JUDGMENT - R.M. LODHA, J. :---In this contempt petition filed under section-2(b) read with section 12 of the Contempt of courts Act, 1971, the petitioner prays that the respondents be held guilty of 'civil contempt' and punished accordingly for wilful disobedience of various orders viz. the order of this Court passed on 12-7-94 in Writ Petition No. 193/94, the order of the Apex Court on 26-10-94 in Special Leave Petition (Civil No. 17677/94), the order of the Industrial Court dated 5-4-1994 in Appeal (BIR) No. 3/89, the order of this Court dated 27-6-95 in Contempt Petition No. 167/95, and ,. the order of Division Bench of this Court dated 18-7-1995 in Contempt Appeal No. 4/95. 2.According to the petitioner he joined service in the Solapur District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. -the respondent No. 1 herein in the year 1962 on the post of Sr. Inspector, Class-I. On 3-1-1978 he was transferred from Akluj to village Natepute on the post of Agent which according to the petitioner was not a transfer simpliciter but amounted to his demotion. Thereafter the petitioner was transferred to village Barsi and from November 1979 he remained on medical leave. It appears that petitioner remained absent for number of years and then on, 30th April -83 he was transferred to village Akkalkot. The petitioner did not report on duty at Akkalkot and he resisted his transfer by addressing letter dated 16-5-83 to the respondent No. 1 Bank. On 16-12-1983 the petitioner's services were terminated by the respondent No. 1 Bank. The petitioner preferred an application under section 78(1-a) and section 79 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 challenging his termination before the Labour Court, Solapur. After holding the enquiry, the Labour Court, Solapur on 29-7-1989 dismissed the application made by the petitioner. An appeal was preferred before the Industrial Court by the petitioner challenging the order of the Labour Court dated 29-7-89 and the Industrial Court, Solapur by its order dated 5-4-1994 allowed the appeal, set-aside the order dated 29-7-89 passed by the Labour Court and directed the respondent No. 1 Bank to reinstate the petitioner in the employment with continuity in service and to pay full backwages to the appellant except the wages drawn by the petitioner in the employment of Uttar Taluka Kharedi Vikri Sangh from 10-11-1986 to 9-1-1988. The respondent No. 1 Bank challenged the order dated 5-4-94 passed by the Industrial Court, Solapur in the writ petition before this Court and on July 12, 1994 the learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 Bank. Dissatisfied with the order passed by this Court on 12-7-94 upholding the order of Industrial Court, Solapur dated 5-4-94, the respondent No. 1 Bank preferred Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court but that was dismissed on 26-10-94. According to the petitioner the order passed by the Industrial Court on 5-4-94 which was not disturbed right upto the Apex Court was not implemented and petitioner filed contempt petition before this Court which was registered as Contempt Petition No. 167/95. In the contempt petition statement was made by the Counsel for Bank that the petitioner has already been reinstated as per the order dated 5-4-94 passed by Industrial Court, Solapur and so far as the question of seniority of the petitioner was concerned, Bank would decide the same in accordance with prevailing Rules within the period of three months and accordingly this Court rejected the contempt petition on 27-6-95 after taking on record the statement of the Counsel for respondent No. 1 Bank. The appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the Division Bench challenging the order dated 27-6-95 rejecting the contempt petition, and, the Divisional Bench also dismissed the appeal on 18-7-95 after accepting the statement made by the Counsel for respondent No. 1 that the question of seniority of the petitioner based on continuity of service would be decided within the time stipulated by the learned Single Judge in his order dated 27-6-95. On 23-9-95 an office order was issued by the respondent No. 1 Bank recording the fact that the petitioner has been absorbed in the employment of the Bank in the Ist grade category as per the order of the Industrial Court dated 5-4-94 and has been given all payments in this grade. In the said office order dated 23-9-95 it is also recorded that in view of the order given by this Court on 27-6-95, the seniority of the petitioner was to be decided and his seniority was fixed at number one. In the said office order dated 23-9-95 it is also recorded that in view of the order given by this Court on 27-6-95, the seniority of the petitioner was to be decided and his seniority was fixed at number one. However, petitioner was not found fit for promotion presently on the ground that he had not worked actually for almost fifteen years and during that time various changes had taken place in Banking activities and the working of the Bank, and, looking to the responsible nature of the promotional post if the petitioner was promoted at that stage, it may affect the working of the Bank. However, his case for promotion to the higher post was kept open and it was observed that it would be considered after doubts were removed by his working on the present post efficiently. The grievance of the petitioner in the contempt petition is that by not according promotion to him, the respondent No. 1 Bank has disobeyed the order passed by the Industrial Court and the orders of this Court and the order of the Apex Court referred to hereinabove. 3.Ms. Buch, learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that by not according promotion to the petitioner, the Bank-respondent No. 1 flouted the order dated 5-4-1994 passed by the Industrial Court confirmed upto Supreme Court. According to her, the direction of petitioner's reinstatement with continuity of service meant restoration of status quo ante i.e., putting the petitioner back in law and in fact in same position which he was occupying earlier before his services were terminated, and that included his entitlement to promotion as if no order of termination was ever passed. She would submit that the order passed by the Industrial Court on 5-4-94 and confirmed right upto the Apex Court, and, the orders passed by this Court on 27-6-95 and 18-7-95 have not been implemented in spirit by the respondent No. 1 Bank and its directors i.e. other respondents and, therefore, they are guilty of wilful disobedience of the said orders. According to her, implementation of the aforesaid orders in the letter alone was not sufficient and the respondent No. 1 Bank and its directors while implementing the aforesaid orders in their spirit ought to have granted promotion to the petitioner to the higher post to which he was entitled. According to her, implementation of the aforesaid orders in the letter alone was not sufficient and the respondent No. 1 Bank and its directors while implementing the aforesaid orders in their spirit ought to have granted promotion to the petitioner to the higher post to which he was entitled. In support of her contentions, the learned Counsel for petitioner relied upon (Anugrah Narayan Sinha v. United Commercial Bank and others)1, (1988)II L.L.J. 295; (K.S. Venkatraman v. State of Tamil Nadu and another)2, (1977)II L.L.J. 211; and (Sudhakar Baburao Bodke v. State of Maharashtra and others)3, (1991)I L.L.J. 188. 4.On the other hand Mr. Apte, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 Bank, Mr. Rele, Mr. Dharap and Mr. Mengane, learned Counsel appearing for other respondents urged that the respondents have not disobeyed the order in any manner whatsoever and the order passed by the Industrial Court on 5-4-94 affirmed right upto the Apex Court, the orders passed by this Court on 27-6-95 and 18-7-95 have been duly complied with. 5.By the order dated 5-4-94 passed by the Industrial Court, the respondent No. 1 Bank was directed to reinstate the petitioner in its employment with continuity in service and to pay full backwages subject to payment of the wages drawn by the applicant in the employment of Uttar Taluka Kharedi Vikri Sangh from 10-11-1986 to 9-1-1988. The respondent No. 1 Bank on 23-9-95 passed the order from which it is apparent and clear that the petitioner has been absorbed in the Ist grade category and has been given all the payments in this grade on 31-12-1994. The petitioner has also joined his duties on 24-4-95. It is thus clear that so far as reinstatement and payment of backwages is concerned the order has been duly complied with. As regards the grievance of the petitioner that he has not been given promotion which was due to him treating the petitioner in continuity of service since 1979, it may be observed that when the first contempt petition was filed by the petitioner before this Court, on 27-6-95, the Counsel for respondent No. 1 Bank made statement before this Court that the question of seniority of the petitioner shall be decided in accordance with prevailing Rules within a period of three months. The Division Bench in its order dated 18-7-95 also accepted the statement made by the learned Counsel before the learned Single Judge that the question of seniority of the petitioner based on continuity of service would be decided within the time stipulated by the learned Single Judge in his order dated 27-6-95. The seniority accordingly has been decided within the time granted by the learned Single Judge and accordingly the petitioner has been fixed at number one in the category of Ist grade employees. Therefore, the orders passed by this Court on 27-6-95 and 18-7-95 which records the statement of respondent No. 1 Bank have also been duly complied with in time. The Staff Service Rules framed by respondent No. 1 Bank provides that promotions will ordinarily go by seniority subject to merit and fitness. The Board may grant special promotion without consideration of seniority for specific reason to be recorded in writing. Thus according to Rule 40 of Staff Service Rules ordinarily promotion is to be made by seniority subject to merit and fitness. It is thus clear that under the service rules promotion to higher post is not on the basis of seniority alone but is subject to merit and fitness. In the order dated 23-9-95 the promotion has not been accorded to the petitioner presently though he is at number one in the seniority list in the category of Ist grade employees because the petitioner has not actually worked for about fifteen years though he has been treated as continuing in service. When promotion is based not on the seniority alone but is subject to merit and fitness, obviously the actual work done by the employee attains vital importance. How could merit or efficiency of employee can be assessed and evaluated objectively when the employee has not worked actually on a post. With the liberalization in economy, the functioning and working of the Banks have materially and substantially changed and in the order passed on 23-9-95, it is recorded by the Bank that there has been changes/increases in the policies of Reserve Bank, NABARD Bank and various Government activities and also change in the working of the Bank. Mr. Apte, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 Bank states that the next promotional post to the petitioner would be Assistant Manager and same would be considered after assessing his performance for some time on the present post. Mr. Apte, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 Bank states that the next promotional post to the petitioner would be Assistant Manager and same would be considered after assessing his performance for some time on the present post. In the office order dated 23-9-95 also it is recorded that the probable promotional post is of responsible nature and in case the petitioner is promoted at this stage it would affect the working of the Bank. The petitioner accordingly was not entitled to the promotional post presently and was asked to work on the present post and his case for promotion on the higher post would be considered after considering his efficiency and work. The office order passed by the respondent No. 1 Bank on 23-9-95, therefore, cannot be said to be in disobedience of any of the orders referred by the learned Counsel as well as in Contempt Petition. 6.In K.S. Venkatraman's case (supra), the Madras High Court held thus : "When once the petitioner is absolved of all charges the reason which prompted the Government not to consider him for promotion is obliterated, so that the petitioner's right to have his case reopened and his name considered for promotion with effect from the date when a person junior to him was promoted would revive. Further, he is entitled to such consideration with the application of the same criteria which were brought to bear on the promotion of his juniors. If there was more than one such occasion his case has to be considered in relation to them all and on the same basis. Refusal of these rights to him is a denial of equality of opportunity in the matter of employment and is hit by Art. 16 of the Constitution of India. Learned Advocate-General has not been able to cite any authority in support of his proposition contrary to this conclusion which finds support from the decision in (State of Mysore v. C.R. Seshadri and others)4, 1974(3) S.C.R. 87 7.In Venkatraman's case (supra) the petitioner was functioning as Superintendent of Police and he was suspended in view of pending departmental action. Thereafter the petitioner was served with an order from the State Government dropping all the charges, reinstating him in service and limiting his salary from service to the subsistence allowance drawn by him. Thereafter the petitioner was served with an order from the State Government dropping all the charges, reinstating him in service and limiting his salary from service to the subsistence allowance drawn by him. Another order was served on him on the same date directing his retirement from service with effect from 15th June 65 on his attaining age of 55 years. The petitioner was relieved of his duties on that date and placed on leave. He challenged the order of his retirement before the Madras High Court and the writ petition was allowed and the order of retirement was quashed. During pendency of this litigation the petitioner K.S. Venkatraman had attained the age of superannuation on completing his 58th year. He made representation that he should have been given promotion to the select grade and supertime scale from the dates on which his immediate juniors were given such promotion. The State Government refused to consider the petitioner K.S. Venkatraman's case for promotion and that led to the filing of the writ petition before the Madras High Court in which the aforesaid observations have been made. The facts in Venkatraman's case would clearly indicate that the observations made by Madras High Court has no application to the present contempt proceedings. The petitioner herein has not challenged the order passed by the respondent No. 1 Bank on 23-9-95 in substantive proceedings and the present contempt petition cannot be overstretched for examining the legality and validity of the order dated 23-9-1995. 8.In Anugrah Narayan Sinha's case (supra) the Calcutta High Court held thus: "Thus, the petitioner having continued to be in service under the statutory provisions for "all purposes" having been exonerated of the charges there can absolutely be no reason for not considering him for promotion with retrospective effect when it actually became due to him. 8.In Anugrah Narayan Sinha's case (supra) the Calcutta High Court held thus: "Thus, the petitioner having continued to be in service under the statutory provisions for "all purposes" having been exonerated of the charges there can absolutely be no reason for not considering him for promotion with retrospective effect when it actually became due to him. To deny such promotion to the petitioner would obviously amount to penalising him unnecessarily in spite of his being fully exonerated of the charges." 9.In Anugrah Narayan Sinha's case (supra) the Calcutta High Court was dealing with the question whether the suspended employee who is not considered for promotion solely on the ground that disciplinary action is pending against him is entitled to be considered for such promotion retrospectively after said proceeding is dropped following his exoneration of charges and while answering the said question the Calcutta High Court held in para 16 of the report as aforestated. Obviously the said case has no application in the facts and circumstances of the case where I am seized of the question whether the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the order passed by the Industrial Court on 5-4-94 upheld right upto the Apex Court and the orders passed by this Court on 27-6-95 and 18-7-95. From the available material in the present case it is clear that the respondents have reinstated the petitioner on the post he was working at the time of his termination and has given him all backwages due under the order and has treated him with continuity of service and fixed his seniority at number one in the list of employees of Grade-I of respondent No. 1 Bank. As regards promotion, the petitioner has not been found fit under the rules at this stage. 10.The learned Single Judge of this Court in Sudhakar Baburao Bodke's case (supra) held thus: "Thus, reinstatement involves putting a particular person back, in law and fact, to the same position as he had occupied earlier before his services were terminated by the employer because to reinstate a man means to place him in the position from which he was dismissed so as to restore the status quo ante the dismissal." 11.The expression 'reinstatement with continuity in service' is well understood in service jurisprudence. The petitioner has been reinstated and put to the same position which he was holding on the date of termination and has been given all wages due to him and treating him in continuity of service. 12.The proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act is a proceeding of a special jurisdiction available to the superior Court and is of vital importance inter alia to ensure that the orders passed by the courts are not flouted and disobeyed. For maintaining the public faith and confidence in the administration of justice and in the ability of the courts to enforce their orders, the Supreme Court and the High Court invoke their special jurisdiction in contempt. The exercise of such jurisdiction, therefore, cannot be by way of routine and has to be exercised in proper cases where it is necessary and required to be invoked. The Supreme Court and the High Court being courts of record has to ensure that the orders passed by it or courts subordinate to it are obeyed, implemented and enforced in its letter and spirit and are not wilfully or intentionally disobeyed. However, every case of disobedience or breach of order or decree or direction of a Court would not be a civil contempt under section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act unless the disobedience is wilful, deliberate and intentional. The proceedings for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act cannot be converted in the substantive proceedings for agitating an independent right which does not directly flow from the order passed by the Court in favour of a party nor in the garb of compliance or implementation of the order passed by the Court, the party can seek relief which was not granted at the time of passing such order. I am of the view and that appears to me to be correct principle of law that while exercising the jurisdiction in contempt it is not open to the Court ordinarily to pass an order which will materially add to or alter the order for alleged disobedience of which its contempt jurisdiction was invoked. I am of the view and that appears to me to be correct principle of law that while exercising the jurisdiction in contempt it is not open to the Court ordinarily to pass an order which will materially add to or alter the order for alleged disobedience of which its contempt jurisdiction was invoked. In suitable cases, the Court may not only in the contempt proceedings set things right but also pass consequential orders for enforcement, implementation and execution of the order, decree or direction but while doing so the Court will not add to the relief which was not granted while passing the order, decree or direction. In the present case as I have already observed that grievance of the petitioner that by not according promotion to him, the respondent No. 1 Bank has wilfully disobeyed the order passed by the Industrial Court on 5-4-94 and the orders passed by this Court on 27-6-95 and 18-7-95 is misconceived and ill-founded. The petitioner has not been accorded promotion though he was at number one in the seniority-list because he was not found fit for promotion presently having not been in actual work for more than a decade and half. The service rules do not provide promotion on the basis of seniority alone but is subject to merit and fitness and while evaluating the merit of an employee, the respondent No. 1 was competent to assess it objectively that to what extent the actual non-working of the petitioner for about a decade and half would affect the working condition of the Bank if he was given promotion presently. The order passed by the respondent No. 1 Bank on 23-9-95 refusing to promote the petitioner apparently cannot be said to suffer from lack of bona fides nor is actuated with ulterior motive. The direction of petitioner's reinstatement with continuity in service did not comprehend promotion to the petitioner on next higher post as a matter of course when the service rules provide promotion on the basis of seniority subject to merit and fitness. 13.For all the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in this contempt petition and same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs. Petition dismissed.