R. K. MAHAJAN, J. This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 26-4-1986 passed by Sri S. C. Srivas tava, 1st Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr dismissing Civil Appeal No. 206 of 1982 and affirming the judgment and decree dated 16-4-1982 passed by Sri Gyanendra Singh, Ilnd Additional Munsif, Bulandshahr decreeing original suit No. 273 of 1980, Bani Singh Yadav v. Com mittee of Management and another. 2. The brief facts of the case are these. The petitioner-respondent filed the suit against the appellant as well as the respon dent No. 2 alleging that he was appointed as Assistant Libraring in Rashtriya Higher Secondary School, Ismailpur on 1-1-1974 and was confirmed w. e. f. 1-1-1975. The Principal of the school developed ill-will and grudge against the plaintiff thinking that he was favouring the former Manager Rajesh Yadav a and suspended him vide order dated 15-9-1979. The plaintiff made a representation against the suspension order to the Principal on 17-10-1979 and to the Manager on 29-11-1979 but without any effect. A charge-sheet dated 20-9-1979 was received by the petitioner-respondent on 28-9- 1979 per registered post to which the plaintiff sent his reply to the Principal on 17-2-1979. An enquiry officer was appointed who issued a notice to the plaintiff calling him to appear before him on 31-10- 1979. The plaintiff appeared and asserted that the charges were false and frivolous. However, the enquiry officer made no en quiry nor recorded any evidence and the plaintiff was not given opportunity to cross-examine any witness. It was further alleged by the plaintiff that the enquiry officer did not given his report to the plaintiff. Later on, the plaintiff was in formed by the Principal on 9-11-1979 that his services had been terminated. The plaintiff filed an appeal before the Com mittee of Management and the then manager of the school informed him vide letter dated 12-1-1980 that his appeal had been rejected. Then the plaintiff filed an appeal before the District Inspector of Schools who too had rejected the appeal by his order dated, 5-9-1980. It was claimed that the order of termination passed by the Principal on 12-1-1980 and the orders rejecting appeals were illegal and ultra vires. Then the plaintiff filed an appeal before the District Inspector of Schools who too had rejected the appeal by his order dated, 5-9-1980. It was claimed that the order of termination passed by the Principal on 12-1-1980 and the orders rejecting appeals were illegal and ultra vires. The plaintiff claimed a dec laration that the order of termination and the orders rejecting appeals were illegal and void and the plaintiff continued to be the Assistant Librarian of the said school. 3. The suit was contested by the ap pellant only on the ground that the plain tiff was appointed as a Library Assistant and not Assistant Librarian though he was confirmed w. e. f. 1-1-1975. It was admitted that the plaintiff was suspended on 15-9-1979 and after enquiry, he was terminated. It was also admitted that he had filed the appeals which had been dismissed. It was alleged that the plaintiff was only a class IV employee and there were serious char ges against him. It was denied that the Principal had any ill-will against the plain tiff or the order passed was mala fide. It was alleged that the plaintiff had been given full opportunity of being heard and his services had been validly terminated. It was pleaded that the plaintiff was not en titled to the declaration claimed and the suit was not maintainable in respect of the declaration. 4. The trial Court after considering the material evidence on record found that the suit was maintainable. The trial court also held that the plaintiff had not been given full opportunity of being heart resulting in to non-observance of prin ciple of natural justice before terminating his services and the compliance of Regula tions 36 and 37, framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act had not been made. In this way, the termination order was illegal and on these finding, the decree was passed. On an appeal, the lower Ap pellate Court, affirmed the finding of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. The second appeal has been filed against the orders of both the courts below. 5. The appeal was admitted by this Court on ground No. 4, formulated in the memo of appeal, which raises a substantial question of law. The ground No. 4 runs as under: "4. Because the contract of service could not be specifically enforced. The second appeal has been filed against the orders of both the courts below. 5. The appeal was admitted by this Court on ground No. 4, formulated in the memo of appeal, which raises a substantial question of law. The ground No. 4 runs as under: "4. Because the contract of service could not be specifically enforced. View taken to the contrary by the courts below is erroneous. " I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. I have also perused the entire records of the case as well as perused the judgments of both the courts below carefully. 6. Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned coun sel for the appellant, has submitted that the specific contract cannot be enforced and the view taken by the courts below is erroneous. This question has been ex amined by this Court (by me) in Second Appeal No. 2768 of 1984, Kaneez Fatima v. The Principal, Hamidia Girls Inter College, Allahabad. In this case a suit for declara tion and injunction was filed by the plain tiff Kaneez Fatima. The trial Court decreed the suit. However, on an appeal, the lower Appellate Court, allowed the appeal after setting aside the judgment of the trial Court against which the second appeal was filed raising the question of maintainability of the suit where in it has been held that the suit for declaration lies regarding the termination of the services of the employee and he can get his rights declared. In view of the changing condi tions of the society and education declared a fundamental right in Unnikrishnas case the educational institutions are also getting aid from the Government, the in stitutions are expected to follow the fair procedure before terminating the services of employees. 7. The learned counsel for the appel lant has also submitted that since there is a breach of Regulation 16-G, as referred under Regulation 16 of the U. P. Inter mediate Education Act, 1921 and the Regulations 36 and 37 of Chapter III, as such the institutions are expected to ob serve the procedure. They relate to con ducting of enquiry hearing before the Management Committee and approval of action by Inspector or Regional Inspectress. These contain immediate safeguards to the employees. Lower courts have held non-observance by them by holding that principle of natural justice have not been observed. 8. They relate to con ducting of enquiry hearing before the Management Committee and approval of action by Inspector or Regional Inspectress. These contain immediate safeguards to the employees. Lower courts have held non-observance by them by holding that principle of natural justice have not been observed. 8. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not an enforcing the personal contract of service but declaring the exist ing rights and thus the suit for declaration lies against the order of termination dis missal of the employee. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. The courts below have recorded findings of fact after appreciation of the material evidence on record. The said finding of fact requires no interference in the second appeal. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is not a case of enforcement of personal contract on service. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the conditions of society has changed in view of democratic system of Government and State control over the institutions. Every field of activity of the society is governed by rules and regulations. There is duty of State to see that standard of education does not deteriorate. The schools are governed by the statutory provisions before their employees kicked out from the service. The concept on fundamental rights had been interpreted in Unnikrishnas ruling. In the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and others v. Lakshmi Narain and others, AIR 1976 SC 888 , Justice Bhagwati remarked: "where, the termination is outside the powers of a statutory body either because the statutory body has no power to terminate the employment or because the termination is ef fected in breach of a mandatory obligation im posed by law which prescribes that the ermination shall be effected only in a particular manner and no other, it would be a nullity and the employee would he entitled to ignore it and ask for being treated as still in service. " 10. The point of declaration is a mat ter of discretion of court and the same has to be exercised according to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 34 is quoted as under: "34. " 10. The point of declaration is a mat ter of discretion of court and the same has to be exercised according to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 34 is quoted as under: "34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.-Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. So from the bare reading of this sec tion shows that the suit for declaration lies against the management regarding the declaration of right. The management has full liberty to terminate the services but only in accordance with law, on principle of reasonableness as it involves the ques tion of livelihood and the reasonable protection of fairness in procedure has been given which has not been observed according to the concurrent findings of both the courts below. The learned coun sel for the respondent has placed reliance on the following rulings: (1) 1973 S. C. 855 srisi Municipality v. C. K. F. Talkies. (2) 1976 SC 888, Executive Commit tee of Vaish Degree College Shamli and others v. Lakshmi Narain and others. (3) 1977 All 539. Full Bench, holding that though Committee of Management is not a statutory body but writ petition is main tainable against it. (4) (1980) 6 ALR 532, Principal Swami Ramanand Mahavidyalaya, Inter College v. Smt. Lilawati. Holding: Suit for declaration lies that the service of the employees still exists when the termination is in breach of the mandatory provisions of U. P. Inter mediate Education Act 1921. (5) (1979) 5 ALR 199, Victoria High School Association Agra v. Krishna Kant Sharma. Holding that suit for declaration lie; to the effect that the termination was it breach of conditions of service governed by rules and regulations. (6) 1982 UPLBEC 533, Committee of Management Lal Bahadur Shastri Balila, Inter College, Moghal Sarai v. Joint Director of Education. (5) (1979) 5 ALR 199, Victoria High School Association Agra v. Krishna Kant Sharma. Holding that suit for declaration lie; to the effect that the termination was it breach of conditions of service governed by rules and regulations. (6) 1982 UPLBEC 533, Committee of Management Lal Bahadur Shastri Balila, Inter College, Moghal Sarai v. Joint Director of Education. Holding that if Chairman of the enquiry committee is biased, a reasonable suspicion arises about fairness. (iii) Enquiry under Regulations 33 36, 37 should be fair without any element of suspicion and must conform to the principles of natural justice. (7) (1996) UPLBEC 1203, Siyanand Singh Tayagi v. Smt. Shashi Prabha Sharma. Holding that there is no bar for suit for declaration: (i) Under Sections 21 and 22 of the Act impugned is without jurisdiction ant in breach of mandatory provision. (ii) Bar of Sections 14 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act is not applicable. Exception 3 is applicable to the Committee of Management, because Committee is a Public Body and act in breach of man datory provisions. 11. Government is performing public function. It is strange logic that writ petition lie and suit for declaration would no lie for the same grievance. In this High Court writs are allowed and dismissed it similar matters when the litigants come b; way of writs. The query is posed how the suit can be barred which proposition would be bereft of logic. I do not agree with submissions of learned counsel to the appellant that suit is not maintainable In my considered view the suit is maintainable and the contract in facts and cir cumstances of the case involves performance of public function is regulated b; rules and regulations as discussed is enforceable as declaration can be made. 12. In the result the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed .