JUDGMENT : 1. This is a revision petition against an Order dated January 11, 1996 passed by the lower appellate Court on applications under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC, Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, moved by the petitioner who was the appellant before it. 2. Non-petitioner Ganesh Lal and others have brought a suit against the revision-petitioner for eviction and recovery of rent on the ground of default in payment of rent and need of the sons of Ganesh Lal, Harak Lal and Kanhaiya Lal as also of Ganesh Lal himself. The trial Court decreed the suit for eviction and arrears of rent and the petitioner filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court. In the appeal the petitioner moved an application under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC praying for framing of an issue on the question of partial eviction and remand of the case to the trial Court for decision on that issue. The non-petitioners -- respondents opposed the prayer on the ground that the issue regarding comparative hardship covers the point and as there was no specific plea about partial eviction, no issue could be raised on that. Another application was moved by the petitioner before the lower appellate court under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for taking certain additional evidence on record regarding establishment of agriculture produce market at Udaipur and consequent ban on trade in agriculture produce in the old Dhanmandi where the suit shop is situated. This prayer was also opposed by the plaintiffs. Third application was under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment of the written statement on the basis of alleged subsequent events. This application was also opposed by the plaintiffs. The appellate Court rejected the applications under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC and Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and deferred the consideration of application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for decision along with the appeal itself. Aggrieved by this order, the defendant-petitioner has come up in this revision. 3. Mr. This application was also opposed by the plaintiffs. The appellate Court rejected the applications under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC and Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and deferred the consideration of application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for decision along with the appeal itself. Aggrieved by this order, the defendant-petitioner has come up in this revision. 3. Mr. R.R. Nagori, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short 'the Act' hereinafter) is mandatory and no decree of eviction on any of the grounds set forth in Section 13(1)(h) can be passed unless the Court is satisfied that greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. According to the learned counsel, the Court is also bound to consider whether any hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of part of the premises and satisfied, pass the decree in respect of part of the premises only. According to the learned Counsel therefore, the appellate Court was also bound to consider all these questions by raising a specific issue under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. 4. A decision of the Supreme Court in Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand, AIR 1978 SC 413 was cited for the proposition that it was mandatory for the Court to consider whether a part of the premises will satisfy the need of the landlord. It is observed in this case that even in the absence of a specific pleading the Court has to act in accordance with the mandate and give a finding as to whether a part of the premises would substantially satisfy reasonable requirement of the landlord. 5. Another Supreme Court decision in Chief Engineers Roads and Buildings, Hyderabad v. A.V. Arunachalam, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 438 was cited for the same proposition. 6. A Single Bench decision of this Court in Narsingh Dass v. Jethmal, 1988 (1) WLN 677, was cited for the proposition that the question of partial eviction is a question of fact and an issue and evidence is needed for determination of that question. 6. A Single Bench decision of this Court in Narsingh Dass v. Jethmal, 1988 (1) WLN 677, was cited for the proposition that the question of partial eviction is a question of fact and an issue and evidence is needed for determination of that question. It was therefore, contended that the Court should have allowed application under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC and should have given an opportunity to lead evidence on the question of partial eviction. 7. Another Single Bench decision of this Court in Riyaz Mohammad v. Rameshwar, 1989 (1) Raj 95 was cited in support of proposition that even if the defendant did not take a specific plea on the question of partial eviction in the written statement and consequently no issue is framed thereon and no evidence is adduced, the Court is not precluded from raising a question in an appeal as it is incumbent upon the Court to consider the question in view of the second paragraph of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 , for the proposition that the Court has to take into account change in circumstances during the pendency of the suit. 9. The learned counsel then relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon , AIR 1969 SC 1267 for the proposition that an amendment of the plaint has not to be refused on technical grounds. 10. Decision of the Supreme Court in Harcharan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 43 was relied on in support of the proposition that an amendment cannot be refused only on the ground of delay. 11. A decision of the Supreme Court in V.S. Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina, AIR 1985 SC 207 was cited again on the point that subsequent events occurring during the pendency of the proceedings have to be taken into account by the Court. 12. A Single Bench decision to this Court in Chandan Lal v. Keshav Dev, 1986 WLN (UC) 419, was also cited on the point that cause of action arising subsequently during the pendency of the suit should be allowed to be raised by way of amendment. 13. 12. A Single Bench decision to this Court in Chandan Lal v. Keshav Dev, 1986 WLN (UC) 419, was also cited on the point that cause of action arising subsequently during the pendency of the suit should be allowed to be raised by way of amendment. 13. A decision of the Madras High Court in T.P. Palaniswami v. Deivenaiammal, AIR 1984 Mad. 1984 Madras 19, was cited for the proposition that at the time of considering the amendment application, merits and demerits of the amendment have not to be considered. 14. A decision of the Supreme Court in Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra, AIR 1991 SC 1760 , was cited for the proposition that subsequent events can be taken into account under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the appellate Court. 15. Mr. Dinesh Maheshwari, learned counsel for the non-petitioners on the other hand contended that the applications have been rightly rejected by the lower appellate Court as they were mala fidely made to delay the disposal of the appeal. The learned counsel pointed out that the suit was pending for 20 years in the trial court and the appeal is pending since 1990. He further contended that no new fact has come to light and all what was being canvassed is already in evidence, it was also contended that all that was being argued was also a part of the grounds of appeal and without stating the date of knowledge of the alleged new facts, the application was made mala fidely to delay the proceedings. 16. As regard the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the learned Counsel stated that the only course open to the Court was to defer the consideration of the said application till the final hearing of the appeal. In support of this view, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners cited the decision of the M.P. High Court in Harbilas Ochchelal v. Kokabai, 1981 MPLJ 722 . 17. A Single Bench decision of this Court in Rampal Garg v. Shrimad Dayanand Orphanage Ajmer, ILR (1971) Raj 506, was also cited for the proposition that an application under Order 41 Rule 27 has to be considered along with merits of the appeal. 18. 17. A Single Bench decision of this Court in Rampal Garg v. Shrimad Dayanand Orphanage Ajmer, ILR (1971) Raj 506, was also cited for the proposition that an application under Order 41 Rule 27 has to be considered along with merits of the appeal. 18. having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records and having considered the decisions cited at the Bar, I am of the view that no case for interference under Section 115 CPC has been made out. So far as application under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC is concerned, it is clear that it was made on the basis of Section 14(2) of the Act. The application itself stated that the Court was duty bound to go into and decide the question of partial eviction. It was also stated in the application that the point was argued in the trial Court but the trial Court ignored it and such a ground has been taken in the memorandum of appeal also. It is, therefore, clear that the point as to whether the question of partial eviction which is to be considered under Section 14(2) of the Act can be decided without raising a specific issue or not is itself the subject-matter of the appeal. In the decision of Rahman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand, (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down that proviso to explanation to Section 11(h) of the J & K Houses and Shops Rent Control Act (34 of 1966) mandates the Court to consider whether eviction to tenant from part of premises could be ordered, so as to substantially satisfy reasonable requirement of landlord. It has been further laid down that even in the absence of a specific pleading, under the proviso the Court has to act in compliance with the mandate and give a finding. The provision in the J and K State appears to be on the lines of Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Act. When even pleading is not necessary, it cannot be said that an issue would be necessary. It is, therefore, clear that while deciding the appeal after considering the evidence on record, the Court shall apply its mind to this aspect of the matter also and if it finds on the evidence on record that a partial eviction will satisfy the need of the landlord. It shall grant relief accordingly. 19. It is, therefore, clear that while deciding the appeal after considering the evidence on record, the Court shall apply its mind to this aspect of the matter also and if it finds on the evidence on record that a partial eviction will satisfy the need of the landlord. It shall grant relief accordingly. 19. It is settled law that if the parties are alive to the real controversy and have led evidence in support of their rival contentions on the point, absence of an issue on that point would not preclude the Court from deciding the point. I, therefore, find no fault with the rejection of the application for framing an additional issue and remanding the case back. 20. So far as application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is concerned. It has been sought to raise two pleas. One regarding partial eviction and the other regarding taking on rent of other shop by the plaintiffs in Krishi Upaj Mandi, Udaipur during the pendency of the suit. So far as the partial' eviction is concerned. We have already seen that no specific pleading was required as it was the duty of the Court to satisfy itself whether parties eviction would meet the requirement of the landlord. So far as the other amendment is concerned, the plaintiff has not even given the date or approximate time when the shop was taken on rent by the plaintiff. Considering that the amendment was being moved in a suit which was pending for 25 years on the date of the application for amendment, it cannot be said that the appellant was not obliged to plead specifically the point of time when the shop was taken on rent. It is also to be considered whether hiring of a shop by the landlord during the pendency of the suit would amount to acquiring premises permanently disentitling him from getting a decree of eviction against the tenant in the premises owned by him. If in the circumstances of the case such an application for amendment was rejected for vagueness and as belated no fault can be found with the order. 21. As regards application under Order 41 Rule 27 is concerned, since the Court has not yet disposed it of, there is no 'case decided' before this Court. If in the circumstances of the case such an application for amendment was rejected for vagueness and as belated no fault can be found with the order. 21. As regards application under Order 41 Rule 27 is concerned, since the Court has not yet disposed it of, there is no 'case decided' before this Court. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Rajasthan High Court in the cases of Mandasur Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Mandsaur v. Madhya Pradesh Government Electric Department, 1981 MPLJ 297 and Rampal Garg v. Shrimad Dayanand Orphanage, Ajmer, (supra) and do not find that the Court below has committed any material irregularity in defering the decision on application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. 22. In the aforesaid circumstances, I find no force in this revision petition. It is dismissed.Petition dismissed.