Judgment : This revision is directed against the Order dated 110. 1996 in C.A.No.131 of 1994 on the file of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Villupuram dismissing the appeal and confirming the confiscation of the vehicle by the order of confiscating authority under Sec. 14(4) of the Prohibition Act. 2. On 111. 1993 at about 22.30 hours at Koothakudi Cross Road, on Kallakurichi Thiyagadurgam Main Road, the Inspector of Police, Kallakurichi and his party intercepted the Ashok Leyland lorry bearing Registration No.T.M.J. 3357 and seized 21 iron barrels, each containing of 200 liters of rectified spirit, all totalling of 4200 liters. The petitioner-Natarajan was arrested and the contraband with the lorry were seized. In this connection a case was registered in Crime No.2752 of 1993 under Sec.4 (1-A) T.N.P.Act (Transport) read with 5,6 and 11 of T.W.R.S Rules. The petitioner gave a statement that he was the owner of the said lorry. The arrested accused Mr.Natarajan, revealed on interrogation that he is the owner of the said lorry. During the course of investigation, it was disclosed that under the directions and instructions of the petitioner, the other persons like driver and two other persons transported the rectified spirit illegally. During the pendency of the investigation, on the basis of the report sent by the Inspector of Police, the confiscating authority viz., The Superintendent of Police, Prohibition and Enforcement wing sent show cause notice to the petitioner on 30.6.94 informing about the proposed action for the confiscation of the vehicle. On 7. 1994 the petitioner received the show cause notice and sent a reply on 17. 1994. Intimation giving the opportunity of personal hearing was also given to him. In pursuance of that, he appeared in person on 18. 1994 and made his statement. On consideration of the materials produced by the police and the written reply and submission made by the petitioner, the confiscating authority viz., the Superintendent of Police, Prohibition and Enforcement wing, passed an order confiscating the vehicle by giving option to the petitioner to pay the amount of Rs.1 lakh being the present approximate market value of the said lorry in lieu of its confiscation. This order was made on 20.8,1994. 3. After this confiscation, the Inspector of Police filed the charge sheet before the court against the petitioner and others. This order was made on 20.8,1994. 3. After this confiscation, the Inspector of Police filed the charge sheet before the court against the petitioner and others. In the meantime, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Court and raised several submissions. However, Sessions Court dismissed the appeal by confirming the order of confiscation. Being aggrieved of this, the present action has been resorted to, by the petitioner by filing this revision before this court. 4. Mr.Amarnath, counsel for the petitioner mainly attacked the order of the Appellate Authority, confirming the order of confiscation by the confiscating authority on the ground that the prosecution which was launched against the petitioner was ended in acquittal by the Assistant Sessions Court, Villupuram by order dated 8. 1995 in S.C.No.98 of 1994 and that therefore, the order of the Appellate Authority, confirming the confisfaction order does not have legs to stand and therefore, both the orders passed by the authorities concerned are liable to be set aside. 5. The substantiate this proposition, the counsel for the petitioner cited two authorities viz., Muthu Pandian v. State, 1993 M.L.J. (Crl.) 713 and Abdul Jabar v. State by Inspector of Police, 1994 M.L.J. (Crl.) 567. These authorities would relate to discretionary powers of the Magistrate under Sec.452, Cr.P.C. after conclusion of trial, No doubt, it is true that since the word may is found in Sec.452, Cr.P.C. this Court held that the confiscation is not a compulsory one. But this judgment would not be of any use to the petitioner’s case as this case stands on a different footing. 6. In this case we are not concerned with the powers of the Court with reference to Sec.452, Cr.P.C. after conclusion of trial. We are only concerned with the power of confiscation as contemplated under Sec. 14(4) of the Prohibition Act. The question to be decided is merely because the trial Court acquitted the accused, whether the order of the Appellate Court confirming the order of confiscation could be set aside. 7. It is relevant to note at this stage that the confiscating authority passed the confiscation order on 20.8.1994. It is brought to my notice by the counsel for the petitioner that the prosecution case ended in acquittal by order dated 8. 1995. 7. It is relevant to note at this stage that the confiscating authority passed the confiscation order on 20.8.1994. It is brought to my notice by the counsel for the petitioner that the prosecution case ended in acquittal by order dated 8. 1995. Therefore, we have to see whether there is any relevance for considering the acquittal judgment in the matter while going through the reasonings given by the confiscating authority for confiscating the vehicle. To answer this question, some of the judgments as pointed out by Mr.Elango, Government Advocate would be of very useful. The first judgment is Swerpujanraj I. Lim-itedv. Collector of Customs, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 845 in which it has been held as follows: “A distinction must at once be drawn between an action in rem-and a proceeding in personam..... The point to note is that so far as the confisfaction of the goods is concerned, it is a proceeding in remand the penalty is enforced against the goods whether the offender is known or not known, the order of confisfaction under Sec.182, Sea Customs Act, operates directly upon the status of the property and under Sec.184 transfers an absolute title to Government” .8. The second judgment is K.Nagabhusan v. State, 1996 Crl.L.J. 658 It has been held in that decision as follows: .“Sec.6 of the Act contemplates an independent proceeding of confiscation connected with taking cognizance of an offence framing of charge and trial thereof. Therefore, even the collector drops confiscation proceedings. Provisions of Sec.6-A it will have no effect on criminal proceedings. Provisions of Sec.6-A are not in Pari materia with Sec.7. The two proceedings only stand on different places.” .9. In Divisional Forest Officer v. G: V.Sudhakar Rao 1986 Crl.L.J. 357: A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 328 while dealing with the provisions under the Forest Act, the Apex Court has held as follows: .“They further held that merely because there was an acquittal of the accused in the trial before the Magistrate due to paucity of evidence or otherwise did not necessarily entail in nullifying the order of confiscation of the seized timber or forest produced by the Authorised Officer under Sub-Sec.(2-A) of Sec.44 of the Act based on his satisfaction that a forest offence had been committed in respect thereof.” 10. In the light of the above proposition laid down by the Apex Court and also the High Court, I am not able to persuade myself to accept the contention urged by the counsel for the petitioner that the confiscation order is liable to be set aside in view of the acquittal order passed by the trial Court. 11. Under Sec.13-A of the Act, whenever an offence in relation to liquor has been committed, which is punishable under this Act or the Rules made thereunder the vehicle which is used for carrying the same shall be liable to be confiscated. Under the proviso to Sec.13-A of the Act, the confiscation cannot be done, if the owner of the vehicle had no reason to believe that such an offence was being or likely to be committed. 12. Sec.14 of the Act deals with, a question as to how the confiscation is being done. Under Sec. 14(1) of the Act, irrespective of the fact, whether the offender is convicted or acquitted, if the Court decides that anything is liable to confiscation, such confiscation shall be ordered by the Court. 13. Under Sec. 14(4) of the Act, if the confiscating authority is satisfied that an offence has been committed against this Act and whether or not a prosecution is justified for such offence, he may without prejudice to any other punishment to which the offender is liable under this Act, order confiscation of such vehicle used for the commission of the crime. 14. Under Proviso to Sec. 14(4) of the Act, before passing an order of confiscation, the owner of the vehicle shall be given a notice in writing informing him on the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the vehicle and he should be given an opportunity to make a representation in writing against the grounds of confiscation and lastly to give a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. .15. These Sections of the Act would reveal, the details of the procedures to be followed before ordering confiscation. .15. These Sections of the Act would reveal, the details of the procedures to be followed before ordering confiscation. Therefore, in the light of the section in which it is stated that if the confiscating authority is satisfied that an offence has been committed against this Act in respect of the vehicle and whether or not a prosecution is justified for such offence, he may without prejudice to any other punishment to which the offender is liable under this Act, order confiscation. Therefore, this Court is only called upon to decide whether the order passed by the confiscating authority is correct or not, in the sense to see whether the opportunities provided under Sec.14(4) of the Act have been given to the owner of the vehicle before passing the order of confiscation. In this case, as indicated earlier, the petitioner was arrested when he was in the lorry, even at the time when the lorry and the contraband were seized under the mahazar in which the petitioner also signed. On the basis of the report of the Inspector of Police, the confiscating authority sent show cause notice to which the petitioner also sent a reply. Further more, the opportunity of personal hearing was also given by sending intimation to the petitioner. On receipt the same, the petitioner came and appeared before the Confiscating Authority and explained his case. Since the Confiscating Authority was satisfied with the materials produced by the Inspector of Police, the Authority ordered confiscation of the vehicle and further it gave an option to the petitioner to pay the market value of the vehicle in lieu to pay the market value of the vehicle in lieu of confiscation. In the light of the word contained in Sec. 14(4) of the Act stating that whether the prosecution is justified or not, I am of the view the acquittal order passed by the trial Court would not in any way vitiated the findings given by the confiscating authority since it was satisfied that the offence has been committed in respect of the vehicle. Of course, on the basis of the materials produced before the trial court by the prosecution, trial Court might have found that there are no sufficient materials to hold that the petitioner had committed an offence beyond doubt. Of course, on the basis of the materials produced before the trial court by the prosecution, trial Court might have found that there are no sufficient materials to hold that the petitioner had committed an offence beyond doubt. But that would not entitle for the petitioner to say before the confiscating authority or before the Appellate Authority that acquittal order passed by the trial Court would automatically disentitle the authorities concerned from confiscating the vehicle. Further more, the proceedings under confiscation is entirely different from the proceedings in trial as held in various authorities as indicated above. Therefore, I am of the view that the order of the confiscating author-ity, confirmed by the Appellate Authority is sustainable in law and there is no infirmity as such. 16. In the result, revision is dismissed.