ORDER R.S. Garg, J. 1. By this revision petition, the petitioner challenges the correctness, validity and propriety of the order dated 27.9.96, passed by the Additional District Judge, Sakti (election tribunal constituted under Section 20 of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961) in Election Petition No. 8/95. 2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the present revision petition are that election for the Councillor was held on 27.11.94, the election was notified on 5.12.94 in which the present applicant was declared as returned candidate from Ward No. 14. An election petition was filed by non-applicant no. 1 before the Additional District Judge, Sakti challenging the election of the applicant. The said petition was filed on 6.1.95 i.e. on 32nd day from the notification of the elections. The non-applicant no. 1 to bring the election petition within limitation, moved an application under section 5 of Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay and extension of time. The application was opposed by the present applicant on various grounds. The learned Addl. District Judge, after recording the evidence came to the conclusion that the delay was unavoidable and deserved to be condoned. It accordingly condoned the delay. Being dissatisfied by the said order, the applicant has preferred this revision petition. 3. Shri Rajiv Shrivastava, learned counsel for the applicant submits that election petition is required to be filed under Section 20 of the Act and if the same is not filed within 30 days from the date on which such election was notified, the election petition being in competent is liable to be rejected. He submits that Section 23 of M.P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') provides the procedure to be followed in disposal of election petition. Referring to Section 355, he submits that the State Govt. may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act. Election petition rules were framed by the State Govt. in the year 1962, known as M.P. Municipalities Election Petition Rules, 1962, and the said rules read with Section 20 and 23 shall provide & complete code for presentation of trial and disposal of the election petition, therefore, provisions of Section 5 Limitation Act would not be applicable. He submits that the District Judge or the Add. in the year 1962, known as M.P. Municipalities Election Petition Rules, 1962, and the said rules read with Section 20 and 23 shall provide & complete code for presentation of trial and disposal of the election petition, therefore, provisions of Section 5 Limitation Act would not be applicable. He submits that the District Judge or the Add. District Judge is not a Civil Court, but in fact are the authorities appointed under the Act for the purposes of disposal of the election petitions, therefore, they being persona designate cannot apply the provisions of Section 5 Limitation Act when provisions for condonation of delay or extension of time has not been provided either under the Municipalities Act or under the Rules. 4. On the other hand, Shri Kostha, learned counsel for the non-applicant no. 1 submits that in view of the language of Section 29 of Indian Limitation Act, the provisions of Section 5 Limitation Act shall apply to an election petition and the Court below was absolutely justified in condoning the delay finding that there was a sufficient cause. 5. The order passed by the learned Court below does not show that the question regarding applicability of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act was ever raised before the lower Court, but as the question goes to the very root of the jurisdiction of the election tribunal, it can be raised at any point of time. Section 20 of the Municipalities Act, 1961 reads as under: Election Petitions- (1) No election or selection under this Act be called into question except by a petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Section 20 of the Municipalities Act, 1961 reads as under: Election Petitions- (1) No election or selection under this Act be called into question except by a petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this Section. (2) Such petition may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 22- (a) by any candidate at such election or selection; or (b) (i) in the case of an election of a Councillor, by any voter of the ward concerned; (ii) in the case of a (nomination) of Councillor; by any Councillor; to the District Judge, where such election or selection is held within the revenue district in which the Court of the District Judge is situate, and in any other case, to the Additional District Judge having permanent seat of his Court within the revenue district in which such election or selection is held and if there be more than one such Additional District Judge with the said revenue district, to such one of them as the District Judge may specify for the purpose (here-in-after such District Judge or Additional District Judge referred to as Judge). (3) No petition presented under sub-section (2) shall be admitted unless - (i) it is presented within thirty days from the date on which the result of such election or selection was notified in the Gazette; and (ii) It is accompanied by a Government Treasury receipt showing a deposit of two hundred rupees, in the case of (election or nomination to Municipal Councils) and one hundred rupees in the case of (election or nomination to Nagar Panchayats). (4) A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition- (a) Where the petitioner, in addition to claiming a declaration that the election or selection, as the case may be, of all or any of the returned candidates is void, claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected or selected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates and (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition. (5) An election petition shall- (a) contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) set forth with sufficient particulars, the ground or grounds on which the election or selection is called in question; (c) be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), for the verification of pleadings. 6. According to sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Municipalities Act, no petition presented under sub-section (2) shall be admitted unless it is presented within thirty days from the date on which the result of such election was notified in the Gazette. Admittedly result of the election of the returned candidate was notified on 5.12.94. The day on which election was notified has to be excluded when the limitation of 30 days is counted. Counting remaining 26 days of December and 4 days of January, 95, the petition ought to have been filed on or before 4.1.95. As the phraseology used in sub-section (3) is "it is presented within 30 days, "if the words have been 30 days from the date of notification;, then the petition probably could have been filed on 5th, but the word 'within' would clearly show that whatever is required to be done, has to be done within a period of 30 days. In the matter of Satyayatamma vs. Padmavatamma A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 30 the Court has observed that the word 'within' whether legally or otherwise, can only mean at any time before the fixed date. The word 'within' means 'on or before'. The term pre-supposes the existence of a right in the person to do something on or before the date so fixed. 7. In the matter of (H.H. Raja) Harinder Singh vs. S. Karnail Singh and others A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 271, the Supreme Court considering the words "not later on 14 days" held that the phrase would mean the same thing as "within a period of 14 days". The word within a week, a month, fifteen days, fourteen days have been interpreted by almost every Court to mean that a particular thing has to be done on or before the said date. The word within a week, a month, fifteen days, fourteen days have been interpreted by almost every Court to mean that a particular thing has to be done on or before the said date. The Courts are also of the opinion that the word 'within..........' should mean the exclusion of the date of the occurrence as otherwise it would be taking into consideration of a day and calculate limitation from the previous day. The date of declaration of the result therefore, to be excluded. When certain time is allowed for doing an act, the last day of that time is included for the purpose of performing that act. If on such last day, the office or Court is closed, then the first day after re-opening will be considered the last day for the purpose of performing the act. 8. In the matter of Dasrulal Bhagchand Lal vs. Narayan Mahadeo and others A.I.R. 1937 Nag. 105, the words 'within one month' were interpreted to mean as the period not beyond one month. If that is so, the petition was required to be filed on 4.1.95. The petition filed on 6.1.95, apparently was beyond the prescribed period of limitation. 9. Section 23 of the Act provides as under- Procedure to be followed in disposal of election petition An election petition shall be enquired into and disposed of according to such summary procedure as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act. 10. Exercising the powers under Section 355 read with Section 23 and in supersession of all rules previously made on the subject, the State Government made UP. Municipalities (Election Petition) Rules 1962. Rule 3 provides that copy of the election petition is to be served on each respondent, according to Rule 4 if there are more than one election petitioner in relation to one election, the presiding Judge may enquire into the petitions either in one or more proceedings as he shall think fit. Rule 5 provides for the procedure. It clearly provides that subject to the provisions of the Act or of the Rules, every election petition shall be enquired into by the Judge, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of the suits. Rule 5 provides for the procedure. It clearly provides that subject to the provisions of the Act or of the Rules, every election petition shall be enquired into by the Judge, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of the suits. Under Rule 6, the parties are required to produce their witnesses and rule 7 permits that election petition cannot be withdrawn without the leave of the Judge. If an application for withdrawal Is made, what procedure is to be adopted by the trying Judge is given in Rule 7. According to Rule 8, an election petition may abate. Rule 11 provides that what shall be the powers of a Judge for purposes of enquiring into such petitions. Rule 5 read with rule 11 would show that what procedure is to be adopted in exercise of the particular powers of the Judge. According to Rule 11, the Judge trying the election petition shall have the powers in respect of the particular matters well described in Rule 11. Rule 12 provides that provisions of the Indian Evidence Act shall be applicable to the trial of the election petition. Rule 15 provides that any appearance, application or act before the Judge may be made or done by the party in person or by a pleader or a recognised agent duly appointed to act on his behalf. Rule 16 provides that if election or selection is declared void, the Judge may either declare that a casual vacancy has been created or that the petitioner or any other candidate has been duly elected or selected. Rule 19 provides that no petition by way of revision shall lie against an interlocutory order passed by the Judge. 11. The question for consideration now would be whether the present petition, in view of bar contained under Rule 19, would be maintainable or not. Rule 19 provides that no revision shall lie against an interlocutory order. The word 'interlocutory order' has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the matter of Amar Nath vs. State of Haryana A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2185 while considering the provisions of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a word used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. The word 'interlocutory order' has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the matter of Amar Nath vs. State of Haryana A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2185 while considering the provisions of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a word used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. The Supreme Court further observed that it merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. "But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court." 12. In Vol. 22 of the third Ed. of Halsbury'r, Laws of England at page 742, it has been stated in para 1606 that "a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another, or final as to part. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required." In general, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed 'final'. An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed 'interlocutory'. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals." 13. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals." 13. (a) In the matter of S. Kuppuswami Rao vs. King A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 1 it was observed by the Court that if their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute think that for the purpose of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory." 14. In the matter of Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 47 the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, observed that- On the one hand, the Legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and on the other it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation, it appears to us that the real intention of the Legislature was not to equate the expression 'interlocutory order' as invariably being converse to the words 'final order'. There may be an order passed during the course of a procedure which may not final in the since noticed in Kuppuswami's case (supra), but yet it may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction we think that bar in sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders and it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders. It is neither advisable, nor possible to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types or orders which will fall in between the two. 15. The test, therefore, would be if the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on. 15. The test, therefore, would be if the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on. The finality of an order is not to be judged by co-relating that order when the controversy in the matter viz. whether the action shall remain alive would be irrelevant. 16. Applying the above tests, if Rule 19 is read in its true perspective, it would show that a revision shall not lie against any interlocutory order which does not decide the rights of the parties nor is an order of the moment. If the order partakes the characteristics of an order which decides the rights of the parties regarding the action and if the reversion of the said order would culminate or terminate the action, then such an order is not an interlocutory order because it really decides the rights of the parties on the moment, at the moment. It cannot be disputed that if the delay in filing particular proceedings is not condoned or if the delay is condoned and the orders reversed by the revisional Court, then the action would come to an end. In Section 19 the word 'interlocutory order' has not to be read to mean that every order which is passed intermediately during the period of the filing of the petition till its final decision under Rule 16. When the rights of the parties are affected by such an order, then the order cannot be termed to be an interlocutory order. In view of the above discussion, this Court has no hesitation in holding that a revision petition filed by the present petitioner is maintainable. 17. The provisions of Sections 20 and 23 of the Act so also the election petition rules do not provide that an election petition can be filed beyond the period of 30 days from the date on which the election was notified to the gazette. The question, therefore, now to be considered is whether delay in filing the election petition can condoned under Section 5 Limitation Act. The question, therefore, now to be considered is whether delay in filing the election petition can condoned under Section 5 Limitation Act. The question as to whether the jurisdiction is as a persona designata or not should not detain this Court much because in Babulal vs. Dattatraya & others 1971 M.P.L.J. 765, a Full Bench of this Court has already observed that the jurisdiction conferred on the District Judge under the Section is as the Presiding Officer of an established Court and not as a persona designate and consequently it is open for him to act in exercise of its general powers under Section 7 of the M.P. Civil Courts Act. 18. Section 5, Limitation Act reads as under- Extention of prescribed period in certain cases Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation - The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may Be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. 19. Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act reads as under- 29. Savings -(1) Nothing in this Act shall effect section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872(9 of 1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period where the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law. (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law. (4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of 'easement' in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882) may for the time being extend. 20. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 clearly provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. When a limitation shorter than the one prescribed under the schedule of the Limitation Act is prescribed by any special or local law, then in view of the special or local law, the schedule would stand accordingly amended. For the purposes of application of Section 5, the Court must be satisfied that the proceedings are of a Judicial nature, that such proceedings are pending before a Court, that a period has been prescribed for institution of such proceedings and the proceedings are of civil nature as required under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure if the matter is instituted before a Civil Court. 21. In the matter of K. Venkateshwara Rao and another vs. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi and others A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 872, the Supreme Court observed that an analysis of the provisions of the Representation of People Act would be sufficient to show that the trial of an election petition is not the same as the trial of a suit. The Supreme Court was considering the question of addition of a necessary party which was not joined within the limitation for filing petition. The Supreme Court was considering the question of addition of a necessary party which was not joined within the limitation for filing petition. The Supreme Court observed that limitation act cannot apply to proceedings like election petition inasmuch as the Representation of the People Act is a complete and self-contained Code which does not admit of the introduction of the principles or the provisions of law contained in the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court further observed that for the purpose of filing the petition on the re-opening day of the Court, the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 may not apply but provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act would apply to a petition. 22. In the matter of Hukumdev Narain Yadav vs. Lalit Narain Mishra A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 480, the Supreme Court has observed as under- Even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would none-the-less be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of the provisions of the special law or the nature of the subject matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. What the Court has to see is whether the scheme of the special law and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete Code. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the special Act. The provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act that a suit is instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed are provided for in Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act which gives a peremptory command that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Sections 81, 82 or 117. If for non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 82 and 117 which are mandatory, the election petition has to be dismissed under Section 86(1) the presentation of election petition within the period prescribed in Section 81 would be equally mandatory, the non-compliance with which visits the penalty of the petition being dismissed. If for non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 82 and 117 which are mandatory, the election petition has to be dismissed under Section 86(1) the presentation of election petition within the period prescribed in Section 81 would be equally mandatory, the non-compliance with which visits the penalty of the petition being dismissed. Though Parliament has made certain amendments in Section 8 of the Act in 1969, it has not considered it necessary till now to amend the Act to confer, on persons challenging an election, benefits similar to those available to them under the proviso to the repealed Section 85 of the Act, for it did not want delays to occur in the disposal of election petitions in the past. Hence the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern the filing of election petitions of their trial. 23. From the judgment of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to an election petition to be presented under Representation of People Act. In the case in hands Section 20 sub-section (3) provides that no petition presented under sub-section (2) shall be admitted, unless it is presented within thirty days from the date on which the result of such election or selection was notified in the Gazette. The statutory command given in Section 20 sub-section (3) is that the Election Tribunal shall not admit a petition, if the same is not filed within the period of limitation. In other words, it can be said that the Election Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the mandatory provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 20. When the provisions are mandatory and the same have not been complied with, then the non-compliance would lead to termination of the action. Election petition which is not filed within the period of limitation as provided under the Act, if cannot be admitted because of the mandate contained in the statute itself, then no further steps in the matter can be taken by the Tribunal/Judge and the necessary corollary would be that the same has to be dismissed. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Hukumdev Narayan (supra), I hold that provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act do not govern the filing of election petitions or their trial. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Hukumdev Narayan (supra), I hold that provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act do not govern the filing of election petitions or their trial. Though by virtue of section 29 Limitation Act certain provisions of Limitation Act can be made applicable to the said enactments, if the said provisions are not expressly excluded in the special enactment, but there is no scope for applying Section 5 Limitation Act to an election petition. If the intention of the Legislature was to apply the said provisions of Section 4 to 24 inclusive' the provisions of Limitation, non-addition of the words "subject the provisions of Limitation Act" would clearly show that the Legislature in its wisdom has clearly excluded the application of the provisions of Section 5 Limitation Act to an election petition, filed under Section 20 of the Municipalities Act. 24. Sections 20 and 23 of the Act read with election petition rules are complete and self-contained code and do not admit of introduction of the principles of provision of law contained in Limitation Act, Section 5 Limitation Act would, therefore, have no application to an election petition filed under Municipalities Act. 25. In the opinion of this Court, the Court below was not justified in applying the principles of Section 5, Indian Limitation Act. When the provisions of Section 5, Limitation Act are not applicable, then the question of sufficiency of the cause would not arise for consideration. In view of my findings that section 5, Limitation Act does not apply to an election petition filed under the Act, I am not required to consider as to whether there was sufficiency of cause or not for filing the election petition beyond the period of limitation. 26. The revision deserved to and is accordingly allowed. The order dated 27.2.1996, passed by the Court below is set aside. The election petition deserves to and is accordingly dismissed, as barred by limitation. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed