JUDGMENT - REBELLO F.I., J.:---Rule. By consent rule heard forthwith. These are two cross petitions, one filed by the employer and the other by the employee against the order dated 13-1-1996 passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur. By the said order, Industrial Court has directed the petitioner in W.P. No. 2691/96 to withdraw unfair labour practice which he has held, has been committed by the petitioner and to fix pay of the complainant in the time scale as per the provisions of Clause 49 of Settlement of 1956 with effect from 16-1-1987. It is further pointed out that the monetary benefits should be paid from the date of complaint i.e. from 9-1-1992. 2. The short facts of the case may now be set out. It was the case of the respondent that he was working as sweeper in a permanent post with the Corporation. It was his further case that he was working in the same post from 1975 till the date of complaint and has rendered more than 17 years of service. It was his contention that he was being denied rights of getting the time scale like other persons who are doing identical work. It was further contended that though he was entitled to a time scale pursuant to the settlement of 1956 and 1963, he has been denied the same. The petitioner-employer filed their reply and denied the contentions raised by the workman. It was denied that the respondent was workman. It was further submitted that the respondent was working as part time sweeper till 1985. It was further pointed out that the workman was selected by the Selection Committee for the post of sweeper. The respondent was kept on waiting list as there were no vacancies at Bhandara Division. It is further pointed out that on completing 180 days service, he has been granted a time scale in terms of resolution of the Corporation passed in the year 1978. It is further pointed out that Clause 49 of settlement of 1956 stands cancelled vide JCF Resolution 88856 dated 31-8-1978. For the aforesaid reasons, it was contended that the complaint should be rejected. 3. It is further pointed out that Clause 49 of settlement of 1956 stands cancelled vide JCF Resolution 88856 dated 31-8-1978. For the aforesaid reasons, it was contended that the complaint should be rejected. 3. The Industrial Court, Nagpur by impugned order has held that the complainant was entitled to time scale in terms of Clause 49 of settlement of 1956 and ought to have been given time scale from 16-1-1987, when he completed 180 days of continuous service. 4. The principal contention before this Court is whether Clause 49 of settlement of 1956 has been substituted by resolution of Joint Committee constituted in terms of subsequent settlement and which resolution was passed in the year 1978. An ephemeral time scale was created by the said resolution applicable to a workman on his completion of 180 days of continuous service. It is, therefore, contended that there has been no unfair labour practice committed on the part of the employer. 5. These petitions had come up earlier but were kept pending as another learned Single Judge of this Court has found that there were two conflicting judgments of two Single Judges and accordingly had referred the matter to the Division Bench. The Division Bench has now pronounced the judgment today on 21-10-1997. 6. The learned Single Judge who referred the matter to the Division Bench was of the opinion that there was a conflict of judgments in view of the judgment dated 1, 2, 3-3-1982 passed in Writ Petition No. 255 and others and the judgment passed in Writ Petition No. 426/82. 7. In Writ Petition No. 255 and others, from the perusal of the judgment what was in issue was matter pertaining to the appointment of a Competent Authority. The corporation in terms of service regulation had appointed a Competent Authority. On account of large number of workmen involved totalling over 70,000, Corporation found that it was not possible to keep the same Competent Authority and, therefore, had desired to change the same in respect of some establishment. The said was done according to the Corporation after consultation with Committee constituted under the settlement. The learned Single Judge while answering the question as to whether the committee could amend the settlement first and foremost found that there were service regulations which conferred power on the employer to designate the officers. The said was done according to the Corporation after consultation with Committee constituted under the settlement. The learned Single Judge while answering the question as to whether the committee could amend the settlement first and foremost found that there were service regulations which conferred power on the employer to designate the officers. Consequently on merits, it found that in fact there was consultation with the representatives of the union. It was in these circumstances that the said judgment was pronounced. As can be seen the issue was limited to the question as to whether Competent Authority could be changed. 8. The next judgment, which was noted by the learned Single Judge which made a reference was in W.P. No. 426/82. The learned Single Judge was faced with the issue as to whether joint committee could alter, modify or change the terms of settlement. Considering the issue, learned Single Judge held that the Joint Committee cannot modify, alter or change settled conditions of service of employees and no right can accrue to the petitioner corporation to unilaterally cancel Item No. 49 in the absence of any consensus on the point in the meeting held for the purpose. It, therefore, rejected the contention made on behalf of the employer that changes brought about were in exercise of powers conferred on the Joint Committee by subsequent settlement of 1969. It held that cancellation of Item 49 was beyond the scope and jurisdiction of the Joint Committee. Item 49 reads as under :- "All employees working for 180 days including weekly offs and other holidays continuously will be brought on the time scale of pay and will get all the benefits available to time scale workers. Any absence on account authorised leave will not be treated break for the above purpose and will not also count for service." Resolution No. 78 bearing No. 8856 reads as under: "(i) the present Clause 49 of the settlement dated 25-4-1956 shall stand cancelled. (ii) the persons in the employment on daily wages as on 31-8-1978 and those who may be employed on daily wages thereafter, shall if they have already completed or will complete an aggregate service of 180 days in any one financial year commencing from 1-4-1973 should hereafter be appointed temporarily. In ephemeral vacancies in time scale of pay as from 31-7-1978 or thereafter. In ephemeral vacancies in time scale of pay as from 31-7-1978 or thereafter. This provision is not operative with retrospective effect but will have only prospective effect from 31-7-1978." The Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1240/87 has answered the said reference referred by Deshpande, J. The two points which are : (i) whether Joint Committee can bring about alterations, modifications or changes in settlement in the conditions of service of the employees; (ii) whether the period of 180 days fixed by 1956 settlement could not have been extended by the Joint Committee, which has been constituted after that resolution was passed in pursuance of the settlement of 1956, 1961 and 1968. Herein we are not concerned with the second issue but only to the first issue. In respect of the first issue, Division Bench has answered the issue holding that the Joint Committee was competent to bring about modifications, alterations or changes in the settled conditions of service of employees in so far as changes, alterations or modifications pertain to non-financial matters. 9. In answering that the Joint Committee can make modifications to the settlement, Division Bench relied on the settlement of 1968. It is relevant for the purpose of discussion to refer to the relevant provisions of settlement of 1968. Clause 9 of the said settlement reads as under: "9. Reconstitution of Joint Committee. In view of the new situation created on account of the recognition of four unions at the State Level, it was found necessary to revise the Constitution of the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee now consist of four representatives of the Corporation and representatives of the four recognised unions as indicated below: 1. M.S.T. Workers' Federation -8 members 2. Maharashtra S.T. Mazdoor Sabha -8 members 3. Provincial Rashtriya Motor Kamgar Union, Nagpur -1 member 4. Motor Kamgar Panchayat, Amraoti -1 member The meeting of the Joint Committee should be held once every month provided there is agenda. The Vice Chairman of the corporation should be the Chairman of the Joint Committee and the Secretary should be a worker. All matters affecting the employees will fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee. The decision of the Joint Committee should be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and/or Government approval where required. The Vice Chairman of the corporation should be the Chairman of the Joint Committee and the Secretary should be a worker. All matters affecting the employees will fall within the scope of the working of the Joint Committee. The decision of the Joint Committee should be binding on both the parties subject to Corporation and/or Government approval where required. In case there is no decision for any reason or any issue, the same will be decided by the Corporation. The Corporation shall, however, before deciding such issues give an opportunity to the representatives of all the four recognised unions (one each) to be heard. This arrangement is in supersession of the earlier arrangements concerning the Constitution and scope of functions of the Joint Committee." It will also be important to refer to preamble to the settlement as extracted in the judgment of Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 1240/87: "During the deliberations of the third meeting of the Negotiating Committee held on 6th/7th/8th March, 1968, it was unanimously decided that in view of the inordinate delay which lengthy discussion on all 64 demands viz. (1) revision of scales of pay, (2) linking of Dearness allowance with the cost of living Index, (3) increase in existing allowances and grant of new allowances, and (4) arbitration in disputes related to bonus calculations. It was further decided that the remaining demands be dealt with by the Joint Committee already set up and functioning." From the reading of preamble and Clause 9 of the settlement it is clear that unions had raised various demands on the employer. As there were altogether 64 demands, it was seen that it would take a long time and as such there should be a package deal covering four major demands; which are mentioned above. 10. It is thus clear from the reading of preamble and Clause 9 that for the first time instead of merely referring disputes pertaining to the implementation of settlement, the parties agreed that the demands raised in the year 1968 would be divided into two categories. The financial demand which were decided and the remaining demands to be referred to the Joint Committee. It is in that context that the Division Bench has held that the Joint Committee had jurisdiction to decide the issue pertaining to non-financial matters. The financial demand which were decided and the remaining demands to be referred to the Joint Committee. It is in that context that the Division Bench has held that the Joint Committee had jurisdiction to decide the issue pertaining to non-financial matters. There could be no escape from this conclusion as in the settlement itself it was provided that matters not covered by settlement of 1968, would be decided by the Joint Committee. Subsequent to this settlement, there have been other settlements. In subsequent settlements, a clause like Clause 9 is absent. We need not refer further to said issues. 11. On consideration of the above, therefore, it is clear that when Division Bench referred to the power of Joint Committee to settle non-financial matters it refers specifically to the settlement of 1968, which left all the demands excepting those four referred to above to the decision of Joint Committee. In the context of that, demand pertaining to pay scale is definitely a demand pertaining to financial matter and even assuming that Joint Committee could have gone into this issue, clearly this was a demand pertaining to financial matter, it could not have been decided by the Joint Committee. 11-A. It was contended on behalf of Corporation that in term of resolution of 1978, time scale had been given to the respondent and as such they have complied with the settlement. It is further contended that therefore, even if the wrong time scale has been given cause of action would be within 90 days of granting time scale. Here the complaint has been filed much later and consequently complaint should have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. Counsel relied on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of (Balkrishna Pujari v. Gyaneshwar Maharaj Sanstha)1, reported in A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 798. In the said case one of the contention was that there are provisions in the Limitation Act, which would apply in a suit for declaration of hereditary rights as Pujari and an injunction against trustee of institution. Second point which is relied upon is to what is continuing wrong. Reference was made to section 23 of Limitation Act. The Apex Court observed as under : "Section 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. Second point which is relied upon is to what is continuing wrong. Reference was made to section 23 of Limitation Act. The Apex Court observed as under : "Section 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrong that section 23 can be invoked. Where the wrongful act complained of amounts of ouster, the resulting injury to the right is complete at the date of the ouster and so there would be no scope for the application of section 23 in such a case." This observation of the Apex Court is itself self-explanatory. It is only when wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster resulting injury to the right is complete. In the instant case, can it be said that by giving a time scale in the year 1986 contrary to Clause 49 of the settlement of 1956 wrongful act if any complained of amounts to any ouster. It is now well settled that in respect of denial of payment of salary or wages or proper time scale resulting in lower pay would amount to denial of property as money includes property. No person can be deprived of property as envisaged under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India without due authority of law. Therefore, deprivation can only be by authority of law. By giving wrong time scale and because workman accepted the said time scale would not mean that the workman's right to payment has been ousted by acceptance of wrong time scale and as such the act is complete. In such case what is barred is relief and not the remedy. Therefore, deprivation can only be by authority of law. By giving wrong time scale and because workman accepted the said time scale would not mean that the workman's right to payment has been ousted by acceptance of wrong time scale and as such the act is complete. In such case what is barred is relief and not the remedy. In the instant case, the Court itself after considering the matter in terms of powers conferred on it under section 30 of M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act has restricted monetary benefit from the date of complaint, though it has directed it to be applicable three years from the date of complaint i.e. within a period of limitation itself. Therefore, the said submission of the learned Counsel has no force and accordingly has to be rejected. 12. It has also been contended that pursuant to the settlement of 1985, Clause 49 of Settlement of 1956 ceases to apply to the employees. That argument has to be rejected on the threshold. Clause 49 of Settlement of 1956 speaks about giving a time scale to the workmen on completion of 180 days. The settlement of 1985 on the other hand provides for regularisation in service of such workmen. The said two clauses are therefore, distinct. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, it cannot be said that the order of Industrial Court suffers from any error of law apparent on the face of record and/or is without jurisdiction and consequently rule is discharged. In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. 14. In so far as Writ Petition No. 1521/97 filed by the workman is concerned, the order of the Industrial Court granting relief was within its jurisdiction in terms of section 30 of M.R.T.U. P.U.L.P. Act and hence petition being limited to the issue of relief is rejected. Order accordingly -----