ORDER 1. Infallibly, this is the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. The employer has filed this petition to obtain writ of certiorari for incineration of the award dated 10.12.1990 (Annexure- 1') passed by respondent No.2 (Labour Court, Indore) in case No.6 (reference) 90, thereby directing the petitioner-employer to reinstate respondent No. 1 - employee in service with back wages. 3. Factual matrix lies in a narrow compass. Respondent No. 1, an ex-Army Personnel and pensioner, was appointed on application and interview by the petitioner as a Physiotherapist on 25.7.1988 (Annexure-A) on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1,700/- per month inc1uding all allowances on probation for a period of six months, extendable at the discretion of the Management, from the date of joining with term that appointment is terminable on month's notice or one month's salary in lieu thereof on either side. Respondent No. 1 joined services on 24.9.1988 (Annexure-B). Probationary period was extended on 14.3.1989 (Annexure-C) for a further period of three months effective from 24.3.1989. Near the end of this period, it was ordered that respondent No. 1 is deemed to have been relieved from his duties effective from 23.6.1989 by order dated 15.6.89 (Annexure-D). Respondent No. 1 wrote to the petitioner to cancel the order of 15.6.89 (Annexure-E). This proved to be an exercise in futility. Respondent No.1 through Laghu Udyog Labour Union, Indore then moved Local Conciliation Officer and sought settlement or reference of industrial dispute to Labour Court, Indore for adjudication. Additional Labour Commissioner Indore formulated the question and referred dispute on 27.1.1990 (Annexure-'F') for adjudication. Petitioner opposed the c1aim and took preliminary objection that respondent No. 1 was not a workman in terms of section 2(s) (iv) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'Act') (Annexure-'H'). Respondent No.2 over-ruled the objection and held that respondent No. 1 was a workman to attract the applicability of the Act. Respondent No.2 passed the award as noted above. Annexure- 'I' is challenged. 4. Respondent No.1 has filed the return in oppugnation and averred that he never worked in a supervisory capacity and was a "workman". 5. The Division Bench had directed in this case on 30.1.1992 that subject to compliance of section 17-B of the Act, the amount awarded shall remain stayed. 6. On 27.8.1997 hearing was adjourned on prayer to explore possibility of reasonable settlement. Parties failed to settle. 5. The Division Bench had directed in this case on 30.1.1992 that subject to compliance of section 17-B of the Act, the amount awarded shall remain stayed. 6. On 27.8.1997 hearing was adjourned on prayer to explore possibility of reasonable settlement. Parties failed to settle. The petition was thus heard. 7. I have heard Shri G.M. Chaphekar, learned senior counsel with Shri G.S. Patvardhan, for the petitioner and Shri S.C. Bagdiya, learned senior counsel with Shri Pankaj Bagdiya and Shri B.R. Potdar, for respondent No. 1, on 1.9.1997. Respondent No.2 is the authority passing the order. 8. The counsel for the petitioner urged as under :- (a) Respondent No. 2 erred in holding that respondent No. 1 is a workman. Reliance is placed on 1996 LLR 1119 Management of Heavy Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and others); AIR 1993 SC 392 (Governing Council, K.M. Institute of Oncology v. Pandurang); AIR 1994 SC 1343 (M. Venugopal v. Divnl. Manager, LIC of India); and 1996 LLR 482 (State of Rajasthan and others v. Rameshwar Lal Gahlot). Reference is made to Annexure- 'G'. (b) In view of appointment letters (Annexure-' A' & 'C'), there is no retrenchment as per (bb), inserted w.e.f. 18.8.1984, of section 2 (oo) of the Act. Reliance is placed n 1977 FLR (Vol. 75) 349 (SC) and 1997 LLR 699 (Escorts Ltd. v. Presiding Officer and another). Termination of a probationer on consolidated salary is permissible in law as he is not a permanent employee. 1997 LLR 16 (SC) is also relied upon. (c) Award is unsustainable in law. Back-wages are wrongly allowed to a pensioner. 9. The counsel for the respondent No.1 has dubbed the contentions as non-meritorious and contended as under :- (a) Finding of fact is proper. Findings are on facts. In this case it is held that there was no Supervisory Capacity or function of managerial nature. Reliance is placed on 1986 Lab.I.C. 1516 (Surendra Kumar v. Union of India); and 1977 Lab. I.C. 1088 (P.N. Gulati v. Labour Court, Gorakhpur and another). (b) The M.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963 are applicable here. Rule 2 (i) defines "permanent" employee as one who completed six months satisfactory service in a clear vacancy as a probationer or otherwise. Hence the Act applied. I.C. 1088 (P.N. Gulati v. Labour Court, Gorakhpur and another). (b) The M.P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963 are applicable here. Rule 2 (i) defines "permanent" employee as one who completed six months satisfactory service in a clear vacancy as a probationer or otherwise. Hence the Act applied. Reliance is placed on 1994 JLJ 215 (Sureshchandra v. Jiwaji University); 1994 LLJ 320 (Rajeshkumar and others v. State of M.P. and others) and 1996 (I) SCT 199 (M.P. Bank Karmachari Sangh. Syndicate Bank). (c) Award is sutainable. Para 17 of Award logically states about justification to grant back-wages. 10. I proceed to consider rival contentions. 11. Section 2 (s) (iv) of the Act provides as under :- "(iv) Who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature." 12. The inbred question is whether or not respondent No.1 was employed in a Supervisory Capacity so as to attract exclusion from ambit of section 2 (s) of the Act? 13. I notice that this question is not referred by the Additional Labour Commissioner for adjudication (Annexure- 'F') and that this petition does not contain any precise relief of quashment of Annexure- 'F'. The objection was, however, taken before respondent No.2 (Annexure-'H'). 13. I notice that this question is not referred by the Additional Labour Commissioner for adjudication (Annexure- 'F') and that this petition does not contain any precise relief of quashment of Annexure- 'F'. The objection was, however, taken before respondent No.2 (Annexure-'H'). Respondent No.2, on pleadings, framed Issue No. 1 in this regard and on evaluation of evidential material concluded in Para 12 on reasons chronicled in Paras 6 to 11 of the Award as under :- ^^vr% mijksDr lkf{k;ksa ds dFkuksa ds foospu ds çdk’k esa mldk dk;Z lqijok;tjh uspj dk fdlh Hkh n`f”Vdks.k ls ugha gksrk gSaA tgk¡ rd çn’kZ ih&5 dk loky gS] mlesa bapktZ crk nsus Hkj ls çkFkhZ lqijok;tj ugha gks tkrkA nksuksa MkDVj lkf{k;ksa us Hkh çfrçkFkhZ dh vksj ls mifLFkr gksdj ;g dgha ugha dgk fd çn’kZ ih&5 ds vuqlkj çkFkhZ ds lqijok;tj uspj ds D;k D;k dk;Z Fks\ ml n’kk esa ekuuh; ckEcs mPp U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; dqyd.khZ fo:) bafM;u jsM Økl lkslk;Vh ,y ,y ,u lsd.M 1987 i`”B 752 Li”V gSA mlesa ;gh er çfrikfnr fd;k gS fd pkgs og foHkkx dk bapktZ D;ksa u gks] egt ,slk dj nsus ls gh og lqijok;tj ugha cu tkrkA vr% ;gh ekuk tk;sxk fd çkFkhZ lqijok;tj ugha FkkA vr% çkFkhZ Jfed dh ifjHkk”kk esa vkrk gSA** 11. Tenebrosity, if any, is luculently torn by appointment letter (Annexure-' A'). Para 5 of this letter contains that :- "You will perform duties as may be assigned to you by the Head of the Department/Medical Superintendent/Management." Period was extended on same terms and conditions (Annexure- 'C'). These orders do not spell out that respondent No.1 was incharge of the department or had any supervisory capacity. The respondent No.1 was appointed as a Physiotherapist and not as a Head or Superintendent. The written-statement (Annexure- 'H') does not contain facts or particulars to show supervisory capacity for the purpose of exclusion from the purview of section 2 (s) of the Act. This was emphatically denied by respondent No.1 on oath. The evidence in rebuttal did not prove the aforesaid capacity. Annexure 'PIS' is considered by respondent No.2 and is held not to impart supervisory capacity. The definition of "Workman" contained in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 under went a substantial amendment in 1956. Even Development Officer in Life Insurance Corporation is held to be a workman. The evidence in rebuttal did not prove the aforesaid capacity. Annexure 'PIS' is considered by respondent No.2 and is held not to impart supervisory capacity. The definition of "Workman" contained in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 under went a substantial amendment in 1956. Even Development Officer in Life Insurance Corporation is held to be a workman. In AIR 1984 SC 1462 (S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra and another), it is held that: - "The words 'any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or c1arical work' are not intended to limit or narrow the amplitude of the definition of 'workman'; on the other hand they indicate and emphasise the broad sweep of the definition which is designed to cover all manner of persons employed in an industry, irrespective of whether they are engaged in skilled work or unskilled work, manual work, supervisory work, technical work or clerical work. Quite obviously the broad intention is to take in the entire 'labour force' and exclude the 'managerial force'. That, of course, is as it should be." The Act is a welfare legislation. Exclusionary provision should be viewed strictly. In AIR 1984 SC 786 (Shivram Anand Shiroor v. Mrs. Radhabai Shantaram Kowshik and another), it is held that :- "It is also true that the exclusionary provisions in the Act should be construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds." 15. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is little and limited. In AIR 1984 SC 38 (Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and others), it is held that:- "A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 227. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 227 of the Constitution is limited' 'to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority" and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much Jess an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art. 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision." 16. In exercising the supervisory power under Art. 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision." 16. The jurisdiction has to be exercised with great circumspection. Unless I am able to conclude that respondent No.2 snatched at jurisdiction, I should say monosyllabic "no" to the prayer. Respondent No.2 operated only on reference (Annexure- 'F'). Respondent No.2 did not usurp jurisdiction. It is futile to contend that there had existed no "industrial dispute" in terms of section 2 (k) of the Act. Such a dispute pertained to workman only. In AIR 1984 SC 1467 (Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation), it is held that :-, 'We are afraid the High Court misdirected itself. The jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is truely wide but for that very reason it has to be exercised with great circumspection. It is n0t for the High Court to constitute itself into an appellate Court over Tribunals constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes of a kind qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes and to re-adjudicate upon questions of fact decided by those Tribunals. That the questions decided pertain to jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High Court to interfere with the findings on jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. Where the circumstances indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in interfering. But where the Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not think that it was proper for the High Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Labour Court and hold that the workman had raised no demand with the management. There was a conciliation proceeding, the conciliation had failed and the Conciliation Officer had so reported to the Government the Government was justified in thinking that there was an industrial dispute and referring to the Labour Court. Nor do we think that it was right for the High Court to interfere with the award of a Labour Court under Art. 226 on a mere technicality. Nor do we think that it was right for the High Court to interfere with the award of a Labour Court under Art. 226 on a mere technicality. Article 226 is a device to secure and advance justice and not otherwise. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the award of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court." 17. Respondent No.2 correctly held that respondent No.1 is a workman and committed no error in exercising jurisdiction under the Act on reference. There is no scope for interference. He exercised no function of managerial nature. 18. This takes me to point (b) of Para 8 above. Appointment was on probation (Annexure-'A'). Period was extended till 23.6.1989 (Annexure-'C'). Before expiry of this period, order was passed on 15.6.1989 (Annexure- 'D') that respondent No.1 is deemed to have been relieved from 23.6.1989. It does not say that post is abolished or services are not required or performance has been unsatisfactory or that respondent No. 1 was not found suitable for being retained in service. Service of a probationer can be ended on the ground of unsuitability. But such is not the case here. Annexure- 'D' should be judged on its language. In AIR 1978 SC 8 51 (Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others), it is held that :- "When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challange, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. AIR 1952 SC 16 , Rel on." 19. It is trite position of law that a movement order on the ground of unsuitability even to ad-hoc employee without communication in advance about defects, if any, is liable to be struck down as arbitrary. In AIR 1989 SC 1431 (Dr. Mrs Sumati P. Shere v. Union of India and others), it is held that :-, 'We must emphasize that in the relationship of master and servant there is a moral obligation to act fairly. An informal, if not formal, give-and-take, on the assessment of work of the employee should be there. In AIR 1989 SC 1431 (Dr. Mrs Sumati P. Shere v. Union of India and others), it is held that :-, 'We must emphasize that in the relationship of master and servant there is a moral obligation to act fairly. An informal, if not formal, give-and-take, on the assessment of work of the employee should be there. The employee should be made aware of the defect in his work and deficiency in his performance. Defects or deficiencies; indifference or indiscretion may be with the employee by inadvertence and not by incapacity to work. Timely communication of the assessment of work in such cases may put the employee on the right track. Without any such communication, in our opinion, it would be arbitrary to give a movement order to the employee on the ground of unsuitability." 20. Respondent No.2 on appreciation of facts and features has recorded the finding that Annexure- 'D' is invalid, improper and illegal. Nothing substantial is urged to show any perversity or illegality. Even striking off name from rolls amounts to retrenchment within meaning of section 2 (oo) of the Act. AIR 1978 SC 8 (Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji and others) is pertinent. 21. Employer cannot act arbitrarily or as a dictator. The position between an employer and employee is no longer in tenebrosity. Employer's dominion over his employees was in tune with rustic simplicity of by-gone days, but is incompatible with current pattern. Lord Denning put it elegantly in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union; (1971) 1 All ER 148 and Supreme Court stated in Khudi Ram's case (1975) 2 SCR 832 = AIR 1975 SC 550 that in a Government of laws' 'there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial review ability". Fairness, founded on reason, is the essence of the guarantee epitomised in Article 14 and 16 (1). If the power has been exercised improperly or mistakenly so as to impinge unjustly on legitimate rights or interests of the subject, then Courts must so declare. The Courts stand between the executive and the subject alert, alert to see that discretionary power is not exceeded or misused. Lord Atkin highlighted that aspect. Liver Sidge v. Anderson (1942) AC 206 is instructive and indicator of the amplitude of the power available with the Courts. 22. The Courts stand between the executive and the subject alert, alert to see that discretionary power is not exceeded or misused. Lord Atkin highlighted that aspect. Liver Sidge v. Anderson (1942) AC 206 is instructive and indicator of the amplitude of the power available with the Courts. 22. Now provisions authorising termination of service by merely giving a notice are held to be violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In AIR 1987 SC 111 (O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and others), it is held that :- "Rule 31 (v) which provides for termination of the services of the employees of the corporation simply by giving 90 days' notice or by payment of salary for the notice period in lieu of such notice, is violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. W.P. No. 2329 of 1984, D/-26.9.1984 (Delhi) Reversed. AIR 1986 SC 1571 Rel. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. W.P. No. 2329 of 1984, D/-26.9.1984 (Delhi) Reversed. AIR 1986 SC 1571 Rel. on." Labour Court (respondent No.2) concluded, and rightly so, as under :-- ^^dk;Z vLFkkbZ Lo:i dk Hkh ugha FkkA LohÑr rF; gS fd fQft;ksFksjsfiLV foHkkx dk dk;Z LFkkbZ Lo:i dk gSA vr% /kkjk 2 ¼vksvks½ ¼chch½ viokn ykxw ugha gksrsA bl ckjs esa ekuuh; ckEcs mPp U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; 1990 ,y vkbZ lh i`”B 100 Li”V gSA mlesa ;g Li”V :i ls çfrikfnr fd;k gS fd fQDl fifj;M ds fy, fu;qfDr ls le; lekfIr ij lsok lekfIr ij lsok lekfIr NVuh dh ifjHkk”kk ls ugha fudy ldrhA mldks U;k;ky; dks ns[kus dk vf/kdkj gSA ml eku ls oSls rks çkFkhZ us 240 fnu ls vf/kd dk;Z fd;k gSA mldh lsok lekfIr dk dksbZ dkj.k ugha crk;k x;k gSA vkns’k esa dksbZ dkj.k ugha gSA tokcnkos esa dksbZ dkj.k ugha crk;k x;k gSA MkDVj lk{kh us vius dFku esa t:j dgk gS fd vis{kk,¡ iwjh ugha djus ls lsok lekIr dh xbZ rFkk nwljs lk{kh ikVhnkj us dFku fd;k fd dk;Z larks”kçn ugha Fkk blfy, lsok lekIr dh xbZA tcfd ,slk dksbZ fjdkMZ çLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA u gh ,slk fl) fd;k x;k gSA vr% ,slk gh ekuk tk;sxk fd lsok lekfIr voS/k :i ls dh xbZ] tks fu’p; gh nqHkkZouk dk ?kkrd gS rFkk ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; us vius fu.kZ; 1990 ,y ,y ts ¼2½ i`”B 236 esa ;g er çfrikfnr fd;k gS fd leLr lsok lekfIr viokn dh Js.kh esa ugha vkrh gS] NVuh gh ekuh tk;sxhA ml eku ls çkFkhZ çFke i{k nsosUnzdqekj ‘kqDyk dh lsok lekfIr fu’p; gh voS/k NVuh gSaA 23. Impugnment is insalubrious and inutile. What is visible is as chronicled below :- (a) Reference (Annexure- 'F') was not challenged imprimis. (b) No communication about defects, if any, was forwarded. (c) Order was passed on 15.6.1989 before even expiry of the period i.e. 23.6.1989 and it does not contain anything like unsuitability for retention in service. (d) Orders of appointment and extension do not indicate Supervisory Capacity. (e) Respondent No.2 passed award on reference with full opportunity to lead evidence. (f) Petitioner elected to comply with section 17-B of the Act and preferred not to reinstate respondent No.1 pending petition. (g) Conclusions reached by respondent No.2 are on firm foundation. 24. (d) Orders of appointment and extension do not indicate Supervisory Capacity. (e) Respondent No.2 passed award on reference with full opportunity to lead evidence. (f) Petitioner elected to comply with section 17-B of the Act and preferred not to reinstate respondent No.1 pending petition. (g) Conclusions reached by respondent No.2 are on firm foundation. 24. Paul A. Freund wrote on Social Justice and The Law and drew attention to an inscription on the wall of the Harvard Law School Library, taken from Justinian's Institutes that the percepts of the law are "To live honorably, not to injure another, to render each his due (Honest vivere, non alienum laeders, suum cuique tribute)." 25. The order under challenge renders the due. An order like Annexure- 'D' was liable to be mortalised even by civil Court. Justice is done in the case. Petitioner cannot and should not run away from liability. Legal justice cannot be seen to become teasing illusion and promise of unreality. Grievance, born in 1989, should not normally be seen to survive till 1997. There can be no lis like Law Versus Justice. There has to be harmony, not antinomy. Law and justice are not distant neighbours. Lord Denning stated in classic terms that- "My root belief is that proper role of a judge is to do justice between the parties before him. If there is any rule of law which impairs the doing of, justice, then it is the province of the judge to do all he legitimately can to avoid that rule - or even to change it - so as to do justice in the instant case before him." 26. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it has to be seen at once as to "who is wronged" and' 'who has wronged" and whether the order, sought to be mortalised, needs to be incinerated or protected to undo the wrong. Injustice has to be uprooted. It is apt to remember famous words of Mr. Justice Brennau- "Nothing rankles more in human heart than a brooding sense of injustice. Illness we can put up with. But injustice makes us want to pull things down. " 27. Pettifoggery has no place in a democratic set up. Injustice has to be uprooted. It is apt to remember famous words of Mr. Justice Brennau- "Nothing rankles more in human heart than a brooding sense of injustice. Illness we can put up with. But injustice makes us want to pull things down. " 27. Pettifoggery has no place in a democratic set up. Article 22 speaking about "right to life" is held to include "right to livelihood" ( AIR 1986 SC 180 - Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others). But in a case on hand, the prime question before respondent No.1 might as well be one of self-respect rather than livelihood. After all, a doctor, willing to serve on Rs. 1,700.00 per month, may be more concerned with his self-respect and urge to serve the "ailing persons. Petitioner may negotiate ouster on reasonable terms. 28. In para 17 above, I have held that no "error" is committed. In para 20 above, I have found that Annexure- 'D' is illegal. The submissions noted, vide (a) to (c) of para 8 above, are thus devoid of substance. I may further elaborate. 29. At bottom every decision turns on its own facts. Annexure- 'G' is not of much consequence because those facts are not pleaded in written-statement (Annexure-'H') before respondent No.2 Annexure-'A', as noted in para 14 above, clearly shows that respondent No.1 was to perform duties as may be assigned by the Head or Medical Superintendent or Management. There is finding, not shown to be infirm, that respondent No. 1 did not work in a Supervisry Capacity. He performed nothing of managerial nature. In fact, he had to obey aforesaid authorities. The aforesaid decision are, thus, distinguishable on facts and do not help the petitioner. 30. Rule 2(i) of Standing Orders clearly indicates that requisite service even as a probationer for six months makes one a permanent employee. The exclusionary provision of (bb) of section 2 (oo) of the Act is, thus, inapplicable. Hence section 25-F is attracted. Condition precedent is there. Provision is mandatory. 1994 LLR 369 (Raj) State of Rajasthan v. Miss Usha Lakwani may be referred. Decisions relied upon are, thus, unhelpful to the petitioner. 31. Para 17 of the Award is clear enough to sustain direction of backwages as well. 32. I am thus satisfied that Award under challenge has' 'undone" the wrong and is clearly sustainable. 33. Provision is mandatory. 1994 LLR 369 (Raj) State of Rajasthan v. Miss Usha Lakwani may be referred. Decisions relied upon are, thus, unhelpful to the petitioner. 31. Para 17 of the Award is clear enough to sustain direction of backwages as well. 32. I am thus satisfied that Award under challenge has' 'undone" the wrong and is clearly sustainable. 33. Submissions made against the order on scrutiny are, however, found to be meritless. Even otherwise there was no need to deal with abstract question of law or any other contention in support of appeal. In AIR 1979 SC 712 (The State of U.P. and another v. R.D. Rai) it is held that :- "Even otherwise the totality of circumstances does not persuade us to the view that there is any injustice at all. Far from it, the Division Bench judgment of the High Court has perhaps left the matter at a just level. We do not go further into the appeals for this reason. We think that our jurisdiction need not be exercised merely because there are abstract questions of law or there is something to be said in support of an appeal. Having regard to the principles governing the appellate jurisdiction and further the applicability of the same criteria which prevail in exercise of Art. 136 even at the time of the hearing of an appeal, we decline to interfere with the judgments of the High Court.' 34. The order of removal from service involved civil consequences, but was passed in breach of principles of natural justice. In AIR 1990 SC 1402 (Km. Neelima Misra v. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal and others) it is laid down that- "An Administrative function is called quasi-judicial where there is an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with the basic requirement of justice. Where there is no such obligation, the decision is called 'purely administrative' and there is no third category. An administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rule expressed in the Latin Maxim audi alteram partem. 35. All submissions, noted in para 8 above, thus, fail. This petition, thus, turns out to be devoid of merit and should suffer fate of dismissal. Annexure- 'D' does not speak of unsuitability. 1997 LLR 16 (K.V. Krishnamani v. Lalit Kala Academy) is, thus, not applicable here. 36. 35. All submissions, noted in para 8 above, thus, fail. This petition, thus, turns out to be devoid of merit and should suffer fate of dismissal. Annexure- 'D' does not speak of unsuitability. 1997 LLR 16 (K.V. Krishnamani v. Lalit Kala Academy) is, thus, not applicable here. 36. On legal front, submissions, urged to secure mortality of the A ward fail. Yet, in my view, it would be proper if petitioner and respondent No.1, despite respective unsuccess and success here, could have the surge of an urge to sit and search solution to the controversy born on Annexure- 'D' from their side on moral front. After all, employment of nine months has continued for about nine years so far as a result of litigation and legal acrobates. Litigative urge should have a terminal point. 37. The stage is now reached to say OMEGA. 38. Ex consequenti, I dismiss this petition. However, as the ad-interim writ was issued on 30.1.1992 subject to compliance of section 17-B of the Act, I make no~ orders as to costs and leave the parties to bear their own costs of this petition as incurred. Counsel fee for each side is fixed at Rs. 1,500.00, if certified. 39. Security cost, if deposited, be refunded to the petitioner after due verification.