MOHAMED ANWAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS is plaintiff's revision directed against trial Court's judgment and decree dated 4-11-87 passed dismissing his suit filed under Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 ('the Act' for short) in O. S. No. 16/82, on the ground of Res-judicata. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were defendants 1 to 3 in the said suit. ( 2 ) THE parties hereto are referred to according to their respective position in the suit. ( 3 ) THE undisputed facts leading to this revision are as stated as under :the immoveable property in plaint 'a' schedule consisted of 8' open taxi shed which constitute a continous compact open structure with pillars and roof with wall and even flooring'; and 'the rooms situated in the bus-stand at Hampamakatta in the vicinity of the schedule A property' which is show in plaint B schedule. The same belonged to the defendant the-then Mangalore town Municipality which was converted and established into defendant No. 1, 'mangalore City Corporation" in the year 1980 under the Provisions of the Karnataka Municipalities Corporation Act, 1976 ('the Corporation Act' for short ). The said property is, therefore, the 'public premises' within the meaning of Sec. 2 (e) of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised) Act, 1974 (the 'kar. P. P. Act' for short ). In March, 1969 possession of both these items of property was delivered to the original plaintiff M. S. Baliga, since deceased, by the then defendant Municipality for the purpose of running a canteen, on lease according to plaintiff and according to defendants on licence basis. According to plaintiff vast improvements and structural alterations in the suit property were made by him investing huge amounts to suit his hotel business and he had been carrying on his said business therein. In addition, the defendant-Municipality had also given him the property shown in plaint 'c' schedule for his business purpose. When he was so carrying on the said hotel business in the suit property he received the eviction notice dated 24-11-75 from defendant-municipality calling upon him to vacate the plaint schedule A and B property and deliver its vacant possession before 29-11-75, since in its meeting held on 31-1-74 the Municipal Council had resolved to vacate him from the said property. Then plaintiff filed two suits against defendants, viz. Then plaintiff filed two suits against defendants, viz. 1) O. S. No. 644/75 in respect of schedule B premises and 2) O. S. No. 645/75 in respect of schedule A premises, in the Court of Munsiff, Mangalore for the decrees of permanent injunction restraining defendants and its officials and agents, from interfering with his peaceful possession of the said property, pleading that he had been in actual possession and enjoyment thereof and was running the said hotel business on lease basis under defendant-Municipality. ( 4 ) BOTH suits were contested by defendants denying the plaint averments that the suit property was leased out to plaintiff and contending that he was in occupation thereof merely as a licencee which licence period had already expired. On merits both suits came to be dismissed on 31-7-1981 by the trial Court holding that plaintiff was in occupation of the defendant's suit property merely as a licencee for a period of 5 years and the period of said licence having expired on 31-3-74 his occupation thereof since then was that of a trespasser, and, as such, he was not entitled to the remedy of permanent injunction in respect thereof. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER, the defendant-corporation immediately commenced the process of evicting plaintiff from the said schedule 'a' and 'b' property on the night of 31-7-81 and took complete possession thereof on 1-8-1981 after removing all the articles therefrom with police help. The lists of those articles so removed by defendants from said property is given by the plaintiff in D and E schedules of the plaint, the correctness of which was not admitted by defendants. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, it is an admitted fact that possession of A and B schedule property was taken by defendants on 1-8-1981 from plaintiff with the help of police. Plaintiff then filed the Writ Petition No. 16159/81 in this Court seeking the relief of re-delivery of possession of plaint A and B schedule properties. That writ petition was withdrawn by him subsequently. Thereafter, on 20-1-1982 the said O. S. 16/1982 was instituted by him against defendant under Sec. 6 of the Act praying for judgment and decree directing defendants to re-delivery to him possession of A and B Schedule properties with the contents as thereon exist. That writ petition was withdrawn by him subsequently. Thereafter, on 20-1-1982 the said O. S. 16/1982 was instituted by him against defendant under Sec. 6 of the Act praying for judgment and decree directing defendants to re-delivery to him possession of A and B Schedule properties with the contents as thereon exist. ( 7 ) DEFENDANT No. 1 filed his written statement contesting the said O. S. 16/92 on the grounds, inter-alia, that in view of dismissal of plaintiff's said writ petition the suit was barred by Res-judicata. ( 8 ) ON the basis of respective material pleadings of the parties the following necessary issues were raised by the Court-below for determination : (1) Whether the suit is barred by the provision of Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974? (2) Whether the defendants prove that the suit is hit by the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976? (3) Whether the defendants prove that the suit is hit by the principles of res judicata in view of earlier litigations as alleged? (4) Whether the dispossession of the plaintiff in respect of plaint 'a' and 'b' schedule properties is not in due course of law without his consent? (5) (deleted) (6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of possession of 'a' and 'b' schedule premises as claimed ? ( 9 ) WHAT Order? ( 10 ) IN the light of evidence adduced on record by both sides affirmative findings on issue Nos. 3, 4 and 6; and negative finding on issue No. 1 were recorded by the learned trial Judge. In view of his affirmative finding on issue No. 3 he has passed the impugned judgment and decree dismissing the plaintiff's suit. 10-A. It is not in dispute that the trial Court's said decree dated 04-11-1987 was initially challenged by the plaintiff before this Court in R. F. A. 115/88. On his death during pendency of that appeal his LRs. were duly brought on record. Since appeal from the impugned decree of the Court-below passed under Sec. 6 of the Act was not maintainable, it was subsequently converted into present revision. ( 11 ) I have heard the arguments of learned counsel on both sides. ( 12 ) MR. On his death during pendency of that appeal his LRs. were duly brought on record. Since appeal from the impugned decree of the Court-below passed under Sec. 6 of the Act was not maintainable, it was subsequently converted into present revision. ( 11 ) I have heard the arguments of learned counsel on both sides. ( 12 ) MR. Sudakhar Pai strenuously argued assailing the legality of the trial Court's affirmative finding recorded on issue No. 3 on the sole basis of dismissal of plaintiff's said writ petition No. 16159/81. His contention was that though the said writ petition was filed for the relief of re-delivery of suit schedule A and B property but its dismissal does not constitute Res-judicata preventing the plaintiff from bringing a fresh present suit in O. S. No. 16/82 for the same relief for the reason that the said writ was not decided and dismissed on merits. Support for this proposition was drawn by him from a recent decision of Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. M/s. National Construction Company, Bombay, AIR 1996 SC 2367 where S. C. has held to the following effect, discussing material provisions under Sec. 11, C. P. C. "the bar under Sec. 11 of Civil P. C. applies only if the matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit has been heard and finally decided by a Court competent to try such suit. That clearly means that on the matter or issue in question there has been an application of the judicial mind and a final adjudication made. If the former suit is dismissed without any adjudication on the matter in issue merely on a technical ground of non-joinder, that cannot operate as res judicata. "there is no dispute about this legal position regarding applicability of the principle of Res-judicata in a particuclar legal proceeding. There is also no dispute that plaintiff's said W. P. 16159/81 was not decided and disposed of on merit but the same had been dismissed as not pressed. In other words, the said writ petition was withdrawn by the petitioner without taking a decision on its merits of this Court. There is also no dispute that plaintiff's said W. P. 16159/81 was not decided and disposed of on merit but the same had been dismissed as not pressed. In other words, the said writ petition was withdrawn by the petitioner without taking a decision on its merits of this Court. Since the legality or otherwise of the impugned decree of the Court-below having not been adjudicated upon in the said writ petition, its mere dismissal as not pressed cannot be treated doperating as Res-judicata against plaintiff thereby precluding him from bringing a fresh suit against defendant seeking restoration of possession of the said suit property. In that view of the clear legal position the contrary conclusion of the Court-below arrived at on issue No. 3 is patently unsustainable in law and the same is liable to be reversed with a negative finding. ( 13 ) ONCE issue No. 3 thus requires to be answered in the negative; and other two material issue Nos. 4 and 6 being answered by the trial Court in the affirmative and which findings against defendants having remained unchallenged by them in any independent legal proceeding, it necessarily follows that the revision has to succeed. ( 14 ) BUT, then Mr. B. P. Holla, Sr. counsel appearing for defendants vehemently argued questioning the legality of the trial Court's conclusion that plaintiff was evicted by the defendants from the suit property otherwise than in due course of law and, therefore, he was entitled to restoration thereof. The point for consideration would be whether defendants could be permitted to raise objections against validity of trial Court's said affirmative findings, recorded on issue Nos. 4 and 6 against them, they having not chosen to challenge the same by any independent proceeding. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 22 under Or. 41 thereof provides for such an exigency for a respondent in appeal to challenge the lower Court's finding against him on any issue, contending that the same ought to have been decided in his favour. In the case on hand, there is no remedy of appeal against the impugned decree provided to an aggrieved party. 41 thereof provides for such an exigency for a respondent in appeal to challenge the lower Court's finding against him on any issue, contending that the same ought to have been decided in his favour. In the case on hand, there is no remedy of appeal against the impugned decree provided to an aggrieved party. The only remedy available to such a party to challenge the decree is the remedy of revision under Sec. 115, C. P. C. Therefore, on the analogy of the opportunity provided to a respondent in an appeal by the aforementioned provision in C. P. C. to assail the correctness of the trial Court's finding on any issue recorded against him, I find it just and reasonable to hold that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, respondents-defendants herein could be permitted to challenge the legality of the said findings against them recorded in the judgment of the Court-below on issue Nos. 4 and 6 involved in the suit. ( 15 ) FIRSTLY, Mr. B. P. Holla contended, that the finding of the Court-below that plaintiff's eviction from suit schedule property by the defendants was not in due course of law, is illegal and incorrect. He sought to justify the defendant's said action on the ground that same was done in accordance with the relevant provisions contained in Sec. 461 read with Sec. 489 of the Corporation Act. Elaborating this contention he argued that plaintiff was in occupation of the suit property as a licencee under a licence of the defendant-Municipality for a certain period which admittedly expired on 31-3-1974 and on expiry of the same he continued occupation thereof without any further licence from defendants. Therefore, under Sec. 461 r/w. 489 of the Corporation Act, being a trespasser in respect of the suit property, he was liable to be evicted forcibly therefrom by the defendant Corporation. Proposing to rely on a decision of High Court of Bombay in K. K. Verma v. Union of India, AIR 1954 Bombay 358, he further maintained that the plaintiff's occupation of the suit property being that of a trespasser, he was not entitled in law to seek redelivery of the possession of the property invoking Sec. 6 of the Act from the defendant Corporation. The defendant-Corporation, hence it was argued by Mr. The defendant-Corporation, hence it was argued by Mr. B. P. Holla, in exercise of power under S. 461 r/w S. 849 of the Corporation Act evicted the plaintiff from the suit property and have taken its possession; and, as such defendants' action was legal action which was done in accordance with law. So arguing, Mr. B. P. Holla maintained that the act of defendant-Corporation taking possession of the suit property from plaintiff was, therefore, done in due course of law and the same cannot be held otherwise. ( 16 ) LEARNED counsel for plaintiff repelling the submission of Mr. B. P. Holla submitted that the provisions under Sec. 461 read with Sec. 489 of the Corporation Act do not confer any such power on the defendant Corporation authorising the Corporation to forcibly dispossess a person from its immoveable property and take delivery of its possession. Reliance was placed by him in support of this contention on a decision of Supreme Court in Krishna Mahali v. Shobha Venkat, AIR 1989 SC 2097 , and on a recent decision of this Court in Mehaboob Pasa v. Vishwanatha Shetty, ILR 1994 Kant 2353 : (AIR 1994 Kant 350), as also on an unreported decision of this Court in the case of Estate Officer, Legislature Home, Bangalore v. Harry D'souza (W. A. 2384/90) D. D. 27-11-90. ( 17 ) THE authority in K. K. Verma v. Union of India (AIR 1954 Bombay 358) which was cited by Mr. B. P. Holla to support his view that when a licencee becomes a tespasser with respect to the property in his occupation on expiration of his licence period and is forcibly thrown out of possession, he would not be entitled to seek recovery thereof under Sec. 6 of the Act. In that case the High Court of Bombay has observed :"under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under S. 9 and claim possession against the true owner. "reliance was further placed by him for this proposition on a subsequent decision of Supreme Court in Yeshwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968, SC 620 wherein the afore-quoted proposition of Bombay High Court is referred with approval by the Supreme Court. Besides, the Supreme Court has also affirmed in the case of Yeshwant Singh, supra, the law laid down in this regard by Privy Council in AIR 1924 PC 144 that ( AIR 1968 SC 620 at p. 622) :"in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. "further, the law enunciated on the scope of Sec. 6 of the Act by a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Yar Muhammad v. Lakshmi Das, AIR 1959 All 1 is also affirmed by the Supreme Court at Para 12 of its judgment, in the following terms (at p. 623 of AIR) :"law respects possession even if there is not title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. No person can be allowed to become a Judge in his own cause. "a Division Bench of this Court in its unreported decision dated 27-4-1990 in W. A. 2394/90 (Estate Officer, Legislature Home, Bangalore v. Harry D'souza) has denounced eviction from the licenced premises of a licensee after expiry of the licence period by a statutory body or any executive authority following the decision in Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1570 wherein Supreme Court has struck a note of caution thus :"we must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only spacious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order. It is enough to say that they are bona fide in possession of the constructions in question and could not be removed except under authority of law. The respondents clearly violated their fundamental rights by depriving them of possession of the Dharmasala by executive orders. It is enough to say that they are bona fide in possession of the constructions in question and could not be removed except under authority of law. The respondents clearly violated their fundamental rights by depriving them of possession of the Dharmasala by executive orders. Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the Rule of law. "the same position of law in regard to eviction of a licensee by a owner from the occupation of the licenced premises after expiry of licence is reiterated by Supreme Court in its later decision in Krishnamiah Mahale v. Shoba Venkat Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2097 . It has laid down (at p. 2100 of AIR) :"it is a well-settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. "therefore, the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of Supreme Court on the position of law under Sec. 6 of the Act make it crystal clear that a person in settled possession of the property, although his possession may be that of a trespasser, when dispossessed forcibly therefrom by the true owner is entitled to seek restoration of its possession invoking the aid of Sec. 6 of the Act merely on the basis of his prior possession. In that perspective of the legal position, the law stated by High Court of Bombay in K. K. Verma v. Union of India, supra, by M. C. Chegla, J that a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under S. 6 and claim possession against the true owner, could and has to be construed and held as restrictive and limited in its operation against a rank trespasser only-meaning a person who was in forcible occupation of any property and whose such illegal possession thereof was a recent and an unsettled one, and that it will be inapplicable in regard to a trespasser in settled possession of the property. In the case in hand, admittedly, plaintiff's possession of schedule A and B property belonging to the defendant Corporation was lawful in the beginning inasmuch he lawfully occupied the same as a licensee under defendant and had been conducting the hotel business therein, and that it was after expiry of the said licence period, his occupation of which became unlawful and that he continued occupying the same thereafter as a trespasser. In other words, he was a person in settled possession of the property who could not have been evicted thereform by defendant without his consent or otherwise than in due course of the law. He was, therefore, entitled in law to file the present suit under Sec. 6 of the Act against defendants seeking restoration of possession of the said property. The objection of Mr. B. P. Holla is, therefore, without legal substance. ( 18 ) LET me now deal with Mr. B. P. Holla's next contention that plaintiff's eviction from the said property by defendant-Corporation was done in accordance with the aforesaid relevant provisions of the Corporation Act and, therefore, the same cannot be stated as otherwise than in due course of law. In justification of defendant's act of evicting plaintiff from the said property. Mr. B. P. Holla relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Savithri B. Rao v. Corporation of the City of Mangalore, reported in ILR (1986) 1 Kant 2167. The same respondent Mangalore City Corporation herein was also a respondent in that case of Savithri B. Rao. In that case 16 writ petitions were the occupants of 16 shops in the 'public market' belonging to the defendant-Corporation. They were doing their business in those shops as licencees under the latter. They were served with notices under Sec. 369 and 370 of the Corporation Act terminating their licences for default on their part in the payment of licence fee, and calling upon them to stop doing their respective business failing which they would be evicted from said shops by the Corporation exercising its powers reserved for it under Clause 15 of their said licences. The said notices of the Corporation were challenged by the respective occupants of the said shops before this Court by a batch of writ petitions. The said notices of the Corporation were challenged by the respective occupants of the said shops before this Court by a batch of writ petitions. The same was dismissed by the learned single Judge who held that defendant-Corporation was well within its statutory powers under Secs. 369 and 370 to forcibly evict them from the licenced shops. That decision of the learned single Judge was challenged by the aggrieved petitioner in writ appeals before Division Bench of this Court in Savithri B. Rao v. Commissioner, Mangalore City Corporation. The question that arose for its determination in those appeals was : Whether the Corporation could invoke the provisions of Sec. 370 of the Karnataka Municipal Act, 1976 to evict an occupant of a shop in a 'public market' or whether the Corporation is obliged to take recourse to the procedure provided under the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act) 1974. The Karnataka Public Premises Act is referred to in that decision as the 1974 Act'. On examination of the provisions of the law in Secs. 369 and 370 of the Corporation Act the writ appeals were dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court upholding the decision of the learned single Judge. ( 19 ) SEC. 370 deals with Commissioner's control over public markets. The material provision in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 370 reads :"370. COMMISSIONER's CONTROL OVER PUBLIC MARKETS : (1) No person shall, without the permission of Commissioner, or if the fees have been farmed out, of the farmer, sell or expose for sale any animal or article within any public market. (2) Any person who contravenes sub-sec. (1) or any condition of the license or any regulation made under Sec. 378 or in any bye-law made under Sec. 423 or who commits default in payment of the fees leviable under Section 369 may after three days's clear notice be summarily removed from such market by any Corporation Officer or servant and any lease or tenure which any person may possess may be terminated for such period and from such date as the Commissioner may determine without prejudice to the legal rights of the Corporation to prosecute the person or to recover the fees leviable under Sec. 369 and expenses, if any, which the Corporation may incur in such removal. " (Underlining supplied)In the light of these provisions read with Sec. 369 and S. 370 (1), the Division Bench in the case of Savithri B. Rao, (ILR (1986) 2 Kant 2167) supra, answered the aforesaid question in the affirmative holding that : 'it is true that 1974 Act is a special enactment which prescribes a special procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and having regard to the definition of the word 'public premises' in the said Act, every premises belonging to a local authority like the Corporation is a public premises. But it is also a general provision applicable to all premises of the State and all its instrumentalities including local authorities. Sec. 370, however, is a special provision applicable to public markets belonging to the Corporation. It has been incorporated designedly by the Legislature to regulate the occupation of public markets. It has no application to all other buildings/premises of the Corporation, that is, other than public markets. ' ( 20 ) IT is, therefore, clear that in the case of Savithri B. Rao v. Commissioner of Mangalore Corporation (ILR 1986) 2 Kant 2167), the Division Bench has held that the Corporation is empowered under Secs. 369 and 370 of the Corporation Act to summarily evict the licencee occupant of any shop in the public market belonging to it when such occupant is found to have committed breach of licence condition/conditions; and that in view of these special provisions provided in the Corporation Act it was not necessary for the Corporation to have recourse to the Kar. P. P. Act for eviction of such a defaulting licencee. ( 21 ) ADMITTEDLY, in the instant case the said suit property in occupation of the plaintiff was not a public market. Nor was it located in any public market belonging to the Corporation. So undisputably Secs. 369 and 370 are inapplicable to this suit property. The contention of Mr. B. P. Holla was that Corporation had similar power to evict plaintiff therefrom under Sec. 461 read with Sec. 489 of the Act. ( 22 ) I have given my careful consideration to these provisions. They do not contain any provision analogous or similar to that of the one contained in sub-sec. The contention of Mr. B. P. Holla was that Corporation had similar power to evict plaintiff therefrom under Sec. 461 read with Sec. 489 of the Act. ( 22 ) I have given my careful consideration to these provisions. They do not contain any provision analogous or similar to that of the one contained in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 370 extracted above, expressly conferring on any Corporation officer or its servant the power to summarily evict the licencee from the Corporation property on expiry of the licence or on its determination or on breach of any condition thereof. In the absence of any such express provision in Secs. 461 and 489 of the Corporation Act it would be a futile exercise to reproduce the provisions thereof and to proceed to construe their legal import. Moreover, such exercise is also not called for in view of clear pronouncement of the Division Bench of this Court in this behalf in its decision in Savithri B. Rao, (ILR (1986) 2 Kant 2167) supra. At page 2175 of its judgment in that case this Court has made the legal position clear stating that for the purpose of eviction of any unauthorised occupant from its own building/premises other than the public markets the Corporation is obliged to resort to the procedure provided under the Kar. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974. Therefore, the contention of Mr. B. P. Holla that plaintiff was evicted from the said suit property in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Corporation Act is without force and not acceptable. ( 23 ) ANOTHER legal objection that was raised by Mr. B. P. Holla was that plaintiff is precluded in law from claiming restoration of the said suit property when both his said suits in O. S. Nos. 644/75 and O. S. 645/75 for the relief of permanent injunction against defendant-Corporation had been dismissed by the trial Court by its considered judgment holding that as a trespasser thereon he was not entitled to the said relief. This contention of Mr. B. P. Holla, if accepted, would defeat the law under Sec. 6 of the Act. 644/75 and O. S. 645/75 for the relief of permanent injunction against defendant-Corporation had been dismissed by the trial Court by its considered judgment holding that as a trespasser thereon he was not entitled to the said relief. This contention of Mr. B. P. Holla, if accepted, would defeat the law under Sec. 6 of the Act. That apart, the view taken by the trial Court in the said suits that as a trespasser the plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy of injunction itself does not seem to be legally correct view it being the well-settled law that even a trespasser in settled possession of the immoveable property is entitled to protect his possessory right by an injunctive remedy against his forcible eviction even by the true owner of the property. Nevertheless the plaintiff had to suffer the decrees of dismissal in his two suits, he having failed to challenge the same in due course due to peculiar circumstances of the case created by his forcible dispossession from the property by the defendant Corporation immediately after their dismissal by the trial Court. He was in fact successfully prevented by the defendants from having further recourse to the legal remedy of appeal by reason of his forcible ejectment from suit property carried out by the latter with police help on the evening of the very day of dismissal of said suits. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances, dismissal of those suits cannot be stated as operating or creating a legal bar against the plaintiff to seek the legal remedy provided under Sec. 6 of the Act. ( 24 ) ANOTHER legal contention that was raised by Mr. Holla respecting the point of maintainability of the plaintiff's suit was that plaintiff having filed a memo dated 18-11-81 in his said W. P. No. 16159/81 before this Court stating that a compromise was effected between the parties and, therefore, the petition therein may be dismissed unconditionally, he thereby abandoned his right to further agitate the matter. Indisputably, that memo was produced in evidence on record at Ex. D3 in the Court-below. It is also an admitted fact that the defendant-Corporation, who was respondent in the said writ petition did not admit the compromise stated in plaintiff's memo at Ex. D3 and that it had filed its objection resisting the same. Indisputably, that memo was produced in evidence on record at Ex. D3 in the Court-below. It is also an admitted fact that the defendant-Corporation, who was respondent in the said writ petition did not admit the compromise stated in plaintiff's memo at Ex. D3 and that it had filed its objection resisting the same. So the compromise urged by him was no compromise in the eye of law. Hence, he abandoned the same and got his said writ petition dismissed as withdrawn. As such, it cannot be stated that he is bound by the ineffective statement made by him in Ex. D3 memo muchless to construe the same as waiver on his part of his right to seek re-delivery of possession of said property through a regular suit under S. 6 of the Act. This apart, the defendant-Corporation having denied any such compromise between the parties it is estopped from contending that by filing the said memo plaintiff abandoned his right to any other remedy available to him in law. Therefore, the objection of Mr. B. P. Holla is unacceptable. ( 25 ) ONE more point of law raised by Mr. Holla as a ground against maintainability of the plaintiff's suit under Sec. 6 of the Act was that the plaintiff was in occupation of the said suit property of defendant as a trespasser after expiry of the said licence period i. e. with effect from 31-3-1974. On his ejectment by the defendant on 1-8-1981, in view of Sec. 64 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 ('easement Act' for short) he is disentitled to seek restoration of its possession but he is entitled to recovery of compensation only from the Licensor defendant. In support of this contention reliance was sought to be placed by him on a decision of this Court in Honnali Town Municipal Council v. Mahebala Hatwar, reported at S. N. 114 (1971) 1 Mys LJ 50. Countering this argument, learned counsel for plaintiff maintained that Sec. 64 of the Easement Act does not deprive the person who is forcibly dispossessed from the property of his right to seek restoration of possession under Sec. 6 of the the Act and that these provisions of law under two different enactments run complimentary to each other. ( 26 ) LET me now examine the contention of Mr. ( 26 ) LET me now examine the contention of Mr. B. P. Holla with reference to material provisions in Sec. 64 of the Easement Act, and Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Sec. 64 of the Easement Act runs :"licensee's rights on eviction where a licence has been granted for a consideration, and the licensee, without any fault of his own, is evicted by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed, under the licence, the right for which he contracted, he is entitled to recover compensation from the grantor. "sec. 6 of Specific Relief Act reads : (1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. (2) No suit under this section shall be brought :- (a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or (b) against the Government. (3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this Section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed. (4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. "in that case of Honnali Town Municipal Council v. Mahebala Hatwar, (1971 (1) Mys LJ 50 (SN 114)) supra, the licensee in occupation of property on revocation of the licence sought protection under the provisions of the Rent Control Act from the eviction from the property by his grantor. It was held, therein, that the transaction between the parties with respect to the property in dispute was not being a lease the licensee was not entitled to protection of the Rent Control Act. In the course of its order the Court further observed therein that after revocation of licence, the licensee was not entitled to remain in possession of the premises and when he is evicted by the grantor from the property without any fault of his own, the only right conferred by Sec. 64 of the Easements Act on the licensee is one of recovery of compensation from the licensor. The question whether or not by virtue of Sec. 64 of the Easement Act the licensee-forcibly evicted by the licensor from the property, is entitled to seek restoration of possession under Sec. 6 of the Act did not arise for consideration of this Court in that case of Honnalli, supra. It is not expressly held in that case that Sec. 64 of the Act takes away the remedy of restoration of possession available to a forcibly dispossessed licensee under Sec. 6 of the Act on revocation, expiration or termination of the licence. Normally statutory provisions in different enactments dealing with the same subject need application of the rule of harmonious construction in the matter of their interpretation so as to give effect to the respective legislative intendment thereof. A plain reading of both the aforesaid provisions in juxtaposition clearly brings this legal position to the fore that a licensee forcibly evicted by the grantor from the property during continuance of the licence or on revocation or termination or on expiry thereof would have two legal remedies simultaneously available to him against the licensor. They are, (i) the remedy to recover compensation under Sec. 64 of the Easement Act and (ii) to seek restoration of possession under Sec. 6 of the Specific Relief Act : and that one does not bar the other. Therefore, the objection of Mr. B. P. Holla is devoid of legal force. ( 27 ) FOR all the reasons stated and discussed above, I find that the impugned decree of the Court-below is liable to be reversed and the revision deserves to be allowed. ( 28 ) IN the result, the revision is allowed. The impugned decree dated 4-11-87 of the trial Court dismissing the petitioner's suit in O. S. No. 16/82 is set aside and the said suit is decreed. The respondents-defendants shall deliver to the petitioner-plaintiff the possession of the plaint 'a' and 'b' schedule properties as they exist without prejudice to the right of defendant Corporation to recover the same in due course of law. In the circumstances parties to bear their own costs. Revision allowed. --- *** --- .