JUDGMENT - NIJJAR S.S., J.:---The present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants claiming a number of reliefs. It is claimed that there is no valid, binding or concluded contract in existence between the plaintiff and the defendants for the sale by the plaintiff to the defendant No. 1 of 13500 metric tonnes of Indian White long grain rice either on the terms and conditions set out in the fax messages dated 14th July, 1995 and/or 15th July, 1995 which are attached to the plaint as Exhibits-G, H and I addressed by defendant No. 3 acting for defendant No. 1 and/or in the fax dated 14th July, 1995 Exhibit-DD to the plaint, allegedly sent by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1. It is also claimed that the fax allegedly sent by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1. Exhibit-DD, is invalid, illegal, and not binding on the plaintiffs. It is further claimed that defendant No. 2 had no authority to issue the same and in any event at the time when defendant No. 2 purportedly sent the said fax message there was no concluded contract. The plaintiff also claims for an order of injunction permanently restraining the defendants from in any manner enforcing or acting pursuant to or in furtherance of any alleged contract with the plaintiff as narrated above. The plaintiff also claims that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 be restrained from participating in the arbitration proceedings which are to be held by defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6 and further to restrain defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6 from proceeding with the arbitration. The present notice of motion has been taken out against the defendants for restraining defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 from acting in pursuance of the alleged contract as narrated above and also for the relief of injunction as has been narrated earlier. Although the facts pleaded in the plaint are voluminous but for the purpose of the decision of the Notice of Motion few of them are relevant. They are as under. 2. The plaintiff is a public limited company which has its registered office at Virginia House, 37, Chowringhee, Calcutta-700071. Similarly defendant No. 1 is a company organised and existing under the laws of England which has its registered office at 66 Leman Street, London EI 8 EU United Kingdom. They are as under. 2. The plaintiff is a public limited company which has its registered office at Virginia House, 37, Chowringhee, Calcutta-700071. Similarly defendant No. 1 is a company organised and existing under the laws of England which has its registered office at 66 Leman Street, London EI 8 EU United Kingdom. Defendant No. 2 is also a Company registered in England having its registered office at Evans House, 78/82 High Street, Brentwood, Essex, United Kingdom. Defendant No. 3 is a Private Limited Company registered in India under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at Bombay. Defendant No. 4 is the Grain and Feed Trade Association Limited (GAFTA) organised and existing under the laws for England having its registered office at 28, St. Mary Axe London EC3A SEP, United Kingdom. Defendant No. 5 is the Arbitrator appointed by defendant No. 4. Defendant No. 6 is also an Arbitrator appointed by defendant No. 4. 3. By a fax message dated 7th July, 1995 the third defendant invited the plaintiff to make an offer for sale by way of export of 1000 metric tonnes of 25 per cent long grain Indian rice in August/September. The third defendant stated that it had a firm buyer at a price of U.S. $ 244 per metric tonne FOB Kakinada. On 13th July, 1995 the plaintiff replied to defendant No. 3 by way of a fax message offering for export the rice as described by defendant No. 3. A number of conditions were stipulated in the said fax message. One of the conditions related to the mode of payment which was stipulated to be by a confirmed Irrevocable Without Recourse 100 per cent letter of Credit, hereinafter referred to as "the L/C", in favour of the plaintiff issued by a prime International Bank. Defendant No. 3 sought certain clarifications from the plaintiff on behalf of its associate in the United Kingdom, defendant No. 2. It was stated that the details are required to enable the defendant No. 3 to obtain the firm bid of the buyer. These clarifications were furnished immediately by the plaintiff again by a fax message dated 13th July, 1995. Defendant No. 3 sought certain clarifications from the plaintiff on behalf of its associate in the United Kingdom, defendant No. 2. It was stated that the details are required to enable the defendant No. 3 to obtain the firm bid of the buyer. These clarifications were furnished immediately by the plaintiff again by a fax message dated 13th July, 1995. By a fax message dated 14th July, 1995 defendant No. 3 forwarded to the plaintiff a firm offer of 1000 metric tonnes of rice which had been received by defendant No. 3 from its customer in the United Kingdom, defendant No. 1. The bid contained in the aforesaid fax message agreed upon the price. The said bid set out various terms and conditions which were fundamentally different from those contained in the plaintiff's fax message dated 13th July, 1995. Even the type of rice to be exported had been changed. Response was sought from the plaintiff within an hour on 14th July, 1995. Certain telephonic conversation also took place between the representatives of the plaintiff and one Mr. Arun Shah of defendant No. 3. By a fax message dated 14th July, 1995 the plaintiff sought the agreement for three fundamental terms from the defendant No. 3 as discussed on the telephone viz. "(i) That the price of U.S.$ 244 FOB stowed at Kakinada would include a commission of only U.S.$ 1 and not U.S.$ 2 (thus a net price of U.S. $ 243 and not U.S.$ 242) would be payable to the plaintiff; (ii) That the Letter of Credit should be unrestricted for negotiation and not negotiable only at the counters of the opening bank in Singapore; (iii) That shipment would be 15th August/15 September and not 15th August/30th September." No response was received by the plaintiff to the aforesaid fax. However, defendant No. 3 informed the plaintiff on telephone that he had sent the plaintiff's offer to the concerned buyers. This discussion is alleged to have centered on the price, commission and payment terms. Defendant No. 3 also enquired as to whether the plaintiff was interested in making an offer for export of 13500 metric tonnes of white rice for shipment on 10th August/September and payment by way of restricted L/C opened by Bank Indo Suez, London confirmed by Bank Indo Suez, Bombay. No fresh offer was made by defendant No. 3 about the 13500 m.t. of rice. No fresh offer was made by defendant No. 3 about the 13500 m.t. of rice. According to the plaintiff, the terms and conditions were repeatedly sought to be changed by defendant No. 3. The plaintiff, however, continued the negotiations on the basis of the offer dated 13th July, 1995. The plaintiffs insisted that payment should be made by way of the L/C as specified in the fax message dated 13th July, 1995. Since there was difference about the mode of payment between the parties, the plaintiff decided not to proceed with the matter any further. Thus it is stated that on 14-15th July, 1995 fundamental terms remained to be resolved and agreed upon between the plaintiff and the buyer for whom defendant No. 3 was acting. On 17th July, 1995 the plaintiff found in his office copies of three fax messages addressed to the plaintiff by defendant No. 3. The first was a fax message dated 14th July, 1995, second was a handwritten fax message also dated 14th July, 1995 addressed by defendant No. 3 to the plaintiff and marked 11.10 p.m. The third was a fax message dated 15th July, 1995 addressed by defendant No. 3 to the plaintiff and contained several terms and conditions and specifications. The first fax dated 14th July, 1995 mentioned the second proposal for 13500 metric tonnes. The second handwritten fax message disclosed the name of the buyer to be that of defendant No. 1. This was apparently written and signed by Arun Shah. The hand-written message details that the L/Cs were yet to be finalised and alleged that all other terms and conditions of the sale would be as discussed earlier. The third fax message dated 15th July, 1995 purported to reconfirm details of the alleged sale. According to the plaintiff, several terms and conditions contained therein had not been discussed or agreed to by the plaintiffs. These conditions and specifications recorded in the fax message dated 15th July, 1995 were also fundamental departure from the offer dated 13th July, 1995 made by the plaintiff. This fax message purported to record that the business was finalised between the buyer and the seller save and except only one item concerning the L/C. On 17th July, 1995 defendant No. 3 by a fax message again made further offer/suggestion recording the L/C terms. This fax message purported to record that the business was finalised between the buyer and the seller save and except only one item concerning the L/C. On 17th July, 1995 defendant No. 3 by a fax message again made further offer/suggestion recording the L/C terms. On 18th July, 1995 plaintiff by its fax message informed defendant No. 3 that there were changes and departures that had been made from the plaintiff's original offer dated 13th July, 1995. Thus the plaintiff objected to the statement made by defendant No. 3. Again on 18th July, 1995 the plaintiff reiterated that the specifications were not explicitly discussed during the negotiations on 14th July, 1995 and that the plaintiff had assumed throughout the negotiations that the specifications remained the same as in the fax message dated 13th July, 1995. It was pointed out that the specifications suggested by the buyer were not normal and would make a difference of about US $ 15 per metric tonne. Defendant No. 3 has not disputed or denied the contents of this fax message dated 18th July, 1995. By its fax message dated 18th July, 1995 addressed to the plaintiff, defendant No. 2, however purported to record that there had been detailed negotiations on 14th July, 1995 and that the final and mutually agreed contract was arrived at on 14th July, 1995 through defendant No. 3. The plaintiff on the same date i.e. 18th July, 1995 controverted the stand taken by defendants. However, defendant No. 2 by its fax message dated 19th July, 1995 reiterated that an agreement had been reached during the negotiations on 14th July, 1995. By a fax message dated 19th July, 1995 defendant No. 2 forwarded to the plaintiff a fax message also dated 19th July, 1995 addressed to defendant No. 2 by defendant No. 1. In this fax, defendant No. 2 had made a reference to an alleged contract dated 13th July, 1995 for sale of 13500 metric tonnes of rice by the plaintiff to defendant No. 1 through defendants Nos. 2 and 3. In this fax message defendant No. 1 has indicated their intention to declare shipment period from 5th August to 5th September, 1995. It was further stated that if the plaintiffs did not confirm the contract, arbitration would be claimed and GAFTA advised accordingly. 2 and 3. In this fax message defendant No. 1 has indicated their intention to declare shipment period from 5th August to 5th September, 1995. It was further stated that if the plaintiffs did not confirm the contract, arbitration would be claimed and GAFTA advised accordingly. By its fax message dated 20th July, 1995 to defendant No. 2 the plaintiff proposed that further negotiations be terminated forthwith. The plaintiff thereafter received a fax message dated 20th July, 1995 from defendant No. 2 forwarding a copy of the fax message received by defendant No. 2 from defendant No. 1. By this fax message defendant No. 1 purported to appoint defendant No. 5 as Arbitrator allegedly in accordance with the Rules of GAFTA. Again by a fax message dated 25th July, 1995, defendant No. 1 intimated that it would apply to GAFTA for an Arbitrator to be appointed on behalf of the plaintiff alleging that due to the alleged failure of the plaintiff in giving banking details defendant No. 1 had been prevented from opening the L/C. This fax was forwarded to the plaintiff by defendant No. 2 by its fax message dated 25th July, 1995. By its fax message dated 29th July, 1995 sent to defendant No. 1, the plaintiff categorically staged that there was no binding, valid and concluded contract between the parties. Thus it was stated that defendant No. 1 was not entitled to invoke any arbitration proceedings. Defendant No. 1 replied by its fax message dated 31st July, 1995 stating that defendant No. 3 have recorded the agreement on 14th and 15th July, 1995 and since these terms had not been disputed by the plaintiff on the next business date i.e. 17th July, 1995 the contract stood concluded. Thus it was stated that the appointment of the Arbitrator was perfectly valid. Again by fax message dated 1st August, 1995 defendant No. 1 stated that if it did not receive the plaintiff's reply naming a second Arbitrator or accepting Arbitrator appointed by defendant No. 1 as the sole Arbitrator, application would be made to GAFTA to appoint Arbitrator on behalf of the plaintiff. By its fax message dated 2nd August, 1995 the plaintiff replied to the two fax messages of defendant No. 1 and reiterated that neither any arbitration proceedings or Award that may be passed by GAFTA would be binding on the plaintiff. By its fax message dated 2nd August, 1995 the plaintiff replied to the two fax messages of defendant No. 1 and reiterated that neither any arbitration proceedings or Award that may be passed by GAFTA would be binding on the plaintiff. It was further stated that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 conducted negotiations as agents of defendant No. 1 and not as the agent of the plaintiff. The defendants then applied to defendant No. 4 to appoint an Arbitrator. The plaintiff informed defendant No. 4 that there was no valid, binding or concluded contract between the parties and, therefore, no arbitration could be invoked. However, defendant No. 4 by its fax message dated 4th August, 1995 stated that it was obliged to proceed and the question of validity of the contract would be decided by the Arbitrators as a preliminary issue in accordance with Rule 6 of GAFTA Form No. 125/Arbitration Rules. By a further letter dated 7th August, 1995 the plaintiff was informed by defendant No. 4 that defendant No. 6 had been appointed as an Arbitrator on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff again reiterated their stand by their letter dated 12th August, 1995. It was stated that the basic issue between the parties was determination of whether there was a valid and binding contract in existence which would have to be decided on the basis of the Indian law. It was further submitted that the existence of the contract could not be determined in arbitration proceedings. However, by its letter dated 22nd August, 1995 defendant No. 4 informed the plaintiff that in view of the claim made by the plaintiffs it was obliged to proceed with the appointment of Arbitrator. The contract allegedly relied upon by defendant No. 4 was the fax message sent by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 confirming the sale of the rice by the plaintiff to the defendant in the quantity of 13500 metric tonnes. This fax message however also states that "the parties still have to resolve one point concerning the L/C and that is buyers want L/C. opened by Bank Indo Suez to Bank Indo Suez, Bombay/Singapore allowing it reimbursement with L/C to be restricted for negotiation at Bank Indo Suez whereas sellers want L/C to be unrestricted order avail themselves of their overdraft/Forward/F/E cover and OD facilities through one of the banks mentioned therein". In view of the above the plaintiff again sent letter to defendant No. 4 on 23rd August, 1995 requesting to drop the proceedings as there is no valid, binding or concluded contract between the parties. Apprehending that the arbitration proceedings will continue in spite of their protest the present suit has been filed. 4. The aforesaid facts bring out the narrow controversy between the parties. According to the plaintiffs, they had offered to sell the rice by their fax message dated 13th July, 1995 on the basis of terms and conditions contained therein. According to the plaintiff, the mode of payment was an important condition of the contract. Since the parties had failed to resolve the question about mode of payment, it is submitted that there was no concluded contract between the parties. The defendants on the other hand have admitted that there was no agreement reached as to the mode of payment. They, however, maintain that the mode of payment was only a minor dispute. Since the majority of the terms and conditions have been accepted, according to the defendants, the contract had been concluded. Since the contract had been concluded with the condition that it would be subject to arbitration by defendant No. 4, the matter has been referred to arbitration. 5. Counsel for the parties have referred to all the pleadings as also the correspondence contained in various fax messages, which have crisscrossed between the parties over the period. Having gone through all the correspondence prima facie it cannot be spelled out that there is a valid and binding contract. The fax message dated 13th July, 1995 shows that an offer was made by the plaintiffs to sell the rice to defendant No. 1 through defendant No. 3. The quantity was 1000 metric tonnes. A perusal of the fax message show that from the very inception the plaintiffs have insisted on a particular mode of payment. Clause 7 of the fax message dated 13th July, 1995 states: "Payment : By confirmed irrevocable without recourse 100% L/C at sight in our favour by a prime International Bank." A perusal of the subsequent fax messages reveals that the facts as pleaded by the plaintiff are substantially correct. On 14th July, 1995 itself defendant No. 3 has stated that the L/C will be negotiable at the counters of the L/C Opening Bank at Singapore (i.e. No. IT Reimbursement). On 14th July, 1995 itself defendant No. 3 has stated that the L/C will be negotiable at the counters of the L/C Opening Bank at Singapore (i.e. No. IT Reimbursement). This fax message is based on the fax message which defendant No. 3 had received from defendant No. 2. The other fax message which is timed 11.00 p.m. dated 14th July, 1995 also shows that the parties are still to finalise some details on L/C payment. About this, according to the defendant No. 3, with goodwill on both sides a solution would be found. In the same terms is the fax message which is said to be the contract lodged with defendant No. 4. In this fax message it is also stated as under: "We still have to resolve one point concerning the L.C. and that is buyers want L.C. opened by Bank Indo Suez to Bank Indo Suez Bombay/Singapore allowing it reimbursement with L.C. to be restricted for negotiation at Bank of Indo Suez whereas sellers want L.C. to the unrestricted order avail themselves of their overdraft/forward/F/E cover and O/D facilities through one of the following banks. ANZ Grindlays, Bank of Tokyo, Punjab National Bank, State Bank of India. Both sellers/buyers confirm that the business is finalised between them but that this one item still has to be resolved but with goodwill on both sides a solution/compromise can/will be found when we return to offices Monday." A perusal of the aforesaid extract by itself is sufficient prima facie to establish that there is no concluded contract between the parties. Apart from this a perusal of the fax message from defendant No. 3 to the plaintiff clearly goes to show that the defendants do not take the mode of payment to be a serious condition of the contract. In this fax defendant No. 3 has informed the plaintiff about the reputation of defendant No. 1 in the following words: "This party is a big company who normally do not open L.Cs as their name is accepted worldwide on C.A.D. payment but if we insist on L.C. Payment this is what they/their bankers are prepared to do." One need not, however, rely only on the fax message for reaching the prima facie conclusion that there is no concluded contract. In the reply filed to the notice of motion, defendant No. 3 has stated that the plaintiff had desired the L/C to be provided as per the details given by them. He accordingly informed the plaintiff that he would discuss this with the first defendant and stated that this was a minor issue which could easily be stored out. He reiterates that the details about mode of payment would be finalised later. Although according to the defendants it was minor detail, surprisingly they were not resolved till the matter was sought to be taken to arbitration. 6. Relying on the aforesaid pleading and the contents of the fax messages, Mr. Madan, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff, has submitted that there is no valid and subsisting contract between the parties. Consequently it is not at all necessary for them to submit to the jurisdiction of defendant No. 4 for arbitration. It is even submitted that defendant No. 2 was never engaged by them as an agent. It is further submitted that they did conduct the negotiations with the said defendant to make the offer of sale to defendant No. 1. It is a matter of record that the letter of confirmation which has been sent to defendant No. 1 by defendant No. 2 was never forwarded to the plaintiffs. The so called contract which has been lodged with defendant No. 1 was sent to the plaintiffs for the first time by defendant No. 4. Counsel for the defendants has, however, submitted that the only point of dispute between the parties is with respect to the mode of payment. It is submitted by the Counsel that defendant No. 1 is a very reputable company and they are prepared to open the L/C even now. Counsel has, however, not been able to state whether they are prepared to open the L/C in accordance with the specifications given by the plaintiffs in their fax message dated 13th July, 1995. Even otherwise there does not seem to be much substance in the argument in view of the extracts of the fax messages reproduced above wherein defendants have categorically stated that the defendant No. 1 usually conducts its business not on the basis of L/C but on CAD basis. Even otherwise there does not seem to be much substance in the argument in view of the extracts of the fax messages reproduced above wherein defendants have categorically stated that the defendant No. 1 usually conducts its business not on the basis of L/C but on CAD basis. Counsel for the defendants has submitted that since the matter is pending before the Arbitrator it would not be appropriate to continue simultaneous proceedings in this Court. In order to appreciate this argument, it is necessary to examine the Rules framed by GAFTA, defendant No. 4, known as "The Grain and Feed Trade Association Arbitration Rules No. 125". The relevant provisions of the said Rules are as under: "1. Preliminary. 1:1 : Any dispute arising out of a contract embodying these Rules shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the following provisions. 1: : Arbitration shall take place in London, or elsewhere if mutually agreed by the parties. 1:3 : The provisions of the Arbitration Acts, 1950, 1975 and 1979, and of any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force shall apply to every arbitration and appeal held under these Rules save in so far as such provisions are modified by or are in consistent with these Rules. 6. Preliminary issues. 6:1 : Where the Arbitrator(s) decide(s), at any time after being appointed, and prior to making 'an Award, that the dispute is not one arising out of a contract embodying these Rules, he/they shall forthwith certify in writing that in consequence, he has/they have no jurisdiction under these Rules to arbitrate on the dispute, and he/they shall forthwith notify the parties to the dispute and the association in writing of his/their decision and, thereupon, the dispute shall be deemed to be one which is not subject to the Arbitration Rules of the association and accordingly such Rules shall not apply thereto. Such decision shall be final and binding upon the parties and upon the association, subject to the right of appeal to the committee of appeal by either party in accordance with the provisions stipulated in Rule 8." Rule 1.1 provides that any dispute arising out of a contract embodying these Rules shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the following provisions. Rule 1.2 provides that arbitration shall take place in London, or elsewhere if mutually agreed by the parties. Rule 1.2 provides that arbitration shall take place in London, or elsewhere if mutually agreed by the parties. Under Rule 1.3, the provisions of the English Arbitration Acts, 1950, 1975 and 1979 have been made applicable to the arbitration proceedings subject to any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof. Rule 6.1 provides that if the Arbitrators come to the conclusion that the dispute is not one arising out of a contract embodying the said Rules, the Arbitrator shall forthwith certify in writing that he/they have no jurisdiction. Thereafter the parties are to be notified of the decision. This decision is appealable to the Committee of appeal. The aforesaid Rules, in my opinion, do not give any jurisdiction to GAFTA, defendant No. 4, to decide the question as to whether or not there is a contract in existence. The jurisdiction of defendant No. 4 commences after a concluded contract comes into being and thereafter disputes arise between the parties. In my view the letter written by GAFTA dated 22nd August, 1995 has been issued erroneously. There is no provision under the Rules to decide as a preliminary issue as to whether or not there is a concluded contract between the parties. Rule 6.1 only permits GAFTA to decide as to whether or not the dispute is not the one arising out of a contract embodying the said Rules. This provision is made only to exclude the jurisdiction of defendant No. 4 to contracts which are not within the purview of the said Rules. In my view, the submissions made by Mr. Narichania, learned Counsel for defendant No. 1 is, therefore, without any merit. That being the position merely because an application has been filed before defendant No. 4 for arbitration cannot exclude the jurisdiction of this Court from determining the issue as to whether or not there is a concluded contract. Thus, in my view the plaintiff cannot be compelled to participate in the arbitration proceedings. Defendant No. 1 has submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court. Necessary pleadings have been filed. Counsel has appeared on behalf of defendant No. 1. Thus there is no impediment in the way of this Court to determine the issue raised in the suit as well as in the notice of motion. I also find that the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiffs. Necessary pleadings have been filed. Counsel has appeared on behalf of defendant No. 1. Thus there is no impediment in the way of this Court to determine the issue raised in the suit as well as in the notice of motion. I also find that the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiffs. A bare reading of the Rules framed by defendant No. 4 shows that the same are applicable to concluded contracts embodying the said Rules. It also appears that the arbitration proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the English law. This is apparent from Rule 1.3 wherein it is provided that the provisions of Arbitration Acts, 1950, 1975 and 1979 with any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof shall apply to every arbitration and appeal held under these Rules. Rule 1.2 provides that the arbitration shall take place in London or elsewhere if mutually agreed by the parties. Reading of the aforesaid rule clearly shows that the arbitration proceedings under the said Rules, are to be conducted in accordance with the said Rules of disputes arising out of the contract embodying the said Rules. In my opinion, the aforesaid Rules have been framed to resolve disputes arising out of domestic contracts to English parties. It is for this reason that defendant No. 2 has tried to give an impression that he has been acting as a representative of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, have denied that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were acting as their agents. In view of the above it would be wholly unfair and unjust to compel the plaintiff to submit to arbitration proceedings before defendant No. 4. Further in my view, no irreparable loss would be caused to the defendants if the interim relief a granted to the plaintiff as the very existence of the contract has been challenged by them. Whatever damage that may have been caused by the in action of the plaintiffs to the defendants can well be compensated in terms of money, in the event the suit filed by the plaintiffs is dismissed. 7. In view of the above, the Notice of Motion is made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a)(i) and (ii) with no order as to costs. 7. In view of the above, the Notice of Motion is made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a)(i) and (ii) with no order as to costs. Prayer Clauses (a)(i) and (ii) read as follows : "(a) that pending the hearing and final disposal of this suit; (i) this Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain defendants Nos. 1, 2 and/or 3 and/or their servants, agents officers and assigns from in any manner enforcing or acting pursuant to or in furtherance of any alleged contract with the plaintiff or on the basis of the faxes dated 14th July, 1995 and/or 15th July, 1995 from defendant No. 3 (Exhibits "G", "H" and "I" to the plaint) and/or on the alleged fax dated 14th July, 1995 (Exhibit "DD" to the plaint) from defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 including but not limited to participating in or proceeding with the purported arbitration pursuant to the purported reference made by defendant No. 1 under the GAFTA Rules as stated in the plaint; and (ii) this Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain the defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6 from proceeding with the purported arbitration under the GAFTA Rules pursuant to the purported reference by defendant No. 1 as stated in the plaint." Certified copy expedited. Order accordingly. -----