JUDGMENT - CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS T.K., J.:---The petitioner (expired) claiming to be the tenant of two pieces of land comprising survey Nos. 60 and 61 of village Arale in Karvir Taluka, District Kolhapur, approached this Court challenging the order passed by the authorities under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, (hereinafter called the 'Tenancy Act'), turning down his application under section 32-G of the Act. By impugned orders, the authorities viz. original, appellate and revisional authority, rejected the contention of the petitioner in the light of the contention raised by the landlord. It appears that the contention raised by the landlord before the authorities are three fold : (i) on the tillers day, the petitioner was not in possession of the land and subsequently he was dispossessed by the orders of the competent Court of jurisdiction as he is defaulter of payment of purchase price. The landlord's contention is that the petitioner was dispossessed on 25th May, 1971 and the suo motu proceedings were initiated by the authorities under section 32-G after the landlord came to be in possession of the land. (ii) on the tiller's day, the landlord i.e. respondent-plaintiff was a minor and he became major only on 18th February, 1972. By virtue of section 32-F of the Act, the tillers date has been postponed regarding application of section 32-G is concerned. (iii) The landlord says that the 32-G has no application as far as the land is concerned, as it is a sugarcane land. As far as the last point, regarding the nature of the land that it is a sugarcane cultivation, has been turned down by the authorities. But, however, on the question of minority and the question of possession, suo motu proceedings taken under section 32-G of the Act in favour of the petitioner came to be dropped. The Appellate Authority and revisional authority confirmed this position by impugned order. It is in these circumstances, that the petitioner has approached this Court by challenging those orders. 3. Mr. N.V. Bandiwadekar, Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the dispossession of the property, though admitted, that alone will not take away the right conferred by the statute on a tenant under section 32-G of the Act, if it is established that he was in possession of the tenanted land on 1-4-1957. 3. Mr. N.V. Bandiwadekar, Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the dispossession of the property, though admitted, that alone will not take away the right conferred by the statute on a tenant under section 32-G of the Act, if it is established that he was in possession of the tenanted land on 1-4-1957. This inalienable and unfettered rights conferred by the statute under section 32-G in favour of the tenant has been incorporated by the legislature to protect the interest of the tenants and that has been so held by the Full Bench of this Court in 1962 N.L.J. 700 in (Ramchandra Anant Joshi v. Janardan Tulsiram Dube)1. It was held in that case that the landlord's application for dispossession of his tenant under section 29 read with section 14 was not maintainable on the ground that it was filed after 31st March, 1957. It appears that even a tenant is dispossessed by the order of the Court, it has to be ignored if the tenant found to be in possession of the land on 1-4-1957. This position has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in decision reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1457 in (Chunibai v. Narayanrao)2. Para 20, the Apex Court held thus: "But the application under section 29 read with section 14 was not maintainable, as it was filed after April 1, 1957. On this point, we adopt the reasoning and conclusion of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramchandra Anant v. Janardan, 1962 N.L.J. 700. We agree with the following observations of Chainani, C.J., in the aforesaid case: "It has been contended that as there is no provision in the Act that an application on the grounds mentioned in section 14 cannot be made after April 1, 1957, such an application is maintainable, for since the legislature has preserved the right to make such an application, it could not have intended that it should not be availed of in any case. There is undoubtedly force in this argument, but it seems to-us that the intention of the legislature in enacting section 32 clearly was to transfer the ownership of the lands to the tenants on April 1, 1957, except in cases where applications for possession had been made by the landlords before April 1, 1957. There is undoubtedly force in this argument, but it seems to-us that the intention of the legislature in enacting section 32 clearly was to transfer the ownership of the lands to the tenants on April 1, 1957, except in cases where applications for possession had been made by the landlords before April 1, 1957. Where such an application had been made, the right of purchase given to the tenant is postponed until that application is rejected. It is clear from this section that the legislature did not intend that the right given to a tenant by the section should be destroyed or affected by any application made after April 1, 1957. If an application for possession made under section 29 read with section 14 after April 1, 1957 is decided in favour of the landlord before the application made by him prior to April 1, 1957 is disposed of, it will affect the right of the tenant to become the owner of the land on the postponed date. It seems to us that this was not intended by the legislature. The fact that the legislature has provided that only an application made prior to April 1, 1957 clearly indicates that the legislature contemplated that no such application should be made after April 1, 1957." Therefore, merely because, the petitioner was dispossessed even by a Court of competent jurisdiction, that has to be ignored for the purpose of section 32-G if the tenant was found in possession on 1-4-1957. About this right under section 32-G has been eloquently spoken by the Supreme Court in a decision reported in (A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 643)3, wherein in para 6 it is observed as under : "Therefore, it is unquestionably established that on the tillers' day, the landlord's interest in the land gets extinguished and simultaneously by a statutory sale without anything more by the parties, the extinguished title of the landlord is kindled or created in the tenant. That very moment landlord-tenant relationship as understood in common law or Transfer of Property Act comes to an end. The link and chain is broken. The absent non-cultivating landlord cease to have that ownership element of the land and the cultivating tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes the owner thereof. This is unquestionable. That very moment landlord-tenant relationship as understood in common law or Transfer of Property Act comes to an end. The link and chain is broken. The absent non-cultivating landlord cease to have that ownership element of the land and the cultivating tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes the owner thereof. This is unquestionable. The landlord from the date of statuary sale is only entitled to receive the purchase price as determined by the Tribunal under section 32-G. In other words, the landlord ceases to be landlord and the tenant becomes the owner of the land and comes in direct contract with the State. Without any act of transfer inter vivos the title of the landlord is extinguished and is created simultaneously in the tenant making the tenant the deemed purchaser. It is an admitted position that on April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the landlord and Janardhan was the tenant. Tarachand landlord was under no disability as envisaged by section 32-F. Therefore, on April 1, 1957 Janardhan became deemed purchaser and Mr. Lalit could not controvert this position." 4. In view of the legal position propounded by the Supreme Court, the reasoning stated by the authorities in the impugned orders cannot be accepted. None of the reasons stated by the landlord can be accepted. In view of the above discussion, all the orders impugned in the writ petition have to be set aside and the matter has to be remanded back to the original authority viz. Additional Tahsildar A.L.T. Karvir, District Kolhapur. The said authority is directed to consider all the contentions of the parties which may be raised before the authorities and application under section 32-G of the petitioner has to be considered afresh and decided within six months from today, according to law. Petition is accordingly allowed. Rule made absolute in the above terms. There shall be no costs. Record and proceedings be sent back to the authorities. Petition allowed. -----