 1(3) (a) . For this purpose, it would be fruitful to refer paragraph-18 of the judgment which is thus :– ``It is true that in dealing with the construction of a clause which is capable of two reasonably possible construction, it is not easy to make a choice, particularly when both constructions seem to lead to some anomalies. On the whole, however, we are inclined to take the view that the clause `engaged in any industry specified in Schedule-I should be interpreted to mean `mainly engaged in any industry specified in Schedule-I. If a factory is engaged in two industrial activities one of which is its primary, principal or dominant activity which should determine the character of the factory under Sec. 1(3)(a). This view does not purport to add any word to the section, it merely interprets the relevant expression `engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I. When it is said that a person is engaged in any business it usually means he is engaged mainly or principally in that business and the same would be the position when the relevant clause refers to an establishment engaged in the specified industry. That is the common sense view which is consistent with the current and accepted denotation of the words `engaged in. (9). The above view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the Associated Industries (P) Ltd. vs. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Kerala (2). (10). That is the common sense view which is consistent with the current and accepted denotation of the words `engaged in. (9). The above view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the Associated Industries (P) Ltd. vs. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Kerala (2). (10). Applying the above principles in the instant case, it can be safely held that Sec. 1(3)(a) of the Act is not applicable as the activity of selling the milk by the Gaushala is only incidental and of insignificant nature, while its dominant activitiesare, reception, protection and treatment of infirm, aged or diseased cows and to maintain a `Pinjrapole for keeping them. The contention of Shri N.K. Jain learned counsel for the Commissioner that the Gaushala fell in the fold of the Act because it was selling the milk of the cows, even it may be in small quantity , cannot be accepted. The activity of milking done by the Gaushala is not for business purposeso as to cover it as an industry engaged in `milk and milk products. Holding it to fall in ambit of the provisions of the Act would amount unnecessary stretching the provisions. While interpreting the provisions of the Act, it has to be borne in mind that they impose burden on the employer, so precautions should be taken in applying the provisions of the Act on a particular establishment. (11). Learned counsel, appearing for the Commissioner, contended that the establishment was given coverage under the Act vide communication dated 30.6.75 and this question should not be allowed to be agitated in this petition. This contention has no force. From the undisputed facts if provisions of the Act are found not applicable to the petitioner Gaushala, the mere fact that it was covered underthe Act in 1975 cannot come in the way, as it is a common experience that in charitable institutions where employees look after the affairs, requisite attention is not given by them to an adverse order in time. From the record it is also borne out that the petitioner-institution has been consistently agitating the question of applicability of the Act. Further, determination of the amount u/S. 7-A vide impugned order has been made on the basis of an inspection report of an Inspector without making the said report available to the petitioner `Gaushala. (12). From the record it is also borne out that the petitioner-institution has been consistently agitating the question of applicability of the Act. Further, determination of the amount u/S. 7-A vide impugned order has been made on the basis of an inspection report of an Inspector without making the said report available to the petitioner `Gaushala. (12). The net result of the above discussion is that this petition deserves to be allowed and it is hereby allowed. It is held that the provisions of Sec. 1(3)(a) of the Act are not applicable to the petitioner-Gaushala. The impugned order under Sec. 7-A is set aside. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.