R. K. MAHAJAN, J. This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 16-7-1984 passed by Sri D. N. Shukla, 1st Additional District Judge, Allahabad al lowing Civil Appeal No. 664 of 1978 and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 23- 10-1978 passed by Sri S. K, Srivastava, Munsif IX, Allahabad decreeing original Suit No. 210 of 1974 in between Kaniz Fatma and Principal, Hamidia Girls Inter College, Allahabad and another. 2. The brief facts to understand the controversy are mentioned herein under. 3. The plaintiff-appellant Smt. Kaniz Fatma claims that she was appointed by the Principal of Hamidia Girls Inter College, Allahabad as Laboratory Assistant in the college in December 1971 and was put on probation in accordance with the provisions of Intermediate Education Act. Her claim was that the probation period was for one year and immediately after the probation period was over, she is deemed to have been confirmed. It appears that she proceeded on leave but when she reported for duty on 4-3- 1974 along with the medical certificate. She was not permitted to attend her duties by the defendant No. 1. Thereafter she sent medical certificate through registered post regarding her fitness which was received on 10-4-1974 but of no avail. It also appears as per allegations that she was terminated during the pendency of the suit and amend ment was made in the plaint. The termina tion is bad as she was not given any oppor tunity to be heard and it is against the regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as no charge sheet was given to her nor any enquiry was conducted nor any notice was given. On these allegation, she filed the suit for permanent injunction and declaration. 4. The case of the defendant-respon dents is that the plaintiff was a temporary employee and was not confirmed, She was not regularly appointed either by the management or by any authority. She could not show the order of appointment. So she being a temporary employee, her services were dispensed with. 5. The trial Court found that the plain tiff deemed to have been confirmed after the expiry of the probation period of one year and as such her termination, without apply ing the regulations framed under the Act, is illegal and inoperative and she is entitled to remain in service. 5. The trial Court found that the plain tiff deemed to have been confirmed after the expiry of the probation period of one year and as such her termination, without apply ing the regulations framed under the Act, is illegal and inoperative and she is entitled to remain in service. The trial Court has decreed the suit. 6. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court. The appeal was allowed by the appel late Court and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The lower appel late Court took the view that the appellant was not having a letter of appointment, she was not appointed. She also suppressed the fact of termination order and she was not confirmed and so the view of the trial Court was not correct. Consequently, the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal. Feeling aggrieved, the instant second appeal has been filed in this Court. 7. The appeal was admitted on the fol lowing substantial questions of law:- (1 ). Whether a class IV employee of an institution like the present one stood confirmed after the expiry of the period of probation under Regulation 11 of Chapter III of the U. P. Inter mediate Education Act, 1921 as it stood in 1974 ? 2. Whether the society which runs a college is a necessary party in a suit challenging his dis missal order filed by Class IV employee of the College against the Principal of the college who is the appointing and dismissing authority of such an employee even if the employee concerned has no grievance against the society nor such a society is appellate or revisional authority under the Act ? 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. I allow the appeal on the following reasonings. 9. In order to appreciate the submis sions. I would like to mention Regulations 6,7 and 8 framed under the Act in Chapter III (Conditions of Service ). The same are quoted as under- " (6 ). All appointments shall be made under formal orders or letters of appointment with the sanction of the appointing authority. (7 ). A person selected for substantive ap pointment against a clear vacancy shall be placed on probation from the date of joining duty. (8 ). The same are quoted as under- " (6 ). All appointments shall be made under formal orders or letters of appointment with the sanction of the appointing authority. (7 ). A person selected for substantive ap pointment against a clear vacancy shall be placed on probation from the date of joining duty. (8 ). The period of probation shall be one year whether a person is a direct recruit or has been promoted from a lower grade in the service of the institution to a higher grade. " 10. The relevant regulation, which is most important, is 22 of the said Chapter. The same is being quoted as under:- "22. Ministerial and inferior servants.-The Committee of Management is the appointing authority in respect of the Clerk including a librarian and the Principal or Headmaster in respect of the inferior servants. The appointment, probation (period for which will be one year) and confirmation of clerks including a librarian and inferior servants shall mutatis mutandis be governed by Regulations 1, 4 to 15 and 21 foreing. " Regulation 25 of the Act would also be referred:- "25. The services of a temporary employee (other than a probationer) or of probationer during the terms of his probation, may be ter minated at any time by giving him one months notice or one months pay in lieu thereof. " 11. The argument of the appellants counsel is that the period of probation is for one year and there is nothing adverse against the appellant and as such the management was not competent to ter minate her service even she was a temporary employee. There is a basic principle of ser vice jurisprudence that unless outer limit of probation is mentioned, the employee will not be confirmed automatically after the expiry of that limit. The idea of keeping the employee in probation is on trial or test period and nothing more or less. The employee is given time to test suitability. The employer also cannot in the garb of that suitability pass a punitive order which is stigmatic. In this case, the employer did not accept her joining report and thereafter medical certificate. It shows unreasonable action on the part of the employer. The termination shows bias though the order is couched in such a manner so to give colour of a similiciter termination. In my view it is not a simpliciter termination. In this case, the employer did not accept her joining report and thereafter medical certificate. It shows unreasonable action on the part of the employer. The termination shows bias though the order is couched in such a manner so to give colour of a similiciter termination. In my view it is not a simpliciter termination. It is stigmatice. In D. K. Yadav v. J. M. A. Industries reported in (1993) 3 SCC 240 ; it was ob served that a person, who remains absent from employment, he should be given an opportunity to be heard and should not be straightway kicked off from service. After all, it is a question of livelihood and nobody can be deprived of livelihood. The legisla ture in its wisdom has made some regulatory checks by way of inserting Regulations 36, 37 and 38 of the Act. They need not be quoted in ex tenso. The purpose of these regulations is that charge sheet has to be submitted and the same has to be served and minimum enquiry is to be conducted by the appointing authority/managing authority and opportunity of effective hearing is to be given. After observing the natural principle of justice, the committee of management has to send the complete report together with all connected papers to the Inspector or Regional Inspectress as the case may be, for approval of action proposed by it. As far deliquent employee, under Regulation 31, punishment of an employee would require the prior approval of the Inspector or Regional Inspectress. In this case, this was not done and this important aspect is lack ing. I am of the considered view that the lower appellate Court has ignored. This aspect of the matter and has reversed the finding of the (trial Court without any jus tification. Therefore, the approach of the lower appellate Court is not warranted under law and by facts. 12. Regarding the confirmation of the appellant, the submission of the learned counsel is that the probation period as men tioned in the regulation is one year and the period of one year has expired whether she was on leave or otherwise. There are so many authorities to the effect that if the employee is not confirmed and the maxi mum period prescribed as one year has ex pired, there is automatic confirmation. There are so many authorities to the effect that if the employee is not confirmed and the maxi mum period prescribed as one year has ex pired, there is automatic confirmation. To this effect, a Division Bench of this very High Court (consisting of Honble Palok Basu and Honble I. M. Quddusi, JJ.) in the case of Vishnu Prabhakar Misra v. State of U. P. and others, reported in (1996) 3 ESC 87 (All); 19966 (2) LBESR 725 (All) has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in which it was held as under:- "service Law - Termination of service-Employee of Chhatrasal Gramin Bank - Legality of - Petitioner appointed as field supervisor his service terminated vide order dated 16-4-85 on probation of period of two year, on charge of misappropriation of fund - No notice served -Enquiry not conducted - Confirmation letter not issued after probation period - Probationer, whose period of probation neither extended nor discharged from the service at the end of period of probation - If he is allowed to continued in the post on completion of maximum period of probation -deemed to be confirmed to the post- Hence -Termination order of petitioner liable to be quashed. " 13. In this case, the famous ruling of the State of Punjab v. Dharma Singh reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1210 was also relied upon to the effect that if the maximum period of probation mentioned has elapsed, there could be automatic con firmation. So it was necessary for the management to hold enquiry with respect to the appellant as she has become a confirmed employee even otherwise the order is stigmatic, as mentioned above and suffers il legality as no approval was obtained for her discharge which is a safeguarded for ar bitrary discharge even in case of a temporary employee. 14. Coming to the next submission that there is no appointment letter and the society, which runs the school, was not impleaded as a party. This argument is nega tived by the statement of Principal Sri Shamim Ahmad (D. W. 1) who said that the plaintiff was appointed on 8-2-1972. The Principal has authority under Regulation 22 of the Act to that effect. This argument is nega tived by the statement of Principal Sri Shamim Ahmad (D. W. 1) who said that the plaintiff was appointed on 8-2-1972. The Principal has authority under Regulation 22 of the Act to that effect. The appellant has filed so many applications in the trial Court for production of the relevant record show ing her appointment as well as the service record but no appointment letter was produced despite Courts directions. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that adverse inference may be withdrawn under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act, He has taken me through the orders of the trial Court dated 22-8-1978; 29-8-1978 and 30- 8-1978 to produce the document regarding her appointment. It is a well settled principle of law that if the record in possession of the defendant was not produced despite of specific orders, an adverse inference should be drawn as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1968 SC page 1414 (para 5) Gopal Krishna J: Kettar v. Mohammad Haji Latif and others ). So the trial Court was correct in its view regarding her appoint ment and confirmation. The appellate Court fell in error in reversing that finding. 15. Now the next question which arises for consideration, is that since the Principal was the appointing authority and it cannot be now said that she had no authority to appoint her under Regulation 22 of the Act. It is also not disputed during the course of argument that the institution is receiving grant-in-aid and run by the Society. It is a recognised school. This fact has not been controverted during the course of argu ments. The right to education has been in terpreted as fundamental right by the apex Court in Unni Krishnas judgment and in view of the this, the public function is per formed by the Society in running the schools. The schools are aided by the Government in financial grant. In case there is a financial grant, the staff etc. were given grade at par with the Government. It cannot be said that the suit for declaration cannot be maintained against the defendant-respondent. The concept of declaration is regarding the existing right of Government servant. It may be against a Government body or statutory or quasi-statutory or non-statutory body to seek declaration. were given grade at par with the Government. It cannot be said that the suit for declaration cannot be maintained against the defendant-respondent. The concept of declaration is regarding the existing right of Government servant. It may be against a Government body or statutory or quasi-statutory or non-statutory body to seek declaration. If a per son can get relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, why she should be debarred in declaratory suit. 16. Sri Vinod Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the suit for declaration does not lie at all and at the most, the plaintiff could file a suit for damages and in support of his contention, he has relied upon a decision of Supreme Court in the case of Smt. J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir and other, 1980 All. LJ 1870; in which it was held as under:- "specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), Section 34 - Educational Institution registered under Societies Registration Act (1860)- Termination of principal-Termination though unlawful, prin cipal entitled only to decree for damages and not to a declaration of continuing in service. " There is no dispute about the ratio of this ruling but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is not applicable be cause it is a public institution performing public duty of imparting education and suit for declaration lies again?: the public authority to get declared the right and can enforce the rights after declaration. In the case of Smt. J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir and others (supra), it was held that the suit does not bar, specially the suit for declaration. In the decision cited, there was the question of breach of clause 10 of the agreement, regarding the declaration of existing rights. So in the facts and cir cumstances, the suit for declaration lies. 17. There is only one problem in this case. In this State, peculiar circumstances are prevailing and it takes long time to get a case decided. Half of the litigants time is spent in getting justice as in this case, the suit was filed in 1974. It would not be and extreme injustice to the appellant if he is non-suited on technical ground. The litigants expected justice i. e. what is due to them to get their "due" they should not suf fer for technicalities of law which are beyond their control. It would not be and extreme injustice to the appellant if he is non-suited on technical ground. The litigants expected justice i. e. what is due to them to get their "due" they should not suf fer for technicalities of law which are beyond their control. In the present case, the appellant has come to the civil court. The civil court enjoys the power of declara tion and setting the things right after decla ration of the existing rights, she is asked that should claim damages which means that she should again spend two decades in Court to get the relief. Every litigant expects that he should get what is "due" to him. Keeping the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that this Court should ignore the technicality and grant the relief, as claimed by the plaintiff-appellant. In this view of the matter, I do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the suit for declaration was not main tainable. 18. Sri Vinod Misra, learned counsel for the respondents, has also argued that the plaintiff-appellant did not produce the relevant documents regarding her appoint ment and this claim has already been nega tived in the earlier part of this judgment as the management also did not produce the record when she appointed. The another argument that she did not join the society is of no avail as the Principal is the appointing authority. 19. It may be pointed out that in a second appeal, the Court can always look into the aspect if there is wrong approach in the interpretation of law by the appellate Court and also to see the flimsy approach in the interpretation of evidence. This view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Major Singh v. Rattan Singh (dead) by L. Rs. & Ors. reported in JT (1997) 1 SC 404. 20. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment of the lower appeljate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. Appeal allowed. .