Judgment R. N. Sahay, J. 1. The suit to which this appeal relates was brought by the present appellant on 2-9-1971 in the court of Munsif, Darbhanga against upendra Yadav for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 25-2-1971 whereby the defendants had agreed to transfer 4 kathas 1/2 dhurs of land situated in village Bhagwatipur in the district of Darbhanga. The defendant had admitted in his written statement that he had executed written agreement but contested the suit on the plea that the plaintiff had paid only Rs.200 as an advance but failed to pay the balance consideration of Rs.300 within a month of the agreement as promised for the reason that he could not arrange for money. The plaintiff was ndver serious and never offered the balance of consideration money or ever demanded execution of sale deed. The defendant being in dire necessity of money contracted with other buyers. 2. On 19-4-1972 Upendra Yadav executed two sale deeds in respect of the suit lands in favour of Sogarath Yadav and Jagdish Yadav, respectively. The plaintiff by amendment of the plaint impleaded the aforesaid transferees. There was possibility of the suit being decreed in favour of the plaintiff if he could establish that he was always willing to perform his part of contract. There appeared a big hurdle in the way of the plaintiff when Murat Yadav and dukhan Yadav jumped into the arena of contestants. On their application under order I, Rule 10 C. P. C. , they were added as defendant Nos.4 and 5. 3. It would be necessary to state at this stage the status of the first defendant Upendra Yadav with regard to the suit property. Original owner of the property was one Most. Sanjha. On 8-11-1967 she executed a sale deed in favour of Upendra Yadav but she backed out when the sale deed was presented, before the Sub-Registrar for registration on 10-11-67. Most. Sanjha denied the very execution of sale deed in favour of Upendra Yadav. On an application filed by Upendra Yadav for compulsory registration under Sec.73 of the registration Act, the Registrar on 22-9-1969 ordered for registration of the sale deed under Sec.75 of the registration Act. A document comptilsorily registrable operates from the time it would have commenced to operate if no registration was required. On an application filed by Upendra Yadav for compulsory registration under Sec.73 of the registration Act, the Registrar on 22-9-1969 ordered for registration of the sale deed under Sec.75 of the registration Act. A document comptilsorily registrable operates from the time it would have commenced to operate if no registration was required. [b. B. Zaminunissa V/s. S. K. Qudoos, A. I. R.1975 Pat 67 and Azeezulla Sheriff V/s. Bab-hutinwl, AIR 1973 Mysore 276]. Upendra Yadav could have sued for specific performance of unregistered sale deed but he did not bring any suit. He was satisfied with the registration. 4. Murat Yadav and Dukhan yadav, who were added as defendants on their application had a different story to tell. Before the sale deed in favour of Upendra Yadav was compulsorily registered on on 22-9-1969 Most. Sanjha executed two sale deeds on 9-1-1969 in favour of Murat Yadav and dukhan Yadav, who came in possession of the lands transferred to them. Upendra Yadav never claimed that most. Sanjha had delivered possession of the land after execution of the sale deed dated 8-11-1967. Upendra Yadav could not deliver possession to the plaintiff. Murat Yadav and Dukhan yadav claimed their possession by virtue of sale deed dated 9-1-1968. Father of the plaintiff filed a pre-emption case against Most Sanjha and these defendants under Sec.16 (3) of the Bihar land Ceiling Act. On 12-2-1970 the pre-emption application was dismissed. To defeat the defendants right the plaintiff-appellant created a mahdnama and filed title suit. According to the defendants, the suit was collusive. The plaintiff did not implead Most. Sanjha nor murat Yadav and Dukhan Yadav although they must be aware of the transaction since the father of the plaintiff had brought pre-emption case against these defendants. 5. The question that arises for consideration is whether the suit was maintainable at all. Obviously, the title of upendra Yadav was imperfect. He was not in possession. To perfect this title he had to bring a suit for declaration of title on the basis of registered sale deed. Registered sale deed did not ipso facto conferred any title over the plaintiff. It is significant that the plaintiff brought suit after lapse of four years execution of Mahdnama. He waited for two years after registration and in the suit only impleaded Upendra Yadav whereas the subsequent sale deeds had been executed by Most. Sanjha. 6. Registered sale deed did not ipso facto conferred any title over the plaintiff. It is significant that the plaintiff brought suit after lapse of four years execution of Mahdnama. He waited for two years after registration and in the suit only impleaded Upendra Yadav whereas the subsequent sale deeds had been executed by Most. Sanjha. 6. In Hari Chand V/s. Gordhan Das, a. I. R.1957 Punjab 238, a suit for preemption under Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, was instituted against the vendee in respect of a house. Before the suit for pre-emption was instituted, the vendee transferred the house to a third party but the sale deed was registered after the suit. The question for consideration was whether the rule of lis pendens would apply. A Division Bench of the punjab High Court held that a document which has been registered dates back to the date of its execution. A sale deed of immoveable property operates immediately after its registration, not from the date of registration, but from the date of its execution. It was further held that the first purchaser had sold the house to defendant No.4 before the suit was filed and the sale deed was executed on 2- 9-1950 and registered on 4-12-1950. The Court observed that what Sec.52, Transfer of Property act, prohibits is transfer of or otherwise dealing with the immovable property which is the subject-matter of a suit, during the pendency of the suit. Undoubtedly, the transfer was made before the suit was instituted. Accordingly, rule of Us pendens had no application to the case. 7. In Jeo Narayan V/s. Budhan Mahto, air 1941 Pat 247, a subsequent sale deed in respect of the same property executed after the first deed but registered earlier than the first was not freld to be effective so as to give good title to the purchaser under the second deed. 8. In Sadei Sabu V/s. Chandramani dei, AIR 1948 Pat 60, it was observed that Sec.47 of the Registration Act and Sec.54 of the Transfer of property Act have to be read together and this leads to the obvious result that a deed of sale executed before the institution of a suit for specific performance of a prior contract for sale of the same property but registered thereafter cannot be regarded as executed pendente lite. 9. 9. In Smt. Sudama Devi V/s. Rajendra singh, 1973 P. L. J. R.534, it was held that if the transferee of certain land through registered sale deed transfers the land to other person before filing of the application under Sec.16 (3) of the bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus land) Act, 1961, the second transfer is not hit by doctrine of lis pendens. It has been held that if the transferee of the property transfers it to the second purchaser by a document executed and registered before the filing of the application, the second transferee gets a good title to the property and there is no question of his right being defeated by a subsequent application filed by the pre-emptor as he could not be presumed to have any knowledge of the application which may be filed in future. 10. In Naresh Chandra Dutta V/s. Girish Chandra Das and Am. , AIR 1936 cal 17, a Division Bench of the Calcutta high Court had occasion to consider the effect of the document compulsorily registered so far as third parties are concerned. The following passage of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court may be quoted: "this gives rise to the question, when was the. deed registered within the meaning of Sec.3, T. R Act. On the question whether the executant of a deed compulsorily registrable has any locus poenitentie to resile, by reason of the fact that the title under it is incomplete for want of registration, it has been held and that proposition appears to have been affirmed by the Judicial Committee that incompleteness due to want of registration is not a thing of which the executant can take any advantage, and that if the instrument is otherwise complete, the executant is to be regarded as having done everything that was in his power to complete the transfer and to make it effective, because registration does not depend upon the executants consent but is the act of the officer appointed by the purpose, 59 Cal 1176 : 54 IA 89. But as regards third parties the point of time at which the transfer is to be effective is when the deed of transfer can be said to be a registered deed. But as regards third parties the point of time at which the transfer is to be effective is when the deed of transfer can be said to be a registered deed. The question has been considered in 24 Mad LJ 664, in which after referring to the relevant sections of the Registration act the learned Judges observed: briefly then, registration includes the getting and the making of certain endorsements, making the certification of registration and the copying of the documents in the register book and the filing of the map or plan, if any, in Book 1. The substantial portion is apparently complete with the making of the certificate of registration. It is these that Sec.49 prescribes should have taken place with reference to the document before it can affect any immoveable property to which it relates or be received in evidence. " 11. However, this case has to be decided with reference to Sec.10 of the Specific Relief Act. Clause (a) of section 19 of the Specific Relief Act recognises and follows the general rule that a stranger to the contract is not a proper defendant to a suit to enforce it. Clauses (b) to (e) give exceptions to this rule, A stranger to the contract is not a proper or necessary party unless the case falls under any of the exceptions. [see AIR 1923 Mad 313]. The Act is an exhaustive Code, for it is an act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief obtainable in civil suits. Sec.19, therefore, defines every class of persons against whom specific performance may be enforced. The scope of a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale of land cannot be enlarged and the suit turned into a title suit as in the instant case. The plaintiff after perfecting his title by obtaining specific performance against the executants of the agreement, can bring a suit against anybody who stands in his way of obtaining possession. See A. I. R.1948 Nag 181 and a. I. R.1964 Tripura 6. Under Section 19 (b) specific performance of a contract of sale may be enforced, not only against the original promisor but against any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value without notice. 12. See A. I. R.1948 Nag 181 and a. I. R.1964 Tripura 6. Under Section 19 (b) specific performance of a contract of sale may be enforced, not only against the original promisor but against any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value without notice. 12. In this case, learned Munsif decreed the suit which was reversed by the appellate court on the question of fact. Mahdnama itself, according to the court of appeal, was a suspicious document. Learned Subordinate Judge has given his reason in para 12 of the judgment. Learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the agreement between Most. Sanjha and Upendra Yadav would be operative from 7-3-1969 when the document was presented for registration and not from the date of execution. Actually this question did not arise in this case. 13. In my opinion, for the reasons stated above, the suit itself was not maintainable. The suit was also barred by limitation because even Upendra yadav could not bring a suit for title and recovery of possession. The suit would have been brought within three years from 8-1-1967, the date of execution of sale deed by Most Sanjha in favour of upendra Yadav. The suit was filed after expiry of period of limitation taking any of these aspects into consideration, the suit was not maintainable. This appeal is accordingly dismissed but without costs. Appeal Dismissed.