JUDGMENT 1. :- In Corpus Juris Secundam Vol.14 the question of the amendment in the Constitution or the rules has been summarised in the following words at pages 1282 and 1283: "If a Club adopts a Constitution and bye laws, they constitute a contract between the Club and its members binding on both, whether the club is corporates or not........ A bye law of a Club can be adopted only in ...... with the provisions, if any, in the bye laws therefore, key laws, which are permanent and continuing rules of Government can be amended or repealed only in the manner prescribed by the bye-laws". 2. It is in the context of law stated above which is also applicable to societies registered in India, I proceed to consider the instant revision application preferred against the order dated April 9, 1997. Few facts are necessary to be set out at the outset. The petitioner instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the non-petitioner (for short the Bar) challenging the amendment made in the bye-laws and the Election Rules. Along with the suit an application for temporary injunction was also filed by the petitioner. The learned trial court after considering the ingredients of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, granted temporary injunction in favour of the petitioner and stayed the impugned amendment to the disposal of the civil suit vide its order dated April 2, 1997. 3. The Bar preferred appeal against the said order. The appellate court vide its order dated April 9, 1997, allowed the appeal and vacated the interim order passed by the trial court. Against this order of the appellate court present action for filing the revision has been resorted to. 4. Before adverting to the rival contentions it will be useful to revise the settled legal position pertaining to issuance of injunction. An injunction is a judicial process whereby a party is required to do, or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of a preventing relief granted to a litigant qua time i.e. because he fears future possible injury. But while determining the question as to the grant of interim injunction, the court should refrain from giving a finding on the merits of the case. It is in the nature of a preventing relief granted to a litigant qua time i.e. because he fears future possible injury. But while determining the question as to the grant of interim injunction, the court should refrain from giving a finding on the merits of the case. The principles which govern the exercise of the discretion conferred by the rule are to the effect that a person who seeks a temporary injunction must satisfy the court as to the insistence of the following conditions: firstly, that there is a serious question to be tried in the suit and that on facts before the court there is a probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by him, secondly, that the court's interference is necessary to protect him from the species of injury which the court calls irreparable, before his legal right can be established on trial and thirdly, that the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to issue from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it. (Emphasis supplied) In Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Commi Sorab Warden and others, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 867 their Lordships of the Supreme Court propounded that the applicant should besides showing existence of prima facie case further satisfy that the court's interference is necessary before his right can be established on trial by showing that irreparable injury will accrue to him if injunction is not granted. 5. The condition about the existence of which the applicant has to satisfy the court and which is to the effect that the mischief, likely to issue from withholding of injunction will be greater than that likely to arise from granting it is called the principle of the balance of convenience". The material and rather the most material question to be considered is whether the applicant would suffer any irreparable injury but for the grant of such injunction. 6. It is also well settled that even where all the conditions for grant of injunction are satisfied, a temporary injunction may nevertheless be refused on the ground of delay. 7. I now refer the Bye-laws and Election Rules of the Bar Association Jaipur. This association was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and it bears registration No. 79 of 1957-58. 7. I now refer the Bye-laws and Election Rules of the Bar Association Jaipur. This association was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and it bears registration No. 79 of 1957-58. The Bye-laws consist of 39 sections and are divided under following heads- (i) Membership (ii) Management and control (iii) General Meetings (iv) Quorum (v) Amendment in the Bye-laws Section 10 under the head of 'Membership' provides that the official year of the Association shall be from the 1st January to 31st December every year. Section 11(c) under the head of 'Management and Control' provides that the office-bearers and members of the Executive Committee shall be elected every year at the annual general meeting of the Association which will be held for the purpose ordinarily in the month of January every year.Section 34 is about the eligibility of candidate and voters for election. It says that a member who is in arrears of his subscription and/ or other dues of the Association for a period of more than one month shall not be entitled to stand as a candidate for election to any office or membership of Executive Committee and no member who is in arrears of his subscription and/or other dues of the Association for more than three months shall be entitled to vote for election in any general meeting.Section 39 provides that any amendment in the Bye-laws can only be made by a resolution of the General body of the Association in an ordinary general meeting held after 15 days prior notice of the proposed amendment and with a clear majority of four-fifth members present and voting, provided that such meeting is attended by not less than one half of the total number of members of the Association, excluding the Non-resident Members. 8. The Election Rules 1981 were framed and adopted in the year 1981 by the General House of the Bar Association for the purposes of smooth conducting of the elections. Rule 28 of the said rules provides thus: HINDI MATTER 361215 A Rule 5 and Rule 11 are with regard to eligibility of the voter and the candidates respectively. 9. A careful reading of the Election Rules 1981 goes to show that the said rules may be amended in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Rule 28. But Rule 28 can not amend Bye-laws. 9. A careful reading of the Election Rules 1981 goes to show that the said rules may be amended in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Rule 28. But Rule 28 can not amend Bye-laws. Any amendment in Bye-laws can only be made strictly through the procedure enumerated in section 39 of the Bye-laws. For the purposes of eligibility of candidates and voters for elections the mandate issued in section 34 shall be followed. Any provision in the Election Rules which is inconsistent with the Bye-laws shall not be binding on the members of the association. As already stated the Bye-laws constitute a contract between the Bar Association and its members and are binding on both. 10. Mr. Jagdeep Dhankar, learned counsel vigorously canvassed that the appellate court has travelled beyond its powers and has exceeded its jurisdiction by interpreting the Bye-laws and Election Rules as a whole and giving its conclusive findings at the interim stage which has the effect of disposing the suit itself. Section 10 of the Bye-laws has to be read with clause 3 of the Election Rules and both read together clearly show that the term of the elected Executive will be from 1st January to 31st December every year. The appellate court committed a gross mistake in interpreting section 11(c) of the Bye-laws independently of section 10 of the Bye-laws and section 3 of the Election Rules and has wrongly concluded that as per section 11(c) the term of the Elected Executive shall be one year from the date of election. Mr. Dhanker further contended that Bye-laws are the main governing rules and it is the Constitution of the Bar Association and the Election Rules are subordinate to the Bye-laws and no amendment in the rules can be brought about which is in contravention of the Bye-laws, without bringing about an amendment in the Bye-laws itself as per section 39. 11. On the other hand, Mr. K.N. Bhatt, learned counsel supported order of the appellate court and contended that the Election Rules are not subordinate to the Bye-laws. The Election Rules were independently framed and adopted by the General House of the Bar. Therefore the amendment in the election rules could have been validly made under Rule 28. The interpretation of section 11(c) was validly made by the appellate court. 12. The Election Rules were independently framed and adopted by the General House of the Bar. Therefore the amendment in the election rules could have been validly made under Rule 28. The interpretation of section 11(c) was validly made by the appellate court. 12. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contention and closely scrutinised the impugned orders. The trial court while discussing the ingredients of "prima facie case" observed that amendments were not made in accordance with section 39 of the Bye-laws. While discussing the ingredients pertaining to balance of convenience and irreparable loss the trial court observed as under: HINDI MATTER B 13. The appellate court in its order finally interpreted section 11(c) of the Bye-laws and observed that the term of elected executive shall be one year from the date of the election. It was further observed that amendment was validly made under Rule 28 by showing of hands as there was no provision of secret ballot. It was further held that increasing the subscription of membership by amending the relevant bye-laws or rule cannot be said to have changed the preamble and object of the Bye-laws therefore the trial court committed illegality in holding that the petitioner had a prima facie case in his favour. 14. I have been asked by the learned counsel to interpret the Bye-laws and the Election Rules but I am unable to persuade myself to accede to the respective contentions. I have to examine the orders of the court below in view of the legal position that there is a serious question to be tried in the suit and that on the facts before the trial court there is a probability of the petitioner being entitled to the relief asked for by him, and that the trial court's interference is necessary to protect the petitioner from the species of injury which the court calls irreparable, before his legal right can be established trial, and that the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to issue from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it. 15. The appellate court while disposing the appeal should not have gone to the extent of deciding the main case of the parties. The appellate court was not expected to deal with the suit on merits. 15. The appellate court while disposing the appeal should not have gone to the extent of deciding the main case of the parties. The appellate court was not expected to deal with the suit on merits. Interpretation of the Bye-laws and Election Rules shall be made by the trial court in the main suit. The finding of the appellate court, if taken as correct, there does not remain anything further in the suit. By making final observation in respect of Rule 28 and Section 11(c) of the Bye-laws and holding finally that objects and preamble shall not be affected by amendment, the learned appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction. 16. The trial court also finally interpreted section 10 and Section 11(c) of the Bye-laws as under-- HINDI MATTER C Further it was held that amendment was not made under section 39, while discussing the ingredients of balance of convenient and irreparable loss it was incumbent upon the trial court to extine as to on which date the petitioner became the member of the Bar Association ? How was he affected by the amendment introduced ? What were his pleadings in the application in respect of balance of convenience and irreparable loss ? Why did he not rush to the trial court when amendments were proposed ? What is his locus standi ? Was he entitled to relief in a suit filed by him in the individual capacity ? How his rights were affected by the amendments ?The trial court though observed that the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss but did not assign any reason in support of this observation. 17. The trial court, it appears, granted interim injunction in mandatory form in staying the operation of amendments made in the election rules. Therefore it was necessary for it to follow the following guidelines of the Supreme Court propounded in Dorap Cawasji Warden's case (supra): "Generally stated these guidelines are : (i) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (ii) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (ii) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (iii) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief." Their Lordships further observed: Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive or complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as pre-requisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion." (Emphasis supplied) 18. In Peer Gulam Naseer's case, 1988(2) RLR Page 871 this court (Hon'ble N.M. Kasliwal J. as he then was) observed as under: "In my view, the lower courts should not have decided the controversy finally raised in the pleadings by the parties at the stage of deciding the application for temporary injunction...... The lower appellate court has even recorded a finding in final terms..... The finding, if taken as correct there does not remain anything further in the suit. I am dearly of the view that lower appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the above question at this stage." 19. In the instant case, the trial court issued interim order after finally interpreting certain bye-laws, whereas the appellate court vacated the order of the trial court also after final interpretation of the said Bye-laws from another angle and both the courts have committed jurisdictional errors and allowing would mean occasioning of failure of justice. 20. In view of the foregoing discussions, I dispose of this revision with the following directions (i) Both the orders of the courts below stand set aside. (ii) The trial court is directed to decide the application filed by the petitioner, afresh in view of the directions referred to as hereinabove after affording opportunity of hearing to both the parties. (iii) I may add that my observations in respect of Bye-laws and Election Rules are not to be taken as binding and they shall not affect the adjudication of the application. (iii) I may add that my observations in respect of Bye-laws and Election Rules are not to be taken as binding and they shall not affect the adjudication of the application. (iv) The parties are directed to appear before the trial court on April 28, 1997 for seeking further directions. Costs easy. Revision disposed of. *******