JUDGMENT 1. - This special appeal has been filed by Dr. S. D. Kapoor, a retired Professor and Head of the English Department impugning a judgment and order dated 10th September, 1996 as passed by a learned single Judge of our Court in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2017 of 1996 dismissing his writ application. In the said writ application he challenged an order dated 29.6.1996 passed by the Chancellor nominating one Dr. S. L. Verma, a retired Professor, Department of Political Science of the University of Rajasthan as the Chancellor's nominee in the Syndicate of the Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur with effect from 28.6.1996 for a period of three years in supersession of his earlier order dated 15.9.1995 by which the writ petitioner-appellant Dr. S. D. Kapoor was made the Chancellor's nominee for a period of three years. 2. The contention of the writ petitioner-appellant is that one Educationist is nominated by the Chancellor as a Member of the Syndicate under Section 16(l)(iv) of the Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur Act and under sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act, such a Member of the Syndicate so nominated holds office for a period of three years. It was submitted by the writ petitioner-appellant that the communication dated 29th June, 1996 (Annex. 2) was ex-facie illegal, in as much as, the power of the Chancellor to nominate a Member of the Syndicate stood exhausted with the nomination being made in his favour. Thereafter, the Chancellor becomes functus officio in the matter of nomination. As per the provisions of Section 16 (i)(iv) of the Act, the Chancellor thereafter is left with no power whatsover till the term fixed by Section 16(2) of the Act is over. Hence, his nomination which was so done by an order dated 15th September, 1995 could not be superseded by the subsequent order dated 29th June, 1996 and the latter order would he treated as inefficacious and incapable of being exercised. That apart, it was contended that the communication of the subsequent order dated 29th June, 1996 nominating Dr. S. L. Verma as the Chancellor's nominee was in complete violation of sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act. inasmuch as, the said provision of the statute fixed the term of the Member of Syndicate, whether nominated or elected, to be three years. S. L. Verma as the Chancellor's nominee was in complete violation of sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act. inasmuch as, the said provision of the statute fixed the term of the Member of Syndicate, whether nominated or elected, to be three years. The writ petitioner appellant having been appointed as a Member of the Syndicate by nomination fora period of three years, this period of three years could not be curtailed by the Chancellor. 3. It was contended by the writ petitioner appellant that assuming without admitting that the Chancellor having nominated the writ petitioner-appellant as a Member of the Syndicate had the power to remove him therefrom, such power could not be exercised arbitrarily. The communication as impugned did not refer to any reason and there was none available and the communication was thus ex-facie arbitrary so as to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. It was further contended that after being nominated as a Member of the Syndicate, the writ petitioner-appellant did not remain the slave to the Chancellor, who nominated him. The Chancellor had no power under the law to dictate term to him as a Member of the Syndicate even though the Chancellor has nominated him. He was not a tool in the hands of the Chancellor Once nominated he was a Member of the Syndicate and he has to act in his own wisdom and in the interests of the University, In this, view of the matter, the Chancellor could not arbitrarily bring to an end his three years term by nominal another person in his place. 5. It was further contended that the writ petitioner-appellant having been nominated for a period of three years as a Member or the Syndicate and having chosen to accept the said nomination, he could not be removed in this arbitrary fashion. Had he been given any idea the nomination could be taken away or snatched at the dictates of the Chancellor, he would certainly not have accepted such nomination. He having altered his position subsequent to the nomination on the implicit promise given to him that he would continue as a Member of the Syndicate for a period of three years, the respondent-Chancellor was estopped from disturbing him from the continuity of the nomination for a period of three years. 6. He having altered his position subsequent to the nomination on the implicit promise given to him that he would continue as a Member of the Syndicate for a period of three years, the respondent-Chancellor was estopped from disturbing him from the continuity of the nomination for a period of three years. 6. That apart, his appointment as a Member of the Syndicate by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act has created in him a legitimate expectation that he would continue to hold the office of the Membership of the Syndicate for three years and it could not be vitiated by an executive fiat in the manner it has been so done. That apart, if an action of this nature was allowed to stand, then the high office of the Member of the Syndicate would be rendered to a ridiculous situation. No responsible, self respecting and sensible man would ever like to accept such an office of being a nominated Member of the Syndicate being so nominated the Chancellor. All acts made by the Chancellor should serve public interest anything which was contrary to such public interest could not be permitted to be done. Hence, the subsequent nomination in favour of Dr. S. L. Verma ought to be struck down. 7. It was further contended that the impugned communication purported to put writ petitioner appellant to state of disrepute since it tends to create an impression that he had not proved - himself worthy of the Membership of the Syndicate. The communication was, therefore, arbitrary and also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was further contended that his appointment by nomination as a Member of the Syndicate conferred on him the right to bold office for three years and it was in a way fixed term appointment for three years. When a fixed term appointment was curtailed, it could not hut he deemed to be penal in character and no person could be subjected to a penal action without being afforded an opportunity to show that he did not deserve to be subjected to such a penal action. Since the impugned communication divested him of his right to continue in office in breach of the principles of natural justice, the impugned communication dated 26.9.1996 must fail on this ground. 8. Since the impugned communication divested him of his right to continue in office in breach of the principles of natural justice, the impugned communication dated 26.9.1996 must fail on this ground. 8. The writ petitioner-appellant accordingly prayed before the learned single Judge for an appropriate writ, order or direction so that the impugned communication dated 29.6.1996 (Annex. 2) might be declared to be invalid and might be quashed and in the meantime, the said communication be stayed. The writ petitioner-appellant prayed for any other appropriate writ, order or direction as may be considered apposite in the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. In the reply filed on behalf of the Chancellor, it was submitted that the circumstances which have culminated in the nomination of Dr. S. L. Verma as the Chancellor's nominee in the Syndicate of the University with effect from 28.6.1996 in supersession of the earlier communication dated 15.9.1995 (Annex. 1) which appointed the writ petitioner appellant as the Chancellor's nominee are contained in the concerned file and the said file would be kept ready for the perusal of this Court at the time of bearing. It was submitted that on a perusal of the provisions of Section 16 of the Act, it would unmistakably show that the power of the Chancellor and the power of the State Government to nominate the persons as the Members of the Syndicate as the respective nominees is unfettered and it is open to the Chancellor as well as the State Government to withdraw the nomination already made by them in exercise of that power from time to time as the occasion requires. It was further given out that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act indeed provides that the Members nominated under Clause (iv). and Clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 shall hold office for a period of three years, but the said provision does not in any manner detract from the power of the Chancellor and the State Government to withdraw the nomination already made by them. It was further given out that the nomination in favour of Dr. S. L. Verma as the Chancellor's nominee in place of the writ petitioner-appellant was valid and the reasons as contended by the writ petitioner-appellant for setting-aside and/or quashing of the same were wrong and untenable. It was further given out that the nomination in favour of Dr. S. L. Verma as the Chancellor's nominee in place of the writ petitioner-appellant was valid and the reasons as contended by the writ petitioner-appellant for setting-aside and/or quashing of the same were wrong and untenable. It was further submitted that the power of the Chancellor to nominate a Member of the Syndicate did not stand exhausted with the nomination once being made within a span of 3 years. The provisions of Section 16(l)(iv) of the Act empowered the Chancellor to nominate an Educationist as a Member of the Syndicate of the University. It does not get exhausted after its exercise and the Chancellor is entitled to exercise such power from time to lime by virtue of the provisions of Section 15 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 and as and when `occasion requires'. 10. It was further submitted that this Court in (i) D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 530 of 1996 Dr. Irfan Mehar v. State of Rajasthan, (ii) D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 777 of 1996 Miss Shruti Goyal v. State of Rajasthan (iii) D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 647 of 1996 Ramesh Joshi v. State of Rajasthan (iv) D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 821 of 1996 Dr. Smt. Aruna B. Kumar v. State of Rajasthan and (v) D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 866 of 1996 Dr. Anupama Gaur v. State of Rajasthan issued the following directions amongst other to the University:- "(1) the prevailing system of adhocism in appointments stands deprecated and we mandate upon the University to make regular appointments in respect of the sanctioned posts by August 31, 1996 positively. The selection process may be commenced within a fortnight hereof." In compliance of the above mandate, the University commenced the process of selection for making regular appointments to the sanctioned teaching posts. The Selection Committees held selections in the month of June, 1996 in compliance of the above directions and the Vice-Chancellor fixed the meeting of the Syndicate on 25th June, 1996 for considering and approving the recommendations sent to the Syndicate by the various Selection Committee in sealed covers. The Selection Committees held selections in the month of June, 1996 in compliance of the above directions and the Vice-Chancellor fixed the meeting of the Syndicate on 25th June, 1996 for considering and approving the recommendations sent to the Syndicate by the various Selection Committee in sealed covers. The Vice-Chancellor of the University apart-from sending formal communication to all the Members of the Syndicate including the writ petitioner-appellant, requested the writ petitioner-appellant on telephone several times and obtained his confirmation on 24.6.1996 for attending the said meeting of the Syndicate. Despite this request, the writ petitioner appellant deliberately did not attend the meeting of the Syndicate on 25.6.1996 and consequently, there was no quorum and the meeting of the Syndicate which was very necessary for compliance of the mandate of the High Court could not be held for want of quorum on 25.6.1996. The concerned file containing the satisfaction of the Chancellor would be kept ready for perusal of the Court. The Secretary to the respondent communicated the order of the Chancellor to the University as also to Dr. S. L. Verma. The said order as submitted above was made in exercise of the power of the Chancellor under Section 16( 1 )(iv) of the Act in the interest of the University and also in public interest. A perusal of the facts and circumstances would leave no manner of doubt that the order passed by the Chancellor was neither arbitrary and capricious nor was it unreasonable nor in any manner violative of Section 16 of the Act nor contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the Chancellor did not become functus officio in the matter of nomination and he was entitled to supersede the earlier nomination in favour of the writ petitioner-appellant and nominate any other Educationist in his place as the Chancellor's nominee in the Syndicate of the University. The submission of the writ petitioner-appellant that he having been nominated as a Member of the Syndicate for a period of three years, 'this period cannot be curtailed by the Chancellor', is wholly untenable and wrong. The power conferred upon the Chancellor is unfettered and could be exercised by him from time to time as the occasion required and the exercise of the power by the Chancellor from time to time could not be assailed on any ground whatsoever. The power conferred upon the Chancellor is unfettered and could be exercised by him from time to time as the occasion required and the exercise of the power by the Chancellor from time to time could not be assailed on any ground whatsoever. The submission of the writ petitioner-appellant that assuming that the Chancellor has the power to remove the nominated Member, nevertheless the power cannot be exercised arbitrarily', is absolutely vague, wrong and untenable and was denied Likewise, the submission of the writ petitioner appellant that since `the communication does not refer to any reason and there is none available even otherwise, the communication is ex-facie arbitrary so as to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India', was clearly wrong untenable and misconceived and was denied. The Chancellor was not required by any law to assign any reason for exercising the power which the Legislature has in its wisdom conferred upon him without any limitation. The reason for conferring such power upon the Chancellor is not far to seek The Chancellor being also the Head of the State is far removed from and is above the day to day party politics. He by virtue of the high officer held by him has been rightly entrusted with the power of nomination of an Educationist for ensuring smooth progress and growth of the University a centre of learning and scholarship. 11. Section 18 of the General Clauses Act empowered an appointing authority to remove the person appointed by it and such power virtue of the provisions of Section 15 of the said Act could be exercised from time to time by such an authority. The Chancellor on coming to know about the deliberate dereliction of duty on the part of the writ petitioner appellant was entitled to take a very serious view of the matter and he owned it to the University to supersede the writ petitioner appellant's nomination and make a fresh nomination in favour of respondent No. 3 - Dr S.L. Verma to save the meetings of the Syndicate from being frustrated in future by the irresponsible functioning of the writ petitioner appellant as his nominee. Accordingly, the Chancellor superseded the writ petitioner appellant's nomination in lire Syndicate in the interest of the University and for interest. 12. Accordingly, the Chancellor superseded the writ petitioner appellant's nomination in lire Syndicate in the interest of the University and for interest. 12. As far as the provisions of Section 16 of the Act are concerned, suffice it to say that the matter of nomination under Section 16(1) (iv) of the Act was entirely a matter of subjective discretion of the Chancellor and the Legislature, has in its wisdom made the Chancellor the sole repository of that power capable of being exercised by him as and when the occasion arises and the duration of the office of his nominee mentioned in sub-section (2) of the Section 16 of the Act cannot be allowed to detract the exercise of the said power by the Chancellor. The nominee does not and cannot acquire any right in the office 10 which he has been nominated for which he could act detrimental to the very power of nomination. The communication as per Annexure-2 was not, therefore, open to challenge on any ground whatsoever. It was specifically denied by the respondent No. 1 that there had been any instance of the Chancellor using the writ petitioner appellant as his tool or slave and the allegations made by the writ petitioner appellant in this context were wholly unwarranted and uncalled for. It was reiterated that the nominee acquired no right to the Membership of the Syndicate to which he has been nominated by the Chancellor and, therefore, the withdrawal of the writ petitioner-appellant's nomination did not violate any of the writ petitioner-appellant's alleged right and did not affect his reputation in any manner whatsoever and it left no stigma. The writ petitioner-appellant could riot be allowed to make any insinuation against the Chancellor expressly or obliquely since not an iota of right accrued to him under his previous nomination. Where the writ petitioner has deliberately avoided die meeting of the Syndicate in total disregard of die interest of the University, lie cannot claim continuity in the office and cannot challenge even a further nomination in supersession to his own. 13. On behalf of the University, a reply was also given pointing out that the writ petitioner-appellant has not impleaded Dr. S. L. Verma, who has been nominated in the Syndicate with effect from 28th June, 1996 for a period of three years. 13. On behalf of the University, a reply was also given pointing out that the writ petitioner-appellant has not impleaded Dr. S. L. Verma, who has been nominated in the Syndicate with effect from 28th June, 1996 for a period of three years. Since the writ petitioner appellant has challenged the validity of the said order of the Chancellor dated 29.6.1996 nominating Dr. S. I. Verma as the nominee of the Chancellor in the Syndicate for a period of three years with effect from 28.6.1996 in supersession of his previous order dated 15.9.1995, the writ application could not he entertained and be heard m die absence of Dr. S. L. Verma nor any interim order staying the operation of his nomination which has already taken effect from 28.6.1996 could he passed in his absence. It was further submitted that the power to withdraw any nomination made under sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act inheres in the Chancellor by virtue of his office and by virtue of the provisions of Section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 and such power could be exercised from time to time. The writ petitioner appellant on account of his nomination by the Chancellor vide order dated 15.9.1995 could not claim any right to continue for three years as his nomination has been withdrawn by the Chancellor. It is only if the Chancellor had not withdrawn his nomination, he could claim to hold the office for a period of three years. It was further submitted that sub-clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act confers similar powers on the Stale Government to nominate two persons in the Syndicate of the University. Notwithstanding the nomination made by the State Government in favour of Shri Narain Singh Bhati, the State Government withdrew his nomination vide order dated 26.2.1993. Even though Shri Narain Singh Bhati challenged the said order of the State Government by filing S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1578 of 1993, this Court did not grant any stay order. 14. Notwithstanding the nomination made by the State Government in favour of Shri Narain Singh Bhati, the State Government withdrew his nomination vide order dated 26.2.1993. Even though Shri Narain Singh Bhati challenged the said order of the State Government by filing S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1578 of 1993, this Court did not grant any stay order. 14. As and when a full-fledged reply was given by the respondent No. 2- University, it was reiterated that the writ petitioner-appellant was informed about the meeting of the Syndicate vide communication dated 17.6.1996, which according to the writ petitioner-appellant, was received by him on 20.6.1996 and the Vice-Chancellor even obtained his confirmation on 24.6.1996 for attending the meeting of the Syndicate fixed on 25.6.1996, but in spite of this, the writ petitioner-appellant deliberately did not attend the meeting of the Syndicate on 25.6.1996 and consequently, there was no quorum in the meeting of the Syndicate and the directions issued by this Court in the judgment dated 19.4.1996 in Dr. Irfan Mehar v.State of Rajasthan and other connected writ petitions could not be complied with despite the fact that the Selection Committees had already finalised the recommendations for making regular appointments to the teaching posts. 15. The writ petitioner-appellant, after filing of the replies by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, tried to justify his failure to attend the meeting of the Syndicate in his rejoinder. He gave out that he was in a position to attend the meeting and that he had no sufficient reason for not attending die meeting of the Syndicate fixed on 25.6.1996. The so called reasons now mentioned by the writ petitioner-appellant in various paras of the rejoinder did not provide the writ petitioner-appellant with any justification whatsoever for not attending the meeting of the Syndicate. He sought to justify his stand contending inter-alia that it would have led to plethora of third party petitions and it would have become impossible to retrieve the situation and there would have been a permanent gulf between the members of the Syndicate and the present incumbent in the office of the Vice-Chancellor and the writ petitioner-appellant might have lost the good will and chance to promote reconciliation. This would have caused serious repercussions in the interests of the University. This would have caused serious repercussions in the interests of the University. Therefore, the writ petitioner-appellant tried to justify his own decision not to attend the meeting by contending it that it was so taken in the interests of the University. In the circumstances then prevailing, it was the bona fide assessment of the writ petitioner-appellant that it would be in the interests of the University to avoid the situation that might have precipitated a discord between the Members and the Vice-Chancellor. The University contended in its reply that the said submissions of the writ petitioner-appellant were not only incorrect, misconceived and untenable, but they were wholly irrelevant and deserved to be ignored altogether. The imputations given by the writ petitioner-appellant that he did not remain the slave of the person nominating him and that the law did not give the power to the Chancellor to dictate the terms to a Member of the Syndicate even if he was nominated by him, were wholly uncalled for and so was his averment that the Chancellor could not arbitrarily bring to an end his term. The writ petitioner-appellant has not made any grievance that the Chancellor had at any lime interfered with his functioning as his nominee in the Syndicate and that being so, his allegations were wholly unjustified besides being incorrect. It was further submitted by the University that a person nominated by the Chancellor to act as his nominee m the Syndicate does not get any right to continue as nominee of the Chancellor for a period of three years and the Chancellor is empowered to withdraw his nomination at any time without assigning any reason. In this view of the matter, there is no question of any implicit promise to the writ petitioner-appellant that he would be continued as the nominee of the Chancellor for a period of three years and the writ petitioner-appellant cannot make any grievance against the supersession of his nomination. The Chancellor is not estopped from superseding the writ petitioner appellant's nomination under the Act. It was further submitted that the facts and circumstances culminating in the suppression of the writ petitioner-appellant clearly established that the supersession was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and it did not violate Section 16 of the Act or Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Chancellor is not estopped from superseding the writ petitioner appellant's nomination under the Act. It was further submitted that the facts and circumstances culminating in the suppression of the writ petitioner-appellant clearly established that the supersession was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and it did not violate Section 16 of the Act or Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The submissions made by the writ petitioner-appellant in his rejoinder for justifying his deliberate failure to attend the meeting of the Syndicate fixed on 25.6.1996 were not only incorrect but they were wholly irrelevant for avoiding the meeting of the Syndicate, which was of a very important nature and in the interests of the University. The writ petitioner-appellant was not only duty bound to attend the meeting of the Syndicate fixed on 25.6.1996 being a nominee of the Chancellor, but he also owed a duty to the University in its larger interests and for its sound functioning to attend the meeting which he deliberately avoided to attend. 16. As regards the additional facts and submissions, it was given out that the Vice Chancellor after his appointment on 1.3.1996 accorded top priority to the preparation for holding the annual examinations which were scheduled to commence in the-month of March. 1996. While the annual examinations were going on, this Court vide judgment dated 19.4.1996 directed the University to hold the regular selections by 31.8.1996 and to commence the process for holding the regular selections within a fortnight of the order. Though on account of the general elections to Lok Sabha, even examinations had to be postponed on the directive from the State Government, it was not possible to convene the ordinary meeting of the Syndicate since it required at least 15 days' notice. Despite these difficulties, the Vice-Chancellor commenced the process of regular selections the month of April, 1996 and all necessary step were taken to enable the Selection Committees to complete the selections by 22.6.1996. The Vice-Chancellor despite the busy schedule convened the meeting of the Research Board. Admission Board and Academic Council in the month of April/May. 1996 for meeting urgent academic requirements of the University for the academic session 1996-97. The Vice-Chancellor also convened the meeting of the Finance Committee for preparing the budget estimates for the financial year 1996-97. The Selection Committees have held the regular selections in the month of May/June, 1996. Admission Board and Academic Council in the month of April/May. 1996 for meeting urgent academic requirements of the University for the academic session 1996-97. The Vice-Chancellor also convened the meeting of the Finance Committee for preparing the budget estimates for the financial year 1996-97. The Selection Committees have held the regular selections in the month of May/June, 1996. In view of the above requirements, which had to be accorded top priority it was not at all feasible for him to convene an ordinary meeting of the Syndicate despite his keenness to hold such meeting and he was left with no optional to convene a special meeting of the Syndicate on 25.6.1996 inter alia for completing the selection process as directed by this Court. It was further submitted that the writ petitioner-appellant has not disclosed to this Court that he deliberately did not attend the meeting of the Syndicate fixed on 25.6.1996 despite his having confirmed to the Vice-Chancellor that he would be attending the meeting. He indulged in invoking irrelevant and even false excuses. Since the writ petitioner-appellant did show little regard for truth, probity and dignity by making allegations not only against the Vice-Chancellor but also against the Chancellor which were not sustainable, the writ application ought to be dismissed. The writ petitioner-appellant relied on his own assessment of what some Members of the Syndicate seem to have indicated to him and he allowed himself to be influenced by such consideration for deliberately avoiding the meeting of the Syndicate fixed on 25th June, 1996 which he was duty bound to attend and he even accorded to attend. He was not even entitled to get the controversy raised by him decided in the writ application because of his unbecoming conduct. 17. It would not however be out of place in this context to refer to the rejoinder used by the writ petitioner appellant. In the said rejoinder, the writ petitioner appellant asserted that he was constantly emphasising the desirability of holding selections to fill in more 22 posts of Professors and 32 posts of Readers (not covered by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court) and pointed out that if selections were not held for these posts, it would necessitate adhoc/temporary appointments of lecturers against the higher posts in order to meet the demands of work-load of the University. When his attempt to get information from the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor failed, he thought it proper to avoid the situation that might precipitate discoid and confrontation between the Vice-Chancellor and other Members of the Syndicate especially as meeting of the Syndicate was convened after the Vice-Chancellor was requested not to hold a meeting during this period. Thus, it was clear that the writ petitioner appellant made certain new allegations about the hostile discrimination alleging in his rejoinder that before the nomination of the wait petitioner appellant by the Chancellor, Mr. V. S. Vyas and Mr. M. V. Mathur were also nominated as Members of the Syndicate by the Chancellor in the past, but they did not attend the meetings of the Syndicate, yet they were not removed by the Chancellor. 18. The learned single Judge held that a conjoint reading of the Sections 9 and 16 of the Act No. 17 of 1962 makes it clear that the body of Syndicate consists of officer members of the Syndicate, nominated members of the Syndicate and elected members of the Syndicate. Under Statute 26(1) of the University only officers members of the Syndicate can be removed under the said statute on specified grounds enumerated therein. The Vice-Chancellor or the Director of College Education Rajasthan could be said to be such officers of the Syndicate within the meaning of clause (v) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act and rest of the members of the Syndicate are either nominated members or elected members, who do not fall within the ambit of statute 26(1) of the University. The nominated and elected members, according to (lie learned single Judge, could not therefore be removed in the same manner as in respect of an officer member under Statute 26( 1). The learned single Judge concluded that Statute 26(1) of the University is not a self-contained code regulating the procedure for removal of either nominated or elected members of the Syndicate and, therefore, the general provisions envisaged under Section 18 of the General Clauses Act could not be made applicable for removal of.the writ petitioner appellant from the membership of the Syndicate. In fact the power of removal is a necessary concomitant of the power to appoint within the meaning (if Section 18 of the General Clauses Act provided such removal order its passed reasonably and riot arbitrarily. 19. In fact the power of removal is a necessary concomitant of the power to appoint within the meaning (if Section 18 of the General Clauses Act provided such removal order its passed reasonably and riot arbitrarily. 19. As regards the application of the doctrine of pleasure in the facts of the present case, the learned single Judge referred to the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Suresh Bhardwaj v. H. P. University, decided on 30.11.1993 being Civil Writ Petn No. 229 of 1993 and he decisions of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhyay reported in AIR 1961 SC 751 Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, N.E.F. Railway, Malegaon reported in AIR 1964 SC 600 , Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 : (1974 Lab IC 1380) ; Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 : (1985 Lab IC 1393) ; Dr. D.C. Saxena v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1987 SC 1463 : (1987 Lab IC 1018) and Om Narain Agrawal v. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur reported in 1993 (2) SCC 242 : ( AIR 1993 SC 1440 ) and observed that the pleasure doctrine cannot be imported to Sections 18 and 23 of the Act No. 8 of 1955 unless the State Legislature makes specific provisions to this effect. In Suresh Bhardwaj v. H. P. University (Ibid) even in absence of any specific provision made by the State Legislature, the doctrine of pleasure was extended to Sections 15 and 20 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act. The learned single Judge did not agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in this case and held further that the ratio of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Dr. The learned single Judge did not agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in this case and held further that the ratio of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Dr. D. C. Saxena v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1987 SC 1463 : (1987 Lab IC 1018) and Om Narain Agrawal v. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur reported in (1993) 2 SCC 242 : ( AIR 1993 SC 1440 ) based on pleasure doctrine were not applicable to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, in those two cases after change of State Governments in furtherance of its policy decisions, the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of the Haryana Board Education as well as two women nominated members of the Municipal Board, Shahjahanpur were removed on political considerations, whereas in the present case, neither the writ petitioner appellant was nominated on political consideration nor he was removed by the Chancellor on any political reasons to carry forward a policy decision. The writ petitioner appellant was nominated under clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act No. 17 of 1962 as an Educationist and he is being removed by the impugned order to-make body of Syndicate, functional in the interest of public in general and the University in particular and also to ensure faithful compliance of.the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court. 20. After discussing the distinctive features of the pleasure doctrine and the theory based on subjective satisfaction, the learned single Judge observed that the contention of the respondents that the writ petitioner appellant's nominated as a Member of the Syndicate could be proceeded al the will of the Chancellor by virtue of application of the pleasure doctrine was to he rejected. The learned single Judge further observed that although the pleasure doctrine is not importable under Sections 18 and 23 of the Act No. 8 of 1955 but the impugned order superseding the writ petitioner appellant from the membership of the Syndicate will be treated lo have been passed on subjective satisfaction of the Chancellor. 21. Coming to the question raised by the writ petitioner appellant that in the past such nominated Members like Mr. M. V. Mathui aid Mr. 21. Coming to the question raised by the writ petitioner appellant that in the past such nominated Members like Mr. M. V. Mathui aid Mr. V.S. Vyas as Members of the Syndicate had not attended any meeting of the Syndicate, but they were not superseded while the writ petition appellant was singled-out by way of superseding his nomination because of his single absence in the meeting of the Syndicate, the learned single Judge observed that nowhere it was alleged that the aforesaid both members of the Syndicate nominated by the Chancellor did deliberately (abstain from attending the meeting. 22. Coming to the question as regards the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India regarding arbitrariness in executive and administrative action, regard being had to the decision in A.L. Kalra v. The Project Equipment Corporation India Ltd. reported in AIR 1984 SC 1361 : (1984 Lab 1C 961) , the learned single Judge looking to the information available from the original file as produced on behalf of the Chancellor observed that by no stretch of imagination could the impugned order be said to be per se arbitrary or that the writ petitioner appellant has been meted out with discriminatory treatment within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 23. Coming to the other question regarding doctrine of legitimate expectation and the principle of promissory estoppel, the learned single Judge observed that the impugned order has been passed fairly in public interest and also in the interest of the University. Where the order impugned is found to be just and proper within the statutory scope of Section 18 of the Act No. 8 of 1955, in such situation the doctrine of legitimate expectation gets a back seat. The principle of legitimate expectation cannot he permitted to be stretched beyond rational limits against the factual back-grounds of a case. Following the decision in A. Mahudeswaran v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu reported in (1996) 5 JT (SC) 506 , the learned single Judge rejected the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation as also the principle of promissory estoppel. The principle of legitimate expectation cannot he permitted to be stretched beyond rational limits against the factual back-grounds of a case. Following the decision in A. Mahudeswaran v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu reported in (1996) 5 JT (SC) 506 , the learned single Judge rejected the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation as also the principle of promissory estoppel. According to the learned single Judge, the concept of these principles could not be invoked by the writ petitioner appellant in the present case as he was nominated as a Member of the Syndicate on 15.9.1995 for a period of three years purely on pious and altruistic solemn mission to render his free services to the cause of learning in the campus of the. University. On this score also, the writ petitioner appellant is not entitled to claim the benefit of doctrine of legitimate expectation as also the promissory estoppel. 24. On the question about the order impugned being arbitrary and having been passed against the principles of natural justice, the learned single Judge observed that it was indeed true that the Statutes and the Ordinances framed under the Act did not lay down the conditions in which the nomination of the membership of the Syndicate of the writ petitioner appellant may be determined nor do the Act, Statutes and Ordinances prescribed any limitations upon the exercise of power of the Chancellor to supersede the nomination of the writ petitioner appellant. In the absence of any modes prescribed under the Act in which the writ petitioner appellant was nominated regulating his removal from the nominated membership of the Syndicate, the learned single Judge held that the Chancellor had the power to remove such member in exercise of his general power under Section 18 of the Act No. 8 of 1955. The power to supersede the writ petitioner appellant from the membership of the Syndicate under Section 18 of the Act No. 8, of 1955 does not permit it to be exercised , arbitrarily, but it could be exercised fairly for a good cause. In the absence of pleadings and proof in the present case to the effect that the Chancellor has passed the impugned order superseding, the writ petitioner appellant from the membership of the Syndicate on non-existent ground, it is not possible for the Court to make such an order of supersession ineffective by issuing a prerogative writ. 25. In the absence of pleadings and proof in the present case to the effect that the Chancellor has passed the impugned order superseding, the writ petitioner appellant from the membership of the Syndicate on non-existent ground, it is not possible for the Court to make such an order of supersession ineffective by issuing a prerogative writ. 25. The learned single Judge observed,that the Court being bulwark for the protection of the rights of the citizens has to evolve some objective criteria to check vagaries, negligence, mistakes or highhandedness of the executive while passing an order under Section 18.of the Act No. 8 of 1955 in exercise of its subjective satisfaction. The order of termination, dismissal or removal passed under Section 18 of the Act No 8 of 1955 must therefore be based on something more than a mere rumour or a gossip or a hunch of the authority. According to the learned single Judge, there must be some definable material which could be regarded as reliable information. Such orders passed under Section 18 of the Act must be based on credible information having nexus with the bona fide belief of the authority to have acted fairly. Before passing an order under Section 18 of the Act No. 8 of 1955, it would be condition precedent to verify as to whether the person who is sought to be removed has been appointed under a particular Act or Rules and if so whether such Act or Rules prescribe modes for regulating his removal. When such an order of dismissal, removal or suspension is challenged in a Court of law then it will be always open to the writ petitioner to contend that on the facts, and information disclosed, no reasonable man could have arrived to a conclusion at which the authority has arrived. 26. The learned single Judge further observed that since the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was very limited and the Court could not afford to act as an appellate or revisional Court, it has no justification to examine meticulously the information on the basis of which an order is passed under Section 18 of the Act No. 8 of 1955, but only it.could say whether the order is arbitrary or mala fide or subjective satisfaction under the aforesaid Act is based on non-existent ground. In his considered opinion, the learned single Judge held that if the order is found to be based on definable material and the information on the basis of which such order is passed has nexus with the bona fide belief of the authority to have acted fairly, then the order passed under the aforesaid Act should not be ineffective. 27. On the question as to whether the order impugned superseding the writ petitioner appellant from the membership of the Syndicate of the University is arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust and against the principles of natural justice, the learned single Judge observed that if it is so only then the order impugned could be made ineffective by issuing a prerogative writ. The learned single Judge referred to the decision in Dr. Girendra Pal v. Slate of Rajasthan reported in (1994) 3 WLC (Raj) 334 , where Dr. Girendra Pal, Principal Homeopaethic Medical College, Jaipur was nominated as a Member of the Syndicate in the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur by the State Government for a period of three years under Section 21(4) of the University of Rajasthan Act, 1946 and some information was received about him that he had association with R.S.S. a banned organisation under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The State Government did not consider it appropriate to continue him as a Member of the Syndicate of the University and, as such, his nomination was withdrawn with immediate effect. On a challenge being made by Dr. Girendra Pal about the order of curtailment of his tenure of Syndicate of the University on the ground that the order did not disclose as to with which banned organisation the petitioner was associated, even no material was placed before the learned single Judge of this Court to the effect that the petitioner was a member of any banned organisation and the order was ultimately set aside on being based on non-existent ground. 28. 28. On examining the merits of the order impugned superseding the writ petitioner appellant from the membership of the Syndicate of the University and on scrutiny of the original records produced before the learned single Judge by the learned Additional Advocate General containing the relevant information, the learned single Judge observed that the order superseding the writ petitioner appellant from the membership of the Syndicate of the University has not been passed on the rumour or a gossip or a hunch or on a non-existent ground, but it has been passed on the definable materials and relevant information sent by the Vice Chancellor to the Chancellor. Indisputably,in faithful. compliance of the order passed,by the Division. Bench of our Court in a number of writ applications mentioned above, the University had commenced the process of selections for making regular appointments to the sanctioned teachers posts. The Selection Committees held selections in the month of June, 1.996 in compliance of the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court and after receiving the recommendations, by various Selection Committees in sealed covers the Vice-Chancellor convened a meeting of the Syndicate on 25.6.1996 for approval of. the recommendations sent to him. The letter dated 10.5.1996 which was filed by the writ petitioner appellant himself as Annex. 3 to the rejoinder was also on the record of the original file.produced before the Court. The learned' single Judge observed that "suffice it to observe that it is less difficult to understand the contents of letter dated 10.5.1996 Annex. 3 to the rejoinder although more difficult to approve its. contents The contents of Annex. 3 reveals that the petitioner was putting the cart before the horse and Was making conscious effort to create hurdles in faithful compliance of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court while the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor of the respondent University including the petitioner were under constitutional and legal obligation to comply with the mandate of Division Bench of this Court positively up to 31.8.1996. The learned single Judge further observed that there were no other reasons also to arrive at the aforesaid conclusion. The learned single Judge further observed that there were no other reasons also to arrive at the aforesaid conclusion. The act of insistence of the writ petitioner appellant to see that his personal wisdom should prevail over collective wisdom of other members of the Syndicate after its deliberations in the meeting scheduled to he held on 25.6.1996 betrays his conscious omission to abstain from attending the said meeting which runs hostile lo the cultural ethos of an Educationist. The averments made in the rejoinder to the effect that to avoid a situation that might precipitate discord and confrontation between the Vice-Chancellor and the Members of the Syndicate could at best have been the consequence especially if the meeting was convened after the Vice Chancellor requested not to hold meeting On 25.6.1996 but the penultimate but one line of .contents of letter Annexure-3 to the rejoinder A meeting of the Syndicate should be held for this purpose before the selections, are made" clinched the issue otherwise. The learned single Judge observed that it was not understandable as to how the writ petitioner appellant and other Members of the Syndicate under his leadership could ask the Vice-Chancellor not to convene the meeting of the Syndicate on 25.6.1996 for faithful compliance of the mandate of the Division Bench of this Court, when the Vice-Chancellor had absolute statutory power under sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act No. 17 of 1962 to convene the meeting of the Syndicate, Senate and the Academic Council. The writ petitioner appellant being an Educationist was supposed to be an upholder of Indian value system according to which selfless contribution to the cause of learning to posterity is treated to be greatest service. Here in the present case, the acts and omissions of the writ petitioner appellant speak louder than words. 29. On a perusal of the original file produced before the Court, the existing information and its relevance in passing the impugned supersession Order against the writ petitioner appellant under the cover of the powers under the Act No. 8 of 1955 by the Chancellor was successfully demonstrated. Therefore, the learned single Judge observed that he refrained to examine the sufficiency of the information produced before the Chancellor, as the order impugned has been passed in exercise of his subjective satisfaction. Therefore, the learned single Judge observed that he refrained to examine the sufficiency of the information produced before the Chancellor, as the order impugned has been passed in exercise of his subjective satisfaction. In the considered opinion of the learned single Judge, under Article 226 of the Constitution, while the sufficiency or otherwise of the information cannot be examined by the Court, yet existence of information and its relevance to the order impugned passed by the Chancellor could be considered. 30. As regards the contention regarding violation of the principles of natural justice, the learned single Judge referred lo the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India reported in AIR 1978 SC 597 especially in penultimate paragraph 58. Whether the fairness in action demanded that an opportunity to be heard should have been given to die person affected. For proper appreciation on the points canvassed before him and also to find out the-correct answer to the question posed, the learned single Judge looked into some of the important judgments of the Supreme Court including Union of India v. P. K. Roy reported in AIR 1968 SC 850 to hold that the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned with the straight jacket of a rigid formula. Its application depends upon the nature of jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority upon the character of the rights of the person affected, scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant facts of each case. 31. In A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India reported in AIR 1970 SC 150 , it was observed that the aim of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice. 32. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 , it was held that the natural justice is not capable of astatic and precise definition. It cannot be prisoned in the straight jacket of a cast iron formula. 33. In Union of India v. I. N. Sinha reported in AIR 1971 SC 40 ; (1971 Lab 1C. 8) , the Supreme Court upheld the decision taken by the competent authority under Rule 59(J) of the Fundamental Rules compulsorily retiring a Government servant. It was observed that it did not require any opportunity of hearing to be given to the Government servant to show cause against the proposed action of compulsorily retiring him. 8) , the Supreme Court upheld the decision taken by the competent authority under Rule 59(J) of the Fundamental Rules compulsorily retiring a Government servant. It was observed that it did not require any opportunity of hearing to be given to the Government servant to show cause against the proposed action of compulsorily retiring him. 34. In Km. Neelima Mishra v. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal reported in AIR 1990 SC 1402 : (1990 Lab IC 1229) , the question arose whether the Chancellor was holding the power of appointment as of administrative nature. The Court held that the Chancellor was not required to act judicially though he was required to act fairly, for the purpose of which the power was conferred. The duty to act judicially or to act fairly may arise in widely different circumstances. It may arise expressly or impliedly depending upon the context and considerations. All these types of non adjudicative administrative decision making are now covered under the general rubric of "fairness in the administration". But, when even such an administrative decision, unless it affects one's personal rights or one's properly rights, or the loss of or pre judicially affects something which would juridically be called at least a privilege, does not involve the duty to act fairly consistent with the rules of natural justice. We cannot discover any principle contrary to this concept. Vide Km. Neelim Mishra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal reported in AIR 1990 SC 1402 : (1990 Lab IC 1229) . 35. In Dr. Rashial Yadav v. State of Bihar reported in (1994) 5 SCC 267 : (1994 AIR SCW 3329) it was ruled by the Supreme Court that the concept of natural justice is not a static one but is an ever expanding concept from its initial stage and its application differs from case to case. The power has to be exercised in the public interest and for public good because the State Government is duty bound to protect the image and credibility of the Board so that people's faith in the Board is not shaken. Of course, if the State Government exercises the power vested in it under the said sub-section and if the exercise of such power is challenged in the Court, the State Government will have to satisfy the Court that it exercised the power bona fide and on materials relevant to establishing the existence of the said power. Of course, if the State Government exercises the power vested in it under the said sub-section and if the exercise of such power is challenged in the Court, the State Government will have to satisfy the Court that it exercised the power bona fide and on materials relevant to establishing the existence of the said power. That can at best be the extent of the judicial scrutiny. 36. The learned single Judge ultimately concluded that the writ petitioner appellant was not entitled to have an opportunity of hearing as the order passed by the Chancellor in the present case in exercise of his subjective satisfaction, has been passed for good cause in the interests of the University and the Chancellor has acted fairly in passing the impugned order. The Chancellor has not exercised his power arbitrarily. Suffice it to say that the principle of natural justice is not a strait jacket formula but its application differs from case to case. Fairness is a fundamental principle of natural justice in administrative law. It is a rule to ensure that vast power in the modern State is not abused but properly exercised, the fairness being component of principle of natural justice, to ensure that the statutory authority must arrive at a just decision either promoting an interest or affecting the right of a citizen. Fairness is a prime test for principle of natural justice and wherever an executive order is challenged which is based on subjective satisfaction of the authority, in such case it is to be seen if the authority in passing such order has acted fairly. It would be sufficient compliance of principle of natural justice and no opportunity of hearing, is needed unless it has civil Consequences. In the present case, the writ petitioner appellant was nominated as a Member of the Syndicate to render his free services to the University. Hence no question of civil consequences arises in the present case. In every case against whom some order is passed by an executive in exercise of his subjective satisfaction, such person is bound to have subjective feeling of loss of reputation but such subjective feeling does not make him entitled to be given an opportunity of hearing. Hence no question of civil consequences arises in the present case. In every case against whom some order is passed by an executive in exercise of his subjective satisfaction, such person is bound to have subjective feeling of loss of reputation but such subjective feeling does not make him entitled to be given an opportunity of hearing. The principle of natural justice includes that the power must be exercised reasonably and the Court has to reconcile itself with no less an important doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority upon which the legislation has reposed lo take such decisions within the meaning of Sections 18 and 23 of the Act No. 8 of 1955. The principle of natural justice could not be stretched beyond a reasonable and rational limit as otherwise the principle of natural justice itself would become a principle of unnatural justice. In the considered opinion of the learned single Judge the order impugned superseding the writ petitioner appellant from the membership of the Syndicate did not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and the writ petitioner appellant was not entitled to be given an opportunity of hearing and the Chancellor has acted fairly in passing the impugned order. 37. Mr. Mridul, learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant contended before us that on an analysis of the judgment of the learned single Judge, it is manifestly clear that the pleasure doctrine was not accepted by him as applicable at all so that the writ petitioner appellant could be removed at the pleasure of the Chancellor. The learned single Judge further held that the Chancellor had the powers to effect the removal of a nominated Member of the Syndicate by virtue of Section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act. In so far as the statute 26 is concerned, the learned single Judge has taken a view that it was applicable only to the officers of the University and, therefore, was not available to be pressed into service against the other officers members of the Syndicate. In so far as the statute 26 is concerned, the learned single Judge has taken a view that it was applicable only to the officers of the University and, therefore, was not available to be pressed into service against the other officers members of the Syndicate. It was further held by the learned single Judge that though the principles of natural justice have to be followed while exercising the powers under Section 18 of the General Clauses Act, it was not necessary to afford an opportunity to the writ petitioner appellant before effecting his removal and all that was to be seen by the Court is as to Whether in effecting the removal of the writ petitioner appellant, the Chancellor had acted fairly and reasonably or not. The learned single Judge has further held that the power exercised by the Chancellor is open to be exercised on his subjective satisfaction. The learned single Judge then proceeded to hold that the removal of the writ petitioner appellant was fair and reasonable, as according to him, the failure of the writ petitioner appellant to attend the meeting of the Syndicate held on 25.6.1996 despite his being available at Jodhpur and despite his agreeing to do so, resulted in the meeting not taking place on 25.6.1996 and it resulted in frustrating the mandate of the order of the High Court in Dr. Irfan's case. According to the learned single Judge, it was not understandable as to how the writ petitioner appellant and other members of the Syndicate could ask the Vice-Chancellor not lo convene the meeting of the Syndicate on 25.6.1996 which was called for faithful compliance of the mandate of the Division Bench of this Court. The learned single Judge has observed M am constrained to observe with anguish that an educationist nominated member of the Syndicate can prove himself either an asset or disaster to an educational institution. He who takes his job seriously would prove himself as an asset and he who takes himself seriously would prove himself a disaster for the institution by converting serene atmosphere of campus of learning where future generation is under preparation into turmoil. The conversion of serene atmosphere of highest seat of learning of campus of University into a hot bed of politics may lead to grotesque result by affecting the academic excellence'. The conversion of serene atmosphere of highest seat of learning of campus of University into a hot bed of politics may lead to grotesque result by affecting the academic excellence'. The learned single Judge has further held that the removal of the writ petitioner appellant did not involve any civil consequences and according to him, the writ petitioner appellant was merely a nominated Member of the Syndicate to render free services to the University and, therefore, no question of civil consequences did arise in this case. The learned single Judge rejected the contention of the writ petitioner appellant that the action of the Chancellor was arbitrary and on the other hand held that the same is not arbitrary in any manner. 38. In the special appeal, the writ petitioner appellant contended that with the nomination of the Writ petitioner appellant to the Syndicate of the University by the Chancellor by pressing into service Section 16 (1)(iv), the writ petitioner appellant has a right to remain in the office for three years. So far as the Chancellor is concerned, he having exercised the powers conferred upon him by Section 16(1 )(iv) of the Act, his powers in this regard were exhausted. 39. It was further contended that the Chancellor in the instant case in term of Section 2(ii) of the Act is just an officer of the University and has powers which have been vested in him by Section 10 of the Act and no more. Since no power is vested in him by any provision of the Act and since no Statute or Ordinance is there vesting any power whatsoever in him, the Chancellor cannot effect the removal of a Member nominated by him under Section 16( 1)(iv) of the Act. 40. The writ petitioner appellant has further referred to Section 21(a), (b), (c) and (m) of the Act. Whereas sub-section (a) of Section 21 warrants a statute being made in respect of the constitution, powers and duties of the Syndicate, sub-section (b) makes the provisions of making the statutes inter alia for election and continuance in office of the members. Sub-section (m) lays down that all matters by this Act were required to be made or might be provided for by the Statute could be so provided by making the Statute. Sub-section (m) lays down that all matters by this Act were required to be made or might be provided for by the Statute could be so provided by making the Statute. No statute except Statute 26 being there in respect of the matter covered by these Sections, it was contended that if at all removal of a Member of the Syndicate could be effected, it can only be done in accordance with the Statute 26. In this context, it was contended that the Chancellor had no power to effect the removal of a person once nominated under Section 16( 1 )(iv) of the Act who is entitled to hold office for a period of three years and the only way of removal that could be effected was by taking resort to the Statute 26 of the Statutes of the University. 41. In so far as the finding of the learned single Judge that the Statute 26 made provisions for removal of officers only, Mr. Mridul submitted that this was not the correct interpretation of Statute 26. The opening words of Statute 26 are Any member and therefore Statute 26 applies to all members of the Syndicate. Merely because in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Clause (J) of Statute 26, the term 'officers' has come to be used, that cannot but be deemed to be a case of ill-drafting and the Statute 26(1) cannot but apply to all members of the Syndicate. Mr. Mridul submitted that no words of a Statute could be considered to be surplus, redundant, otiose or repetitive. For this purpose, he relied upon the decision in Utkal Contractors & Joinery Private Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1987 SC 1454 . In State of Maharashtra v. Mohammed Salim Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 550 it was observed that legislature does not indulge in pointless legislation. It was submitted by Mr. Mridul that if the finding of the learned single Judge in this respect was to be maintained, the words `Any member' would become totally redundant, surplus or repetitive. The construction pul upon the Statute 26 would therefore be manifestly incorrect. 42. Mr. Mridul further argued that if the interpretation put by the learned single Judge was to be correct, it would result in startling implications. So far as the officers members of the Syndicate are concerned, only Deans of the Faculties are such members. The construction pul upon the Statute 26 would therefore be manifestly incorrect. 42. Mr. Mridul further argued that if the interpretation put by the learned single Judge was to be correct, it would result in startling implications. So far as the officers members of the Syndicate are concerned, only Deans of the Faculties are such members. This being the position in the construction put by the learned single Judge, the Statute 26 would apply only to the Vice-Chancellor and the Deans of the Faculties since they alone are the officers of the University as per the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. The Statute 26, if read in the manner as was so done by the learned single Judge, would not render a fair and reasonable reading of the Statute 26 and would defeat the very purpose for which the said Statute had been framed. If the Statute 26 is given the meaning as was so given by the learned single Judge, there would be no way to get rid of the elected members of the Syndicate even if they have become incapable to perform their duties or are found to De convicted by a Court of law of an offence involving moral turpitude. In such a situation, while it will be possible to effect the removal of the Deans by taking resort to Statute 26, it would not be possible to remove the Professors appointed by the Vice-Chancellor in terms of Section 16(1)(iii) and the elected members. Mr. Mridul further submitted that if this view was taken, it would not be possible to effect the removal of the two members of the State Legislature nominated by the State Government, if the State Government did not choose to effect their removal by pressing into service the Section 18 of the General Clauses Act. Such an interpretation would surely be against the public interest and would be discriminatory,as well, just because Statute 26 would be available against the Deans, it would not be available against the Professors members and other members. It is settled law that the Courts are required to so interpret a provision so that it does not fall foul with the provisions of the Constitution of India such as. Article 14 thereof. 43. Mr. Mridul further argued that the aforesaid provision constitutes a different intention within the meaning of Section 18 of the General Clauses Act. It is settled law that the Courts are required to so interpret a provision so that it does not fall foul with the provisions of the Constitution of India such as. Article 14 thereof. 43. Mr. Mridul further argued that the aforesaid provision constitutes a different intention within the meaning of Section 18 of the General Clauses Act. Reliance in this regard was placed upon Kanta Devi v. State of Rajasthan, 1957 Raj LW 60: ( AIR 1957 Raj 134 ) , a Division Bench judgment of this Court and Dr. Girendra Pal v. State of Rajasthan, (1994) 3 WLC (Raj) 334 and Manik Chand Surana v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2 WLC (Raj) 49. 44. Mr. Mridul also placed an alternative argument. It was submitted by him that even if the aforesaid contention is found not acceptable and if it be held that the powers under Section 18 of the General Clauses Act were available to effect the removal of the writ petitioner appellant, this could not be done without affording an opportunity of hearing to him. Reliance in this respect was placed upon Dr. Bool Chand v. Kurukshetra University, AIR 1968 SC 292 : (1968 Lab IC 232) , a three Judges judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In paragraph 4 of this judgment, there was no provision for inquiry. Again in the same paragraph, the term was `ordinary' as prescribed. There is a complete absence of procedure in the Acts, Statutes and the Ordinances as stated in paras 8 and 11. Still it was held that a notice informing the Vice-Chancellor containing the grounds on which it is proposed to effect his removal was required to be given and it is only after taking the same into consideration that the removal could be effected by a reasoned order. Reliance in this respect was placed on paragraphs 13 and 21 of the said judgment. Reliance in this respect was also placed on Ridge v. Baldwin reported in (1964) AC 40 at page 65. 45. Coming to the question of exercise of powers contained in Section 18 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Mridul contended that the basic premises on the basis of which the learned single Judge has proceeded was that the removal of a nominated 1 member from the Syndicate did hot bring about any civil consequences. 45. Coming to the question of exercise of powers contained in Section 18 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Mridul contended that the basic premises on the basis of which the learned single Judge has proceeded was that the removal of a nominated 1 member from the Syndicate did hot bring about any civil consequences. Although the learned single Judge has held that the principles of natural justice have to be followed while exercising the powers under Section 18, still the learned single Judge has held that since such removal does not involve civil consequences, it was not necessary to give an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned since such removal does not involve civil consequences. 46. Mr. Mridul in this context contended that firstly for attracting the principles of natural justice, it is not at all necessary that civil consequences should ensue, civil consequences being understood here as some consequence which may affect the person individually and personally by way of some pecuniary loss or loss of the status etc. Mr. Mridul submitted that all that was necessary to attract the principles of natural justice was that the person should be somehow affected adversely. This submission Mr. Mridul contended was fully fortified by the decision given in Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 and State of U. P. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 305 : ( AIR 1995 SC 1512 ). The first ease was one concerning election process and the second was a case in which some villagers were included in the Gram Panchayat without a hearing being given to them. In both the cases, it was held that the principles of natural justice warrant an opportunity being given to the affected person to make his submissions in regard to the proposed action being taken. 47. It was further submitted by Mr. Mridul that the removal of a person from the membership of the Syndicate involved civil consequences. It seriously affects the reputation and loss of the position of honour on account of his nomination. 48. Mr. Mridul also placed reliance on Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 wherein it was stated that the principles of natural justice are required to be followed even in a case where a procedural error in the course of election has been committed. 48. Mr. Mridul also placed reliance on Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 wherein it was stated that the principles of natural justice are required to be followed even in a case where a procedural error in the course of election has been committed. Reliance was also placed upon S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 and also on Guru Gobinda Basu v. Sankari Prosad Ghosal, AIR 1963 Cal 364 . In both the cases, it was stated that if the reputation of a person is effected, that constitutes civil consequences. Reliance was also placed upon State of U. P. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 305 : ( AIR 1995 SC 1512 ) which was a case of a particular Panchayat in which some villagers were included and it was held that it required giving of a notice conforming to the principle of natural justice. Reliance was also placed upon E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 : (1974 Lab IC 427) para 86, wherein it has been stated that for attracting the principles of natural justice, the right embedded may not be a vested right. Reliance was also placed on Management of M/s. M. S. Nally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1990) 2 SCC 48 . 49. It was submitted by Mr. Mridul that the learned single Judge has held that the power exercisable under Section 18 of the General Clauses Act was open to lie so exercised on subjective satisfaction. Mr. Mridul submitted that (here was nothing to indicate in Section 18 that such a power could be exercised on subjective satisfaction. Firstly, the subjective satisfaction can be read in a Statute only when the words like `is satisfied' and `is of opinion' etc. are used, for this purpose reliance was placed upon Purser & Co. (Hillingdon) Ltd. v. Jackson, (1976) 3 All F.R 641. `Review of Administrative Action' by Whitmore page 59 and `Administrative Law' by Thakkar page 287. It was submitted that the subjective satisfaction is normally a matter which pertains to a policy, exercise of sovereign powers, such as making treaties etc. It was further submitted by Mr. (Hillingdon) Ltd. v. Jackson, (1976) 3 All F.R 641. `Review of Administrative Action' by Whitmore page 59 and `Administrative Law' by Thakkar page 287. It was submitted that the subjective satisfaction is normally a matter which pertains to a policy, exercise of sovereign powers, such as making treaties etc. It was further submitted by Mr. Mridul that the principles of natural justice have to he followed and reliance in this respect was also placed upon `The Treatises of Wade' at pages 251 and 382. 50. Mr. Mridul further submitted that if the subjective satisfaction is read in Section 18, it would bring-in indirectly the pleasure doctrine. Since no one can do indirectly what cannot be done directly, this was simply not possible. The writ petitioner appellant also pressed in service the principle of legitimate expectation by placing reliance on Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, AIR 1994 SC 980 and Dr. J. N. Banavalikar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 89 : (1995 AIR SCW 4124). Mr. Mridul submitted that apart from all other considerations, when legitimate expectation is belied, no action could be taken without following the principles of natural justice. 51. It was further submitted that unless expressly excluded or excluded by necessary implication, the principles of natural justice have to be read in every Statute and the Section 18 of the General Clauses Act could not be any exception to this. 52. It was further submitted that if the subjective satisfaction is read in Section 18, then that would be disastrous for the simple reason that Section 18 is available to all sorts of authorities in the administrative hierarchy or even in private employments. The finding of the learned single .fudge if taken to its logical extremity would vest highly arbitrary powers in all the appointing authorities so as to take an action on the basis of their subjective satisfaction. 53. Mr. Mridul also challenged the findings on the issue that the action of the Chancellor was fair and reasonable. He submits that as per the directions made by the Division Bench, the appointments were to be made by 31.8.1996. 53. Mr. Mridul also challenged the findings on the issue that the action of the Chancellor was fair and reasonable. He submits that as per the directions made by the Division Bench, the appointments were to be made by 31.8.1996. When the meeting was convened on 25.6.1996 at least 4-5 members of the Syndicate had informed the Vice-Chancellor that they would not he able to participate in the meeting in the month of June and amongst those who made this request were some MLAs and even Government nominees besides Teachers' representatives. The writ petitioner appellant in his wisdom thought that since the meeting of 25.6.1996 would be the first meeting of the Syndicate after the present Vice-Chancellor had assumed the office, the Vice-Chancellor would be better advised not to hold the meeting on 25.6.1996 as that would create a permanent confrontation between the Vice-Chancellor on the one hand and the members of the Syndicate on the other. The writ petitioner appellant felt advised not to participate in the meeting of 25.6.1996 since as a former teacher he thought that he would leave a bridge for future reconciliation/reproachment. According to him, when the meeting was convened on 25.6.1996 he had a talk with the. Vice-Chancellor on 23.6.1996 and requested him not to hold the meeting on 25.6.1996 and the Vice-Chancellor agreed to this. It was submitted by the writ petitioner, appellant that if the meeting was not to be held on 25.6.1996 the mandate of the High Court would nod be in any manner be frustrated. 31st. August, 1996 was still far off. The decision not to attend the meeting on 25th June, 1996 was taken by the writ petitioner appellant bona fide in his own wisdom. There might be two opinions about the correctness thereof, But it could not be at all contended that his attendance justified his removal and that such a removal in the manner it was so done was reasonable and fair as was so held by the learned single Judge. 54. It was further submitted that it was wrong to say that the writ petitioner appellant was just a mouth piece of the Chancellor. Section 18 envisaged at least two types of nominations. Whereas Section 16(1)(iv) spoke of two persons nominated by the State Government clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 spoke of an educationist being nominated by the Chancellor. Section 18 envisaged at least two types of nominations. Whereas Section 16(1)(iv) spoke of two persons nominated by the State Government clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 spoke of an educationist being nominated by the Chancellor. Normally, persons covered by clauses (ii), (iii), (vii) and (viii) came from the group which could constitute a constituency, but not so in the case of an educationist. The persons falling in the category covered by Clauses (ii) and (iii) could be nominated or elected, but not so an educationist. It was for this reason that the provision had to be made for nomination of an educationist by the Chancellor. He was thus not just a mouth piece of the Chancellor but he had to act in his own wisdom. The nominated member could be a spokeman only if he was the one in respect of whom the provision like clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 had been made. The nomination of a person as a Member of the Syndicate bring certain privileges to him, confers a status upon him and places certain powers and duties in him by law. The mere fact that he is nominated by the Chancellor does not mean that he is just a chosen hand of the Chancellor. He is an Educationist first, who had been nominated by the Chancellor, nomination being the only method available for inducting an Educationist in the Syndicate of the University. 55. In the ultimate analysis, it was submitted by Mr. Mridul that if the interpretation put by the learned single Judge of Section 16 was taken as accepted, it would bring in the pleasure doctrine in its application through the back door. In this respect, if the provisions of Articles 75(2), 76(4) and 165(3) of the Constitution of India are perused, it would be clearly observed that in all these cases it was specifically provided that the person concerned held the office during the pleasure of the Governor and this was so despite the fact that the General Clauses Act had been made applicable in respect of the constitutional matters by virtue of Article 367 of the Constitution of India. If the subjective satisfaction and the pleasure doctrine were implicit in Section 18 of the General Clauses Act, then the provisions containing pleasure doctrine would not have been there in law. If the subjective satisfaction and the pleasure doctrine were implicit in Section 18 of the General Clauses Act, then the provisions containing pleasure doctrine would not have been there in law. If the pleasure doctrine or the doctrine of subjective satisfaction were to be spelt out in Section 18 as a part of the statutory provision, then that would amount to inserting in Section 18 these doctrines by proxy. 56. Last but not the least Mr. Mridul contended that a perusal of the order of the Chancellor which was manifest enough from the file of the Secretary of the Governor Secretariat would show that the action taken against the writ petitioner appellant was penal in character. Annexure-2 is not, as a matter of fact, an order effecting the removal of the writ petitioner appellant. The order is one which is in the file of the Secretariat of the Chancellor though not communicated to the writ petitioner appellant, but nevertheless it was an order of such character, which had a penal connotation. For passing a penal order, it needs hardly to be stated that the principles of natural justice had to be followed. In conclusion, it was submitted by Mr. Mridul that leaving apart all other aspects of the case, the order effecting the removal of the writ petitioner appellant from the status of a nominated member of the Syndicate was penal in character. This order could not be deemed to have been made on subjective satisfaction of the Governor or in exercise of the pleasure doctrine of the Chancellor as it has been made for the specific reason pertaining to the conduct of the writ petition. It is not a policy decision either. For all intents and purposes, this is a case of punishing the writ petitioner appellant for some overt act done by him and the order is clearly stigmatic. 57. Mr. L. R. Mehta, learned advocate appearing for the University contended before us with all vehemance at his command that the Chancellor as is apparent from the provisions of1 Section 16(1)(iv) of the Act nominates an Educationist as a Member of the Syndicate as his nominee in his subjective satisfaction and there is no limitation on the exercise of that power by. him in this regard the power of nomination, there is an inherent power to withdraw the nomination. him in this regard the power of nomination, there is an inherent power to withdraw the nomination. In the power of nomination under Section 16(1)(iv) of the Act, there is an inherent power to withdraw. This is so because there is no, bar in the provision on the exercise of the power to withdraw. The Chancellor is fully empowered to supersede the nomination which he has already made without assigning any reason and without affording any opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner appellant. 58. Mr. Mehta contended that Section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 also provides that the power to appoint unless a different intention appears and as stated above there is none carried with it the power to remove or dismiss. Section 23 of the General Clauses Act re-enforces this power by providing that the power to make/issue orders, rules, notifications etc. unless there is some repugnancy in the subject or context, carries with it the powers to add to or amend or rescind any order or notification etc. already made or issued. Section 15 of the General Clauses Act makes it clear that such power does not exhaust or cease to exist after its exercise once and it can be exercised from time to time as and when the occasion requires. 59. Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act does not create any bar to remove the members before the expiry of the period mentioned therein. This sub-section only specifies the maximum period beyond which the nominating authority empowered to nominate cannot nominate person as a Member of the Syndicate which in the present context not for more than three years at a stretch. The nomination under Section 16(1)(iv) of the Act does not create any right in the nominee to continue as a member of the Syndicate for a period of three years. This is so because the power Of curtailment of the terms of the nominee is inherent in the power of nomination itself. The writ petitioner appellant as the nominee of the Chancellor, under Section 16(1)(iv) can enjoy the, privilege of membership of the Syndicate, only till the Chancellor does not withdraw the nomination. Mr. Mehta submitted that the nomination which was initially made in favour of the writ petitioner appellant by order dated 15.9.1995 as per Annex. The writ petitioner appellant as the nominee of the Chancellor, under Section 16(1)(iv) can enjoy the, privilege of membership of the Syndicate, only till the Chancellor does not withdraw the nomination. Mr. Mehta submitted that the nomination which was initially made in favour of the writ petitioner appellant by order dated 15.9.1995 as per Annex. I did hot confer any status on the writ petitioner appellant since the status is a creature of law and cannot normally be conferred or created by act of parties unless such action of the parties is carried into the realm of the Private International Law, like marriage etc. The comparison of the provisions of Section 16(1) regarding ex-officio members with the provisions in respect of the nominated members manifestly shows that the formal provisions confer status oh ex-officio members, while the latter provisions make the persons mentioned therein members Of the Syndicate only when the authorities concerned make nomination in their favour. Even the elected members of the Syndicate stand on a different footing, inasmuch as, the electoral college which elects them does not have the power to recall them. There is no question of curtailment of their tenure except on the assumption that the Syndicate is entitled to pass a resolution on the grounds mentioned in the Statute 26(1)(i) and (ii) and such a resolution is passed. 60. Mr. Mehta placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court dated 30.11.1993 passed in Civil Writ Petition No. 229 of 1993 (Suresh Bhardwaj v. Himachal Pradesh University). In the said decision, the notification dated 26.2.1993 terminating the tenure of the petitioner Suresh Bhardwaj as a nominated member of the Executive Council of Himachal Pradesh University was challenged. The Himachal Pradesh High Court on a consideration of the entire materials on record including the provisions of Section 21 of the Himachal Pradesh University Act. 1970 which arc almost similar to Section 16 of the present Act held that the State Government which has the power to nominate its nominee as a member of the Executive Council has inherent and implied powers to remove such a member and that the nominee does not acquire any right on account of the nomination and that he was a member of the Executive Council only till his nomination Was not withdrawn. It Was 'also held that 'the provisions Of sub-section (2) of Section 21 which are also similar to section 16(2) of the present Art do no create any bar to withdrawal of nomination. The Himachal Pradesh High Court further held that authority who has the power to nominate a member has inherent power to remove him by rescinding the earlier notification which is also enshrined in the provisions of Section 20 of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act running almost similar to Section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act. 61. Mr. Mehta also cited the following, decisions to amply support the aforementioned propositions:- 1. Dr. D.C. Saxena v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1987 SC 1463 pages 1465 and 1466 :1987 Lab 1C 1018 at pp. 1021 and 1022) (Para No. 6) 2. Ghanshyam Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1991 Delhi 59, Head Note 'B', pages No. 69 and 70, paras No. 36 and 37. 3. Shri Harisinh Pratapsinh Chavda Gandhinagar v. Sh. Chimanbhai J. Patel, AIR 1991 Gujarat 115 page No. 119, (Para. No. 7). pages No. 120 to 122 paras No. 11, 12 and 13, page No. 123 para No. 19 and page No. 125 para No. 24). 62. Mr. Mehta ultimately submitted that the nomination of the writ petitioner appellant as a Member of the Syndicate made by the Chancellor vide order dated 15.9.1995 Annex 1 did not confer upon the writ petitioner appellant any status of his Own. In this connection, the University also cited the case in Sri. Mahalinga Thambiran Swemingal v. His Holiness Shri La Kasiwasi Arulnandi Thambiran Swamigal reported in AIR 1974 SC 199 , page Nos. 206 and 207 (paras No. 31 to 37). In this case, the Supreme Court observed that `status is a condition imposed by law and not by act or parties though it may be predicated in certain cases on some private act as the contract of marriage'. The Supreme Court further held that `the type of nomination' in case of the Senior member of the Math in question is a concept pertaining to the law of Hindu Religious Endowments' In this view of the matter, the concept of nomination is sui generis and that makes it rather difficult to bring it under any legal rubric. The Supreme Court further held that `the type of nomination' in case of the Senior member of the Math in question is a concept pertaining to the law of Hindu Religious Endowments' In this view of the matter, the concept of nomination is sui generis and that makes it rather difficult to bring it under any legal rubric. It was finally held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that the relationship created by the nomination is one which cannot be put an end to by the Head at his sweet-will and pleasure. 63. Mr. Mehta submitted that the nomination under Section (16)(1)(iv);by the, Chancellor or for that matter by the State Government Section 16(1)(vi) was revocable at the sweety will of the person making the nomination It was contended that the submission of the writ petitioner appellant that the nomination as made by the Chancellor under Section 16(1) (iv) of the Act was irrevocable was not only incorrect but was wholly misconceived and untenable and deserves to be ignored. 64. We cannot agree to such a bald proposition, that the, nomination of one educationist by the Chancellor is to be equated with, the nomination of two persons made by the State Government nor is it conceivable that the nomination once made be revocable at. the sweet-will of the person making the nomination. We have our own doubts whether the power under the General Clause Act specially in Section 18 could be exercised by the Chancellor on his subjective satisfaction so as to remove a nominated member Of" the Syndicate in the manner it has been so done. Subjective satisfaction is normally a matter which pertains to a policy but here in this particular perspective it was made applicable so as to remove the appellant petitioner from the post of nominated member of the Syndicate on account of certain acts of omission and commission by him as is manifestly apparent from the file produced by the Secretariat of the Chancellor. There is also some force in the submission of Mr. Mridul that once the exercise of nomination is made by the.Chancellor under Section 16 (1)(iv) of the Act, his powers are apparently exhausted before another occasion does arise fora fresh term of nomination. 65. There is also some force in the submission of Mr. Mridul that once the exercise of nomination is made by the.Chancellor under Section 16 (1)(iv) of the Act, his powers are apparently exhausted before another occasion does arise fora fresh term of nomination. 65. Even though it was asserted by the respondents that the pleasure doctrine was called into play so as to remove the writ petitioner appellant from the office of a nominated Member of the Syndicate, we cannot spell out that, any policy of the Government was involved in it so as to make the principle applicable. We also cannot subscribe our support to the Division Bench judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Suresh Bhardwaj v. H.P. University (Ibid) which was cited before the learned single Judge and also before us for the proposition that a nominated Member so nominated by cither the State Government or by the Chancellor enjoys privileges at the pleasure of the appointing authority arid That nomination does not create a right much less a fundamental right in him to hold the office for the prescribed number of years and the curtailment of the term of the nominee is inherent and implied. 66. In Dr. D. C. Saxena v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 1463 : (1987 Lab IC 1018) the tenure of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman or a member of the Haryana Board of School Education was brought to a termination before the scheduled period, of tenure of office by an order of the State Government. In that case, Khalid, J. speaking for the Bench observed that "It is apparent, on a comparison of the terms of Section 4-A and Section 9 that while the former deals with the general power of the State Government to terminate the tenure of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members, the latter carves out a special field for dealing with a category Of cases where the State Government may remove a member whose continuance in office is not in the interest of the Board. A case falling within Section 9 is a case where removal must be for reasons personal to the member and flow front his conduct or such other factor which requires that in the interest of justice and fair play, he should he given an opportunity to tender an explanation. A case falling within Section 9 is a case where removal must be for reasons personal to the member and flow front his conduct or such other factor which requires that in the interest of justice and fair play, he should he given an opportunity to tender an explanation. In view that Section 9 carves out a special field, Section 4-A is left with an abridged scope. So abridged, it deals with the cases other than those where the continuance of a member calls for termination in the interest of the Board and requires that such member be given an opportunity of tendering an explanation before such removal. Section 4-A can be said to include cases where the tenure of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman or member is liable to termination on grounds of general policy. Thus, where the termination of the tenure of the Chairman of the Haryana Board of School Education was the result of the policy decision taken by the Government and of dispensing with the services of non-officials and non-MLAs as Chairman of the Board and Corporations, it could not he '-aid that the omission to follow the procedure laid down in Section 9 rendered his removal bad. More so when Section 4-A enabled the Government to remove him and no challenge had been posed to the validity of Section 4-A." 67. In Ghanshyam Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1991 Delhi 59 , initially the petitioner was nominated as the Director of Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Limited, but later on he was superseded by another person. The Said order was challenged inter alia on the ground of mala fide exercise of power by the Government as well as on the ground of constitutional validity of Section 41 (3) of the Multi State Cooperative Society Act, 1984. It was urged in that case that the provision like Section 41 (3) of the Multi State Cooperative Society Act, 1984 which provided that the persons nominated should hold the office during the pleasure of the Government by which he has so nominated was ultra vires. It was also argued that such a nomination could be said to be selection of a person in the office and since it is a public office, there must he deemed to have an element of continuity. It was also argued that such a nomination could be said to be selection of a person in the office and since it is a public office, there must he deemed to have an element of continuity. The bye-laws of the Society provide for a fixed period and in these circumstances, the provision whereby the Directors could hold the office only during the pleasure of the Government under sub-section (3) of Section 41 of tire Act was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and ultra vires of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. However, the said contention was negatived by the Delhi High Court and the provision was held intra vires. The Delhi High Court observed that it was true that the term of office of the elected members of the Board of Directors was for three years and was extend able also. That however did not mean that an absolute right had been created in favour of such persons and that no action could be taken against them during the said term. The term was subject to the pleasure of the Government and the Government had the inherent power to recall or revoke that order. The Delhi High Court also upheld the contention of the respondents that the exercise of power nominating respondent No. 3 in that case in place of the writ petitioner was made on the basis of the subjective satisfaction only. Since it was in exercise of the powers vested in the Government, it was not open to judicial review excepting mala fides. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court did not uphold the contention of mala fides on the part of Shri Devilal, the then Deputy Prime Minister and dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner. 68. However, as stated earlier, taking the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Babu Ram Upadhyaya reported in AIR 1961 SC 751 , Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, N.E.F. Railway, Malegaon reported in AIR 1964 SC 600 , Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 : (1974 Lab IC 1380) Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 : (1985 Lab IC 1393) , Dr. D. C. Saxena v. Statemf Haryana, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1463 : (1987 Lab 1C 1018) and Om Narain Agrawal v. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur,. reported in (1993) 2 SCC 242 : ( AIR 1993 SC 1440 ) , we are of the view that the pleasure doctrine cannot be imposed in Sections 18 and 23 of the General Clauses Act unless the State Legislature makes specific provision in this regard. 69. In Dr. D. C. Saxena v. State of Haryana, (1987 Lab IC 1018) (SC) (ibid) and in Om Narain Agrawal v. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur ( AIR 1993 SC 1440 ) (ibid) only after the change of the State Governments in furtherance of its policy decisions, the incumbents in office were removed on political considerations. But, in the present context, we cannot hold that any political consideration or governmental policy decisions prompted the Chancellor to take such a decision. There was no political reason also to carry forward a policy decision. The writ petitioner appellant was nominated under Section 16 (1)(iv) of the Act as an educationist and he was removed by the impugned order by the Chancellor to make the body of the Syndicate functional, apparently in the interest of the University in particular and the public in general and also to ensure the faithful compliance of the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court as regards making the selections of the permanent teachers. 70. The next question that comes in is the theory of subjective satisfaction. The learned single Judge was apparently satisfied that in accordance with the principle of subjective satisfaction, the Chancellor could have validly revoked his earlier nomination in favour of the writ petitioner appellant and make a fresh nomination in favour of Dr. Verma. It was of no consequence whatsoever that the previous nominated members like Mr. Mathur and Mr. Vyas had not attended any meeting of the Syndicate. Verma. It was of no consequence whatsoever that the previous nominated members like Mr. Mathur and Mr. Vyas had not attended any meeting of the Syndicate. But then as and when the writ petitioner appellant was nominated as a Member of the Syndicate, it was his bounden duty to render the service even though without any remuneration for a public cause by attending the meetings of the Syndicate and if for valid and good reasons the Chancellor thought it proper that he was not discharging his duties properly, the Chancellor could revoke his nomination-in accordance with law so as to make a fresh nomination in favour of some other educationist. 71. Next comes up the question: of arbitrariness in executive action on the part of the Chancellor. It is indeed true that the principle of natural justice has not been followed in this case and an efficacious hearing ought to have been given to the writ petitioner appellant about the flagrant violation that he made as regards his duties as a nominated member of the Syndicate, being so nominated by the Chancellor. Neither do we find out any application of the principle of legitimate expectation or of the principle of promissory estoppel being attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The decision in A. Mahudeswaran v. Government of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1996) 5 JT (SC) 506 is a clear authority on the point. The writ petitioner appellant in the present case was nominated as a Member of the Syndicate for a period of three years purely on pious and altruistic solemn mission to render free services to the cause of learning in the campus of the University and he could not claim any benefit out of the doctrine of legitimate expectation or of promissory estoppel, since none of the fiduciary interests were involved in the present office of there were ever any civil consequences emanating out of the removal from the office of nominated member of the Syndicate. 72. 72. Even though the Statutes and Ordinances framed under the Act did not lay down any condition whatsoever that in case of nomination of the membership of the Syndicate, the incumbent in office has to discharge his functions in a pre-determined way or that his membership was liable to be revoked on the happening of any contingency and the Acts, Statutes and Ordinances did not also prescribe any limitations upon the exercise of the power of the Chancellor to revoke the nomination, still then even though assuming for the sake of argument that the Chancellor had the right to remove him from the office, fairness in principle demanded that the principle,of audi alterm partem ought to have been followed before the Chancellor could decide upon a fresh nomination in place of the present writ petitioner appellant so as to make a further nomination in his place and stead. However, the nomination in office especially as a member of the Syndicate by the Chancellor himself pre-supposed the existence of trust and confidence on the writ petitioner appellant as an educationist and once that trust and confidence was gone because of the acts of omissions and commission of the writ petitioner appellant we do not think it wise to set aside the impugned order of removal of office of the writ petitioner appellant by virtue of the supersession order by which a fresh nomination was made in favour of Dr. Verma. We do not think that any civil consequences ensued in so far as the writ petitioner appellant is concerned in his losing the position of a nominated member of the Syndicate. 73. We are quite in one with the learned single Judge that under the present framework of the constitutional writ jurisdiction, we cannot assess the sufficiency or otherwise of the information on the basis of which the Chancellor exercised his subjective satisfaction and exercised his power under the General Clauses Act so as to remove the writ petitioner appellant from the office of a nominated member of the Syndicate. But, we are satisfied on merits that there were materials in this regard which prompted the Chancellor to remove him for the best interests of the University and for the general public interest. The post-decisional hearing at the present stage would merely be a mockery. But, we are satisfied on merits that there were materials in this regard which prompted the Chancellor to remove him for the best interests of the University and for the general public interest. The post-decisional hearing at the present stage would merely be a mockery. Once the writ petitioner appellant has lost the trust and confidence of a nominated member in his capacity as educationist to serve the interest of the University, it would be no use reverting him back to his formal position and humiliate another reputed educationist Dr. Verma, who has been appointed in his place as a newly appointed nominated member of the Syndicate. 74. We agree with the learned Single Judge that the doctrine of natural justice cannot be made applicable with a strait jacket by way of application of a rigid formula. Even though we deprecate the action of the Chancellor in not having adhered to the audi alterm partem principle in giving the writ petitioner appellant an opportunity of being heard prior to his taking a decision, still then we do not wish to set aside the decision which the Chancellor has taken in the best interest of the University in the facts and circumstances of the present case, by superseding the previous nomination in favour of the writ petitioner appellant and in making a fresh nomination in favour of Dr. Verma. Without entering into the merits on the question as to whether failure of adherence to the tenets of audi alterm partem would vitiate the subsequent nomination, we may ultimately agree on the question of our exercise of discretion in this matter in a writ proceeding in such a way so as to quash the subsequent nomination in favour of Dr. Verma and set aside the same so as to effect continuity of nomination in favour of the writ petitioner appellant, when once he forfeited the trust and confidence of the Chancellor as a nominated member of the Syndicate and almost a year has elapsed since the subsequent nomination. 75. The main principle for upholding the rules of natural justice is to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The concept of natural justice is not capable of a static and precise definition and in every case perhaps a hearing might not have been possible. The Chancellor however was required to act fairly for the purpose of which the power was conferred on him. The concept of natural justice is not capable of a static and precise definition and in every case perhaps a hearing might not have been possible. The Chancellor however was required to act fairly for the purpose of which the power was conferred on him. The duty to act fairly may arise in widely different circumstances and it may arise expressly or impliedly depending upon the context and considerations and that is why it is often said that in non-adjudicative administrative decisions we can only have the general rubric of fairness in the administration and nothing beyond. Except that the writ petitioner appellant was put to some embarrassment or humiliation, he did not suffer in any other tangible manner. Only to set an example that such acts are not perpetuated in future and at least the basic principle of natural justice by way of following the principle of audi alterm partem be followed by the Chancellor or other functionaries in future, when because of his own personal lapses any decision is taken against any incumbent in office, we signal a note of caution that due care and circumspection should abide every decision taken by the administrative Head or the Chancellor, whosoever exercises such powers. 76. With these observations, we dismiss the present special appeal. There will be no order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******