M. S. A. Siddiqui, J. ( 1 ) THESE are two appeals directed against the order dated 27-2-74 passed by the Senior Sub-Judge Delhi and as such they were heard together. These appeals, measured by their legal merits or factual dimensions may not justify their longevity from 16-4-1971 to July, 1997, the former being the date of birth of the suit and the latter the termination, at long last, of the cases in this Court. ( 2 ) FACTS relevant and requisite for the purpose of deciding these appeals lie in a narrow compass. Plaintiffs, who are rate payers of old and New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi, filed two separate suits against the respondent restraining to recover house tax in respect of their houses for the year 1971-72. Alongwith the plaints, plaintiffs/appellants also filed applications under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code for ad-interim injunction. It appears that these applications were disallowed by the trial Court. However, by the order dated 1-3-1972 passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 5 of 1972, an ad interim injunction was granted in favour of the appellants. At the hearing of the said revision petition, an objection was raised on behalf of the respondent with regard to maintainability of the suits filed by the appellant s and also an objection to the misjoinder of parties. Consequently, the Trial Court was directed to decide said objections on or before 1-5-1972. After the said order, the appellants filed an application under Order 1 Rule 8 Civil Procedure Code for permission to sue in representative capacity on behalf of all the owners of the buildings of old and New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi and despite opposition by the respondent they were permitted to do so. Thereafter, the Trial Court framed issues and issue Nos. 3 and 6 were tried as preliminary issues. After hearing the parties the Trial Court held that the suits are bad for misjoinder of plaintiffs and causes of action and the suit as framed is not maintainable. Accordingly the Trial Court dismissed both the suits. On appeal by the appellants, the lower appellate Court took the view that the suit against the respondent is maintainable but the same is bad for misjoinder of plaintiffs and cause of action. Accordingly the Trial Court dismissed both the suits. On appeal by the appellants, the lower appellate Court took the view that the suit against the respondent is maintainable but the same is bad for misjoinder of plaintiffs and cause of action. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed and the cases were remanded to the Trial Court for their disposal on merits and the plaintiffs were allowed to exercise their option of retaining one of them as plaintiff to continue the suit relating to his house tax. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeals. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the suits filed by the appellants. According to the learned Counsel for the grounds of challenge in both the suits relate to one matter, i. e. , measure for determination of the annual rateable value of the property tax in question. The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (for short the Act) provides an effective forum to resolve the dispute pertaining to the levy and assessment of property tax and as such suits filed by the appellants are outside cognizance of a Civil Court. On the other hand, Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the respondent has no power to impose illegal tax and, therefore, the tax having been imposed contrary to the provisions of the Act, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that if a citizen is deprived of his property illegally by recovering from him unauthorisedly an amount of tax, he ought to have a proper and appropriate remedy to ventilate his grievance against the Municipal Corporation and such a remedy would be in the form of a suit brought before an ordinary Civil Court. ( 4 ) THEIR Lordships of the Supreme Court in a number of cases relating to tax matters had the occasion to consider similar questions and have laid down the law. In Firm Seth Radha Kishan (deceased) Vs. Administrator Municipal Committee AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1547, a question arose whether suit would lie in a Civil Court claiming refund of the terminal tax collected by a municipal under the Provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. In Firm Seth Radha Kishan (deceased) Vs. Administrator Municipal Committee AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1547, a question arose whether suit would lie in a Civil Court claiming refund of the terminal tax collected by a municipal under the Provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. Their Lordships observed that where a liability is created by, a statute, a party aggrieved must pursue the special remedy provided by it and he cannot pursue his remedy in a Civil Court. Their Lordships further held that "the liability to pay terminal tax is created by the Act, and a remedy is given to a party aggrieved in the enforcement of that liability. As has been already indicated against the order of the Municipal Committee levying terminal tax an appeal lies to the Deputy Commissioner and a reference to the High Court. Applying one of the principles stated supra, the party aggrieved can only pursue the remedy provided by the Act and he cannot file a suit in a Civil Court in that regard. " ( 5 ) IN Firm of Illuri Subhayya Chetty and Sons Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 322 ; a question arose whether the suit instituted by the appellant firm claiming refund of the sales tax recovered from him under the Madras General Sales Tax 1939, was competent or not. Their Lordships have held that ; "in dealing with the question whether Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain a suit is barred or not, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that there is a general presumption that there must be a remedy in the ordinary Civil Courts to a citizen claiming that an amount has been recovered from him illegally and that such a remedy can be held to be barred only on very clear and unmistakable indications to the contrary. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain civil causes will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect, or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. " ( 6 ) IN Ram Swarup and others Vs. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain civil causes will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect, or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of that nature. " ( 6 ) IN Ram Swarup and others Vs. Shikar Chand and another AIR 1966 SC 893 it was observed by their Lordships that in one of the points which is often treated as relevant in dealing with the question about the exclusion of Civil Courts jurisdiction, is whether the special statute which, it is urged, exclude such jurisdiction has used clear and unambiguous words indicating that intention. Another test which is applied is; does the said statute provide for an adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party that may be aggrieved by the relevant order under its material provisions. ( 7 ) IN State of Kerala Vs. M/s. N. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons AIR 1966 SC 1738 , their Lordships have held that jurisdiction of the Civil Court may be excluded expressely or by clear implication arising from the scheme of the Act. Where the Legislature sets up a special tribunal to determine questions relating to rights or liabilities which are the creation of a statute, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be deemed excluded by implication. ( 8 ) IN M/s. K. S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Madras AIR 1966 SC 1089 it was held by their Lordships that "if a statute imposes a liability and creates an effective machinery for deciding questions of liability or fact arising in regard to that liability it may, by necessary implication, barred the maintainability of a civil suit in respect of the said liability. A statute may also confer exclusive jurisdiction on the authorities, constituting the said machinery to decide finally a jurisdictional fact thereby excluding by necessary implication the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in that regard. " ( 9 ) IN M/s. Kamala Mills Ltd. Vs. State of Bombay AIR 1965 SC 1942 , exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain and decide suits for refund of tax paid fell to be determined. In that case a dealer was assessed to tax under the Bombay Sales Tax Act in respect of the "outside sales" which by virtue of the ban imposed by Article 286 of the Constitution were not taxable. In that case a dealer was assessed to tax under the Bombay Sales Tax Act in respect of the "outside sales" which by virtue of the ban imposed by Article 286 of the Constitution were not taxable. The dealer sued to recover the tax paid by him. Their Lordships held that where the Sales Tax Officer by misconceiving the nature of the transactions brings to tax transactions in respect of which the State has no authority to Legislature for levying tax because of the ban imposed by Article 286 of the Constitution, the validity of the order of assessment of tax cannot be re-opened in a suit for refund of tax paid. Their Lordships further observed that the question about the exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts either expressly or by necessary implication must be considered in the light of the words used in the statutory provision on which the plea is rested, the scheme of the relevant provisions, their object and their purpose. ( 10 ) IN the Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others AIR 1975 SC 2238 , it was held that if the dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. Same view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in decisions rendered in Bata Shoe Co. Vs. Jabalpur Corporation AIR 1977 SC 955 , Raja Ram Vs. UOI AIR 1988 SC 752 , Dhula Bhai Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78 , Munshi Ram and others Vs. Municipal Committee, Chheharta AIR 1979 SC 1250 and Ram Singh Vs. Gram Panchayat AIR 1986 SC 2197 . In the case of Munshi Ram (supra) the appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-Municipal Committee from realising the profession tax levied under Section 61 (1) (b) of the Punjab Municipal Act. It was contended that the impugned assessment could only be questioned under the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of the Act and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of the tax levied or the assessment made is excluded. It was contended that the impugned assessment could only be questioned under the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of the Act and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of the tax levied or the assessment made is excluded. Upholding the said contention their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that:- @subpara = It is well recognised that where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded. Construed in the light of this principle, it is clear that Sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar, by inevitable implication, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under this Act. " ( 11 ) THE legal position that emerges from the aforesaid authorities may be summarized thus : (i) Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be lightly inferred; such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied; (ii) where a right not existing at common law is created by a statute and the statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created UNO FLATU, e. g. , "in the same breath" and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the Civil Courts jurisdiction is impliedly barred. Thus the question of Civil Courts jurisdiction to entertain a suit has to be determined in the light of the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act, their object and their purpose, Chapter VIII of the Act deals with the levy of taxes. Section 113 empowers the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to levy, assess and collect taxes on matters specified in the Section. Section 114 provides that the property tax shall be levied on lands and buildings in Delhi. Section 116 prescribes measure for determination of the annual rateable value of any lands and building assessable to property tax. Section 124 casts a duty on the Corporation to prepare an assessment list of all lands and buildings in Delhi for determining the annual rateable value thereof. Section 116 prescribes measure for determination of the annual rateable value of any lands and building assessable to property tax. Section 124 casts a duty on the Corporation to prepare an assessment list of all lands and buildings in Delhi for determining the annual rateable value thereof. Section 124 is as follows :- "assessment list - (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the corporation shall cause an assessment list of all lands and buildings in Delhi top be prepared in such form and manner and containing such particulars with respect to each land and building as may be prescribed by bye-laws. (2) When the assessment list has been prepared the Commissioner shall give public notice thereof and of the place where the list or a copy thereof may be inspected and every person claiming to be the owner lessee or occupier of any land or building included in the list and any authorised agent of such person shall be at liberty to inspect the list and to take extracts therefrom free of charge. (3) The Commissioner shall, at the same time, give public notice of a date, not less than one month thereafter, when he will proceed to consider the rateable values of lands and buildings entered in the assessment list; and in all cases in which any land or buildings is for the first time assessed (or the rateable value of any land or building is increased,) he shall also give written notice thereof to the owner or to any lessee or occupier of the land or building. (4)ANY objection to rateable value or (any other matter) as entered in the assessment list shall be made in writing to the Commissioner before the date fixed in the notice and shall state in what respect the rateable value (or other matter) is disputed and all objections so made shall be recorded in a register to be kept for the purpose. (5) The objections shall be inquired into and investigated, and the persons making them shall be allowed an opportunity of being heard either in person or by authorised agent, by the Commissioner or by officer of the Corporation authorised in this behalf by the Commissioner. (5) The objections shall be inquired into and investigated, and the persons making them shall be allowed an opportunity of being heard either in person or by authorised agent, by the Commissioner or by officer of the Corporation authorised in this behalf by the Commissioner. (6) When all objections have been disposed of, and the revision of the (rateable valued) has been completed, the assessment list shall be authenticated by the signature of the Commissioners or, as the case may be, the officer authorised by him in this behalf, who shall certify that except in the cases, if any in which amendments have been made as shown therein no valid objection has been made to the (rateable values) or any other matters entered in the said. (7) The assessment list so authenticated shall be deposited in the office of the Corporation and shall be open, free of charge during office hours to all owners, lessees and occupiers of lands and buildings comprised therein or the authorised agents of such persons, and a public notice that it is so open shall forthwith be published. " ( 12 ) SECTION 125 vests power in the Commissioner to amend the assessment list prepared under Section 124. " ( 12 ) SECTION 125 vests power in the Commissioner to amend the assessment list prepared under Section 124. Section 126 is as follows:- "amendment of assessment list (1) The Commissioner may, at any time, amend the assessment list- (A) by inserting there in the name of any person whose name ought to be inserted; or (B) by inserting therein any land or building previously omitted; or (C) by striking out the name of any person not liable for the payment of property taxes; or (D) by increasing or reducing for adequate reasons the amount of any rateable value and of the assessment thereupon; or (E) by making or cancelling any entry exempting any land or building from liability to any property tax; or (f) by altering the assessment on the land or building which has been erroneously valued or assessed through fraud, mistake or accident; or (G) by inserting or altering an entry in respect of any building, re-eracted, altered or added to after the preparation of the assessment list: PROVIDED that no person shall by reason of any such amendment become liable to pay any tax or increase of tax in respect of any period prior to the commencement of the year (in which the notice under Sub-Section (2) is given.) (2) Before making an amendment under Sub-Section (1) the Commissioner shall give to any person affected by the amendment, notice of not less than one month that he proposes to make the amendment and consider any objections which may be made by such person. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the proviso to Sub-Section (1) and Sub-Section (2), before making any amendment to the assessment list for the years (commencing on the 1st day of April, 1988, the 1st day of April, 1989 and the 1st day of April, 1990. Under Sub-Section (1), the Commissioner shall give to any person affected by the amendment, notice of not less than one month at any time before the 1st day of April, 1992) that he proposes to make the amendment and consider any objection which may be made by such person. Under Sub-Section (1), the Commissioner shall give to any person affected by the amendment, notice of not less than one month at any time before the 1st day of April, 1992) that he proposes to make the amendment and consider any objection which may be made by such person. (4) No amendment under Sub-Section (1) shall be made in the assessment list in relation - (A) Any year prior to the year commencing on the 1st day or April, 1988, after the 31st day of March, 1991; (B) The year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1988, or any other year thereafter, after the expiry of three years from the end of the year in which the notice is given under Sub-Section (2) or Sub-Section (3), as the case may be: PROVIDED that nothing contained in this Sub-Section shall apply to a case where the Commissioner has to amend the Assessment list in consequence of or to give effect to any direction or order of any Court. ( 13 ) SECTION 127 vests discretion in the Commissioner to prepare for the whole or any part of Delhi, a new assessment, list every year or to adopt the rateable values contained in the list for any year, with such alternation as may in particular cases be deemed necessary, as the rateable values for the year following, giving the same public notice as well as individual notices, to persons affected by such alternations of the rateable values. Section 131 vests power in the Commissioner to call for information and returns and to enter and inspect premises. Section 131 vests power in the Commissioner to call for information and returns and to enter and inspect premises. Section 131 is as follows :- "power of Commissioner to call for information and returns and to enter and inspect premises (i) To enable him to determine the rateable value of any land or building and the person primarily liable to for the payment of any property taxes leviable in respect thereof, the Commissioner, may require the owner or occupier of such land or building, or of any portion thereof to furnish him within such reasonable period as the Commissioner fixes in this behalf, with information or with a return signed by such owner or occupier - (A) as to the name and place of residence of the owner or occupier, or of both the owner and occupier of such land or buildings; (B) as to the measurements or dimensions of such land or building or of any portion thereof and the rent, if any, obtained for such land or building or any portion thereof; and (C) as to the actual cost or other specified details connected with determination of the value of such land or building. (2) Every owner or occupier on whom any such requisition is made shall be bound to comply with the same and to give true information or to make a true return to the best of his knowledge or belief. (3) Whoever omits to comply with any such requisition or fails to give true information or to make a true return to the best of his knowledge or belief, shall, in addition to any penalty to which he may be liable, be precluded from objecting to any assessment made by the Commissioner in respect of such land or building of which he is the owner or occupier. ( 14 ) SECTION 163 provides that if any building is wholly or partly demolished or destroyed or otherwise deprived of value, the Commissioner may, on the application in writing of the owner or occupier, remit or refund such portion of any tax assessed on the rateable value thereof as he thinks fit. ( 14 ) SECTION 163 provides that if any building is wholly or partly demolished or destroyed or otherwise deprived of value, the Commissioner may, on the application in writing of the owner or occupier, remit or refund such portion of any tax assessed on the rateable value thereof as he thinks fit. Section 164 (1) lays down that if any building has remained vacant and unproductive of rent for sixty or more consecutive days, the Commissioner shall remit or refund as the case may be, two third of such portion of tax assessed on the rateable thereof, as may be proportionate to the number of days during which the said building together with the land appurtenant thereto has remained vacant and unproductive rent. Section 165 lays down the for the purpose of obtaining a partial remission or refund of tax, the owner of a building composed of separate tenements may request the Commissioner, at the time of the assessment of the building, to enter in the assessment list, in addition to the rateable value of the whole building, a note regarding any detail of the rateable value of each separate tenement. It further lays down that when any tenement, the rateable value of which has been separately recorded has remained vacant and unproductive rent for sixty or more consecutive days, such portion of any tax assessed on the rateable value of the whole building shall be remitted or refunded as would have been remitted or refunded if the tenement had been separately assessed. Section 166 requires that no remission or refund under Sections 164 and 165 shall be made unless notice in writing of the circumstances in which remission or refund is claimed has been given to the Commissioner. Under Sub-Section (2) of Section 167, the burden of proving the facts entitling any person to claim remission or refund of tax under Section 163, or Section 164, or Section 165, shall be upon him. When the Commissioner makes an order of assessment in exercise of the powers conferred on him, a right is given to the assessee to prefer an appeal under Section 169. Section 169 is as follows :- "appeal against assessment, etc. 1 (1) an appeal against the levy or assessment of any tax under this Act lie to the Court of the district Judges of Delhi. Section 169 is as follows :- "appeal against assessment, etc. 1 (1) an appeal against the levy or assessment of any tax under this Act lie to the Court of the district Judges of Delhi. (2) If, before or on the hearing of an appeal under this Section, any question of law or usage having the force of law or construction of a document arises, the Court of the district Judge on its own motion may, or on the application of any party to appeal, shall draw up a statement with opinion on the question for the decision of the High Court. (3) On a reference being made under Sub-Section (2) the subsequent proceedings in the case shall be, as nearly as may be in conformity with the rules relating to reference to the High Court contained in Order XLVI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908 ). (4) In every appeal, the costs shall be in the discretion of the Court. (5) Costs awarded under this Section to the Corporation shall be recoverable by the Corporation as an arrear of tax due from the appellant. (6) If the Corporation fails to pay any costs awarded to an appellant within ten days after the date of the order for payment thereof, the Court may order the Commissioner to pay the amount to the appellant". ( 15 ) SECTION 171 gives finality of appellate orders. Section 171 is as follows :- @subpara = "finality of appellate orders- The order of the Court confirming, setting aside or modifying an order in respect of any rateable value or assessment or liability to assessment or taxation shall be final: PROVIDED that it shall be lawful for the Court, upon application or on its own motion, to review any order passed by it in appeal within three months from the date of the order". ( 16 ) IT would thus be seen that the whole activity of assessment beginning with the filing of objections or return and ending with the order of assessment, falls within the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority and no part of it can be said to constitute a collateral activity not specially and expressly included in the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority as such. Exercise of his jurisdiction under the Act is not conditioned by the correctness of his conclusion. Exercise of his jurisdiction under the Act is not conditioned by the correctness of his conclusion. It is pertinent to note here that the provisions of the Act mentioned here-in-before do not purport to curb or curtail any pre-existing common law right. On the contrary, the Act imposes a liability on the owner or occupier of a building to pay property tax. The Act is a complete code in itself and it contains complete machinery for levying, assessing and collecting tax: it also contains an adequate redressal machinery for rectification of mistakes. The entire machinery for levy, assessment, collection and refund is within the Act and has to be administered by the appropriate authority entrusted with power in that behalf. To expose this machinery and the adjudications made under the Act by the authority competent in that behalf to collateral attacks in civil suits would make the Statute unworkable. ( 17 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants contended that the remedy of appeal under Section 169 of the Act is inefficacious as it imposes the condition for deposit of the amount of tax demanded by the Corporation and thus it affects substantive right of appeal and such impairment of right of appeal by putting restriction thereon and imposing more onerous condition makes the remedy illusory or nugatory. The Supreme Court in Shyam Kishore Vs. M. C. D. AIR 1992 S. C. 2279 had rejected similar arguments. It was held by their Lordships that the remedy of statutory appeal under Section 169 of the Act is neither illusory nor nugatory. Thus, the Act provides an adequate and efficacious remedy for obtaining relief in respect of any improper order passed by the appropriate authority. It is significant that Section 171 of the Act gives a finality to the appellate orders. In Dhulabhai Vs. State of M. P. AIR 1969 SC 78 it was held that where the Statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. It is also well settled that where the scheme of the Act implies exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, the Courts will give effect to it. (Secretary of State Vs. Mask and Co. It is also well settled that where the scheme of the Act implies exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, the Courts will give effect to it. (Secretary of State Vs. Mask and Co. AIR 1940 P. C. 105) ( 18 ) FOR the foregoing reason, I find and hold that the suits instituted by the appellants were barred by the Scheme of the Act. That apart, as stated earlier the appellants have filed these suits for permanent injunction restraining the respondent from recovering property tax in respects of buildings owned or occupied by them. The Act provides adequate and efficacious remedy for obtaining relief in respect of any improper order passed by the appropriate authority and as such these suits for permanent injunction were also barred under Section 41 (h) of the Specific Reliefs Act. The learned Additional Distt. Judge over looked the aforesaid provisions of the Act while reversing the order of dismissal of the learned Trial Court. When the suit itself was outside the congnizance of the Civil Court, the question of grant of permission to the appellants under Order 1 Rule 8Civil Procedure Code does not arise at all. 19. Having formed a definite opinion that the suit itself was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed, the question arises how the appeal should be disposed of when the plaintiffs only have come up in appeal feeling aggrieved by that part of the impugned order which goes against them and the defendant has chosen not to file any appeal: ORDER 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code provides as under : "rule 33. Power of Court of Appeal- The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees. " (emphasis supplied) ( 20 ) THE wide power conferred on the appellate Court by the abovesaid provision was so stated by their Lordships in Pannalal vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1516 : @subpara = "it empowers the appellate Court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as "the case may require". If there was no impediment in law the High Court in appeal could therefore, though allowing the appeal of the defendant - appellant by dismissing the plaintiff s suits against it, give the plaintiff respondent a decree against any or all the other defendants who were parties to the appeal as respondents. While the very words of the rule make this position abundantly clear the illustration puts the position beyond argument. @subpara = If a party who could have filed a cross objection under Order 41 Rule 22 has not done so it cannot be said that the Appeal Court can under no circumstances give him relief under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33. " ( 21 ) IN SMS Subramanian Chettiar Vs. Sinnammal and Ors. AIR 1930 Madras 801, the Trial Court decreed a suit for redemption filed by plaintiff on payment of Rs. 830-8-5 to the defendant. The plaintiff preferred an appeal on the ground that the amount which he was directed to pay was too large and that he was entitled to redeem on payment of a smaller amount. Sinnammal and Ors. AIR 1930 Madras 801, the Trial Court decreed a suit for redemption filed by plaintiff on payment of Rs. 830-8-5 to the defendant. The plaintiff preferred an appeal on the ground that the amount which he was directed to pay was too large and that he was entitled to redeem on payment of a smaller amount. The appellate Judge came to the conclusion that plaintiff was not entitled to redeem at all. He not only dismissed the appeal but also reversed the decree of Trial Court and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred second appeal to High Court. The learned Single Judge referred the question to Full Bench: whether the lower appellate Court had jurisdiction in an appeal preferred by plaintiff not only to dismiss the plaintiff s appeal but further to reverse the decree passed in plaintiff s favour, even though the respondent had not preferred any memorandum of objections or an independent appeal questioning the decree of the first Court. THE Full Bench opined: "where a plaintiff being dissatisfied with a decree passed in his favour, prefers an appeal, the appellate Court, in a proper case, has jurisdiction to exercise its powers in favour of the respondent by dismissing the plaintiff s case in toto, though the respondent did not prefer a cross-appeal or memorandum of objections challenging the decree passed by the first Court. " ( 22 ) SO is the Division Bench decision in Alafkhan V. Kurbankhan. , AIR 1948 Nag 41:- @subpara = "where in an appeal by the plaintiff against a partial decree the suit appears to be patently time-barred and the point can be decided without any evidence being taken, it is the duty of the appellate Court to take judicial notice of the law and to dismiss the whole suit even though the defendants have not appealed against the decree. " ( 23 ) THAT being the position of law, I am of the opinion that not only the appeals filed by the appellants deserve to be dismissed but the suits themselves being not maintainable are liable to be dismissed in exercise of the power conferred on this Court by Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC. ( 24 ) IN the result, both the appeals are dismissed with costs. Both the suits instituted by the appellants are dismissed as barred by the Scheme of the Act. ( 24 ) IN the result, both the appeals are dismissed with costs. Both the suits instituted by the appellants are dismissed as barred by the Scheme of the Act. Counsel s fee Rs. 5,000. 00.