D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, a Junior Branch Manager posted at Disaratganj Branch of Zila Sahkari Bank ltd. , Bareilly during the period of 1983-84, having been superseded by an order dated 14-5-1984, was subjected to a disciplinary proceedings with the service of a charge-sheet dated 11-12-1984 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition ). The petitioner alleged that his requests for inspection by his letter dated 18-12-1984 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition), was declined by the enquiry officer. While declining such permission, the enquiry officer by a letter dated 9-1-1985 asked the petitioner to submit his reply within one week. By his letter dated 17-1-1985, the petitioner once again asked for inspection of the record before submitting his reply. Ultimately on 15-2-1985 the petitioner was compelled ro submit his reply without being afforded opportunity of inspection. The petitioner by his letter dated 19-2-1985 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) asked for permission to adduce evidence. Despite such request no opportunity either to adduce or to cross examine the witnesses of the prosecution was afforded. Neither any enquiry nor any hearing took place before the enquiry officer. By a letter dated 20-5-1985, an enquiry report dated 28-4-1985 was served upon the petitioner asking him to show cause why punishment of dismissal should net be imposed upon him. On the basis of the said report, the petitioner showed cause by means of his reply dated 23-6-1985 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition ). By a letter dated 24-6-1986 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) the petitioner pointed out that the enquiry officer did not hold any enquiry and that he was not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses nor he was allowed to adduce any evidence in support of his defence. By a letter dated 27-1-1986 the Bank sought for approval of the proposed punishment of dismissal from the U. P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board (hereinafter called as the board) By a letter dated 30-3-1987 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), the Board had given its concurrence to the proposed punishment. The petitioner has challenged this order dated 30-3-1987 passed by the Board being Annexure-10 to the writ petition. ( 2 ) THE writ petition is opposed by respondents. It is alleged en behalf of respondents that the petitioner was asked to show cause through Annexures-1 and 2 to the writ petition. The petitioner has challenged this order dated 30-3-1987 passed by the Board being Annexure-10 to the writ petition. ( 2 ) THE writ petition is opposed by respondents. It is alleged en behalf of respondents that the petitioner was asked to show cause through Annexures-1 and 2 to the writ petition. The charge-sheet was submitted after the preliminary enquiry giving details of each charges. In the charge-sheet itself it was pointed out that if the petitioner wants personal hearing and intends to adduce any evidence in his defence or if he wants to cross-examine any witness in that event he should indicate the names and address of such witnesses and his desire to be heard in the reply itself, But the petitioner did not indicate anything in his reply. On the other hand, the reply was evasive. In the reply almost all the charges were admitted. The alleged letter dated 19-2-1985, contained as Annexure-6 to the writ petition, was never received by the Bank or by the Enquiry officer and it is not available on their records. The enquiry proceeding was based on records and no oral evidence was adduced or relied upon by the disciplinary authority and, therefore, there was no question of cross examining any witness. Since the petitioner did net propose to adduce any evidence nor he had asked for persona) hearing, therefore, it was not necessary to give any personal hearing. The enquiry officer proceeded on the basis of record. Even on the second show cause issued, proposing the punishment, the petitioner did not indicate in the reply thereto that personal hearing was denied or that he was net permitted to adduce any evidence or examine any witness in his defence. Nowhere in reply he had wispered about the case now sought to be made out. He has also not pointed out in any of the two replies that he was denied inspection of documents On the other hand in the second show cause, he had admitted that at the time of inspection of these documents, he had found something which statement is apparent from his reply to the second show cause The Beard had given concurrence to the proposal rightly. The petitioner having not challenged the order of termination passed by the Bank pursuant to the concurrence given by the Board, the writ petition is not maintainable. ( 3 ) MR. The petitioner having not challenged the order of termination passed by the Bank pursuant to the concurrence given by the Board, the writ petition is not maintainable. ( 3 ) MR. A. Kumar, learned counsel appearing in support of the petition assailed the order dated 30-3-1987, Annexure-10 to the writ petition, on several grounds. First, he contends that the enquiry is vitiated on the principle of audi alteram partem. Inasmuch as at no stage of proceeding, the petitioner was afforded any opportunity of hearing and that no enquiry at all has been held or had taken place before the enquiry officer and that inspection of the documents as requested by the petitioner were declined. Secondly, he contends that before granting concurrence it is incumbent upon the Board to give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer in view of the fact that the Board while giving concurrence in exercision quasi judicial authorities under Regulation 87 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Employed Service regulations 1975, hereinafter referred to as the said Regulation in which it is so implicit inasmuch as such concurrence has civil con sequence. Whenever civil consequence is inflicted on account of certain decisions taken in exercise of quasi judicial function giving of an opportunity to the person visited with such civil consequence is implicit. He elaborated his submission that similar provisions as existing in Section 16 (g) of the U. P. Intermediate education Act which requires prior approval and Section 33 and Section 22-A of U. P. Industrial dispute Act, 1947 which postulate giving of hearing to the delinquent. He relied on certain decisions in support of his contention which I shall be referring to shortly hereinafter. His last contention was that in similar circumstances, one Virendra Kumar was awarded lesser punishment though he was found guilty of the same charges Therefore the Bank and the Board had discriminated as between the petitioner and the said Virendra Kumar and as such the order of discharge passed against the petitioner is arbitrary. ( 4 ) MR. His last contention was that in similar circumstances, one Virendra Kumar was awarded lesser punishment though he was found guilty of the same charges Therefore the Bank and the Board had discriminated as between the petitioner and the said Virendra Kumar and as such the order of discharge passed against the petitioner is arbitrary. ( 4 ) MR. S. N. Upadhyaya, learned counsel appearing en behalf of respondent No. 2 on the other hand contends that since the petitioner did not specify in either of the two replies though specifically asked to indicate his desire to be heard personally, the petitioner cannot agitate the point that he was not given hearing] Since no oral evidence was produced, therefore, there was no question of giving any opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine any witness. Since the petitioner himself did not propose to adduce any evidence or examine any witness, there was no scope for giving him any opportunity, particularly when the entire proceeding is based on records. The petitioner had never complained in either of his reply that he was not given inspection of the documents. On the other hand, he refers to inspection of documents in his second reply. The alleged letter dated 19-2-1985 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition, is not on record and he alleges that the same manufactured for the purpose of present case, Mr. Upadhyaya, took me through various Annexures to the writ petition while translating the same at the bar pointed out that the petitioner had virtually admitted the charge and that ail the charges were proved.-He next contends that Regulation 87 of the said Regulation does not postulate giving of any hearing to the delinquent before grant of concurrence by the Board, He relied on several decisions in support of his said contention. His last contention was that the impugned order is not an arbitrary one and there is no scope of discrimination since the chaiges were different so far as the said Virendra Kumar is concerned and that the finding of guilt was also different. ( 5 ) FROM a perusal of the materials placed before this court it appears that the petitioner had asked for inspection by ,his two letters dated 18-12-1984 and 17-1-1985 which are Annexures 2 and 3 to the writ petition. ( 5 ) FROM a perusal of the materials placed before this court it appears that the petitioner had asked for inspection by ,his two letters dated 18-12-1984 and 17-1-1985 which are Annexures 2 and 3 to the writ petition. In his reply dated 15-2-1985 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) nowhere he mentions that he was not given inspection of there documents. Neither he had asked for inspection of documents in order to submit any further or better reply. No whisper was made even in his second reply that he was not given inspection of documents. The petitioner has alleged refusal of inspection in paragraph 9 of the writ petition. In paragraph No. 7 of the counter affidavit the said fact has been denied and it has been pointed out that all the records were available for inspection. In the absence of any whisper about refusal of inspection in either of the two replies, it is not possible to hold that the inspection was denied. ( 6 ) ADMITTEDLY no hearing took place. Admittedly, the entire proceeding was based on record. No oral evidence was relied upon by the disciplinary authority. In either of the two replies, the petitioner had never asked for personal hearing though specifically asked to indicate the same in both the show cause notices. If the petitioner does not opt for personal hearing and indicate his desire to be hard in the reply or otherwise, it is not incumben upon the disciplinary authority to give any hearing. It is the option of the delinquent. If the delinquent wants to adduce evidence, the disciplinary authority has no alternative but allow him to adduce evidence. If any oral evidence is relied upon in that event the disciplinary authority is bound to give opportunity to the delinquent to cross-examine such witnesses. Unless the delinquent expresses his desire, it is not incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to give hearing to the petitioner particularly when despite being asked he did not indicate his desire to be heard in his reply end therefore the proceeding had proceeded on the basis of record. Then again the second show cause was given in which again the petitioner was asked to indicate his desire if he wants personal hearing. Even then the petitioner did not express any desire towards that end in his second reply. Then again the second show cause was given in which again the petitioner was asked to indicate his desire if he wants personal hearing. Even then the petitioner did not express any desire towards that end in his second reply. He had also net taken the point that no hearing was given in the enquiry or that he was refused permission to adduce evidence. A perusal of Annexures 3, 4 and 5 relating to proceedings as are annexed indicate that Annexures 3, 4 and 5 were received under dated signature whereas neither annexure-6 nor Annexure-9 to the writ petition shows any such receipt. Despite the averment made by the respondents that these documents are not available on record, in the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner having asserted that he will produce the receipt at the time of hearing, no such receipts are produced by him at the hearing. Annexures 3, 4 and 5 and 8 to the writ petition bears receipt on those documents itself whereas Annexures 6 and 9 does not bear any such receipts. On the basis of allegation and counter allegation the facts being disputed and the same are not being possible to be decided on the basis of records, this court is unable to interfere with such disputed facts. Unless the petitioner comes with the receipt which he asserted to produce in his rejoinder, since it has been assailed by the respondents that these documents are not record, they can not be asked to prove negative facts. At the same time, nothing is indicated in annexure-8 that despite his letter dated 15-2-1985 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) he was not given opportunity to adduce evidence or examining the evidence. Thus it can not be said that the petitioner was refused opportunity of hearing despite his desires to be heard. He had neither raised the said question in his second reply. While examining the proceedings of the disciplinary authority in exercise of writ jurisdiction this court exercises revisional power which is a restricted one White exercising such power, the High Court does not act as an appellate authority nor does it sit on appeal. The scope of jurisdiction is confined to the examination not of validity or justification of the decision but of the decision making process. The scope of jurisdiction is confined to the examination not of validity or justification of the decision but of the decision making process. In the present case the petitioner having not desired to be heard and never intended to adduce evidence as it appears from the record and over and above, the petitioner having virtually admitted some of the charges and pleaded that he will be cautious in future, it can not be said that there is any infirmity in the decision making process in the absence of personal hearing in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 7 ) MR. A. Kumar during his argument has laid great stress. On the interpretation of Regulation 87 of U. P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulation, 1975. Before embarking upon the scope of Regulation 87 we may refer to the Regulation 84 and 85 of the said regulations regulation 84 of she said Regulation provides and specifies the penalties end the manner in which the same can be imposed. Sub-clause (iii) to Regulation 84 of the said regulation prescribes that no penalty except censure shall be imposed unless a show cause notice had been given to the employee and he has either failed to reply within the specified time or his reply has been found to be unsatisfactory by the punishing authority. In the present case a show cause has been given and the reply was also received. Clause (iv) (a) of Regulation 84 of the said regulation requires that the chargesheeted employee shall be awarded punishment by the appropriate authority according to the seriousness of the offence; provided that no penalty under sub-clause (e), (f) or (g) of clause (i) shall be imposed without recourse to disciplinary proceedings. Disciplinary proceedings is required to be conducted as provided in Regulation 85 of the said Regulations. Disciplinary proceedings is required to be conducted as provided in Regulation 85 of the said Regulations. Regulation 85 provides that: " (i) The disciplinary proceedings against an employee shall be conducted by the Inquiring officer (referred to in clause (iv) below) with due observance of the principles of natural justice for which it shall be necessary (a) The employee shall be served with a charge-sheet containing specific charges and mention of evidence in support of each charge and he shall be required to submit explanation in respect of the charges within reasonable time which shall not be less than fifteen days; (b) Such an employee shall also be given an opportunity to produce at his own cost or to cross-examine witnesses in his defence and shall also be given an opportunity of being heard in person, if so desires. " The petitioner has not raised any question of infraction of Clause (a) above. Counsel for the petitioner with reference to Clause (b) above does not submit that even though the delinquent may not desire still then hearing is to be given He proceeds on the basis that despite the petitioner desired to be heard, no hearing was given. Clause (b) clearly specifies that opportunity of hearing is to given if the delinquent so desires The delinquent may also adduce evidence or cross-examine witnesses in his defence. ( 8 ) CLAUSE (b) does not make any distinction with regard to opportunity to produce or cross examine witnesses in dafence and opportunity of being heard in person. It does not split up the opportunity into two parts. It is one and the same scheme of affording opportunity in terms of principles of Audi-Alteram-Partem. The opportunity to produce or cress-examine witnesses and being heard in person is one and the same process of defence. The phrase "if so desires" governing whole of the Clause (b ). Inasmuch as framing of sentence does not use any punctuation between the word "in his defence" and "land shall also be given". The scope of clause (b) is that a delinquent is to be allowed opportunity to produce or cross-examine witnesses in defence as well as opportunity of being heard in person, only when he so desires. The desire is also to be expressed. A desire kept within the heart and uncommunicated to the disciplinary authority is not a desire contemplated under Clause (b ). The desire is also to be expressed. A desire kept within the heart and uncommunicated to the disciplinary authority is not a desire contemplated under Clause (b ). It is through an expression the desire is to be communicated. The delinquent is given option. Such option is to be exercised by the delinquent through concrete action. In the present case the chargesheet had expressly stipulated that the delinquent if so desire to examine or cross examine the witnesses in defence and be heard in person, he may indicate the same. This option was given to the delinquent in writing requiring him to indicate his desire In terms of Clause (b) in writing. The petitioner having not expressed such desire in the first reply and not alleging in the second reply that he was declined such opportunity despite his desire being expressed and even not having indicated such desire in the second reply. Clause (b) can not be attracted, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, ( 9 ) REGUIATION-87 of the said Regulations, 1975 postulate that "order imposing penalty Under sub-clauses (e) to (g) of Clause (1) of Regulation No. 84 shall not be passed except with the prior concurrence of the Board. The expression used in Regulation 87 is short end simple It does not brook any scope for confusion or amoiguity. It requires the committee of management to pass an order imposing penalty only after obtaining concurrence of the Board. In granting concurrence, the Board does not hold the enquiry. The disciplinary proceeding, as observed earlier, is to be held in the manner provided in Regulation 86 of the said Regulations, which in Clause (iv)provides that "the Inquiring officer shall be appointed by the appointing authority or by an officer of the society authorised for the purpose by the appointing authority ; provided that the officer at whose instance disciplinary action was started shall not be appointed as an inquiring officer nor shall the Inquiring officer be the appellate authority. " While Regulation 84 in Clause (iv) (b) provides that "no employee shall be removed or dismissed by an authority other than by which he was appointed unless the appointing authority has made prior delegation of such authority to such other person or authority in Writing" Role of the Board is confined to the grant of concurrence to the order imposing penalty by the disciplinary authority. The grant of concurrence is only an administrative power of supervision As it appears from the scheme of the said regulation/the Board does net act as an appellate authority. As best, it can be said that it exercise a supervisory power in examining the process of the disciplinary proceeding. The concurrence by the Board is a check and a balance on the arbitrary and illegal exercise of power by the appointing or the disciplinary authority. It has only to examine as to whether the order imposing penalty has been passed arbitrarily or capriciously by the disciplinary authority. It is only a supervising power that is exercised with reasonable care and cautions. The only duty that is cast in Regulation 87 of the said Regulations, is to examine or scrutinise the records and material placed before the Board in connection with the disciplinary proceedings. This scrutiny or examination is implicit in Regulation 87 of the said Regulations, 1975. The grant of concurrence is an act done administratively. To read that grant of opportunity to the delinquent while granting concurrence is implicit in Regulation 87 would amount to readings something extreneous in Regulation 87. In the absence of any expressed provision used in Regulation 87 this court can not impose something more which had never been intended by the legislature. The intention of the legislature to incorporate concurrence of the Board in Regulation 87 never intended to prolonging the disciplinary proceedings into a third stage. In any event, giving of an opportunity is required only during the enquiry. The Board has never been intended to be concerned or connected with the enquiry or the disciplinary proceedings. The order imposing penalty is passed after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. It is the disciplinary authority or the appointing authority who is authorised to pass the order imposing penalty. The board has net empowered to pass any order imposing penalty but the disciplinary/appointing authority imposing penalty has been made subject to the concurrence of the Board. The rule audi-Alteram-Partem is not implicit in Regulation 87. In the case of Dharampal Singh v. Zila sahkari Bank and Ors. 1993 (2) UPLBEC 1011 this court has held that the Board exercises administrative power of supervision and alt that it has to do is to act reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously in discharge of its duty in giving the concurrence sought. In the case of Dharampal Singh v. Zila sahkari Bank and Ors. 1993 (2) UPLBEC 1011 this court has held that the Board exercises administrative power of supervision and alt that it has to do is to act reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously in discharge of its duty in giving the concurrence sought. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner relied on para-15 of the decision in the case of Scheduled caste and Weaker Welfare Association (Regd) and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. , AIR 1991 SC 1117 , in support of his contention that giving of opportunity before granting concurrence by the Board is implicit in Regulation 87 of the said Regulation. The ratio decided in the said case does not support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner because of the distinction that the ratio therein was conceived only in support of giving of opportunity during hearing while conducting inquiry. The Board under Regulation 87 does not conduct any inquiry, Board has never been intended to be substituted either as Inquiry authority or the appellate authority or the authority to supervise the inquiry. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner vehmentally argued that while granting concurrence, the board is bound to give reason. According to him, the Board discharges quasi judicral function while granting concurrence, and therefore, it is necessary that the Board should give reason for granting of concurrence. In the present case, the Board has recorded in Annexure-10 that having scrutinised the material with regard to the disciplinary proceedings, it was granting concurrence to the penalty proposed. ( 12 ) IN the case of Prabhu Dayal Grover v. State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and Ors. , 1995 JT (7)SC 207 it is held that Appellate authority is not required to give reasons when it records that it has examined material and had applied its mind and concurs with the decision of the disciplinary authority which is bound to give reason in view of ratio decided in the case of S. N. Mukherji v. Union of India and Ors. , 1990 (4) SCC 594 . , 1990 (4) SCC 594 . Relying on the ratio in the case of Prabhu Dayal grover (supra) it can very well be said that the Board which was not sitting on appeal and neither being the Appellate or revising authority is never required to give reasons in terms of the ratio decided in the case of S. N. Mukherji (supra) since it has exercised administrative function of giving concurrence only by way of check and balances so as to subject the disciplinary authority to such checks and balances. In the case of State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, 1996 JT (3) SC 722 it has been observed that "justice means Justice between both the parties. The interest of justice equally demands that guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the end of justice, The principle of natural justice are to achieve the means of justice. They can not be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter productive exercise. " ( 13 ) AFTER discussion of all the cases on the question involved in the said case the Apex court had summerised the principles in para 34 of the said judgment. We are not concerned with all other observations as has been evolved in the said para for our present purpose. The facts and circumstances of the case leads to the scope of Clause 4 (b) of para 34 of the said Judgment which runs as follows : "in the case of violation of a procedural provision which is of a mandatory character, it has to be assertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former then it must be seen whether the delinquent office has waived the said requirement either expressly or by his conduct if he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment can not be set aside on the ground of said violation, if on the other hand it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the court or the Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar. The ultimate test is always the same viz. test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing as it may be called. " ( 14 ) ADMITTEDLY in the present case the provision contained in Clause (b) of Regulation 85 is the procedural provision of mandatory character and is provided in the Interest of person proceeded against. Despite having given opportunity to indicate whether he wants to examine or cross-examine the witnesses in his defence and be heard in person, he having not indicated the same, has waived the said requirement by his conduct, and, therefore, the case squarely comes within the ambit of Clause 4 (b) of para 34 of the said judgment. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has laid great stress on the ratio decided in the case of S. N. Mukherji (supra) to bring home his contention that hearing is to be given. The ratio decided therein does not help the petitioner in view of distinguishing facts and circumstances of the present case as observed earlier while referring to the decision in the case of S. N. Mukherji (supra) herein-before. ( 16 ) WITH regard to the third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, nothing is available on the record to show that Virendra Kumar was subject to an enquiry under identical charges and that he was found guilty of the same charges Though the petitioner had alleged that virendra Kumar was subjected to precisely to the same charges but the chargesheet has not been produced. Neither the enquiry report against the said Virendra Kumar is available In such circumstances on the basis of denial of such statement, (made by the petitioner in para 20 of the writ petition,) by respondent, in its counter affidavit in para 18 it is not possible for this court to enter into such disputed question of fact and come to any conclusion. The question of inflicting punishment, therefore, cannot be said to be discriminatory or arbitrary. The dismissal of punishment is dependent on the subjective assessment of the gravity of charges proved which may differ en the basis of the situation emerging. Nothing is on record to show that on which basis the enquiry against the said Virendra Kumar has held and what was the charges and what was proved against him and what was the gravity of the charges proved. Therefore it would not be safe to decide the question on the basis of scant allegations made by the petitioner and that too being disputed by respondents. Therefore, there is no substance in the third point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 17 ) FOR the reasons stated above I am not Inclined to interfere with the order impugned. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to casts. .