JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners in the above matters are all ex-employees of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short 'Corporation') having been compulsorily retired from the services of the Corporation, have challenged the impugned orders of their compulsory retirement by way of aforesaid writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Since the questions involved in the aforesaid writ petitions are identical, they are being decided and disposed of by this common order. For the sake of convenience and ready reference S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7576/1992 titled Ashok Kumar Pareek v. R.S.R.T.C. & Others is being treated as main case and the facts stated in the said writ petition are being reproduced and for the sake of brevity the facts as narrated by the petitioners in other connected writ petitions are not being recreated or reproduced. 2. The respondent-corporation is a statutory body of the State and is represented before this court through its Managing Director as well as the Chairman of e said Corporation who have been arrayed as party respondent Nos. I & 2 respectively. 3. The respondent-corporation was created under the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (Act No. LIV of 1950) which came into force w.e.f. 4.12.1950 (for short 'the Act of 1950') as amended by the R.S.R.T.C. (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act No. LXIII of 1982) dated 6.11.1982. The respondent-corporation is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal. The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the corporation vests in the Board of Directors, which with the assistance of the Committees and the Managing Director may exercise such powers and do all such acts and things as may be exercised or done by a statutory body viz. The Corporation being an instrumentality of the State is within the scope and ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is, therefore, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court. 4. The petitioner took employment with the respondent- corporation after due selection on the post of Assistant Traffic Inspector w.e.f. 9.8.1963. Subsequently the petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Depot Manager on 29.6.1968 and further to the post of Depot Manager w.e.f. 10.4.1973. 5. The petitioner was again promoted to the post of Asstt. 4. The petitioner took employment with the respondent- corporation after due selection on the post of Assistant Traffic Inspector w.e.f. 9.8.1963. Subsequently the petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Depot Manager on 29.6.1968 and further to the post of Depot Manager w.e.f. 10.4.1973. 5. The petitioner was again promoted to the post of Asstt. Divisional Manager w.e.f. 30.1.1978 and thereafter he was temporarily promoted as Divisional Manager (Security) w.e.f. 1.5.1978 and was posted at Shriganganagar. Thereafter the petitioner was again promoted to the post of Divisional Manager on 27.9.1982 on the recommendations made by the service Recruitment Board on its meeting dated 16.7.1982. 6. It has been contended by the petitioner that notwithstanding the aforesaid recommendations of the Board duly recommending the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Divisional Manager, on which post he has been discharging his duties ever since then and though in order of seniority he stood senior to his other colleagues in the matter of appointment on the said post in the seniority list of Asstt. General Managers and Divisional General Managers respectively, yet he was superseded for promotion on the post of Deputy General Manager in the year 1989. 7. Apart from the outstanding service record of the petitioner during his tenure of service which is apparent from the successive promotions which he received from time to time, the petitioner was superseded in the matter of promotion to the post of Deputy General Manager for which be was constrained to file a writ petition in this court vine S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4897/89 wherein he had challenged the order of promotion of the candidates to the post of Deputy General Manager who were junior in order of seniority to the petitioner. The corporation did not contest the said writ petition by filing its reply and it was at the stage of final hearing that this court was informed that one post of Deputy General Manager had fallen vacant and was thus available and consequently the petitioner did not press the aforesaid writ petition and sought leave of this court to file a fresh writ petition on the basis of fresh cause of action as and when may be available to him in accordance with law. Consequently the said writ petition was disposed of by this court vide its order dated 1.4.1991 with the observation that the petitioner will be free to file a fresh writ petition in case he does not succeed in getting promotion to the post of Deputy General Manager against the vacancy which had become available at the time of disposal of the said writ petition. 8. The petitioner has further contended that apart from one post of Deputy General Manager which had fallen vacant at the time of disposal of the aforesaid writ petition, another post of Deputy General Manager had become available as on 30.9.1991 but instead of considering the candidature of the petitioner for appointment on the said post, the petitioner was taken by surprise when he received a letter from the corporation dated 18.4.1991 by which the services of the petitioner were placed under suspension w.e.f. the said date. With regard to the said order, the petitioner has contended that mala-fides of the respondent's corporation are apparent from the fact that it was passed just a few days after the disposal of the said writ petition particularly when no departmental enquiry was pending against the petitioner which would have promoted the respondents to have passed the said order. Apparently there could be no reason for passing the said order except the fact that the petitioner in this court which might have caused annoyance to the respondent-corporation as a result of which the services of the petitioner stood transferred to Jaipur and the petitioner had joined the new place of posting only on 2.4.1991 and the order of suspension passed on 18.4.1991 was on the close heals of the earlier decision of this court on the basis of allegations levelled against the petitioner during his tenure of posting at Jaipur from 31.7.1990 to 1.4.1991 while the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 7.6.1991. The petitioner has further challenged the suspension order on the ground that vague and concocted charges were levelled against him in the charge-sheet dated 7.6.1991 with the allegations that he had committed irregularities in respect of inquiries against the employees of the corporation during his tenure at Jaipur. The petitioner has further challenged the suspension order on the ground that vague and concocted charges were levelled against him in the charge-sheet dated 7.6.1991 with the allegations that he had committed irregularities in respect of inquiries against the employees of the corporation during his tenure at Jaipur. By way of reliance the petitioner has also placed on the record of this court the deposition of the Deputy General Manager, Jaipur recorded in the departmental enquiry against the petitioner which would show that the observations of the Deputy General Manager were wrongly construed as a complaint against the petitioner vide Annexure 3. The petitioner has further contended that in the backdrop of the aforesaid events which go to show that the respondent-corporation was not only bent upon in denying the promotional benefits to the petitioner on the post of Deputy General Manager but also to have suspended him from service of the corporation even in absence of any complaint from higher authorities and this impugned action of the respondent-corporation was mala fide and for extraneous consideration. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the corporation in not considering the candidature of the petitioner inspite of the two vacancies being available for the next promotional post of Deputy General Manager which had fallen vacant and also in view of the order of this court dated 1.4.1991, the petitioner had filed another writ petition in this court on 13.10.1991 vide S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6081/91 which came up for hearing before this court on 28.10.1991 and consequent to the notice dated 13.12.1991 being issued to the respondents by this court, the respondents expedited the enquiry proceedings against the petitioner and the enquiry officer submitted his report on 24.2.1992, when the enquiry was concluded in a hush-hush manner. Thereafter the petitioner filed a contempt petition against the concerned officer of the corporation on 26.3.1992 which was registered as Contempt Petition No. 197/92 and the petitioner was directed to appear before the Chairman of the corporation on 11.5.1992. 9. Thereafter the petitioner filed a contempt petition against the concerned officer of the corporation on 26.3.1992 which was registered as Contempt Petition No. 197/92 and the petitioner was directed to appear before the Chairman of the corporation on 11.5.1992. 9. It has been further contended by the petitioner that the Chairman of the corporation (respondent No. 2) was prompted to pass the impugned order of compulsory retirement dated 27.6.1991 vide Annexure 8 in exercise of the powers conferred on the appointing authority by Regulation 57(a)(i) of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Employees Service Regulations of 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulations of 1965'). Vide the impugned order the Chairman of the corporation (respondent No. 2) also sent a sum of Rs. 20967.00 by way of a bank draft in lieu of 3 months notice period to the petitioner. On the relevant date when the impugned order dated 27.6.1992 compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service of the corporation was passed, the petitioner had completed 25 years of qualifying service in the corporation and had attained the age of 50 years and last served on the post of Divisional Manager (under suspension). 10. On the relevant date when the impugned order dated 27.6.1992 compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service of the corporation was passed, the petitioner had completed 25 years of qualifying service in the corporation and had attained the age of 50 years and last served on the post of Divisional Manager (under suspension). 10. The petitioner has assailed the impugned order Annexure 8 dated 27.6.1992 whereby the petitioner was compulsorily retired from service of the corporation being illegal, contrary, malicious and in colourable exercise of power by the concerned authorities of the corporation on the grounds inter-alia (a) that at the time when the petitioner was appointed in service of the corporation, the Regulations of 1965 did not provide for compulsory (premature) retirement of its employees in the nature of Regulation 57(a)(i) of the Regulations of 1965 which was amended in the year 1975 or in the nature as provided under Rule 244(2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules of 1951 and the only provision for retirement was on the attainment of age of superannuation i.e. 58 years, (b) the amended provision of Regulation 57(a)(i) of the Regulations of 1965 was not applicable to the petitioner as on the date when the impugned order dated 27.6.1992 was passed since it amounted to change of service conditions to the detriment of the petitioner, (c) the order of premature retirement was passed on 27.6.1992 when the petitioner was under suspension and the said suspension order was neither withdrawn nor revoked at the time when the said impugned order was passed, (d) neither any disciplinary enquiry was pending against the petitioner on the relevant date nor the petitioner had filed any detailed reply to the charge-sheet containing memorandum of allegations against the petitioner and unless and until the order of suspension had been withdrawn or the disciplinary proceedings which were initiated against the petitioner had been discontinued, the competent authority was not empowered to pass the impugned order of compulsory and premature retirement, (e) the order of compulsory and premature retirement was a camouflage of disciplinary proceedings and the impugned order had actually been passed against the petitioner by way of major penalty when the corporation could not impose such punishment on the petitioner by continuing disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner in view of the strong defence set up by him and as a matter of fact suspension and charge-sheet were foundation of the impugned order of premature and compulsory retirement which the respondents were not competent to pass in the circumstances as aforesaid, (f) the impugned order was passed with ulterior motive and smacks of bias and mala fide of Shri M.D. Kaurani, the then Chairman of the corporation (respondent No. 2), (g) the Chairman had no competence to exercise the power of compulsory and premature retirement under Regulation 57(a)(i) of the Regulations of 1965 and in absence of delegation of such powers to the Chairman by the corporation, respondent No. 2 was not competent to pass the said order, (h) and at the time when the impugned order dated 27.6.1992 was passed, the said power could not be resorted to or invoked against the petitioner because at the time when the petitioner joined the service of corporation, there was no such Regulation in the service Regulations of 1965 governing the service conditions of the employees of corporation and any amendment in service Regulations to the prejudice and detriment of the petitioner's service conditions should not be made applicable and in view of this matter also the impugned order is liable to be set aside and quashed by this order. 11. The respondents on being noticed by this court have controverted the aforesaid contentions of the petitioner except the contention that the corporation is an instrumentality of the State within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. 12. With regard to the petitioner's contention regarding his service record being thoroughly clean, it has been contended by the respondents that the said contention is not tenable for the reason that he was punished by the competent authority as many as 11 times by having been given repeated warnings to improve his conduct and even 3 departmental enquiries were pending against the petitioner at the time of passing of the impugned order dated 27.6.1992 (Annexure 8) and hence it cannot be said that the service record of the petitioner was clean. In order to substantiate this contention, the respondents have contended that the petitioner was given recorded warning repeatedly on 3.11.1984, 10.3.1987, 13.7.1987, 16.5.1988, 14.12.1990 and the punishment of censure was repeatedly imposed on the petitioner by the appropriate authority vide orders dated 11.4.1985, 20.7.1988, 12.6.1990 and 15.4.1991. Thereafter vide order dated 18.2.1992 the competent authority imposed major punishment.of stoppage of 2 grade increments with cumulative effect under Rule 16 of the C.C.A. Rules. Prior to it also on 9.9.9 1, the petitioner was given warning to remain more careful in future as a result of the cumulative effect of the series of repeated acts of misconduct which constrained the competent authority in imposing the punishment of recorded warnings, censure as well as stoppage of 2 grade increments with cumulative effect as referred to above, the petitioner was served with charge-sheets for series of acts of misconduct and misdemeanour and as aforesaid on different dates, i.e. on 2.1.1991, 10.5.1991 and 7.6.1991 from which it is apparently clear that. the service record of the petitioner was tainted and hence the competent authority was justified in imposing the various punishments from time to time which finally culminated in passing of the impugned order dated 27.6.1992 on his completion of 25 years of qualifying service and on his attaining the age of 50 years in accordance with Regulation 57(a)(i) of the Regulations of 1965. In order to judge the veracity of the aforesaid contentions of the respondents, this court had also summoned the service record pertaining to the petitioner for the aforesaid period and from the perusal of the same it is clear that the petitioner is not having unblemished service record in view of the imposition of series of punishments by the competent authority for several times and, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that he was having unblemished service record is wholly unwarranted, erroneous and palpably false and the petitioner does not deserve the benefit of any indulgence by this court. 13. The respondents have further contended in their reply that it was as a result of the petitioner having been served with the charge-sheet for major misconduct for which he was placed under suspension and hence it would be wholly erroneous to contend that the petitioner's order of suspension was passed for some extraneous considerations and rather it is the requirement of service jurisprudence that whenever repeated acts of misconduct or misdemeanour having been brought to the notice of the competent authority regarding a delinquent employee before imposing major penalty of dismissal removal or penalty of compulsory retirement as contemplated under the Rules, the said delinquent employee should be placed under suspension at the first instance pending departmental enquiry and it is only after the completion of the disciplinary enquiry, if the competent authority is of the opinion that the major penalty of dismissal or removal from service or penalty of compulsory retirement should be imposed, the same be imposed on the delinquent. The respondents have further contended that mere vague allegations of mala fides are not enough to prove the mala fides of the appropriate authority unless the said allegations are substantiated by positive evidence on the record and onus for discharging the said burden was heavily on the petitioner and which he has filed to discharge to the satisfaction of this court. The respondents have further contended that the matter with regard to the earlier promotion to be awarded to the petitioner cannot wash off the subsequent acts of the misconduct and misdemeanour which he had committed. Respondents have further contended that the petitioners have not approached this court with clean hands in having made a false declaration about their service record by suppressing the material facts. 14. Respondents have further contended that the petitioners have not approached this court with clean hands in having made a false declaration about their service record by suppressing the material facts. 14. With regard to the petitioner's contention that the departmental enquiry was hurriedly concluded after service of the charge-sheet on the delinquent on 7.6..991, it had been contended that the said allegation is palpably false, since the said departmental enquiry took almost eight months in its completion LA the report was finally submitted by the enquiry officer to the competent authority on 24.2.1992, from which it cannot be inferred that the petitioner was prejudiced in any manner and rather the petitioner was given full opportunity to defend his case. 15. With regard to the passing of the impugned order of compulsory and premature retirement, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the said order was not only passed against the petitioners but also against several other employees of the corporation since the said delinquents in the opinion of the competent authority, were not fit of be retained in service any more and rather the appropriate authority on the perusal of their service record, had finally arrived at the conclusion that their retention in service was not in the interest of the corporation and hence they deserved to be weeded out and the necessary exercise in this regard was done by the committee constituted by the appropriate authority after getting the complete information and after thoroughly scrutinising the record of each employee and only thereafter necessary recommendations were made for their compulsory retirement. 16. 16. With regard to the powers of the competent authority to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement, it has been contended in the reply that by virtue of amended Regulations of 1959 with reference to Regulation 57(a)(i) of the Regulations of 1965 and which was adopted by the Corporation vide its resolution No. 167/75 vide the amendment which came into force w.e.f. 14.11.1975, it has been contended that the said Regulation was fully applicable to the petitioner w.e.f. the date it came into force and since the impugned order imposing punishment of compulsory retirement was passed by the competent authority on 27.6.1992 subsequent to the coming into force of the aforesaid Regulations and also subsequent to the aforesaid amendment dated 14.11.1975, it cannot be said that the impugned order was passed contrary to the Regulations or the service conditions governing the employees existing at the relevant dates. For the sake of convenience and ready reference, it shall be appropriate to refer to the Regulation 57(a)(i) of the Regulations which reads as under : "57(a)(i) - Notwithstanding anything contained in this regulation, the Corporation may, if it is of the opinion that it is in the Corporation's interest to do so, have the absolute right to retire the Corporation employee after he has attained the age of 50 years or on the date he completes 25 years service whichever is earlier, or notice in writing or three months' pay and allowances in lieu thereof." 17. Regulation 89 deals with the delegation of powers by the corporation to a competent authority for taking appropriate necessary action in the matter to the concerned delegate who shall be exercising the said powers for and on behalf of the corporation. The said provision reads as under : "89 (a) Corporation may delegate any of its powers to a competent authority under the various regulations. Provided that the following powers shall not be delegated or rede legated : Nature of power To be exercised by 1. Power to make Regulations Corporation (Regulation 123) Corporation 2. Power to retire on superannuation Appointing Authority (Regulation 57) Appointing Authority 3. Joining time (Regulation 78) Appointing Authority 4. Provided that the following powers shall not be delegated or rede legated : Nature of power To be exercised by 1. Power to make Regulations Corporation (Regulation 123) Corporation 2. Power to retire on superannuation Appointing Authority (Regulation 57) Appointing Authority 3. Joining time (Regulation 78) Appointing Authority 4. Permit acceptance of pension, gratuity or other emoluments not specified in the terms and conditions of the deputation Corporation (b) A competent authority may further delegate any of his powers under these regulations to subordinate authorities to such extent and subject to such conditions as may be deemed fit in the interest of service of corporation, in consultation with the Chief Accounts Officer." 18. In this context I also deem appropriate to refer to the corresponding analogous provision of compulsory retirement of Government servants i.e. Rule 244(2) of the R.S.R., which is in pari-materia the same as inserted in the Regulation 57(a) of the Regulations of 1965 which reads asunder:- "Rule 244(2)-- Rule 244(2) R.S.R. was inserted in the R.S.R. vide Notification dated 7.4.1982 and said right is intended to be exercised by the competent authority against a Government servant whose efficiency is impaired, but against whom it is not desirable to make formal charges of inefficiency or who is assessed to be fully efficient but not to such a degree as to warrant his retirement on compensate allowance. It was not intention of the rule making body to use the said provision as financial burden, i.e., to say, the aforesaid provision should be deployed by the competent authority in appropriate cases only, that is to say in cases of those Government servants who, on the basis of the assessment of their service record, the competent authority is of the view that it is not desirable in the interest of the department concerned as well as in the interest of general public to retain such a public servant in view of his questionable and doubtful integrity and who are considered unfit for retention in service 'in public interest. 19. 19. Reverting back to the Regulations 57(a)(i) of the Regulations, the only safeguard which the appropriate authority has to adopt in such cases is to ensure that the procedural requirements of the said provision have been fully complied with, i.e., to say that the said employee has on the relevant date completed (a) 25 years of qualifying service (b) and has completed the age of 50 years, whichever is earlier or on any date thereafter, (c) such Government servant shall be entitled to payment of 3 months' pay in lieu of 3 months' notice which has been served to him clearly indicating the said employee that he shall stand compulsorily retired on the expiry of 3 months' notice on the date to be specified by the competent authority in the said notice. 20. Thus it is clear from the plain reading of the aforesaid provision that the competent authority has absolute right to retire a public servant whose retention in the services of the corporation may not be desirable in its interest on scrutiny of the service record of such an employee. 21. It is well settled proposition of law that compulsory and premature retirement of an employee would not attract the consequences as envisaged under clause (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India because such retirement is not conceived as a penalty imposed on an employee by the competent authority unless actuated by bias, malice or ill-will, since otherwise the competent authority shall not be able to exercise the said power even in appropriate cases where the retention of such public servant is not desirable in the interest of department or general public and it is not open to the delinquent employee to challenge the impugned order of compulsory retirement on such sham, illusory and vague grounds as has been done in the present writ petitions. 22. Admittedly all procedural safeguards were fully adopted by the competent authority including the disciplinary enquiry which was initiated against the petitioners and in which they were given full opportunity to file their defence in reply to the charge-sheet and memorandum of allegation served upon them. 22. Admittedly all procedural safeguards were fully adopted by the competent authority including the disciplinary enquiry which was initiated against the petitioners and in which they were given full opportunity to file their defence in reply to the charge-sheet and memorandum of allegation served upon them. As a matter of fact it is not essential for the competent authority that it should refrain from exercising its powers as envisaged under Regulation 57(a)(i) of the Regulations in those cases where an employee has been placed under suspension or to formally withdraw the order of suspension before passing order of compulsory and premature retirement against such employee and in this regard I am of the considered opinion that once the competent authority on the basis of its subjective satisfaction which is derived from the material available on record that retention of such an employee would be contrary to the interest of general public as well as the concerned department, the order of compulsory retirement can certainly be passed against such an employee subject to the observance of procedural safeguards as contemplated by the aforesaid provision which, in my view, have been fully adopted and have been adhered to by the competent authority. I am further of the view that the allegations of the petitioner with regard to the bias and malice of the competent authority in having passed the impugned order dated 27.6.1992 are entirely baseless and unfounded, since it is settled law that mere allegation of bias or malice would not by itself be a ground for challenging the impugned order or compulsory ant; premature retirement unless it is substantiated by positive evidence on the record and onus to discharge such burden is heavily on the person who levels such allegations which admittedly the petitioner has failed to discharge. 23. Thus in my view the Chairman of the respondent- corporation had absolute right, authority and competence as well as the powers to terminate the services of the petitioner by passing an order of compulsory and premature retirement which has been rightly exercised keeping in view the adverse service record of the petitioner and in accordance with the regulation 57(a)(i) of the Regulations as referred to above. I am further of the view that it is not correct to allege that the power to compulsorily retire the petitioners could have been exercised by the appointing authority only on their attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 58 years and rather the intention of the Rule making authority was to arm the competent authority to exercise such power. in be fitting and appropriate cases even in those cases where the delinquent employee has not attained the age of 58 years and rather the requirement of the Regulations is only to the effect that the said employee should have attained the age of 50 years or should have completed 25 years of qualifying service whichever is earlier or on any date thereafter in accordance with the regulations as referred to above. 24. With regard to the contention of the petitioner that since the aforesaid provision was not inserted in the service regulations when the petitioner had joined the service of the corporation and since it was inserted in the Regulations by the amendment which came into force w.e.f. 14.11.1975, I am of the view that it would not make any difference at all since the insertion of the aforesaid provision in the Regulations has neither been to the detriment nor to the disadvantage to the petitioner since it does not tantamount to change of service conditions of the petitioner at all. I am further of the view that the corporation has absolute powers to amend or delete any of the Regulations or frame any regulation at its discretion subject to approval of the State Government and since the corporation had, before insertion of Regulation 57(a)(i) of the Regulations of 1965 which was substituted by notification dated 14.11.1975, obtained the prior approval of the State Government, the insertion of the aforesaid provision in the Regulations cannot neither be interpreted nor understood as having its implications to the disadvantage or interpreted nor understood as having its implications to the disadvantage or determinate of the petitioner nor it tantamount to change of service conditions of the employees of the Corporation. As a matter of fact the petitioner was well aware of the Regulations of the Corporation when he joined its services and also the scope and ambit of the powers of competent authority to exercise its power of compulsorily retiring the delinquent employee of the corporation in appropriate cases. 25. As a matter of fact the petitioner was well aware of the Regulations of the Corporation when he joined its services and also the scope and ambit of the powers of competent authority to exercise its power of compulsorily retiring the delinquent employee of the corporation in appropriate cases. 25. In this context it shall be appropriate to refer to provisions of Regulations 3, 4, 5 zed 6 of the Regulations of 1965 which read as under : "3. Power to relax Regulations - The Corporation may, subject to limits of his powers to make such Regulations, relax the provisions of these Regulations to such extent and subject to such conditions as it may consider necessary in a just and equitable manner, subject to the approval of the State Government. 4. Power to amend - The Corporation may amend or delete any regulations or frame any new regulation at its discretion, subject to the approval of the state government. 5. Power to interpret - The State Government shall have absolute right of interpreting these regulations and its decision shall be binding on Corporation employees. 6. Power to delegate The Corporation may declare any of its officers as competent authority and delegate to him, subject to any conditions which it may impose any power under these regulations : Provided that no persons other than the competent authority so declared, shall exercise or delegate powers under these regulations without specific or general orders from the Corporation." 26. The Regulations of 1965 were framed by the corporation in exercise of the powers vested to it under sub-section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (Central Act) and in accordance with such powers the Rule making authority had vested the corporation with the power to frame the Regulations of 1965 of regulate the service conditions of its employees appointed to various posts in connection with the affairs of the corporation. Thus the aforesaid powers to frame the Regulations was derived by the corporation by virtue of the Central legislation i.e. the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 and hence the exercise of the said powers in having framed the Regulations of 1965 by the corporation is perfectly just and in consonance with powers derived from the Central Act and in accordance with Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 27. 27. With regard to the contention of the petitioner that it was with a view to deprive him of the future promotional benefits from the post of Divisional Manager to that of Deputy General Manager and above, I am of the view that the contention of the petitioner is entirely unfounded and baseless in view of the fact that no Government servant can claim absolute or vested right from promotional benefits since it is sole prerogative of the competent authority to extend or not to extend the promotional benefits to an employ and the said power is to be exercised on the basis of the fair assessment of the service record of each employee and it has got nothing to do with the right of the competent authority to compulsorily retire a delinquent employee on the basis of his service record. I am further of the view that it would be absolutely incorrect to say that there was no provision for compulsory and premature retirement 'f the employees of the corporation available prior to the aforesaid amendment, since the said provision was earlier available in the regulations which was amended by the amending Regulation dated 14.11.1975 and was accordingly made applicable not only to the petitioner but also to other employees of the corporation and hence it cannot be said that it was either beyond the competence or purview of the competent authority to have passed such order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner. If any employee of the statutory body such as corporation retirement of the petitioner. If any employee of the statutory body such as corporation in the instant case commits any act of misconduct or misdemeanour which would be detrimental to the interest of the corporation which is an instrumentality of State, then the authority concerned would be failing in its duty if it shirks from exercising such power fairly in appropriate cases where such power should be exercised and in my considered view this power which is derived by virtue of Regulation 57(a)(i) of the Regulations has so rightly been exercised by the competent authority in the instant case as well as in the connected writ petitions. I am further of the view that the pendency of the disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner as well as the petitioners in connected writ petitions was no bar to the passing of the order of compulsory and premature retirement of the said delinquents since the impugned orders were passed after the delinquent employees were duly served with the charge-sheet and thereafter they were given full opportunity to meet their defence and it is only thereafter that the orders of compulsory and premature retirement of the delinquents were passed in accordance with law. 28. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, examined their rival claims and contentions as well as material available on the record including the propositions of law as advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. 29. In support of his contention advanced at the bar, learned counsel for petitioner placed reliance upon the following decisions : Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India and others, 1981 S.C. page 70 [1980(3) SLR 1 (SC)] , R.S.E.B. v. Manohar Lal D.B., 1991(1) R.L.R. page 239 , H.C. Gargy v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 S.C. page 65 : [1986(5) SLR 57 (SC)] , Ramekbal Sharma v. State of Bihar & others 1990 (3) SCC page 504 , Brijmohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab, 1987(2) SCC 188 : [1987(2) SLR 54 (SC)] and Saremal Soni v. State of Rajasthan & others, S.B. C.W.P. No. 917/91 decided on 19.12.1994 . 30. I have examined the ratio of the aforesaid decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners and for the sake of brevity, it would be appropriate if I may discuss briefly the principles as laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Baldev Raj Chadha v. U.O.I.& others (supra). In the said matter the appellant before the apex court was an Accounts Officer serving in the office of Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG). He was compulsorily retired from service by the competent authority in accordance with the Fundamental Rules 56(j)(i) of the Rules. In the said matter the appellant before the apex court was an Accounts Officer serving in the office of Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG). He was compulsorily retired from service by the competent authority in accordance with the Fundamental Rules 56(j)(i) of the Rules. He had challenged the validity of the impugned order on the grounds that the material on the basis of which he was compulsorily retired, was not disclosed to the delinquent and since he had crossed the efficiency bar after continuous service of 14 years had reached at the maximum of the scale admissible to him and that no adverse entries for the last five years immediately before the impugned order was passed, could be cashiered on the score that long years ago, his performance had been poor although his superior had allowed him to cross the efficiency bar keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the said case, the apex court further held that the order of compulsory retirement was not sustainable in absence of relevant material on the record. Under Rule 56(j)(i) of the Fundamental Rules which was applied to the case of the petitioner stipulates that if the appropriate authority is of the opinion that it is in public interest to compulsorily retire a public servant, it shall have the absolute right to do so by giving him a notice of not less than 3 months in writing or 3 months pay in lieu thereof. Under the said Rules the authority entitled to make the substantive appointment is the appropriate authority to compulsorily retire a Government servant under the said rules which is at par with regulations 57(a)(i) of the Regulations of 1963-and Rule 244(2) of the RSR. 31. No doubt the requisite opinion to retire a public servant is that of the competent authority but such power has to be exercised in all fairness and in accordance with the said Rules on the basis of the subjective satisfaction of the competent authority so arrived at on objective and bona fide assessment of the relevant material which is available on the record against the concerned delinquent which would finally enable the competent authority to form the requisite opinion that it would not be in public interest to retain such as employee in Government service. The absolute power further does not mean necked or arbitrary exercise of such power but at the same time if the material on. the record is of such nature as would justify the formation of such opinion, then it will not be desirable either in public interest or in the interest of the concerned department to retain such public servants in the service. In such a situation, nothing would prevent the competent authority to exercise its power by virtue of the aforesaid provisions in compulsorily retiring a public servant in accordance with law. Hence the ratio of the aforesaid decision in Baldev Raj Chandha's case (supra) as well as the decisions in other cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the instant writ petitions which are being dealt with and disposed of by this common order, since none of the conditions which were available for consideration of the apex court as well as this court in the above referred matters are available in the present case and since the competent authority had passed the impugned orders on the basis of fair assessment of the entire service record of the petitioners which was tainted in view of the adverse entries in the service record of the delinquents. Hence it cannot be said that the impugned orders of compulsory and premature retirement of the petitioners are either bad or not sustainable in law. 32. On examination of Service record of the petitioners which was summoned. I am of the view that in view of adverse entries recorded against the petitioners in their service record, there was sufficient material for the competent authority to have arrived at the conclusion that their further retention in services of the Corporation was neither in public interest nor in interest of the Corporation. 33. I am of the view that law on the subject has undergone radical change and the learned counsel for the petitioners have not taken note of the latest and subsequent law which is applicable and attracted to his case. 34. 33. I am of the view that law on the subject has undergone radical change and the learned counsel for the petitioners have not taken note of the latest and subsequent law which is applicable and attracted to his case. 34. I am fortified in my observations from the following decisions of the apex court: K. Kandaswamy v. Union of India & another, 1995(6) SCC 162 : [ 1995(6) SLR 47 (SC)] , Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, Bhuvaneswar and others v. Suresh Chandra Behera, AIR 1995 SC 1745 : [ 1995(2) SLR 754 (SC)] , Union of India v. Ajoy Kumar Patnaik, 1995(6) SCC 442 : [1995(6) SLR 27 (SC)] , Secretary to the Government, Harijan & Tribal Welfare Department, Bhuvaneswar (Orissa) & another v. Nityananda Pati, 1993(2) (Supp.) SCC 391 , State of U.P. & another v. Abhai Kishore Masta, 1995(1) SLR 16 , Baikuntha Nath Das & another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada & another, 1992(2) SCC 299 : [1992(2) SLR 2 (SC)] , Union of India v. V.P. Seth & another, AIR 1994 SC 1261 : [1995(4) SLR 708 (SC)] , U.P. Jal Nigam & another v. Syed Khadim Waris, 1995(4) (Supp.) SCC 638 : [1996(1) SLR 26 (SC)] & Allahbad Bank Officers' Association & another v. Allahabad Bank & others, 1996(4) SCC 504 : [ 1996(4) SLR 22 (SC)] . 35. In K. Kandaswamy's v. Union of India & another (supra), the petitioner who was a senior IPS Officer (Addl. D.I.G.) was compulsorily retired from service since his service record was tainted and on fair estimation of his service record, the competent authority formed the opinion that it was not desirable to retain such an officer in public service in view of his doubtful integrity and the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate authority on the basis of its bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement of the said officer was in public interest. In appeal before the apex court, it was held as under : "If the appropriate authority bona fide forms an opinion that in view of doubtful integrity it would not be desirable in public interest to retain the officer concerned in service, the correctness thereof on merits cannot be challenged before the courts, though it may be open to the aggrieved employee to impugn it. But the same may be challenged on the ground that requisite opinion is based on no evidence or has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision. While exercising the power under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules, the appropriate authority has to weight several circumstances in arriving at the conclusion that the employee requires to be compulsorily retired in public interest. The Government is given power to energise its machinery by weeding out deadwood, inefficient, corrupt and people of doubtful integrity by compulsorily retiring them from service. When the appropriate authority forms bona-fide opinion that compulsory retirement of the Government employee is in the public interest, court would not interfere with the order." It was further held by the Apex Court as under : "Higher the ladder the officer scales in the echelons of service, greater should be the transparency of integrity, honesty, character and dedication to duty. The appropriate Government or the authority would, therefore, need to consider the totality of the facts and circumstances appropriate in each case and would form the opinion whether compulsory retirement of a Government employee would be in the public interest. The opinion must be based on the material on record; otherwise it would amount to arbitrary or colourable exercise and power. Considered from his perspective and the material on record, the decision taken by the Government of India in the present case cannot be held to be arbitrary, unjustified or based on no evidence." 36. In the matter of Chief General Manager State Bank of India v. Suresh Chandra Behera (supra) the Review Committee of the appellants in its meeting held on the relevant date, considered the case of the respondent in accordance with IIIrd proviso to para 19(1) of the State Bank of India Officers' (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1979 and recorded that overall performance of the respondent during the preceding five years had been 'Average. He was censured for procedural irregularities as head cashier and his performance as a Branch Manager had not been satisfactory on account of his inadequate job knowledge, besides his initiative had also been only average for the last five years. The Bank has not able to utilise his services effectively commensurate with his seniority and the order of compulsory and premature retirement was passed against such delinquent. The Bank has not able to utilise his services effectively commensurate with his seniority and the order of compulsory and premature retirement was passed against such delinquent. In appeal before the apex court it was held as under : "In the present case, looking to the finding arrived at by the Review Committee after a detailed examination of the service record of the respondent, the order of compulsory retirement cannot be faulted on any ground. The High Court cannot examine for itself the service record of any employee and substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the Review Committee. The power under the IIIrd proviso of para 19(1) has been properly exercised in this case on relevant considerations in public interest. The order cannot be termed as either arbitrary or mala fide." 37. In Union of India v. Ajoy Kumar Patanaik (supra), the Screening Committee on consideration of the material before it had recommended to retire the respondent compulsorily under FR 56(j) on account of his doubtful integrity. The respondent who was at the relevant time working as Collector of Customs had completed 50 years of age and the order was passed by the competent authority under FR 56(j) of the fundamental rules compulsorily retiring him in public interest. In appeal before the apex court it was held as under : "An officer though performs official quasi judicial functions, his conduct in discharge of the quasi judicial act or omission relates to the activity in the course of the discharge of his duties as a servant of the Government and bears reasonable relation or nexus with the nature and conduct of the service and when it casts reflection upon his reputation, integrity or devotion to duty as public servant, that would be squarely referable to the conduct of the public servant amenable to the disciplinary proceedings. When it is a misconduct, the competent authority is equally entitle to take a decision whether an officer has impeccable integrity and absolute devotion to duty for further continuation in service. The competent authority would be free to consider the material particularly the latest one, and form a bona fide decision- in the public interest to compulsorily retire an officer from service. 38. The competent authority would be free to consider the material particularly the latest one, and form a bona fide decision- in the public interest to compulsorily retire an officer from service. 38. In the matter of Secretary to Government Harijans & Tribal Welfare Department v. Nityananda Pati (supra), the respondent who was Junior Welfare Extension Officer in services of the State Government of Orissa was compulsorily retired from service under Rule 71 of the Orissa Service Code by the impugned order which he challenged before the High Court. The case was later transferred to Orissa Administrative Tribunal and was allowed by the impugned judgment which was challenged in appeal before the Apex Court by the State Government. The apex court in appeal while negativing the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents held as under : "It appears from the records that the respondents was subjected to several departmental enquiries from time to time and had been placed under suspension for more than nine years and large sums of money were recovered from him by orders made in several proceedings. We have examined the matter thoroughly and we find that the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the impugned order of retirement of the respondent. This appeal is accordingly allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the petition of the respondent originally filed in the High Court and later transferred to the Tribunal is dismissed." 39. In the matter of State of U.P. and another v. Abhay Kishore Masta (supra) the respondent who was an Executive Engineer in services of the State Government was suspended pending enquiry into certain charges. He challenged the said order by way of writ petition in Allahabad High Court which was dismissed. Though the enquiry had commenced, it was not concluded by the-year 1988 when the respondent filed another petition challenging the continuation of the order of suspension pending enquiry and High Court suspended the order of suspension pending enquiry on 8.8.1988, while the said ' enquiry, was pending, the respondent was compulsorily retired under FR 56(j) by the order of State Government dated 28.12.1989 and which the respondent challenged by filing the writ petition before the High Court. During the pendency of the said writ petition, final orders were passed by the competent authority imposing the publishment of education in rank to be given effect to in case the order of compulsory retirement was set aside. Thereupon the respondent amended his writ petition on the question of order of punishment as well. High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed order of compulsory retirement on the ground that it was passed during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings and it must be deemed to be penal in nature. In appeal before the apex court preferred by the State Government of U.P., it was held that the impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable in law for the reason that it cannot be said as a matter of law nor it can be said as invariably and every order of compulsory retirement made under FR 56(j) or other corresponding provision thereto during the disciplinary proceeding is necessarily penal in nature which it may or may not be so and it is a matter to be decided on verification of the relevant record 3r the material on which the order is based. It was held by the Apex Court as under : "We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was in error in holding that merely because the order of compulsory retirement was passed during the pendency of a disciplinary enquiry, it must be necessarily deemed to be penal in nature, is unsustainable in law." 40. In the matter of Baikuntha Nath Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer (supra) the apex court in appeal preferred by the appellant against the order of compulsory retirement under FR 56(j) deemed the scope of judicial review by observing that it is open to challenge only on the grounds of mala fides, arbitrariness and perversity and further observed that the 'opinion' of the authority regarding compulsory retirement of an employee is thus subjective satisfaction which has to be formed on the basis of the entire service record and the said order cannot be assailed on the ground that it is punitive and vindictive or in violation of the principles of natural justice and the principles of Audi Alteram Partem stand excluded from the scope of judicial review in sustaining such an order. 41. 41. In the matter of Union of India v. V.P. Seth (supra) the apex court reiterated its earlier view in the matter of Baikuntha Das Nath (supra) and upheld the validity of the impugned order of compulsory retirement. 42. Likewise in the matter of U.P. Jal Nigam v. Syed Khadim Waris (supra) the apex court reiterated its earlier view that is is the entire service record which has to be perused by the competent authority and it is only thereafter that the subjective satisfaction can be said to have been formed by the Screening Committee on the basis of the material on record for sustaining the order of compulsory retirement. 43. Prima facie I am of the opinion that the impugned orders which are under challenge in the aforesaid writ petitions were passed by the competent authority on the basis of its subjective satisfaction duly arrived at after thorough screening and examination of entire service record of the petitioners and it is only thereafter that the competent authority had formed its opinion to compulsorily retire the petitioners from service of the corporation in accordance with Regulation 56(a)(i) of the Regulations. I am in full agreement with the findings recorded by the competent authority and I am further of the view that the impugned orders are not open to challenge before this court on any of the grounds urged by the petitioners and I am further of the view that the said orders cannot be purported to have been passed in absence of any material on record, for collateral purposes, mala fides or for any extraneous consideration not germane to the matter in dispute. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners are wholly misconceived, misdirected and contrary to the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court. I am fortified in my observations from the aforesaid decisions of the apex court relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents which, in my considered opinion, are fully attracted to these writ petitions. 44. As a result of the above discussions, I find no merit in the aforesaid writ petitions and the same are consequently dismissed with no order as to costs and the impugned orders of compulsory premature retirement of the petitioners are confirmed being not open to challenge.Petition dismissed. *******