JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the defendants, who are the legal representative of Magan, the original defendant. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 26.2.1996 passed by Second Additional District Judge, Katni, in Civil Appeal no. 36-A of 1989 arising out of judgment and decree dated 3.4.1980, passed by the IInd Civil Judge Class-II Murwara, in Civil Suit No. 108-A of 1977. The connected Second Appeal No. 246 of 1996 (Vijay Kumar v. Smt. Shakuntala Bai and four others) is filed by another illegal representative of the erstwhile tenant against the same judgment and decree. Thus, both these appeals involve common questions of the facts and law and consequently, the disposal of this appeal shall govern the disposal of the Second Appeal No. 246 of 1996. 2. Girdharilal Gattani filed Civil Suit No. 21-A of 1962 for eviction against the original defendant, Magan, who occupied his non-residential premises as a tenant. The plaintiff took the plea that the suit premises were required by him for starting his business and he had no alternative accommodation of his own in the town of Katni. It is clear from the paragraphs 3 and 3-A of the plaint filed by him that his case was confined to eviction of Magan on his personal requirement only under Section 12 (1) (f) of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control, Act 1961 (henceforth 'the Act' for short. No claim for eviction was made by Gifdharilal Gattani that the suit premises were also required for starting the business of any one of his major sons or an unmarried daughter. 3. The trial Court decreed the suit filed by Girdharilal, holding inter alia that the plaintiff bona fide required the suit premises let out by him to Magan as its owner. The requirement was for starting the business by Girdharilal as he had no alternative accommodation of his own in the town of Katni, 4. Maganlal filed a Civil Appeal No. 17-A of 1965 against the aforesaid decree passed in favour of Girdharilal on 18.2.63, by Civil Judge Class-II, Murwara, in Civil Suit No. 21 -F of 1962. During the pendency of this appeal Girdharilal died and the respondents No. 1 to 5, in this appeal, were substituted in his place of Civil Appeal No. 17-A of 1965. During the pendency of this appeal Girdharilal died and the respondents No. 1 to 5, in this appeal, were substituted in his place of Civil Appeal No. 17-A of 1965. At the time of death of Girdharilal, his sons, the respondents No. 2, 3 and 5 were minors. The respondents No. 1 is his wife and the respondent No. 5 is his brother. It is clear from Paragraph 7 of the order of remand passed by the learned Judge in Civil Appeal No. 17-A of 1965 that both the parties filed amendment applications. The respondents No. 1 to 5 claimed that even after death of Girdharilal the bona fide requirement of his wife and sons continued. The appellant Mganlal in that appeal sought amendment in the written statement to show that after the death of Girdharilal, the bona fide requirement pleaded in the suit came to an and. The lower appellate Court allowed the amendment in the plaint holding that it was necessary to decide the controversy in the suit. It directed that the trial Court shall permit the respondents to incorporate the amendment. It shall give opportunity to Maganlal to amend the written-statement and, then after framing the necessary issue, the civil suit shall be tried. The lower appellate Court specifically gave the finding that on account of the death of Girdharilal, his personal bona fide requirement ended with him. It is clear from paragraph 7 of the order of remand that the respondent had amended the plaint that the need for eviction continued in favour of the respondents and the death of Girdharilal did not affect the need. 5. On remand, the suit was re-registered as Civil Suit No. 7-A of 1977. The trial Court permitted the respondents to amend the plaint and the appellants to make consequential amendment. Thereafter, since the case was pending for a long time, the respondents further amended the plaint stating that the house was required bona fide by the respondents No. 2, 3, and 4 and this requirement arose on account of the fact that they had attained majority and completed their education. After completing their studies, the respondents wanted to start their cloth business. The trial Court, after giving opportunity to the appellants to amend their written-statement, permitted the parties to lead evidence and decided the case. After completing their studies, the respondents wanted to start their cloth business. The trial Court, after giving opportunity to the appellants to amend their written-statement, permitted the parties to lead evidence and decided the case. It dismissed the suit holding that at the time of death of Girdharilal, the respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 were minors. Therefore, they had no personal requirement at the time of his death. The requirement of respondent No. 1 was not proved by the evidence on record. The respondent No. 5, being the brother of Girdharilal could not claim that he was his legal - representative. The trial Court came to conclusion that at the time of the death of Girdharilal, the respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 did not require the suit premises. The Court could not take into account this subsequent requirement for decreeing the suit. 6. In appeal, the lower appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. During the pendency of this appeal, Maganlal died. His legal representatives were brought on record. The appellants No. 2 and 3 were substituted along with others. The lower appellate Court decreed the suit on the basis of bona fide requirement of respondents No. 2 and 3 after they attained majority and completed their education. 7. This appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law by order of this Court dated 23.4.96 :- 1. Whether in view of death of Girdharilal, the original plaintiff during the pendency of First Appeal, filed by the tenants, the legal representatives of Girdharilal could amend the plaint for their personal need ? 2. Whether upon the death of Girdharilal, could it be said that cause of action of the suit did not survive ? 8. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the scope of suit and the effect of the order of remand. The lower appellate Court, after holding that the suit, could not continue after the death of Girdharilal, allowed the amendment sought by the respondents claiming that even in a suit where the deceased - plaintiff had claimed the eviction on the basis of his bona fide requirement, they could contest the suit on proving their bona fide requirement. The lower appellate Court, after holding that the suit, could not continue after the death of Girdharilal, allowed the amendment sought by the respondents claiming that even in a suit where the deceased - plaintiff had claimed the eviction on the basis of his bona fide requirement, they could contest the suit on proving their bona fide requirement. The lower appellate Court did not express any final opinion on the question but held that the amendment sought in the plaint was necessary to decide the real controversy in the suit. It is not in dispute that the respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 were minors at the time of the death of Girdharilal. Therefore, their mother. Smt. Shakuntala Bai could also claim bona fide need. However, the question that the legal representatives of Girdharilal could continue the suit, was left open to be determined by the trial Court, as matter of law, after recording the evidence. The respondents, however, took advantage of the fact that the record of trial Court was not received for a long time and, therefore, they amended the plaint claiming that the bona fide requirement accrued to them after they attained majority and completed education. 9. The lower appellate Court by its remand order simply held that the suit could not continue as such on the basis of the plaint filed by Girdharilal. However the leal representatives could continue the suit on the same 'cause of action' if they amended the plaint to show that the death of Girdharilal did not make any difference. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of remand passed by lower appellate Court was not challengeable in appeal because that order was passed prior to commencement of the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure in the year 1977. The Order 41 Rule 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure had not come in existence. Therefore, as was the law, the order of remand was made in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order of lower appellate Court was not appealable. The order of remand, could be challenged under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, this remedy need not be pursued as a party has always a right to challenge an order passed, remanding the case, in appeal, against the ultimate decree passed against a party. The order of lower appellate Court was not appealable. The order of remand, could be challenged under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, this remedy need not be pursued as a party has always a right to challenge an order passed, remanding the case, in appeal, against the ultimate decree passed against a party. This Court, being a superior Court to that Court which passed the order of remand, can hear the appeal on all points and consider if the conclusion of the learned Judge, who passed the order of remand, was in accordance with the law. 10. Therefore, the first question that has to be determined in this appeal is, if the death of Girdharilal ended the suit or the respondents had any right to continue the suit. The second question that has to be decided is that if the respondents were entitled to continue the suit on the foundation that they stepped in the shoes of Girdharilal Gattani and their bona fide requirement was the same as it was his. The third question that has to be decided is, if the respondents could rely on the bona fide requirements of respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 which saw the light of the day after they attained majority and completed their education subsequently. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants stated that the moment Girdharilal died, the suit abated as the pleadings in the plaint showed that the bona fide requirement was confined to Girdharilal. The respondents were not entitled to claim that they could be substituted in place of Girdharilal Gattani. In this case, the decree of trial Court did not become the part of his estate. It would become part of his estate only when the suit was finally disposed of by a Court so that no appeal lay against the decree of that Court or if an appeal lay, no appeal was filed. It was also submitted in the alternative that the respondents had filed an amendment application before the Court ordering the remand. They could have continued the suit on the basis of that amendment alone. They could not enlarge the scope of the order of remand. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that the appellants could not challenge the order of remand passed by the lower appellate Court, in this appeal. They could have continued the suit on the basis of that amendment alone. They could not enlarge the scope of the order of remand. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that the appellants could not challenge the order of remand passed by the lower appellate Court, in this appeal. It was further argued that the death of the plaintiff occurred after the passing of the decree of the trial Court and, therefore, it became part of the estate of the respondents who were the heirs of Girdharilal Gattani. The appeal, therefore, did not abate. The respondents could, therefore, continue the suit. The trial Court was entitled to take note of subsequent events and permit the amendment of the plaint. Therefore, respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 could claim their own bona fide requirement of business for evicting the appellants. 13. It is not in dispute that Girdharilal had filed the suit under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act on his personal bona fide requirement for starting his business. He did not plead that his requirement was for starting the business by any of his major sons of unmarried daughter. What is the effect of death of such a plaintiff who claimed bona fide requirement for himself ? If he dies during the pendency of trial, the 'cause of action' does not survive for the reason, the 'cues of action' is intimately and inextricably connected with the persona of the plaintiff. The maxim action personals maritur cum persona applies. It means that a personal action dies with the person. An example of personal action may a suit for recovery of damages for defamation; or for recovery of damages for causing injuries to the plaintiff when he does not succumb to them. Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act 1925 incorporates the aforesaid principle. It reads as under :- S.306 Demands and rights of action of or against deceased survive to and against executor or administrator. Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act 1925 incorporates the aforesaid principle. It reads as under :- S.306 Demands and rights of action of or against deceased survive to and against executor or administrator. All demands what-soever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except cause of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code 1860, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. This section provides for survival of all claims by or against a deceased person in favour of his executor or administrator or against them as the case may be. The exceptions noted are cases of defamation, assault as defined in the Indian Penal Code or other personal injuries not resulting in death. The further exception; also cases where, after death of the party the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. The same principle would operate against the legal representatives of a deceased -plaintiff as it is statutorily operative against the executor or administrator of the deceased under the Indian Succession Act 1925. This legal position is based on sound common sense. A relief that could be given to plaintiff alone could not be passed on to surviving heirs. It is too personal and intimate matter, to be passed on. 14. Rule 1 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, that a suit shall not abate, if the right to sue survives, therefore, it was argued on behalf of the appellants that the suit abated as soon as Girdharilal Gattani died. This Court, therefore, must examine the case of the appellants. It cannot be disputed that in this case the 'bona fide' personal requirement of Girdharilal Gattani could not be enjoyed by him after his death. Therefore, had he died during the pendency of trial, granting of a decree in his favour would be nugatory. It would a futile exercise as he would not be there to enjoy the fruits of the decree. Therefore, had he died during the pendency of trial, granting of a decree in his favour would be nugatory. It would a futile exercise as he would not be there to enjoy the fruits of the decree. In such a case, the Rule 1 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall become operative for holding that the 'cause of action' did not survive, and the suit automatically abated. The principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Phool Rani and others Vs. Sh. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2110, and applying this principle, the Supreme Court held that the suit would still abate even if, the claim under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act was made by the landlord for himself and for and on behalf of the members of his family. It was held that such a requirement was a personal requirement of the landlord. The personal 'cause'/ perished with him. However, the view of two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Shantilal Thakordas and others Vs. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2358. The larger Bench was of the view that Smt. Phool Rani's case (Supra) was wrongly decided on the point that the claim of plaintiff for himself and that of the members of his family was personal to the landlord. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court took the view that the interpretation of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rant Control Act given in Phool Rani's case (supra) was not correct. Their Lordships held that requirement of landlord and that of the members of his family could be separated for the reason the status permitted the landlord to file suit on the basis of his personal requirements of himself and also that of the members of the family. These two requirements are not one and the same. The following observations of their Lordships bring out the meaning. In Shantilal's case (supra) their Lordships observed at page 2360 as follows:- ...We are unable to take the view that the requirement of the occupation of the members of the family or the original landlord was his requirement and ceased to be the requirement of the members of his family on his death.... In Shantilal's case (supra) their Lordships observed at page 2360 as follows:- ...We are unable to take the view that the requirement of the occupation of the members of the family or the original landlord was his requirement and ceased to be the requirement of the members of his family on his death.... Therefore, in effect, the larger Bench held that the "cause of action" survived and Phool Rani's case (supra) was overruled on a limited point as already stated above. 15. From the aforesaid discussion it is clear that a suit shall abate if the plaintiff dies during pendency of trial if cause of action perishes with him. The aforesaid principle was held to be applicable even to those cases where the landlord filed an appeal after dismissal of his suit as in the Phool Rani's case (supra). As already seen that in Shantilal's case (supra) the principle that a cause of action which is personal to a plaintiff shall perish with him was not disputed. Therefore, this Court comes to the conclusion that if a landlord dies during the trial or during the pendency of his appeal against the dismissal of suit and the suit is based on a ground which is personal to him, "the cause of action" would not survive and the suit shall abafe. 16. However, the above proposition does not solve the problem in this case because Girdharilal died during the pendency of the appeal of the tenant. He had already obtained a decree which was under challenge, when he died. In Phool Rani's case (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court discussed such a contingency as is clear from the category No. (i) considered in paragraph 13 of the judgment in that case, at page 2112: (i) cases in which the death of the plaintiff occurred after a decree for possession was passed in his favour say, during the pendency of an appeal filed by the unsuccessful tenant. Thereafter, their Lordships observed is paragraph 14 as follows :- 14. Cases of the first category are distinguishable because the decisions therein are explicable on the basis, though not always so expressed, that the estate is entitled to the benefit which, under a decree, has accrued in favour of the plaintiff and therefore the legal representatives are entitled to defend further proceedings like an appeal, which constitute a challenge to that benefit. 17. 17. It would be clear from aforesaid observations that an altogether new principle begins to operate when a plaintiff obtains a decree based on a cause of action which is personal to him and dies during pendency of the appeal of the defendant. The principle may be stated by saying that in that case the right of the plaintiff are crystallized in a decree and that decree assumes the character of "estate" of the plaintiff, and therefore, the legal representatives of the plaintiffs are entitled to defend the decree which is an accretion to the estate or made for the benefit of estate of the plaintiff. 18. An estate is what a person owns especially at the time of his death. It is synonymous with ownership of the property. The decree so obtained by the plaintiff prior to his death amounts to an intangible right which is capable of being passed by inheritance or succession. Salmond, in his jurisprudence (Edited by Clanville Williams. Eleventh Edition) has made the following distinction between "personal and proprietary rights" at page 289. Another important distinction is that between proprietary and personal rights. The aggregate of a man's proprietary rights constitute his estate, his assets, or his property in one of the many senses of that most equivocal of legal terms. German jurisprudence is superior to our own in possessing a distinct technical terms for this aggregate of proprietary rights, namely, Vermogen, the rights themselves being Vermogenerachte. The French speak in the same fashion of avoid of patrimonies. The sum total of a man's personal rights, on the other hand, constitutes his status or personal condition, as opposed to his estate. If he owns land, or chattels, or patent rights, or the goodwill of a business, or shares in a company, or if debts are owing to him, all these rights pertain to his estate. But if he is a free man and a citizen, a husband and a father, the rights which he has as 'such pertain to his status or standing in the law. What, then, is the essential nature of this distinction ? It lies in the fact that proprietary rights are valuable, and personal rights are not. The former are those which are worth money; the latter are those that are worth none. The former are the elements in his well-being (m). 19. What, then, is the essential nature of this distinction ? It lies in the fact that proprietary rights are valuable, and personal rights are not. The former are those which are worth money; the latter are those that are worth none. The former are the elements in his well-being (m). 19. Thus, it would be further clear from the aforesaid quotation that the word 'estate' is equivalent to property or assets and the decree though initially based on personal rights becomes property or estate after plaintiff obtains it. However, in the case of Smt. Phool Rani's (surpa) the observations quoted in paragraph 17 were obiter as they were not necessary for the decision of that case on the view taken by there Lordships as the plaintiff had died during the pendency of his appeal and he had not obtained any decree but this Court is bound to give due respect to the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court and treat those obiter remarks as binding on it. However, in Shantilal's case (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court brushed aside the similar contention by saying as follows in paragraph 6 at page 2360. 6. Counsel for the appellants endeavored to bring their case within one of the exceptions noted in Phool Rani's case (supra). He submitted that a decree had already been passed in favour of the original plaintiff by the Trial Court and that could not be disturbed on his death either in appeal or revision. We do not accept the contention as sound or correct. In Phool Rani's case (supra) no final opinion was expressed on this question. Moreover, we find that on the earlier occasion the High Court had set aside the decree and remanded the suit to be First Appellate Court for a fresh decision. There was, therefore, no decree in existence to attract the exception." The fact of the case disclose that the plaintiff had obtained a partial decree and both the parties had filed the appeal and at first appellate stage the landlord died. Therefore, existence of the partial decree obtained by the plaintiff-landlord, could be treated for the benefit of the estate. The remand order was passed in Civil revision challenging the order of the First Appellate Court. Therefore, existence of the partial decree obtained by the plaintiff-landlord, could be treated for the benefit of the estate. The remand order was passed in Civil revision challenging the order of the First Appellate Court. In this case, the principle stated in Smt. Phool Ran's Case (supra) to the effect that a decree challenged by the tenant ensures to the benefit of estate of the landlord, and death of the plaintiff during pendency of appeal would not affect the 'cause of action' held as obiter. The contention of the landlord counsel was also not accepted on (factually incorrect) assumption that the case was remanded prior to death of the plaintiff. There is no merit in the contention of the appellant that the obiter observations in Smt. Phool Rani's case (supra) too were expressly overruled by the Supreme Court in Shantilal's case (supra). 20. The position that emerges is that when a plaintiff obtains a decree and he dies during the pendency of appeal ordinarily the decree is treated as estate of the plaintiff and his legal representatives can defend the suit. This principle was applied to the suit of landlord and tenant in Motilal Pannalal Vs. Kailash Narain A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 134 and in Narain Vs. LRs. of Smt. Ansuyiya Bai 1990 M.P.L.R. 517, decided by this Court. The last case was deiced on the basis of decision of Supreme Court in Smt. Phool Rani's case (supra). It has already been noticed by this Court that in Phool Rani's case (supra) the aforesaid principle was merely in obiter dictum and this fact was also noticed by Supreme Court in Shantilal's case (supra) when the larger Bench observed that in Smt. Phool Rani's case (supra) no final opinion was given. The matter would have rested there and this Court was bound to decide the two appeals before it on the basis of obiter observations of Supreme Court but for the fact the latest case of Supreme Court cited before this Court had added new dimensions to the concept hither too stated and considered. This case bears careful examination and, therefore, it shall be considered in the next paragraph. 21. In P. V. Pappana and others Vs. K. Padmanabhaih (1994) 2 S.C.C. 316 , the fats of the case were as follows. This case bears careful examination and, therefore, it shall be considered in the next paragraph. 21. In P. V. Pappana and others Vs. K. Padmanabhaih (1994) 2 S.C.C. 316 , the fats of the case were as follows. The landlord obtained a decree for eviction against the respondents from the Trial Court under Section 21 (1) of Karnataka Rent Control Act on the ground that he bona fide required the non-residential premises for his personal need and use and occupation. The Trial Court decreed the suit but granted two year's time to the tenant to vacate the house. The revision filed by the tenant was also dismissed by the High Court but time for vacating the tenanted premises was extended to four years. The appeal of the tenant before the Supreme Court too stood rejected. The landlord died before the expiry of four years of time granted to the tenant. The tenant did not vacate. Thereupon, the legatees of the suit-property under the will excuted by the landlord filed execution proceedings. The tenant objected that the requirement of the landlord ended with the death of the landlord and, therefore, the legatees and the legal representatives of the landlord had no right to execute the decree. The executing Court over-ruled the objection holding that it could not go behind the decree. The tenant's appeal was allowed by Karnataka High Court. The Supreme Court, in appeal, filed by the legatees and the legal representatives of the landlord, held that in the case of Hasmat Rai and another Vs. Raghunath Prasad A.I.R. 1981 S. 1711, it was held that the bona fide requirement of the landlord should last till the appellate Court disposed of the appeal against eviction (ii). That appellate Court was entitled to notice subsequent events whereby it was proved that the requirement of landlord did not subsist. The Supreme Court, after referring to other cases, decided by it, indicated its conclusion as follows in paragraph 13 at page 321 :- 13. That appellate Court was entitled to notice subsequent events whereby it was proved that the requirement of landlord did not subsist. The Supreme Court, after referring to other cases, decided by it, indicated its conclusion as follows in paragraph 13 at page 321 :- 13. From the various observations made in the cases referred to above, it is patently clear that this Court, while laying down that in a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of premises by landlord the subsequent events ought to be taken into account for the purpose of finding out whether the landlord still required the premises in possession of the tenant, has also laid down that such an enquiry can be made so long as the decree for eviction does not become final. It was further concluded by the Supreme Court in paragraph 18, at page 322 as follows:- 18. For the foregoing discussion, we must held that events which take place subsequent to the filing of an eviction petition under any Rent Act can be taken into consideration for the purpose of adjudication until a decree is made by the final court determining the rights of the parties but any event that takes place after the decree becomes final cannot be made a ground for reopening the decree. The finality to the dispute culminating in the decree cannot be reopened by the executing court for resdjudication on the ground that some event or the other has altered the situation. As a corollary thereto it must also be held that once the decree became a part of the estate of the landlord and therefore the appellants as legal representatives of the deceased landlord are entitled to execute the same. 22. Thus, the Supreme Court seems to have evolved a new principles by combining the principle that in a suit filed by landlord the requirement or need must subsist till the appeal filed by the tenant is finally decided with the principle that a decree obtained by a plaintiff ensures to the benefit of his estate and in the event of his subsequent death, his legal representatives could defend the decree as it became part of the estate of deceased-plaintiff. It appears to have given primacy to the principle that the requirement must subsist during the pendency and for this purpose the Supreme Court held that the tenant could always take advantage of the subsequent events like death, to urge that the requirement or the need of the land-lord has ended during the pendency of appeal. This advantage to the tenant lasts till the pending appeal was finally disposed of, upto the highest Court. For this reason, it was held that death of a landlord during the pendency of appeal filed by the tenant against a decree for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement would not result in making the decree a part of the estate of the landlord. It would become part of the estate of landlord only when the tenant's appeal was finally dismissed and case became ripe for execution because no further appeal was possible or because the tenant did not file the appeal. Thus, the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court makes an advance on the principle stated by it in Smt. Phool Rani's case (supra) by way of obiter dictum. Thus, reconciling the duty of the Court to take note of subsequent events negativing the need of the landlord that the decree became part of the estate of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court postponed the application of latter to the state when the dispute between landlord and tenant finally settled on merits in favour of the landlord and landlord obtained the right to execute the decree without interference by the Appellate Court or other Court on the merits of the decree. It was held when such stage reached the tenant could not challenge the decree in execution as became part of the estate of the landlord. It is true that in this case, the Supreme Court was considering the appeal arising out of execution proceedings and it held that eviction decree became part of estate of the landlord because appeals on merits of the dispute were earlier exhausted by the tenant upto Supreme Court. It was, therefore, urged that the observations on which reliance was being made by the counsel for the appellants are merely obiter dictum. That may be so. It was, therefore, urged that the observations on which reliance was being made by the counsel for the appellants are merely obiter dictum. That may be so. But this Court is bound by obiter dicta of the Supreme Court particularly, where it holds that the subsequent case explains and reconciles the legal position expressed by way of obiter in Smt. Phool Rani's case (supra). 23. The learned counsel for the respondents had urged that appellants cannot go behind the order and this Court too is bound by the order of remand. It may be remembered here that this Court is superior Court and, therefore, it is not bound by the order of remand (see-Satyandhan Ghoshal and others Vs. Smt. Deorajin Debi A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 941. However, the order of remand did not decide that respondents were entitled to continue the suit. It merely permitted the respondents to amend the plaint to the effect that they could continue the suit and sent it back to the Trial Court. The lower Appeal Court did not decide the consequence of death of Girdharilal on the suit. It left the matter open. The remand order was not appealable as it was passed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellants were not bound to file a revision. Therefore, they could question even the order upto remand in the Supreme Court. For all these reasons, there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that this Court was bound by the order of remand. 24. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, this Court comes to the conclusion that with the death of Girdharilal Gattani the civil suit filed by him came to an end as the appellants could not have continued that suit which was based on personal bona fide need. The lower Appeal Court in Civil Appeal No. 17-A of 1965 did not decide if the respondents had right to continue the suit and it left the matter open for decision by the trial Court. Therefore, this Court holds that with the death of Girdharilal Gattani, the 'cause of action' did not survive and it perished with him. The lower Appeal Court in Civil Appeal No. 17-A of 1965 did not decide if the respondents had right to continue the suit and it left the matter open for decision by the trial Court. Therefore, this Court holds that with the death of Girdharilal Gattani, the 'cause of action' did not survive and it perished with him. The respondents could not take advantage of the decree of trial Court and urge that it became part of the estate of late Girdharilal Gattani for the reasons given by the Supreme Court in P. V. Papanna's case (supra). Since the suit itself had come to an end, the respondent could not take advantage of the subsequent events in favour of respondents No 2., 3 and 4. Even otherwise, a new cause of action could not be added. 25. The attention of this Court was drawn to Vasim Sab Fakruddin Sab Dori Vs. Bassappa Hangaraki (Dead) by L.Rs. 1991 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 219. In this case, the Division, Bench, after considering the cases of Smt. Phool Rani (supra) and Pukhra] Jain Vs. Mrs. Padma kashyap A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1133, came to the conclusion that whether survival of pending proceeding on the death of plaintiff shall depend upon the actual plea raised by the landlord and the ground on which the eviction is sought. The Court held that there could be no universal principle that in each and every case the death of landlord shall result in abatement. Where the ground of eviction was based on the personality of the landlord, and if it was so pleaded there was every chance that the suit shall abate. If statute permitted a joint claim and it was so claimed the suit may not abate. Other grounds of eviction may not be related to the per-sonality of the landlord and, therefore, the legal representatives of the landlord could to continue the suit. This position in law cannot be disputed. This Court comes to the firm conclusion that the suit would abate only if the suit is based on the personal requirement of the landlord. The view of the Division Bench is in accord with the view of this Court. This position in law cannot be disputed. This Court comes to the firm conclusion that the suit would abate only if the suit is based on the personal requirement of the landlord. The view of the Division Bench is in accord with the view of this Court. It may be noted that the alternative ground that the order of eviction became the part of the estate of landlord too was turned down by the Division Bench on the ground that the order had not become final and it was subject to revision. It appears that the view of the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court is similar to the conclusion of this Court. However, this Court had the advantage of decision of Supreme Court in P. V. Papanna's case (supra). 26. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this appeal and connected Second Appeal No. 246 of 1996 succeed and they are allowed. The impugned judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court, in both these appeals, are set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored, as a result of which, the Civil Suit No. 108-A of 1977, filed in the trial Court, by the original plaintiff, late Girdharilal Gattani and pursued by the present respondents / plaintiffs as his legal representatives, shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs throughout. Appeal dismissed