H. N. NARAYAN, J. ( 1 ) CRIMINAL revision petition nos. 805 of 1995 and 77 of 1996 are filed by the accused and are directed against the order of the learned magistrate dated 15-11-1995, recalling the order of discharge passed by the court dated 1-8-1995, thereby restoring the complaint on its file. ( 2 ) CRIMINAL revision petition No. 665 of 1995 is filed by the complainant against the order of the learned magistrate dated 1-8-1995, discharging the accused on the ground of not adducing the evidence before charge. Since the parties in all these revisions are the same and common questions of law and facts arise in these matters, they are by consent of the learned counsels, clubbed together, heard and disposed of by this common order. ( 3 ) THE petitioner in criminal revision petition No. 665 of 1995 (who will be hereinafter called as the complainant) filed a complaint under Section 200, Criminal Procedure Code before the j. m. f. c. , haveri in dharwad district, alleging offences punishable under sections 449, 504, 506 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code. The complainant was the village pradhan of marola mandal panchayath as on the date of the alleged incident dated 22-4-1987. The accused 1 to 9 were members of the said panchayath. Accused 10 was the editor of a kannada weekly kurukshetra varapathrike of jamkhandi. ( 4 ) UPON perusal of the complaint allegations, the learned magistrate took cognizance of the offence alleged and recorded the sworn statement of the complainant and one witness and in his opinion there was sufficient ground for proceeding. summoned the accused to appear before him on the date so fixed by the court. The accused entered appearance through their advocates and were enlarged on bail. ( 5 ) THE offences alleged against the accused are punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which extend to two years or with fine or with both. It is therefore, clear that all the offences are triable by adopting the procedure of the trial of summons case by the magistrate under chapter xx of the code. for the first time on 10-7-1991, the learned magistrate ordered issue of summons to the witness for production of certain documents upon the request of the complainant and posted the complaint for "evidence before charge". for the first time on 10-7-1991, the learned magistrate ordered issue of summons to the witness for production of certain documents upon the request of the complainant and posted the complaint for "evidence before charge". The record of the court thereafter clearly confirms the mode adopted by the learned magistrate in the trial of the accused. The court, the counsel for the complainant, and the accused were all under the impression that all the offences are to be tried as warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report as provided in chapter xix of the code. This is the mistake committed by the trial court at the inception. Thereafter there was no progress in the matter as some of the accused remained absent and the complainant could not secure the witnesses. The learned magistrate who noticed that the case was pending in his court for more than six years, discharged the accused on the very ground of absence of the complainant and his witness. He has not stopped there nor the counsel for the complainant has allowed the matter to rest there. The complainant made an application on the next day under Section 300 (5), Criminal Procedure Code requesting the learned magistrate to revise/recall his order and restore the complaint. This was vehemently opposed by the accused. however, the learned magistrate was pursuaded to recall his order. The learned magistrate in his detailed order dated 15-11-1995, has upheld the argument of the learned counsel for the accused that the application under Section 300 (5) is not maintainable to restore the order of discharge passed by him. He has also upheld the argument of the accused that the order of discharge passed by him was one under Section 249, criminal procedure code. He was also aware that there is no inherent power conferred on him by the Code of Criminal Procedure. however, he was convinced by the argument of the learned counsel for the complainant to revise his own order by restoring the complaint. ( 6 ) IT is the contention of the learned counsel for the accused in these revisions that the learned magistrate has no such power as no specific provision is provided in the code of procedure enabling the magistrate to exercise his inherent power in correcting his own order. ( 6 ) IT is the contention of the learned counsel for the accused in these revisions that the learned magistrate has no such power as no specific provision is provided in the code of procedure enabling the magistrate to exercise his inherent power in correcting his own order. His further contention is that the complainant has challenged the order of discharge before the court in criminal revision petition No. 665 of 1995 but, has also chosen to file an application under Section 300 (5), criminal procedure code before the magistrate thereafter, and it was not open to the complainant to seek remedies in two forums at the same time and thereby abused the process of law. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the complainant vehemently contended that in a summons case, the learned magistrate cannot adopt the warrant procedure to pass an order of discharge and the learned magistrate should have adopted the procedure contemplated in chapter xx of the code. This mode of trial adopted by the learned magistrate resulted in this anomaly and therefore, the entire proceedings are liable to be set aside. ( 8 ) THE contentions are not new and the law is well-settled. ( 9 ) THERE is no dispute that the subordinate criminal courts have no inherent power. This is the settled position. The Supreme Court in bindeshwari prasad singh v kali singh, has laid down as follows:"there is no provision in Criminal Procedure Code empowering a magistrate to review or recall a judicial order passed by him. Inherent powers under Section 561-a are only given to high court and unlike Section 151, civil procedure code subordinate criminal courts have no inherent powers". the order of discharge passed by a magistrate is not a judgment as contemplated under Section 369, criminal procedure code. But it is difficult to accept the contention that the order of discharge not being the decision on merits can be restored in exercise of the inherent power to undo the wrong, even though there is no such express provision in the code. The conclusion reached by the Patna high court in shublal gope and another v state of Bihar , with due respect is difficult to accept. The framers of the code were aware of the inherent jurisdiction vested with the civil courts under Section 151, civil procedure code. The conclusion reached by the Patna high court in shublal gope and another v state of Bihar , with due respect is difficult to accept. The framers of the code were aware of the inherent jurisdiction vested with the civil courts under Section 151, civil procedure code. They have not chosen to introduce similar provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure perhaps for obvious reasons, not to vest such power with the subordinate criminal courts. The provision of Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code specifically empowers the high court to exercise the inherent power thereby impliedly prohibiting the subordinate criminal c'ourts from exercising such inherent power. ( 10 ) TRIAL of summons case by magistrates is provided in chapter xx of the code which reads as follows. "when the accused appears or is brought before the magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make, but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge" (section 251, Criminal Procedure Code ). "but, if the accused pleads guilty, the magistrate shall record the plea as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon" (section 252, criminal procedure code ). Where the magistrate does not convict the accused under Section 252 or Section 253, the magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution, and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence. It is thereafter that the magistrate shall record an order of acquittal or conviction as the case may be. Section 256 (1) specifically provides that where the summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything herein before contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day. The magistrate may also pass an order exempting the appearance of the complainant for reasons recorded by him. The magistrate may also pass an order exempting the appearance of the complainant for reasons recorded by him. Section 257, criminal procedure code empowers the complainant to withdraw the complaint on sufficient grounds before the final order is passed in this case. The magistrate is also empowered in summons case instituted otherwise than upon complaint to stop the proceedings under the circumstances explained in the Section 258. The learned magistrate is also empowered to convert summons case into warrant case under section 259, Criminal Procedure Code if it appears to him that in the interest of Justice the offence is to be tried in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant case. he could only adopt the procedure in the course of the trial of the summons case. Adopting the warrant procedure at the inception is at best a curable irregularity and not an illegality". ( 11 ) THEREFORE, the provision of Section 258, criminal procedure code mandates that an accused cannot be discharged or released under that provision specially where the summons case is instituted otherwise than upon a complaint. Therefore, in a complaint filed under Section 200, Criminal Procedure Code, the magistrate does not get jurisdiction to invoke the Provisions of Section 258, Criminal Procedure Code. ( 12 ) FROM the perusal of the order sheet of the trial court, it is not made clear whether the learned magistrate has adopted the procedure of the warrant case while trying the summons case, in which case the learned magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass the order of discharge. ( 13 ) THE learned magistrate in this case has committed an error at the inception by not recording the plea of the accused, as the offences alleged are summons cases. Obviously, the learned magistrate has erred in not following the procedure provided in chapter xx of the code. The only course open to the magistrate was to acquit the accused under Section 249, criminal procedure code. There is no difficulty in trial of warrant cases. Specific provision is made in chapter xix of the code. Special mode of trial is provided in cases instituted on a police report and in cases instituted otherwise than upon a police report. The only course open to the magistrate was to acquit the accused under Section 249, criminal procedure code. There is no difficulty in trial of warrant cases. Specific provision is made in chapter xix of the code. Special mode of trial is provided in cases instituted on a police report and in cases instituted otherwise than upon a police report. Hence the two modes of trial is provided in chapter xx and the first of it is provided in sections 238 to 243, Criminal Procedure Code and the second one is provided under sections 245 to 247 of criminal procedure code. ( 14 ) INCIDENTALLY, the question of commencement of trial is raised in this case. There is no difficulty both in warrant and summons cases to state the commencement of trial. The said question came up before the Supreme Court in v. c. shukla v state through c. b. i. . The Supreme Court had an occasion to discuss these two aspects of the trial viz. , the inquiry and the trial. "the inquiry" includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this code by the magistrate or court. In the words of the Supreme Court the words commencement of trial were introduced for the first time which clearly denote that the trial starts in a warrant case right from the stage when the accused appears or is brought before the court. This appears to us to be the main intent and purpose of introducing the words 'commencement of trial' by the Amendment Act of 1955 which did not appear in the code of 1988 or in the various amendments made before the act of 1955 to the code. For these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied with the proceedings starting with Section 238 of the code including any discharge or framing of charges under Section 239 or 249 amount to a trial". It may be remembered that the Supreme Court was dealing with the trial of warrant cases. The question whether the magistrate has jurisdiction or not to restore and revive the complaint dismissed for default came up for consideration before the learned single judge of this court in laxminarayan v ramaswamy and others. Relying upon the rulings of the apex court in maj. The question whether the magistrate has jurisdiction or not to restore and revive the complaint dismissed for default came up for consideration before the learned single judge of this court in laxminarayan v ramaswamy and others. Relying upon the rulings of the apex court in maj. general a. s. gauraya and another v s. n. thakur and another and pramatha nath talukdar and another v saroj ranjan sarkar , the learned single judge was of the opinion that the magistrate has no such power. However, if a second complaint on the same facts alleged in the first complaint is permissible in law, the complainant would be within his right to make such a second complaint. This is the law approved by the supreme court in so far as the dismissal of the complaint under section 249, criminal procedure code and filing of the second complaint on the same set of facts if permissible in law. ( 15 ) THE discussion made supra, leaves no doubt that a magistrate has no inherent power to correct his own order. Section 300, clause (5), Criminal Procedure Code does not enable a magistrate to restore an order of dismissal. There is no specific provision in the code empowering the magistrate to invoke such inherent power. Therefore, the order of the learned magistrate dated 15-11-1995 recalling the order of discharge passed by him is liable to be set aside. However, the mode adopted by the learned magistrate does not vitiate the entire procedure as such. therefore, strictly the ruling of the learned single judge of this court in laxminarayan's case, supra, is not applicable to the facts of this case as that was the case of the dismissal simplicitor for the absence of the complainant. The revision petitions filed by the accused and complainant are therefore, liable to be allowed only to this limited extent. ( 16 ) IN the result the revisions are allowed. The order of discharge passed by the learned magistrate is set aside. The order of recall is set aside. The learned magistrate is now directed to proceed with the matter in accordance with chapter xx of the code and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible but, not later than six months. --- *** --- .