JUDGMENT C.K. Prasad, J. This is tenant's appeal u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs-landlords filed Civil Suit No. 35-A/94 for eviction of the tenant (hereinafter referred to as landlord and tenant respectively) on the ground that the landlord requires the suit accommodation for non-residential purpose and that they have no other suitable non-residential accommodation for the said purpose in the town, which is a ground for eviction u/s 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. Civil Judge Class II by his judgment and decree dated 30th August, 1995 passed in Civil Suit No. 35-A of 1994 decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, tenant preferred civil suit No. 31-A/96 and the 6th Additional District Judge, Bhopal by his judgment and decree dated 24th April, 1996 dismissed the appeal. By order dated 14-5-1996 the appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: Whether the Court below was right in refusing the amendment sought to be made by the Appellant on the ground that the landlord/Respondent had acquired a suitable accommodation during the pendency of the appeal? Facts necessary for the decision of the aforesaid substantial question of law are that before the lower appellate Court the tenant filed application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of CPC which was considered, while disposing of the appeal, and the same was rejected. By the said application amendment sought for by the tenant was that in March, 1996, the ground floor of the suit accommodation has been vacated by the Central undertaking namely D.E.T. which consist of the following accommodation: (i) One hall of the size of 22 ft. x 12 ft. (ii) Another hall of the size of 22 ft. x 24 ft. (iii) One room of the size of 10 ft. x 12 ft. (iv) One room of the size of 8 ft. x 20 ft. and (v) One room of the size of 10 ft. x 17 ft. It has been further stated in the amendment application that the accommodation vacated by D.E.T. is sufficient to meet the bona fide requirement of the landlord. It has been stated that the entry to the ground floor is from two sides i.e. one from the Hawa Mahal road and another from the side of Hamidia Hospital. According to the tenant the landlord has got more than sufficient accommodation for his bona fide requirement. It has been stated that the entry to the ground floor is from two sides i.e. one from the Hawa Mahal road and another from the side of Hamidia Hospital. According to the tenant the landlord has got more than sufficient accommodation for his bona fide requirement. Landlord filed reply to the aforesaid application and they have stated that the amendment has been sought for only to delay the disposal of the suit. It has been further stated that accommodation consisting of rooms vacated by the D.E.T. are not shops, but rooms. The lower appellate Court decided the aforesaid application filed by the tenant under Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC is in the following words: An application under Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC has been filed by the Appellant whereby the Appellant has sought the amendment in his written statement regarding the alternate accommodation has become available to the Respondents in March, 1996 which has been vacated by D. E. Telephones. The aforesaid amendment application has been resisted by the Respondents by alleging that the accommodation which has been said to have been vacated by D.E. Telephones is behind the shops, which is not suitable for the business purpose of the son of the Respondent No. 1. So it is clear that the accommodation, which is said to have been vacated by D. E. Telephones is situated behind the shops and if the Respondents say that it is not suitable for their business, so at this juncture the aforesaid amendment cannot be allowed. (Emphasis supplied) Shri Qamaruddin, appearing on behalf of the Appellant submits that there was no material before the lower appellate Court to come to a finding that the accommodation vacated during the pendency of the appeal is not suitable and only on the ipse dixi of the landlord in reply to petition filed by the tenant that it has held that the amendment is not fit to be allowed. Mrs. Menon however appearing on behalf of the landlord submits that the materials already in existence demonstrate that the accommodation vacated during the pendency of the appeal is not suitable. Mrs. Menon however appearing on behalf of the landlord submits that the materials already in existence demonstrate that the accommodation vacated during the pendency of the appeal is not suitable. Shri Qamaruddin contends that the lower appellate Court ought to have allowed the application and remitted the matter back to the trial Court for adducing evidence on the question of availability of suitable accommodation during the pendency of the appeal and the lower appellate Court committed an error of law in not allowing the same. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned Counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hasmat Rai and Another Vs. Raghunath Prasad, and my attention has been drawn to the following passage from paragraph 14, which reads as under: Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred, the appeal being a continuation of suit, the landlord's need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the Court including the appellate Court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage. Yet another decision on which the learned Counsel placed reliance to demonstrate that subsequent events can be taken into consideration is the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gulabbai Vs. Nalin Narsi Vohra and others, and my attention has been drawn to the following paragraph: 25. On a conspectus of all these decisions rendered by this Court, it is now beyond the pale of any doubt that in appropriate cases events subsequent to the filing of the suit can be taken notice of and can be duly considered provided the same is relevant in determining the question of bona fide requirement. Therefore, the High Court was right in duly considering the new facts and circumstances that have been brought to the notice of the Court. I do not have a slightest hesitation in accepting the submission of Shri Qamaruddin that to determine the bona fide requirement of the landlord, subsequent events can be taken into consideration and in fact Mrs. Menon appearing on behalf of the landlord does not dispute this legal position. I do not have a slightest hesitation in accepting the submission of Shri Qamaruddin that to determine the bona fide requirement of the landlord, subsequent events can be taken into consideration and in fact Mrs. Menon appearing on behalf of the landlord does not dispute this legal position. However, she attempted to argue that the materials available on the records do show that the accommodation falling vacant during the pendency of the appeal is not sufficient for the landlord needs. In support of the aforesaid submission she has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Noor Mohammad Vs. Murlidhar, , and my attention has been drawn to paragraph 16 of the said judgment which reads as under: 16. Thus, on the evidence on record it is quite clear that the tenanted accommodation is situate on a main road and it is more suitable for starting the business of the Plaintiff's son Mohd. Iqbal as compared to the shops situate at Kabutarkhana. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff's requirement of the tenanted accommodation for starting the business of his son Mohd. Iqbal cannot be negatived on the ground of availability of alternative accommodation in the house situate at Kabutarkhana. Yet another decision on which Mrs. Menon has placed reliance is a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar Vs. M/s. Traders and Agencies and another, and my attention has been drawn to the following paragraph of the said Judgment: 20. As regards the 'Olympus' fiat the evidence discloses, and it is not in dispute, that Eknath left that flat in October 1972 and since then only Sridhar and his family members have been staying in that flat. It is a two-bedroom flat having an area of 1100 sq.ft. Sridhar has a wife and two children and the family of the Appellant also consists of four persons. In the suit for eviction filed by the landlady of that flat a partial decree has been passed and Eknath has been ordered to hand over half the portion of that flat. Both Ekanth and the landlady have challenged the said partial decree and their respective appeals are pending before the appellate court. In the suit for eviction filed by the landlady of that flat a partial decree has been passed and Eknath has been ordered to hand over half the portion of that flat. Both Ekanth and the landlady have challenged the said partial decree and their respective appeals are pending before the appellate court. In this context the courts had to consider whether it can be said that the Appellant and Eknath are having suitable alternative accommodation and, therefore, the Appellant's claim that she requires the suit premises for her occupation is not reasonable and bona fide. The appellate bench and the High Court considered the possibility of Eknath going back to that flat and occupying it along with Sridhar and also the possibility that in case the landlady's appeal is dismissed and Eknath's appeal is allowed the flat, in its entirety, will become available to Eknath and on that basis held that the Appellant's claim that she requires the suit premises reasonably and bona fide is not true. As pointed out by this Court it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. If the landlord desires to beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis is either insecure or inconvenient it is not for the courts to dictate to him to continue to occupy such premises. Though Eknath continues to be the tenant of the 'Olympus' flat, as a matter of fact, it is being occupied exclusively by Sridhar and his family since October, 1972. For this reason and also for the reason that because of the partial decree passed against him Eknath is now entitled to occupy the area of 550 sq. ft. only, it is difficult to appreciate how the appellate bench and the High Court could record a finding that the 'Olympus' flat is readily available to the Appellant's husband and that the said accommodation will be quite sufficient and suitable for the Appellant and her family. None of the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the landlord has any bearing on the case. None of the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the landlord has any bearing on the case. From the judgment of the lower appellate Court, quoted above it is clear that it did not allow the amendment on the ground, to use his own words, "if the Respondents say that it is not suitable for their residence, so at this juncture the amendment cannot be allowed." The lower appellate Court has not rejected the amendment on appreciation of materials on record, but has rejected the same on the ground that when the Respondent has said that it is not suitable for their business, amendment cannot be allowed. Therefore, in my opinion, the lower appellate Court was not correct in rejecting the application for amendment. Thus, substantial question of law framed is answered in favour of the tenant. To put the record straight, it is relevant here to state that before this Court also an application for amendment of the written statement was filed on the ground that because of partition between the landlord, Plaintiff No. 2 had no right to get the suit accommodation vacated for the need of his son Lalchand. Another application has also been filed by the tenant under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to place on record, document purportedly to prove the factum of partition. It is relevant here to state that before the lower appellate Court the tenant has filed an application under Order 41, Rule 27 for admission of the document for the same purpose and the same was rejected. The fact which the tenant wants to bring on record by amendment in the written statement was known to it before the lower appellate Court and in fact it filed an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the CPC for taking additional document in support thereof. The same was rejected by the lower appellate Court. This appeal has been admitted on the substantial question of law. In view of the fact that the appeal has been admitted only on question referred to above, as also the fact that the tenant was aware of the fact which he wants to bring by way of amendment before this Court, I am not inclined to allow these applications. Applications filed by the tenant before this Court for amendment in the written statement as also for additional evidence are rejected. Applications filed by the tenant before this Court for amendment in the written statement as also for additional evidence are rejected. However, in view of my answer to the substantial question of law in favour of the tenant, the matter has to go back to the trial Court. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside. Tenant's application filed before the lower appellate Court in relation to vacation of the accommodation by the D.E.T is allowed with cost of Rs. 1,000/-. The matter is remitted back to the trial Court with a direction that the tenant shall be allowed to incorporate the proposed amendment within a period of 10 days from the date of their first appearance in the trial Court. The landlord shall thereafter be given an opportunity to make amendment in the plaint, if they so desire. The trial Court will thereafter frame issues on the point so raised, if it is required to do so and not A covered under the issues framed earlier, and decide the case in accordance with law. As the matter is pending since long, I direct the trial Court to dispose of the suit within 3 months from the date of appearance of the parties. Parties undertake to appear before the trial Court on 22nd September, 1997. Let the records be sent down immediately. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.