By this petition, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus directing that the United Provinces Sales of Motor Spirit, Diesel Oil and Alcohol Taxation Act, 1939 (briefly, the Act of 1939) does not authorise the State of U. P. to levy and collect purchase tax on industrial alcohol manufactured and consumed captively by the petitioner in its chemical factory situated in the same premises where the distillery belonging to the petitioner is situated. 2. The facts, as briefly stated, are that the petitioner-company had set up a factory engaged in the manufacture of chemical preparations and afterwards the petitioner-company obtained a licence in form P. D.-2 for setting up a distillery. The distillery so set up is engaged in the manufacture of industrial alcohol. In para 7 of the writ petition it is clearly averred that the entire plant, that is, the chemical unit as well as the distillery which are situated in the same premises are owned by the petitioner-company. It is averred that the entire industrial alcohol manufactured by the distillery of the petitioner-company is being used in the chemical unit of the petitioner-company. Since the entire industrial alcohol manufactured in the distillery of the petitioner-company, is used in the chemical unit belonging to the petitioner-company, it is averred that there is no sale of alcohol and, therefore, no purchase tax can be levied under the Act of 1939. 3. It is also averred that to avoid penal consequence, the petitioner had paid purchase tax under the Act of 1939 under protest to the extent of Rs. 1,02,034,845. 52 for the years, 1987-88 to March 31, 1992 and, therefore, the petitioner has claimed refund of the said amount together with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum. 4. In a counter-affidavit sworn by one Shri Gulab Singh, Assistant Excise Commissioner, Moradabad, it is admitted that the distillery was established by the petitioner-company and that the chemical unit engaged in the production of organic chemical also belongs to the petitioner-company and that they are situated in the same premises, separated by a boundary wall. In para 6 (b) of the counter-affidavit it is also admitted, that the petitioner-company was given licence to manufacture industrial alcohol primarily for its own captive use. In para 6 (b) of the counter-affidavit the respondents further averred as follows : ". . . . . . . . . . . In para 6 (b) of the counter-affidavit it is also admitted, that the petitioner-company was given licence to manufacture industrial alcohol primarily for its own captive use. In para 6 (b) of the counter-affidavit the respondents further averred as follows : ". . . . . . . . . . . So far the petitioner No. 1 has used the entire industrial alcohol produced by its distillery unit. In fact the needs of the petitioner-company are much more, and therefore, the excise authorities have been allotting extra industrial alcohol to the petitioner-company for being lifted from other distilleries. " 5. So the question for consideration is whether purchase tax under the Act of 1939 can be levied in the facts and circumstances of the case when the entire alcohol produced by the petitioner-company is admittedly consumed captively. 6. Section 3, sub-section (1), clause (c) of the Act of 1939, which is charging section runs as follows : " (c) There shall be levied at the point of first purchase of alcohol in the State a tax at the rate of 40 paise per litre for the first million litres and at the rate of 20 paise per litre for the remainder payable by the purchaser, and such tax shall be collected and paid in the prescribed manner to the State Government. " 7. It is trite that sale and purchase are two sides of the same coin. Unless there is a sale there cannot be a purchase. The contention of the petitioners is that since both the distillery as well as the chemical unit belong to the petitioner-company and since the entire alcohol manufactured in the petitioner-distillery is being admittedly used for chemical preparations in the chemical factory, there was no sale and purchase of industrial alcohol and, therefore, no purchase tax is leviable under the charging section 3 (1) (c ). 8. 8. Section 2, clause (d) of the Act of 1939 defines the word "sale" as follows : " (d) sale with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means transfer of motor spirit or diesel oil or alcohol or all the three by a dealer for cash or deferred payment or for other valuable consideration and includes transfer of motor spirit or diesel oil or alcohol or two or more of them by a society or club or any other association of persons to its member but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge. " 9. In U. P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. [1979] 42 STC 476 (All.); 1978 UPTC 653 the fact matrix was that the U. P. Government owned a cement factory known as "churk Cement Factory". It thereafter decided to establish another factory at Dalla. Cement was required for constructing the Dalla Cement Factory and the State Government decided that cement be supplied from the "churk Cement Factory". The Churk Cement Factory started billing the Dalla Cement Factory for supplies of cement. The Dalla unit paid for the cement supplied by the Churk Cement Factory. At the stage of the assessment proceedings, the Dalla unit took up the stand that the transaction did not amount to sale as both the Churk Cement Factory and the Dalla Cement Factory were owned by the State Government. This contention was rejected by the Sales Tax Officer, the appellate authority and by the revising authority, as well. Thereafter the dispute was carried under article 226 before this Court and then a learned single Judge of this Court observed as follows : " Before a transaction can be taxed and included in the turnover of a dealer, it has to be a sale. Although the word sale as defined in section 2 (h) does not specifically mentioned that the transaction must be between the two entities, but inasmuch as it contemplates transfer of property, it is obvious that before a transaction can amount to a sale, there must be two entities involved in the transaction, so that there may be a transfer of property in the goods sold. It would be anomalous to hold that a person can sell goods to himself. It would be anomalous to hold that a person can sell goods to himself. Although section 2 (h) of the U. P. Act does not specially refer to two persons being involved in the transaction, the necessity of two persons being involved in the transactions arises out of the fact that before a transaction can be a sale within the meaning of section 2 (h) of the U. P. Act, there must be a transfer of property. Transfer of property, unless a particular statute expressly provides otherwise, contemplates passing of title from one person to another. It has, as such, to be held that even under the U. P. Act, two entities must be involved before a transaction would fall within the category of sale 10. Merely because the one unit of State Government had billed the another unit of the same Government and has charged the price of goods supplied by it the transaction in question cannot be treated as sale. The billing of one unit of State Government and the payment of price of the goods was only a method of accounting adopted by the two units owned by the State Government, and this method of accounting cannot alter the true character of the transaction. " 11. We quite agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge in U. P. State Cement Corporation Ltd. [1979] 43 STC 476 (All.); 1978 UPTC 653. There is nothing to indicate in the charging section 3 (1) (c) of the Act of 1939 that the requirement that there should be two parties for the transaction of sale and purchase is dispensed with. In the case at hand admittedly the distillery as well as the chemical factory are owned by the petitioner-company and the entire industrial alcohol manufactured in the distillery is being admittedly consumed captively in the manufacture of chemical preparations and, therefore, there is no transfer of goods by the petitioner to any other entity. 12. In Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. , M. P. v. D. P. Dube, Sales Tax Officer, Bhopal Region, Bhopal [1963] 14 STC 406 (SC); AIR 1964 SC 1037 , the factual position is that the Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. (the first petitioner) is a Public Ltd. company and the second petitioner is a shareholder and a Director of the company. 12. In Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. , M. P. v. D. P. Dube, Sales Tax Officer, Bhopal Region, Bhopal [1963] 14 STC 406 (SC); AIR 1964 SC 1037 , the factual position is that the Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. (the first petitioner) is a Public Ltd. company and the second petitioner is a shareholder and a Director of the company. The company is manufacturer of sugar and owns a fleet of motor trucks and other motor vehicles. The company also carries on the business of selling motor spirit, high speed diesel oil and lubricants and maintains a petroleum pump in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The assessing authority under the Madhya Pradesh Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act 4 of 1958, assessed the company to pay sales tax in respect of motor spirit and lubricants used by the company out of the stock held by it for its own vehicles, because in his view such consumption amounted to sales within the meaning of the Act. On these facts, the court enunciated in para 7 as under : " Consumption by an owner of goods in which he deals is therefore not a sale within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act and therefore it is not sale of goods within the meaning of entry 54, List II, Schedule VII of the Constitution. " 13. From these authorities, it is amply clear that consumption of the goods manufactured by the assessee by itself does not amount to sale and purchase. The petitioner-company having captively consumed the entire alcohol manufactured by it, thertherefore, will not amount to sale and purchase within the meaning of the charging section 3 (1) (c) read with section 2, clause (d) of the Act of 1939. 14. The view taken by us is further fortified by the decision in the case of Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Co. v. State of U. P. AIR 1980 SC 1124 . In this case the producer-trader - an agriculturist - produced paddy in his own fields and he also owned a rice mill within the market area. He milled paddy grown by him into his own rice mill and sold the rice. Then the question arose whether there was transaction of sale of paddy and if so whether market fee was chargeable on that transaction. He milled paddy grown by him into his own rice mill and sold the rice. Then the question arose whether there was transaction of sale of paddy and if so whether market fee was chargeable on that transaction. The court held that in such case no market fee could be charged on paddy because there was no transaction of sale and purchase of paddy and market fee could be charged only on the sale of rice. 15. In Government Wood Works v. State of Kerala [1988] 69 STC 62, the Kerala High Court reiterated that to levy tax under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act there should be sale of the furniture, which in turn, implied the existence of a seller and a buyer. 16. The submission of learned Standing Counsel is that the definition of the word "sale" has undergone drastic change by virtue of the amendment made in article 366 of the Constitution of India by (46th Amendment) Act, 1982 inserting clause (29a), which is so far as relevant, reproduced below : " (29a) tax on the sale or purchase of goods includes - (a) a tax on the transfer, otherwise than in pursuance of a contract, of property in any goods for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration; (b) a tax on the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract; (c) a tax on the delivery of goods on hire-purchase or any system of payment by installments; (d) a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration; (e ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (f ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 17. Advertising to clauses (a) and (d), learned Standing Counsel submits before us that transfer of industrial alcohol from the distillery to the chemical factory of the petitioner-company will amount to sale. We do not at all agree with this submission. Clause (29a) does not indicate that transfer of goods can be made by the petitioner-company to itself. 18. " 17. Advertising to clauses (a) and (d), learned Standing Counsel submits before us that transfer of industrial alcohol from the distillery to the chemical factory of the petitioner-company will amount to sale. We do not at all agree with this submission. Clause (29a) does not indicate that transfer of goods can be made by the petitioner-company to itself. 18. For these reasons we are of the view that no purchase tax could be levied under section 3 (1) (c) of the Act of 1939 on the transfer of alcohol from the distillery to the chemical factory of the petitioner-company. 19. So far as the refund of the amount of Rs. 1,02,34,845. 52 is concerned, the petitioner-company may make a proper application for the refund thereof to respondent No. 2 who will consider the same in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 20. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed with the observation that any application made by the petitioner for the refund of purchase tax already deposited by the petitioner-company under protest, will be decided by respondent No. 2 in the light of the above observation made by us expeditiously, preferably within six weeks from the date of presentation of the application along with certified copy of this judgment to the said respondent. Petition allowed. .