JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This is defendants appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 8-11-1996 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Raigarh is Civil Appeal No. 2-A/95, arising out of judgment and decree dated 2-4-1992 passed by the IIIrd Civil Judge, Class-II, Raigarh in Civil Suit No. 65-A/85. 2. The material facts necessary for determination of this appeal are as follows. The respondent filed Civil Suit No. 65-A/85 against the appellants claiming that he was the landlord of the suit property and the appellants were his tenants at the rate of Rs. 200/- (Rupees Two Hundred) per month. The respondent claimed that he acquired the suit property by virtue of a registered gift-deed dated 3-5-1965 executed by Rajpal Goyal and Indrapal Goyal. He claimed that the suit property was let out by him to the appellants for business purpose. He claimed that appellants were liable to be evicted under Section 12 (1) (f) of the MP. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act') as the respondent wanted to start his business at Raigarh and he had no alternative accommodation of his own. The second ground for eviction was based on the provisions of Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act'. It was claimed that the appellants had denied the title of the respondent in the written statement and consequently adversely and substantially affected the interest of the respondent/landlord and thereby furnished him a ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act'. The respondent pleaded another set of facts which gave him a right to evict the appellants under the aforesaid section. He stated that the suit premises were let out for non-residential purpose, but the appellants used a part of it for residential purpose without the consent of the landlord/respondent and thereby did an act which was inconsistent with the purpose for which they were let in. The respondent raised a ground under Section 12 (1) (k) of 'the Act' by asserting that appellants had used the terrace as the garden and consequently coused substantial damage to the house. The respondent took the plea of non-payment of rent even after service of notice of demand as a ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (a) of 'the Act'. The respondent took the plea of non-payment of rent even after service of notice of demand as a ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (a) of 'the Act'. The last ground for eviction pleaded by the respondent was that due to heart attack, he wanted to wind-up his business at Madras and start afresh his business of iron and steel at Raigarh and he pleaded further that he had to alternative accommodation of his own at Raigarh which was suitable for business of iron and steel. 3. The appellants in their written statement denied the grounds raised by the respondent. They denied that the premises in question were let by the respondent. They claimed that it was let out by the uncle of respondent Shrikishan. It was claimed that the respondent was not owner of the suit premises. They challenged the gift-deed in fovour of the respondent by asserting that it was invalid. It was claimed that Shrikishan was the real landlord. It was denied that the interest of the respondent was in any way adversely affected by the denial in the written statement. They denied that the suit property was used by them for any inconsistent purpose without the consent of their landlord. Shrikishan had permitted them to do so. It was denied that the respondent had let out the suit property for the purpose of business. It was claimed that the property in question was let out only for residential purpose. The appellants asserted that a small shop was opened in the ground floor of the apartment with the consent of the landlord. The respondent had no title to the suit house and, therefore, the appellants were not the tenants of the respondent. The appellants asserted further in the alternative that they had deposited the rent in the Court, therefore, they were liable to be protected. They also claimed that the respondent did not need that suit shop bona fide. He had wanted to enhance the rent and, therefore, he had filed the suit for letting it out at a higher rent. There was further assertion to the effect that the respondent had an alternative accommodation in the name of his wife at kotra Road. He had sold this 450059 Sq. Feet of the plot after sub-dividing it. This fact showed that the respondent had no bona fide requirement for starting any business at Raigarh. There was further assertion to the effect that the respondent had an alternative accommodation in the name of his wife at kotra Road. He had sold this 450059 Sq. Feet of the plot after sub-dividing it. This fact showed that the respondent had no bona fide requirement for starting any business at Raigarh. The appellants also denied that they were liable to be evicted under Section 12 (1) (k) of 'the Act'. They further alleged that the suit was not maintainable as the respondent did not join all the partners of the firm as parties to the suit. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit filed by the respondent and held that suit property was let out at the rate of Rs. 200/- (Rupees Two Hundred) per month by the respondent to the appellants. It held that suit property was let out for non-residential purpose and the appellants had used these premises for residential purpose without the consent of the landlord. It was held by the trial Court that the appellants had denied the title of respondent in written statement and, therefore, the respondent was entitled to a decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' on both the counts (i) that the appellants had utilized the suit premises for residential purpose without obtaining any permission of the respondent and (ii) that they had denied the title of the respondent. The trial Court further held that the appellants had caused damage to the suit property by cultivating a garden on the terrace of suit property and, therefore, they liable to be evicted. The trial Court also granted decree to the respondent on the ground of bona fide requirement of the respondent for opening a shop and office for business. It held that the respondent did not have alternative suitable accommodation for that purpose in the town of Raigarh. The trial Court declined to grant decree under Section 12 (1) (a) of 'the Act' as that ground was not proved. 5. In appeal, the lower appellate Court up-held the eviction decree of the trial Court on the ground under Section 12 (1) (c) and 12 (1) (e) of 'the Act'. It declined to accept the finding of trial Court for eviction of the appellants under Section 12 (1) (k) of 'the Act'. 6. 5. In appeal, the lower appellate Court up-held the eviction decree of the trial Court on the ground under Section 12 (1) (c) and 12 (1) (e) of 'the Act'. It declined to accept the finding of trial Court for eviction of the appellants under Section 12 (1) (k) of 'the Act'. 6. In this appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed by this Court by order dated 18-12-1996. (i) Whether the first appellants Court was justified in holding that the respondent/plaintiff was entitled to evict the appellants/defendant on the ground of disclaimer of the title and on he ground of bona fide need for non-residential purposes ? (ii) Whether the findings recorded by the two Courts below are not binding in this second appeal as the findings are based on mis-reading and are vitiated because of non-consideration of the material evidence ? 7. Shri Ravindra Shrivastave, counsel for the appellants vehemently attacked the judgment passed by the lower appellate Court holding that the respondent was entitled to claim eviction on the basis of the pleadings in the written statement of the appellants. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants was that the interest of the respondent was not likely to be "affected adversely and substantially" by the stand of the appellants. The appellants withdrew the statement made during the evidence accepting Ghanshyam as the owner of the suit property. The learned counsel for the appellants sought to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Majati Subbarao Vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (deceased) by L. Rs., reported in AIR 1989 SC 2187 and referred to the decisions rendered in the case of Balveersingh Vs. Kishanlal, reported in A.I.R. 1988 MP. 225 and in the case of Nebraj Vs. Amrit kaur, reported in 1973 J.L.J. 445. The learned counsel for the appellants further attacked the finding of the lower appellate Court that suit house was let out for non-residential purpose. The learned counsel Shri Shrivastava submitted that the suit house was let out for both residential and non-residential purposes. He assailed the findings and the conclusion of the Court below as perverse and argued that the evidence on record suggested that house was let out for residential and non-residential purposes both and it was not possible to split the tenancy for the non-residential and the residential purpose separately. He assailed the findings and the conclusion of the Court below as perverse and argued that the evidence on record suggested that house was let out for residential and non-residential purposes both and it was not possible to split the tenancy for the non-residential and the residential purpose separately. Therefore, the respondent could not claim to evict the appellants under Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act'. In the alternative, it was submitted that evidence on record disclosed that the dominant purpose of letting the house was residential, and even if, the appellants used a small part of the suit property for the purpose of a shop, it could not be said that the appellants were entitled to be evicted under Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act'. Further alternative submission was that this Court should give an independent finding on the point of nature of tenancy as the Court below failed to understand the nature of controversy. It was also argued that the suit must also fail on the ground that respondent was owner of the suit property and, therefore, the appellants could not be evicted on the ground of bona fide requirement. 8. Smt. June Choudhary alongwith Shri Prashant Mishra, counsel for the respondent submitted that the finding of the lower appellate Court is binding in a second appeal and the contention of the appellants cannot be accepted. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that the respondent bona fide required the suit house for non-residential purpose and this fact amply established by evidence on record. It was also established that respondent was the landlord of the suit property. There is nothing in the evidence on record to hold that suit property was let out for composite purpose. It was established from evidence on record that respondent wanted to shift from Madras to Raigarh as he was suffering from heart disease. He had small children and he wanted to settle in his home-town. Therefore, the bona fide requirement of respondent was proved and the appellants could not re-open the finding of fact recorded against the appellants in this appeal. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that so far as Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' is concerned, it is well established that denial of title in written statement furnished a ground for eviction. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that so far as Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' is concerned, it is well established that denial of title in written statement furnished a ground for eviction. The learned counsel for the respondent supported the conclusion of the lower appellate Court on the other aspects of Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' by submitting that this Court should not disturb the finding of fact recorded by the Court below. 9. The aforesaid two questions of law are sub-divided into three questions as follows. The first question relates to eviction decree under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' and the second question under Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act'. The third question relates to the findings of the Court generally. 10. This Court would take-up the question under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' and examine the findings of the Court below from the point of view of question No. 3 with regard to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. It appears to this Court that an important question of law is raised by the appellants regarding the 'denial of title' in the written statement. It is not in dispute between the parties that the respondent specifically asserted in the plaint that he is the owner and the landlord of the suit house. He came-up with a plea that the suit property was let out by him at the rate of Rs. 200/- (Rupees Two Hundred) per month. Since this fact of letting out by the respondent was specifically denied, it would be necessary to consider the record of the case to find out if the Court below arrived at this conclusion by mis-reading the evidence or ignoring the material evidence on record. The case of the respondent as pleaded in the plaint appears to be clear and specific. He says in the plaint that he was the owner of the suit property by the virtue of gift-deed executed by Rajpal Goyal and Indra Pal Goyal and it was he who let out the suit house on 3-11-1967. On the other hand, the appellants denied that suit house was let out by the respondent and he was the landlord of the suit house. On the other hand, the appellants denied that suit house was let out by the respondent and he was the landlord of the suit house. It was pleaded by them in paragraph 5 of the written statement that the suit house was let out by the uncle of the respondent. The evidence of the respondent Ghanshyam was to the effect that it was he who let the suit house to the appellants. His evidence was supported by the evidence of PW-6, Ratanlal Gupta. Shri kishan, PW-3 who was the uncle of the respondent was not cross-examined by the appellants to show if he let out the suit property. Contrary to the pleadings of the appellants, the appellants No. 2 Bhojraj (DW-1) took the stand in the witness box that the suit property was let out by Chhotelal, Shri kishanlal and Brijlal. The Ex. D-1 to Ex.D-9 show that the appellants were paying rent to the respondent. It is thus clear that the finding arrived by the Court below was based on appreciation of evidence and there appears no infirmity in this finding recorded by the Court below and it is not open to attack on the grounds recorded in question No. 3. 12. Once, it is held that initial relationship of landlord and tenant was entered into by the parties, the estoppel contained in Section 116 of the Evidence Act becomes operative and the appellants are not entitled to challenge the title of their landlord during the continuance of the tenancy to claim that the respondent had no title to suit property when they were let in. Therefore, ordinarily the appellants were estopped from challenging the title of the respondent in view of Section 116 of the Evidence Act. This in not a case where the appellants are challenging the derivative title of the respondent. However, there appears to be an exception to plea of estoppel raised by the landlord in case of suit filed for the eviction of the tenants under Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act'. It reads as under. This in not a case where the appellants are challenging the derivative title of the respondent. However, there appears to be an exception to plea of estoppel raised by the landlord in case of suit filed for the eviction of the tenants under Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act'. It reads as under. Sec. 12 (1) (f) : "that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is owner thereof or of any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. 13. It may be clear from the aforesaid that under Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act' plaintiff, if he is not filing the suit for whose benefit he has held the accommodation, in the capacity of the landlord, must prove that he is the owner of the suit-property. A similar provision exists in Section 12 (1) (e) of 'the Act'. What could be the reason for such a provision ? It does not find place in other sub-sections of Section 12 of 'the Act'. This is so because the definition of landlord under Section 2 (b) of 'the Act' shows that he is the person who receives or is entitled to receive the rent on account of or on behalf of the category persons mentioned in the Section. The concept of ownership is normally not germane to a landlord and tenant suit. Therefore, it is necessary to ponder why smuggle in this concept for two sub-section, 12 (1) (e) and 12 (1) (f) of the Act' It can be seen that so far as bona fide requirement was concerned ordinarily a suit has to be filed by the owner, because such landlord can claim eviction for bona fide requirements of the members of his family apart from himself in the case of residential accommodation and in the case of non-residential for and on behalf his major son or in un-married daughter. The legislature wanted that tenant be evicted by the true owner on the ground of bona fide requirement or in the alternative under both the clauses by way of exception a landlord could file a suit for residential and non-residential accommodation for and on behalf of the person for whose benefit he holds the accommodation. The legislature has restricted the right of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement to true owner for the reason a person receiving the rent and claiming to be a landlord would otherwise evict a tenant which could not be really bona fide requirement of the real landlord. The person receiving the rent has file the suit on behalf of true owner. The Court comes to the conclusion that it is, therefore, necessary to plead and prove by the landlord, who is claiming eviction for himself that he is the owner. If landlord is compelled to take such a plea in his plaint, then it stands to reason that the tenant must have right to deny it. Once this fact is realised, it must be held that rule of estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act which is ordinarily applicable in a suit of landlord and tenant has been modified by this special statute. This rule does not apply to cases of eviction under Section 12 (1) (e) and 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act'. The result is that the tenant is permitted to deny the title of the landlord saying that he may be the person who let him in but he is not owner of the premises as claimed by him. 14. If this be the legal position, and it is difficult to see how could be otherwise, so far as Section 12 (1) (e) and 12 (1) (f) the Act' are concerned, the general rule that in a landlord and tenant suit the question is not germane and not applicable would not apply to suits based on the aforesaid sub-section. 15. In this case, the respondent claimed that he become the owner of the suit property by virtue of registered gift-deed dated 3-5-1965 Ex.P-3 executed by Rajpal Goyal and Indrapal Goyal. In support of the plea Ghanshyam, PW-4 examined himself to say that this gift-deed was executed by the above named donors in his favour and he had accepted it. 15. In this case, the respondent claimed that he become the owner of the suit property by virtue of registered gift-deed dated 3-5-1965 Ex.P-3 executed by Rajpal Goyal and Indrapal Goyal. In support of the plea Ghanshyam, PW-4 examined himself to say that this gift-deed was executed by the above named donors in his favour and he had accepted it. He pointed out to the signatures of the donors and that of his signatures in token of acceptance of the gift-deed dated 3-5-1965 Ex.P-3. One of the doners Rajpal Goyal, PW-2 entered the witness box to support the evidence given by Ghanshyam, the respondent. He supported the evidence of Ghanshyam. The execution of gift-deed was proved by examining one of the attesting witnesses to the gift-deed. He is Shri Kishan, PW-3. Thus execution and acceptance of the gift-deed was proved. It has also been proved that as Ex-P-4 the Patta of the land and the property the suit property appears to have been recorded in the name of Rajpal Goyal and Indrapal Goyal. After the execution of the gift-deed dated 3-5-1965, the suit property stood recorded in the name of Ghanshyam Das in Municipal register in also proved by Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-5. Thus, prima facie it has been proved that the respondent was the recipient of the suit property by virtue of registered gift-deed Ex.P-3. The appellant No. 2 Bhojraj denied any knowledge about the gift-deed. 16. The learned counsel for the appellants faced with this overwhelming evidence, tried to assail the registration of gift-deed at Calcutta as invalid. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the property is situate at Raigarh and the execution of the gift-deed at Calcutta was invalid. This gift-deed dated 3-5-1965 was executed before the Registrar of Assurances Calcutta. It was signed and sealed accordingly. The learned counsel for the appellants referred to Section 28 of the Registration Act. It is true that normal rule is that registration must be done at the place where the property is situate in respect of the documents mentioned in Section 28 of the Registration Act and a gift deed would be one of the them. However, Section 30 (2) of the Registration Act is an exception to Section 28 thereof. It is true that normal rule is that registration must be done at the place where the property is situate in respect of the documents mentioned in Section 28 of the Registration Act and a gift deed would be one of the them. However, Section 30 (2) of the Registration Act is an exception to Section 28 thereof. It authorises the Registrar of a District in which Presidency town is included has power to receive and register any document in respect of any property situate in India. It appears that Registrar of Calcutta had received and registered the gift-deed dated 3-5-1965. Therefore, it must be presumed that this power was exercised regularly. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, argues that the Registrar concerned was not the Registrar of Presidency town of Calcutta District. This is a question of fact for which the appellants ought to have raised the ground at the earliest stage. It is not open to contend at the first appellate stage that the person who purported to receive and register the gift-deed dated 3-5-1965 was not the Registrar of Presidency town of Calcutta but that of an area beyond the Presdency town of Calcutta. The Court below rightly rejected the amendment at belated stage of first appeal. This is not inclined to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction disallowing the amendment as it was sought to be made at late stage. 17. The appellants made an attempt to show that the respondent was a minor at the time the gift deed was executed. For this purpose, reliance was placed on Ex.D-10 and Ex.D-14 to the effect that Ghanshyam Das Agrawal was born on 5-2-1948 and, therefore, he was a minor on 3-5-1965 when the gift deed Ex.P-3 was executed. There was no attempt made on the part of the appellats to ask Ghanshyam Das Agrawal if he was a minor at the time of the execution of the document Ex.P-3 dated 3-5-1965. No question was put to him if the certificate issued by the school or entries of birth made therein related to him. There was no attempt made on the part of the appellats to ask Ghanshyam Das Agrawal if he was a minor at the time of the execution of the document Ex.P-3 dated 3-5-1965. No question was put to him if the certificate issued by the school or entries of birth made therein related to him. In absence of any evidence on record to the effect that the entries were made by the School authorities at the instance of a parent or Guardian of the respondent, who knew about the date of birth of the respondent, the entries in Ex.D-10 and Ex.D-14 are not proved as relating to the respondent. In fact they are not admissible in evidence without examining the person who caused the entry to be made. It is, therefore, held that the appellants were unable to prove that the gift-deed is invalid because of minority of the respondent. Even otherwise, the appellants were not parties to the execution of the gift-deed and, therefore, they could not question it when the aggrieved parties have not come forward to challenge the gift-deed. The respondent must have acquired the title to suit land by way of adverse possession against the true owners by enjoying usufruct of the suit property for more than twelve years. Thus, there is no merit in the argument that respondent was not owner of the suit-property. 18. Thus, coming to the conclusion that the appellants, who had challenged the gift-deed dated 3-5-1965 Ex.P-3, were unable to establish from the evidence on record that it was invalid, this Court proceeds to decide whether the respondent had proved bona fide requirement for non-residential purpose. It is, therefore, necessary to examine first the nature of tenancy. Both the Courts below have recorded a finding to the effect that the tenancy was for non-residential purpose. The finding recorded by the Court below cannot be said to be perverse in the sense that no Court would come to the conclusion as the lower appellate Court has done. However, this Court may examine the evidence of the parties in brief bearing in mind the second substantial question of law framed by this Court. A study of Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-9 shows that the rent receipts passed by the respondent were passed in respect of the shop. However, this Court may examine the evidence of the parties in brief bearing in mind the second substantial question of law framed by this Court. A study of Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-9 shows that the rent receipts passed by the respondent were passed in respect of the shop. The first line of these documents is to the effect that the respondent was receiving a rent for the shop. The evidence of Ghanshyam Das Agrawal, PW-4 to this effect is supported by the evidence of Ratanlal, PW-6. As against this Bhojraj, DW-1 says that the suit property was let out for composite purposes by Chhotelal, Shri Kishan and Brijlal. No receipt, issued by Chhotelal was filed by the respondent. Bhojraj, DW-1 is not stating the truth as he had not pleaded that suit property was let out by the aforesaid persons. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to believe that suit house was let out for composite purpose. This Court comes to the conclusion that the finding of fact recorded by the Court below does not suffer from any infirmity of the kind mentioned in question of law No. 3. 19. The next question that must engage the attention of the Court is if the respondent was able to establish his bona fide need and the finding of facts in this behalf is liable to be disturbed. The evidence of Ghanshyam Das Agrawal, PW-4 stated that he had suffered two heart attacks in year 1984 and 1990. The version of the respondent is supported by Dr. Chokalingam, PW-1 who had issued Discharge Summary, Ex.P-2. The respondent was under his treatment as per his evidence and was admitted in the National Hospital Madras between 25-3-1984 to 9-4-1984. Ex.P-1 is the treatment slip. It appears that the respondent had unstable engina. Ghanshyam Das Agrawal, PW-4 has filed Ex.P-7 to the effect that he was admitted in Ayesha Hospital and was treated by Dr. Chokalingam, PW-1 in that hospital. It is clear from the evidence of Dr. Chokalingam, PW-1 that the respondent was patients of heart. This is reason for plea of the respondent for wanting to shift from Madras to Raigarh. We can see from the evidence on record that the respondent had proved his requirement by leading evidence from which it can be clearly held that the requirement is there and it is not a case of mere desire. This is reason for plea of the respondent for wanting to shift from Madras to Raigarh. We can see from the evidence on record that the respondent had proved his requirement by leading evidence from which it can be clearly held that the requirement is there and it is not a case of mere desire. The further question that has to be decided if the requirement is bona fide or in good faith. There was no evidence led by the respondent to show that the intention of the respondent was uterior in the sense he wanted not to occupy the suit property for the purpose of starting his business. The Court below had to decide the case on preponderance of probability. The fact that the respondent was suffering from heart disease and that he asserted in the witness box, that he wanted to close down his business at Madras and return to his native town of Raigarh is sufficient evidence for proving bona fide requirement. He is supported in his statement by Brijmohan, PW-5 and Ratanlal, PW-6. The appellants failed to show that despite the respondent suffered from heart disease, he did not harbour the desire of occupying the suit premises and the disease was merely a ruse for getting the premises vacated. After going through the evidence on record this Court is unable to pursuade itself to agree with the counsel for the appellants that the finding of the Court below is such that this Court could interfere with it under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20. The question of alternative accommodation may now be considered. This Court finds that there is no substance in the case of the appellants. The respondent seeks eviction from the shop and the accommodation at Kotra road is in the shape of a plot. Moreover, it was not proved that the respondent had any plot of his own. The plot allegedly belonged to Chhotelal. This fact would be of no consequence. Chhotelal may be the owner of the plot and he may have started a new shop on kotra road but that fact would not cover the case of the appellants that the respondent had an alternative suitable accommodation of his own. Even in the pleadings of the appellants, it was alleged that the plot in the question was in the name of the wife of the respondent. Even in the pleadings of the appellants, it was alleged that the plot in the question was in the name of the wife of the respondent. There is no evidence on record to show that the respondent was the owner of any shop. Even if he was the owner of a plot, it could not be held to be an alternative accommodation to the suit property which was let out for non-residential purpose. There is no merit in the argument that respondent was required to lead evidence to the effect that the Court should be able to decide that the requirement is real. This argument overlooks the fact that the Court is not the arbiter of the requirement of the landlord. The Court can only determine the nature of requirement. Unless the requirement is pleaded is so absured that the Court doubts the genuineness of claim of the landlord, there appears no scope for interference with the finding of the fact recorded by the Court below. 21. No other point was raised before me, on the questions hither to dealt with. 22. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the bona fide requirement of the respondent in respect of suit property is proved and this Court comes to the conclusion that there is no scope for interference with the finding of lower appellate Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 23. This Court has already held that so far as denial of title of landlord is concerned, the appellants were entitled to traverse the finding in order to raise a defence. Under such circumstances, the denial of title in the written statement in defence into a claim under Section 12 (1) (e) and 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act' cannot be said to be disclaimer of title. Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' had to be read alongwith Section 12 (1) (e) and 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act. It is the duty of the Court interpreting apparently conflicting provisions to harmonize them. Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' had to be read alongwith Section 12 (1) (e) and 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act. It is the duty of the Court interpreting apparently conflicting provisions to harmonize them. It appears that Section 12 (1) (e) and 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act' are so far as they relate to the suit filed by a landlord personally for the bona fide requirement of himself or of a member of his family under Section 12 (1) (e) of 'the Act' or for bona fide requirement of himself or for his major son or unmarried daughter under Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act' in the nature of exception to rule created by interpreting section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' to the effect that words 'which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of landlord therein' that a tenant's denial of title in the written statement in such a suit would be a ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act'. If this view of the matter is not taken the tenant cannot deny the ownership of landlord if he seeks eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of himself or the members of the family mentioned in Section 12 (1) (e) of 'the Act' or under Section 12 (1) (f) of 'the Act' for himself or for his major son or unmarried daughter. It could not be intention' of the legislature to give walk over to the landlord on the point of ownership. Therefore, the plea under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' shall not be available to respondent because the appellants denied his title by saying that the gift-deed in his favour did not pass any title to the respondent. 24. However, the respondent could claim decree under Section 12 (1) (c)of 'the Act' on another count pleaded by him. The Court below has held that the appellants are liable to be evicted under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act' because they have converted a substantial part of the non-residential accommodation into residential accommodation without respondents' consent. The appellants have not disputed the fact that the suit premises are used for composite purpose. The appellants were unable to sustain their plea that the use of the accommodation as residential accommodation was with the consent of the respondent. The appellants have not disputed the fact that the suit premises are used for composite purpose. The appellants were unable to sustain their plea that the use of the accommodation as residential accommodation was with the consent of the respondent. In fact the case of the appellants was that suit property was let out for residential purpose and a part of it was being used for non-residential purpose. This fact was not proved. In view of this matter, it is held that the appellants have done 'an act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which the appellants were admitted to tenancy'. This act itself is sufficient for evicting the appellants under Section 12 (1) (c) of 'the Act'. This Court does not find any infirmity in the finding of the Court below on this count in the light of substantial questions of law framed by this Court. The decision rendered in the case of Mohal Lal Vs. Jai Bhagwan, reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C 1034, is distinguishable for the reason, the suit premises were let out for commercial purpose. By opening for different commercial purpose no inconsistent user was found. 25. The result of the discussion aforesaid is that this Court is unable to find any merit in this appeal filed by the appellants. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500/- (Rupees Five Hundred), if certified. Appeal dismissed