JUDGMENT - `B.B. VAGYANI, J.:---The short point that arises for consideration is what is the range of application of the notification issued by the Government of Maharashtra granting exemption of Court Fees for woman litigants in cases relating to (a) maintenance (b) Property Dispute (c) Violence and (d) Divorce. 2. In brief, the facts giving rise to the present civil revision application are as under: The present petitioner No. 1 is the widow of deceased Vijaydas Vaishnav. Petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 are minor children of deceased Vijaydas Vaishnav. The petitioner Nos. 2 to 5 being minors are under the guardianship of their real mother i.e. petitioner No. 1. 3. The respondent No. 1 is the State of Maharashtra. Respondent No. 2 is the Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad, to whom the Tanker involved in the accident belongs. The respondent No. 3 is the driver of the Tanker, who is admittedly in the employment of the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 4 is the Insurance Company with whom the Tanker is insured. 4. It is alleged by the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 drove the Tanker in a rash and negligent manner and committed an accident. In the said accident, Vijaydas Vaishnav, husband of petitioner No. 1, received injuries directly from the vehicle and succumbed to the injuries. The accident took place on 11th April 1996 in the locality known as New Hanumantnagari of Aurangabad city. Immediately after commission of the accident, a crime has been registered at Mukundwadi Police Station, Aurangabad. 5. The petitioners filed Motor Accident Claim Petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1988). The petitioners have also filed claim which is popularly known as No Fault Claim under section 140 of the Act of 1988. The claim petition was presented on 6-11-1996 in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Aurangabad. The petitioners presented application for exemption of Court fees in pursuance to the Notification dt. 1st October 1994, issued by the Government of Maharashtra. The petitioners moved the Presiding Officer of the Motor Accident Tribunal for grant of exemption in the matter of payment of Court Fees and requested to register the claim petition. The learned Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal rejected the application filed by the petitioners by his order dt. 1st October 1994, issued by the Government of Maharashtra. The petitioners moved the Presiding Officer of the Motor Accident Tribunal for grant of exemption in the matter of payment of Court Fees and requested to register the claim petition. The learned Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal rejected the application filed by the petitioners by his order dt. 7th November 1996, on the ground that the Government Notification, relied upon by the petitioners does not apply to the claims falling under the provisions of Act of 1988. 6. Feeling dissatisfied by the rejection order dt. 7th November 1996, passed by the Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal the petitioners have filed this Civil Revision Application. 7. I heard learned Advocate Shri R.K. Ashtekar, holding for learned Advocate Mr. D.B. Yeotikar, Shri Bhapkar, learned A.P.P. for the respondent No. 1, Shri H.T. Joshi, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 2, Shri H.G. Shinde, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3 and Shri V.N. Upadhye, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 4. 8. The learned Advocate Mr. R.K. Ashtekar vehemently submitted that the Government Notification No. S.T.P. 1094/C.R. -859/M-1 dt. 1st October 1994 takes in its sweep a petition for compensation. The learned Advocate Ashetkar further submits that the Government Notification has granted exemption to the woman litigants in all cases relating to (a) Maintenance (b) Property Dispute (c) Violence and (d) Divorce. The claim filed by the present petitioners is a dispute relating to the property and therefore, the petitioners can legitimately claim the exemption in pursuance of the Government, Notification dt. 1st October, 1994. According to Mr. Ashtekar, Advocate the impugned rejection order passed by the learned Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Tribunal is manifestly incorrect and therefore, it is liable to be set aside. 9. On the other hand, the learned A.G.P. Shri Bhapkar supported the impugned rejection order passed by the Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal. The learned Advocate Shri H.T. Joshi, submits that the claim petition filed by the petitioners does not at all fall within the ambit of property dispute and therefore, the petitioner cannot legitimately claim the benefits of the exemption of Court Fees granted to the woman litigants. The learned Advocate Mr. The learned Advocate Shri H.T. Joshi, submits that the claim petition filed by the petitioners does not at all fall within the ambit of property dispute and therefore, the petitioner cannot legitimately claim the benefits of the exemption of Court Fees granted to the woman litigants. The learned Advocate Mr. H.G. Shinde for the respondent No. 3 and Shri V.N. Upadhye, learned Advocate, for respondent No. 4, adopt the submissions advanced for and on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 10. The Notification issued by the Government of Maharashtra is as under : "MAHARASHTRA STATE GAZETTE REVENUE AND FOREST DEPARTMENT MANTRALAYA, BOMBAY - 400032 Date : 1-10-1994 BOMBAY COURT FEES ACT, 1959 NO. S.T.P. 1094 C.R. 859 / M -1 Whereas the Government of Maharashtra has recently announced a policy with a view to promote the welfare of the women. And whereas the said welfare policy for women inter alia provides for exemption of Court fees for women litigants in cases relating to maintenance, property dispute, violence and divorce. And whereas section 46 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (Bom. XXXVI of 1959) empowers the State Government by Notification in the Official Gazettes to reduce or to remit any of the fees mentioned in the First and second Schedule to that Act. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 45 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (Bombay XXXVI of 1959), the Government of Maharashtra hereby remits the fees payable by women litigants on any of the plaints, applications, petitions, memorandum of Appeal or any of the documents specified in the first and Second Schedule to the said Act to be filled in any Civil, Family or Criminal Court, in respect of cases relating to (a) Maintenance (b) property Dispute (c) Violence and (d) Divorce. By order and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra." 11. In order to remove the doubts, I would like to deal with the objection raised by the learned Advocate Shri H.T. Joshi. According to Mr. Joshi, the Government Notification dt. 1st October, 1994 applies only to the dispute with regard to the immovable property. This interpretation is too narrow and too technical. The notification does not at all make such kind of distinction. According to Mr. Joshi, the Government Notification dt. 1st October, 1994 applies only to the dispute with regard to the immovable property. This interpretation is too narrow and too technical. The notification does not at all make such kind of distinction. The notification does not at all convey that the benefits with regard to the exemption of Court fee are restricted to the dispute only with regard to immovable property. This narrow interpretation mere and frustrates the very purpose of the notification. The Government has taken a welfare step in respect of woman litigants. The definition of the word "Property", as given in the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Vth Edition) is as under : "Property is the generic term for all that a person has dominion over. Its two leading divisions are (1) Real and (2) Personal." 12. The definition of the word Property would further go to show that the property is the most comprehensive of all terms which can be used in-as much-as indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have. The definition of term "Property", given in Bouvier's law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia (Eighth Editional, Vol. II (P to Z), is as under : "Property embraces every species of valuable right and interest, including real and personal property, Dicey treats of property as consisting movables and immovables. The property denotes a right over a determinate thing. The property is a right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a thing." 13. The word "Property" is also defined in Law Lexicon, the Encyclopaedia of Law Dictionary, 1997 Edition. The term property is generic term of extensive application and while strictly speaking it means only the right which a person has in relation to something or that dominion or indefinite right of user and disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or objects. The property signifies every species of property and comprehends of a man's wordly possessions. The Law Lexicon Encyclopaedia would also go to show that the property includes any movable property, money or valuable security. 14. The term property includes any property over which any person has disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit. The word property is wide enough to include property of every description, movable or immovable, in the actual possession of the owner or in the possession of other persons on his behalf. 14. The term property includes any property over which any person has disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit. The word property is wide enough to include property of every description, movable or immovable, in the actual possession of the owner or in the possession of other persons on his behalf. The word property is certainly large enough to include money. If regard is had to the definition of the property, it is beyond doubt clear that the property includes movable and immovable property and does not exclude money. The word property should be given a liberal and wide connotation and should be extended to those all recognised types of interest. Under the circumstance, I repeal the submissions of the learned Advocate Mr. H.T. Joshi. I hold that notification dt. 1st October 1994 issued by the Government of Maharashtra applies to the disputes pertaining to both movable and immovable property. 15. The Government of Maharashtra remits fee payable by the woman litigants on any of the plaints, application, petitions, memorandum of appeal or any of the documents specified in the first and second schedule to the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959, to be filled in Civil, Family of Criminal Courts. The learned Advocate Mr.. Ashtekar, appears to have been fascinated by the word petition used in the notification. He has not taken into consideration further rider for application of the Government notification dt. 1st October, 1994. No doubt, the claimants have filed petition for compensation. But claim petition filed by the petitioner claimants does not at all fall in the first or second schedule to the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. Under the circumstance, the Government notification dt. 1st October 1994 cannot be pressed into service. The rejection order passed by the Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is therefore proper. 16. After death of the husband the widow has filed the claim petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act 1988, for grant of compensation. If bread winner of the family dies in the accident entire family is uprooted. The condition of the widow with minor children becomes worst. The widow and children are illclad, illfed and illsheltered. With a great hope the widow and her minor children have approached the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in the matter of grant of compensation. If bread winner of the family dies in the accident entire family is uprooted. The condition of the widow with minor children becomes worst. The widow and children are illclad, illfed and illsheltered. With a great hope the widow and her minor children have approached the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in the matter of grant of compensation. But by a single stroke of pen, their petition has been declined to be registered on the ground that notification dt. 1st October 1994 issued by the Government of Maharashtra does not apply to the claims arising out the accident. The Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not expected to fold hands and keep quite. It is the duty of the Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to be activist enough to extend the benefits of sub-clause (3) of Rule 257 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles, (Second Amendment) Rules, 1996. The sub-rule (3) of the Rule 257 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles (Second Amendment) Rules, 1996, is as under : "The Claims Tribunal may exempt an applicant from payment of the fee payable under sub-rule (1). However, if claim of such applicant has been accepted by the claims tribunal, he shall pay the prescribed fee notwithstanding the exemption granted in respect of the said fee before the amount of compensation is paid to him." 17. In exercise of powers conferred by Clause (a) and (d) of section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and all other powers, enabling it in this behalf, the Government of Maharashtra has introduced Second Amendment in the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Rules. This amendment has been made on 16th August, 1996. If regard is had to sub-rule (3) of Rule 257 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles (Second Amendment) Rules, 1996 the Claims Tribunal can very well exempt an applicant from payment of the fee payable on every application for compensation under section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. This amendment is already on the statute book. Under the circumstance, the Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal should have become activist enough to extend the benefit of exemption to the petitioner claimants taking into consideration their plight. The widow has stated in her application that she is a poor lady and therefore, she is unable to pay Court Fee. Under the circumstance, the Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal should have become activist enough to extend the benefit of exemption to the petitioner claimants taking into consideration their plight. The widow has stated in her application that she is a poor lady and therefore, she is unable to pay Court Fee. It is to be born in mind that a common man coming to the Court of law is illfed, illclad and ill sheltered. He expects prompt and inexpensive dispensation of justice. The common man cannot afford to Court litigation. The rising tide of unfulfilled expectations and minimum expectations of masses of illfed, illclad, illsheltered population cannot be stopped by huge shrines of justice, by outward decoration and poius declarations appearing in the statute book. While dealing with the cases of illfed, illclad and illsheltered litigants, the Judges should not act as strangers and silent onlookers. In genuine cases the Claims Tribunal should be more activist in granting benefits of exemption in the matter of payment of Court fees, as contempleted in sub-rule (3) of Rule 257 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles (Second Amendment) Rules, 1996. It is to be noted that glory of Law lies in the creative ability of the Judges. If the Government notification of 1st October 1994 does not come to the rescue of the petitioner claimants, the Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal should have granted exemption under sub-rule (3) of Rule 257 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles (Second Amendment) Rules, 1996 and ought to have registered the claim petition. 18. Under the circumstance, the matter is remitted back to the Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal with direction to give the benefit of exemption as contemplated in sub-rule (3) of Rule 257 of the Maharashtra Vehicles (Second Amendment) Rules, 1996, if the facts and circumstances of the present case justify such exemption. The Ex-officio member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is directed to dispose of the claim of the petitioners as early as possible. Rule partly made absolute. Petition allowed.