Research › Browse › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

1997 DIGILAW 526 (GUJ)

R. G. Patel v. NTC (Gujarat Limited)

1997-09-26

N.N.MATHUR

body1997
JUDGMENT : N.N. Mathur, J. 1. By way of this Special Civil Application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 2.12.1996 passed by the Board of Directors of National Textile Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 2.9.1988 dismissing the petitioner from service. 2. The petitioner while he was holding the office of General Manager, a memorandum dated 29.6.1997 was served upon. The substance of imputation, misconduct or misbehaviour in respect of which the inquiry was proposed to be held reads as follows: "I. Shri Ramanlal Gigabhai Patel, while functioning as General Manager, Rajnagar Textile Mills, Ahmedabad, for a period from September 1986 to March 1987, has sanctioned 153 Medical Reimbursement Claims for final payment. The said claims were in respect of 97 employees out of which only 30 employees are in the employment of the said mills and in fact, they have not received the amounts of their claims and remaining 67 employees to whom claims have been passed for payment, were in the names of fictitious persons. Out of said 97 employees, names of 29 employees have been repeatedly passed for payment for more than once and in some cases 4 to 6 times. Said medical reimbursement claims passed for payment by Shri Patel, the certificates supported with such claims were false and fabricated one. Shri Ramanlal Gigabhai Patel, by the above acts, displayed lack of integrity and conduct unbecoming to a public servant thereby violating Rule 4 (1) (i) and (iii) and 4 (2) of National Textile Corporation (Gujarat) Ltd. Employees' Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1974 as amended." "II. Shri Ramanlal Gigabhai Patel, while functioning as General Manager, Rajnagar Textile Mills, Ahmedabad, during the period from Setpember 1986 to March 1987, has sanctioned and finally passed for payment 153 medical reimbursement claims of fictitious employees in the fictitious names. On sanctioning such fictitious medical reimbursement claims, the said mill unit was put to financial loss of Rs.1,50,000. Shri Ramanlal Gigabhai Patel by his above act, exhibited lack of responsibility and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation/mills, thereby violating Rule 5 (v) (x) of National Textile Corporation (Gujarat) Ltd. Employees' Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1974 as amended". 3. Shri Ramanlal Gigabhai Patel by his above act, exhibited lack of responsibility and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation/mills, thereby violating Rule 5 (v) (x) of National Textile Corporation (Gujarat) Ltd. Employees' Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1974 as amended". 3. The Enquiry Officer found Charge No. I as not proved and Charge No. II as proved. The Chairman & Managing Director of the Corporation on September 1, 1988 after perusing the Enquiry Report decided to inflict major penalty of dismissal on the petitioner. The decision of the Chairman & Managing Director was communicated by the Deputy General Manager (Admn. & Peronnel) to the petitioner by communication dated 2.9.1988. The said order was challenged by the petitioner before this court by way of a petition which was registered as Special Civil Application No. 6971 of 1989. It was contended before this court that report of the Enquiry Officer was not given to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed. This court accepted the contention and allowed the petition on the said short ground. A direction was given to the Disciplinary Authority to proceed from the stage at which the matter rested when he received the report of the Enquiry Officer. The matter was carried to the Supreme Court. The Apex Court considering that the ratio in Ramzan Khan's case which has since undergone a change in view of subsequent decisions in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. Karunakar & Others ( 1993 (4) SCC 727 ) held that the judgment of the High Court cannot be allowed to stand. The S.L.P. was thereupon allowed by the judgment dated 8.8.1994. The Apex Court also found that there was certain other points which were not examined by the High Court and therefore remitted the matter to this court for disposal on other points raised in the Special Civil Application on merits. The matter was heard by this court after the same was remitted by the Apex Court. That Special Civil Application was partly allowed by the judgment dated 28.9.1995. This court remitted the matter to the appellate authority with a direction to decide the appeal afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and to consider all the points raised including the points on the quantum of punishment. 4. That Special Civil Application was partly allowed by the judgment dated 28.9.1995. This court remitted the matter to the appellate authority with a direction to decide the appeal afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and to consider all the points raised including the points on the quantum of punishment. 4. The appellate authority after hearing the petitioner by its order dated 2.12.1996 confirmed the decision of the petitioner's removal from service. 5. Mr. Buch, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has restricted his contention to quantum of punishment. It is submitted by him that the only charge proved against the petitioner is of lack of supervision and negligence. Thus, in the facts of the case the punishment of dismissal from service is highly disproportionate to the guilt. 6. It is settled that High Court exercising powers under Article 226 has limited jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment. Normally, it will not be open for this court to interfere with the punishment inflicted by the departmental authorities. However, if the court finds that the decision of the competent authority on the quantum of punishment is arbitrary or utterly perverse, it will be open for this court to interfere. 7. In the present case, the petitioner was holding the post of General Manager. He was required to discharge multifarious duties. It is not in dispute that the Account Department of the mill which processed the alleged fictitious medical bills was headed by Chief Accounts Officer. It is not in dispute that the bills were duly verified to be genuine and correct by the Chief Accounts Officer and only thereafter they were sent for sanction to the petitioner. The petitioner in his capacity as General Manager was only required to consider for sanction of the bills. There is nothing to show that the petitioner was in any way a party to the fictitious bills or he had acted with any ulterior motive or in any case his integrity was otherwise doubtful. I am not at all impressed by the observation of the appellate authority when it is said that, if the General Manager would have taken a little care, he could have found the vouchers in fictitious names as the vouchers were of stereo nature. In my view, the approach of the appellate authority is erroneous. I am not at all impressed by the observation of the appellate authority when it is said that, if the General Manager would have taken a little care, he could have found the vouchers in fictitious names as the vouchers were of stereo nature. In my view, the approach of the appellate authority is erroneous. The bills were verified by the accounts Department and the petitioner in his capacity of General Manager was only to consider for grant of sanction as executive head. The petitioner was discharging multifarious duties, and as such it would be too much to expect that he will check every bill more particularly its genuineness aspect. Thus, in my view, the fault of the petitioner is not of that magnitude which calls for the penalty of dismissal. The view taken by the respondent - authority is not only arbitrary but also utterly perverse. On the conspectus of the facts, I am satisfied that the penalty of dismissal is not communsurate with the magnitude of the fault. The ends of justice would meet if the penalty of dismissal is substituted by penalty of stoppage of three increments. 8. In view of the aforesaid, this Special Civil Application is allowed. The order of dismissal dated 22.9.1988 and the order of the Board of Directors dated 2.12.1996 are set aside and is substituted by punishment of stoppage of three increments. Since the petitioner has retired long back in the year 1994, the respondent should settle the pension, arrears of salary, other retirement benefits, and any other connected issues within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the writ. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Cost cosy. Rule made absolute.