Judgment : The above contempt application was originally filed by the applicant against the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association and another who was the then Secretary of the Association. Notice was ordered on 11. 1995. On 111. 1995. Mr.V.A.Parthasarathy, Vice President of the association was present in court and his appearance for future hearings was dispensed with. Messrs. Rangarajan and Prabhakaran, Advocates, who are the Counsel for the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association are made as party third respondent to the contempt application. 2. It is stated in the Contempt Application that the applicant was constrained to file this application against the respondents for having caused serious damage to the majesty and image of this court in making disparaging remarks against this Court in a matter pertaining to the entitlement of the members of the Madras Race Club in getting complimentary and concessional tickets to watch cricket matches at the M.A.Chidambaram Stadium which are sponsored and conducted by the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association. It is also stated that the applicant with five others have instituted a suit in C.S.No.1520 of 1994 on the file of this court seeking for the relief of declaration declaring that the understanding entered into between the respondents and the Madras Race Club of which the applicant herein and the other plaintiffs are members for the issue of 600 complimentary tickets and 1200 tickets at ‘A’ stand at a discounted value of 25 per cent over the price of the ticket for every cricket match played at M.A.Chidambaram Stadium, is binding and subsisting on the first respondent and the other members of the Madras Race Club are entitled to the issuance of such tickets for all cricket matches played at M.A.Chidambaram Stadium including the match between India and West Indies which was played on 210. 1994 and consequently permanent injunction was also sought for. This Court in Application No.5965 of 1994 in the above suit issued interim directions by order dated 20.10.1994 by which this Court ensured the practice followed by the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association be also continued so that complimentary tickets and concessional tickets are also issued for the cricket match between India and West Indies which was played at Madras on 210. 1994. 1994. However, it is stated that the first respondent insisted upon the personal appearance for the purpose of identification of members which resulted in many members not able to get the tickets because they could not go over to the M.A.Chidambaram Stadium personally, Being aggrieved against the action of the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association in misinterpreting the orders of this Court, a contempt application was filed by three members of the Madras Race Club out of which two were members of the committee of management, which authorised the plaintiffs herein to file the suit along with certain other committee members to protect the interest of the members of the Madras Race Club. Even though the contempt application was dismissed, this Court for the sake of avoiding any confusion, issued certain directions for the issuance of tickets for cricket matches to be played at M.A.Chidambaram Stadium and the said order was in the nature of clarification of the earlier order passed in Application No.5965 of 1994. The first respondent aggrieved not only against the direction s in Contempt Application No.368 of 1994 and also against the order in Application No.5965 of 1994 preferred L.P.A.No.136 of 1995 and O.S.A.No.296 of 1994. It transpired that in the grounds of appeal in respect of L.P.A.No.136 of 1995 the following averments are made in paragraph 8 of ground of appeal: “It is submitted that the order of the single Judge in so far as it relates to passing of directions is mala fide and a gross abuse of the process of the Court. The directions would predetermine the suit.” According to the applicant, this statement in the grounds of appeal, which has to be read as part and parcel of the affidavit for the interim reliefs, is a gross contempt of this Court. A reading of the other grounds of appeal as well as the affidavit filed by the second respondent would clearly go to show that the said averments are quite disparaging and cause a dent and naturally affect the public confidence in the institution of the court and the authority of the High Court. A reading of the other grounds of appeal as well as the affidavit filed by the second respondent would clearly go to show that the said averments are quite disparaging and cause a dent and naturally affect the public confidence in the institution of the court and the authority of the High Court. Mr.Mohan Parasaran, learned counsel for the applicant herein, had specifically objected to the said averments and requested the Hon’ble Judges of the Division Bench to hear the Letters Patent Appeal only after the respondents herein purge themselves of the contempt committed by them in the light of the statements made in the grounds of appeal. In fact in the grounds of appeal. In fact in the counter affidavit filed in C.M.P.No.7097 of 1995 in L.P.A.No.136 of 1995 the following objections have been taken: “I most respectfully submit that at the outset the appellants are not entitled to maintain this appeal in view of the gross contempt which “they have committed in personally attacking the Learned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court without any regard to the Majesty of Justice and to this Honourable Court. While denying the several allegations and insinuative comments I would only wish to bring to the kind notice of this Honourable Court the extent to which the appellants have gone in attacking the learned single Judge with particular reference to para 8 of the grounds of appeal which this respondent and other respondents are not repeating. It is rather unfortunate that the litigants should attack orders of Judge of this Hon’ble court as mala fide and in gross abuse of the process of court. In view of the fact that the statements made in the grounds of appeal by the appellants themselves constitute a gross contempt, the appellants are bound to purge themselves to contempt and then only they are entitled to be heard. It is relevant to point out that even the Apex Court, as I understand, has come down heavily upon such pleadings and have even deprecated the conduct of all concerned including the way the pleadings are drafted." However, it appears that this request has not been acceded to by the Division Bench. It is relevant to point out that even the Apex Court, as I understand, has come down heavily upon such pleadings and have even deprecated the conduct of all concerned including the way the pleadings are drafted." However, it appears that this request has not been acceded to by the Division Bench. As the applicant being one of the plaintiffs in the above suit felt that it is the bounden duty to bring to the notice of this Court the conduct of the respondents, which, on the other hand, is mala fide and tantamount to abuse of process of Court, he filed the present contempt application. 3. On receipt of the notice in the contempt application Mr.V.M.Shivakumar who is working as Junior of third respondent herein and who drafted the grounds of appeal in the above L.P.A., has filed an affidavit on behalf of the third respondent M/s. Rangarajan and Prabhakaran Advocates. It is stated in that affidavit that he is a partner of the third respondent which is a law firm consisting of five partners and that he was entrusted with the drafting of grounds of appeal in the above matter. It is stated in paragraph No.3 of the affidavit by Mr.V.M.Shivakumar that he has the greatest regard and respect for this court. However, it is stated that the third respondent and Mr.Shivakumar are tendering their unconditional and unqualified apology before this Court and deeply regret for the remarks made in Ground No.8 of the grounds of appeal in L.P.A.No.136 of 1995 before this court. Mr.V.M. Shivakumar also prays for a suitable direction for deleting the remarks contained in paragraph No.8 of the grounds of appeal which according to him was unintentional and due to inadvertence. In paragraph No.5 of the affidavit, Mr.Shivakumar has reiterated that it was not the intentioir of the third respondent to make any remarks about this Court and he expressed his deepest and sincere regrets for the unfortunate remarks both on his behalf and on behalf of all the partners. For the reasons stated above, the third respondent and Mr.V.M.Shivakumar pray that this court should accept unconditional and unqualified apology and regret of this respondent and close the contempt Application. 4. I have heard Mr. Mohan Parasaran for the applicant and Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Advocate. For the reasons stated above, the third respondent and Mr.V.M.Shivakumar pray that this court should accept unconditional and unqualified apology and regret of this respondent and close the contempt Application. 4. I have heard Mr. Mohan Parasaran for the applicant and Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Advocate. I have gone through the affidavit of Mr.V.M.Shivakumar filed on his behalf and on behalf of the third respondent, M/s.Rangarajan and Prabhakaran, Advocates. As rightly pointed out by Mr.Mohan Parasaran that the statement made in paragraph No.8 of the grounds of appeal alleging mala fides and abuse of process against the court is a gross contempt of this court. A reading of the said ground and the other grounds of appeal would clearly go to show that the averments are quite disparaging and cause a dent and naturally affect the public confidence in the institution of the court and the authority of the High Court. It is rather unfortunate that when this was brought to the notice of the Division Bench by the learned counsel for the applicant, learned Judges of the Bench have not taken serious note of the averments made in the grounds of appeal and proceeded to hear and dispose of the appeal on merits. A reading of the order of the Division Bench would only show that the Bench has not gone into this aspect at all. 5. Mr. Mohan Parasaran brought to my notice a decision of the Supreme Court reported in M/s. Associated Tubewells Ltd. v. Gujarmal, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 742: 1957 M.L.J. (S.C.) 137: 1957 An.W.R. (S.C.) 137: 1957 S.C.J. 725: 1957 S.C.A. 942. It was held as early as in the year 1957 by the Supreme Court as follows: "Judges of this Court cannot be dragged into a controversy as to whether the statements ascribed to them are correct, or express correctly and fully what they had in view. What may have been said or expressed may often enough be in the course of tentative loud-thinking and may reflect only very partially what the Judges had in view. What ultimately weighs with the Judges in pronouncing the order, when doing so without giving reasons, may often be not reflected in what is tentatively and openly expressed. Judges cannot be drawn into controversy over such matters. What ultimately weighs with the Judges in pronouncing the order, when doing so without giving reasons, may often be not reflected in what is tentatively and openly expressed. Judges cannot be drawn into controversy over such matters. It is not consistent with the dignity of the Court and the decorum of the Bar that any course should be permitted which may lead to controversy as to what a Judge stated in court and what view he held. Such matters are to be determined only by what is stated in the record of the Court. That which is not so recorded cannot be allowed to be relied upon giving scope to controversy. To permit the atmosphere of the court to be vitiated by such controversy would be detrimental to the very foundation of the administration of justice." 6. The above was the case where an application was filed before the Supreme Court on the prior occasion and what was the view of each Judge and what actually transpired in the Court. The Supreme Court strongly deprecated the practice on the ground that Judges cannot be dragged into a controversy over such matters and that it was inconsistent with the dignity of the court and decorum of the Bar. The present is a even more serious case where the contemnors have not merely stopped with challenging my order/before the Division Bench but have proceeded to make serious allegations mala fides and abuse of process of Court. The said allegation contained in the grounds of appeal is not only an attack on the integrity of that particular Judge but is an assault on the dignity of and majesty of the institution. 7. Even though the offending portion in the Memorandum of Grounds of Appeal in L.P.A.No.136 of 1995 was pin-pointed by the counsel for the applicant before the Hon’ble Division Bench and it was specifically pleaded that the appeal against the order of the learned single Judge cannot be proceeded with unless and until the contemnors withdraw the scandalous allegations and tendered unconditional apology for having made an outrageous and scandalous remarks on the judicial functioning of a Judge of this Court. Unfortunately, the serious imputations made by the contemnors were not withdrawn by the contemnors and the same were allowed to remain on record. .8. Unfortunately, the serious imputations made by the contemnors were not withdrawn by the contemnors and the same were allowed to remain on record. .8. It is beyond doubt that the imputations contained in the memorandum of grounds of appeal constitute contempt since it tends to scandalise the Court, undermine peoples confidence in the administration of justice and bring the court into disrepute. In this regard learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision reported in Dr.D.C.Saxena v. Chief Justice of India, (1996)3 S.C.C. 216. The above was the writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by way of Public Interest Litigation making scurrilous imputations against the Chief Justice of India. The Supreme Court on facts held that the averments tended to scandalise the Court and impede administration of justice and hence constituted contempt of the court. The Supreme Court held as follows: .“Thus in a free democracy everybody is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness or legality of a judgment or sentence or an order of a Court but he should not overstep the bounds. Though he is entitled to express that criticism objectively and with detachment is a dignified language and respectful tone with moderation, the liberty of expression should not be a licence to violently make personal attack on a judge, subject to that, an honest criticism of the administration of justice is welcome since justice is not a cloistered virtue and is entitled to respectful scrutiny. Any citizen is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness of the judgment, order or sentence with dignified and moderate language pointing out the error or defect or illegality in the judgment, order or sentence. That is after the event as a post-mortem.” 9. Learned counsel for the applicant has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Shamsher Singh Bedi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, (1996)7 S.C.C. 199 . In this case the contemnor, an Advocate filed an appeal against the judgment of a Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court convicting him under Sec.2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.1,000, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days. In this case the contemnor, an Advocate filed an appeal against the judgment of a Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court convicting him under Sec.2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.1,000, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days. Learned counsel for the Advocate submitted that the remarks made in the notice were against the individual Presiding Officer and as such and therefore, a clear-out case of contempt is not made out. The Supreme Court after going through the remarks made by the Advocate has observed that the remarks against the Magistrate who refused to grant bail are definitely scandalous and are definitely with reference to the discharge of the judicial function, and that the defamatory statements mentioned were only aimed at the institution and also to interfere with the administration of justice. .10. It has been the consistent practice of this Court as well as the Supreme Court that scandalous matter and statements couched in undignified language, particularly against the very institution are first directed to be removed before the litigant is given an opportunity to present a properly drafted revised petition and affidavit failing which the Court invariably initiate suo motu action for contempt. For instance, the cases reported in Captain Virender Kumar v. Union of India, (1993)4 S.C.C. (Supp.) 24 and Dr.D.C.Saxena v. Chief Justice of India, (1996)3 S.C.C. 216 can be relied on. In (1993) 4 S. C. C. (Supp.) 24, the petitioner an Advocate of the Supreme Court moved the Special Leave Petition by way of a public interest litigation for certain reliefs directed against respondents 1 to 7 but principally against the third respondent for suo motu contempt action. When the petition came up for admission before the Supreme Court, they found that the petition was not drafted in dignified language and was abounding in the use of unwarranted adjectives. With a view to give the petitioner an opportunity to present a properly drafted revised petition, the Supreme Court directed the Registry that if a revised petition is filed, the same may be annexed to the original petition. Thereafter, the petitioner instead of presenting a revised petition replaced a couple of words in the original petition itself. With a view to give the petitioner an opportunity to present a properly drafted revised petition, the Supreme Court directed the Registry that if a revised petition is filed, the same may be annexed to the original petition. Thereafter, the petitioner instead of presenting a revised petition replaced a couple of words in the original petition itself. Since the action was not consistent with the order by which only a revised petition was permitted a report from the Registrar was called to explain as to why the amendments were allowed. The report of the Registry revealed that the concerned Section Officer had objected to the petitioner effecting change of words but the petitioner became aggressive and gave threats and insisted on filing the revised petition later and reiterated that he was permitted by the Court to correct a few words in the present petition. Thereafter the petitioner filed a revised petition and submitted his explanation in the form of an affidavit along with annexures which the Supreme Court did not consider to be satisfactory. Allegations were also made against the Registry and the Registrar General’s report has been challenged as false frivolous and highly mischievous. The Bench drew the attention of the Advocate to the language used as well as the allegations made therein and expressed their displeasure in that regard. Thereafter the petitioner filed another affidavit. The Bench though not satisfied with his explanation, has accepted his apology. 11. It is the fundamental principle that a person cannot on one hand seek to scandalise the Court and undermine public confidence in administration of justice and simultaneously seek for reliefs from the self-same institution to which he has shown scant regard. In such circumstances, the person in order to derive benefit of any orders from this Court ought to first unconditionally withdraw the scandalous allegations and in the event of this court finding that the litigant has committed gross contempt of court has to first purge himself of the contempt before seeking reliefs from this Court. .12. In Giani Devender Singh v. Union of India, (19.95)1 S.C.C. 391 the Supreme Court has observed as follows: .“The Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court lacks in material particulars and it is also very difficult to discern precisely the allegations sought to be made in the application. .12. In Giani Devender Singh v. Union of India, (19.95)1 S.C.C. 391 the Supreme Court has observed as follows: .“The Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court lacks in material particulars and it is also very difficult to discern precisely the allegations sought to be made in the application. The petitioner has also made a wide and sweeping allegation against a Judge of the High Court without giving any instance how and in what manner the said Judge has influenced the other judicial officers of the State. Such sweeping allegations against a Judge and other judicial officers need to be deprecated in no uncertain terms. But it appears that the petitioner is a confused person obsessed with various lofty ideals and perhaps has failed to appreciate the consequence of making wild allegations against Judicial Officers. Such statements, to say the least, reveal utter confusion and obsessions of the petitioner. It is, therefore, not necessary to take any serious view of the wild allegations made against some of the members of the judiciary.” 13. In Sanjiv Datta In re, (1995)3 S.C.C. 619 , suo motu proceedings for contempt of court initiated by the Supreme Court by its order dated 9.2A 995 and 22. 1995 for the contents of the affidavit, dated 30.11.1993 filed in Writ Petition No.836 of 1993. The Cricket Association of Bengal (CAB) organised an international cricket tournament. Differences arose between the CAB and the Union of India, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB), Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL) and Doordarshan (DD) regarding telecasting of the matches by agency engaged by the CAB viz. Trans World International (TWI). In this connection the High Court issued certain directions in a writ petition filed by the CAB. In another writ petition filed before the Supreme Court, the Court passed an order directing the Secretary, Ministry of Communications to hold a meeting and communicate to hold a meeting and communicate its decision to the Court. The Secretary passed an order directing TWI to take the signal from DD. thus keeping the CAB and TWI at the mercy of DD. The Secretary passed an order directing TWI to take the signal from DD. thus keeping the CAB and TWI at the mercy of DD. The CAB therefore, again moved the Supreme Court which taking into consideration the then hostile relations between the parties’to avoid constant irritations, bickerings and disputes between them resulting in possible interruptions in telecasting, thus affecting the interests of the viewers; permitted TWI to generate its own signals and also directed the Customs Authorities to release the equipment of TWI which had been seized by them. Thereafter, an affidavit in reply to the writ petition was filed on behalf of the Ministry to Information and Broadcasting, by its Deputy Secretary. In the affidavit the Deputy Secretary among other things, averred that this Hon‘ble Court erred in law by entertaining this petition and thereafter passing interim orders with undue haste on it without affording an opportunity to the respondents to set down their case through a proper affidavit thereby causing irreparable damage to the respondents by making a mockery of the established policy of the Government of India by permitting a foreign corporation to undertake broadcasting from India against the national interest and thereby undermining the sovereignty of the Nation in order to ensure the execution of an agreement that the petitioners entered into with the foreign Corporation which was ab initio void because of the failure of the petitioners to apply for and be granted the requisite licence to enable them to operate from Indian soil. The Supreme Court issued notice to the Deputy Secretary to show cause as to why he should not be proceeded against for contempt of the Supreme Court for the said statements, the contemnor filed his reply to the show-cause notice tendering unconditional apology for the statements. Disposing of the contempt proceedings, the Supreme Court held as follows: “The accusations, attributions and aspersions made in the affidavit are not only deliberately calculated to malign the court but also to undermine its authority and to deter it from performing its duty. It is nothing but an intentional attempt to obstruct the course of justice and thus patently amounts to criminal contempt of the Court. The statements made in the affidavit, when they were so made, were to the knowledge of the contemnor a malicious attempt to cast aspersions on and attribute motives to the Court. It is nothing but an intentional attempt to obstruct the course of justice and thus patently amounts to criminal contempt of the Court. The statements made in the affidavit, when they were so made, were to the knowledge of the contemnor a malicious attempt to cast aspersions on and attribute motives to the Court. They were not made in ignorance of their consequences nor were they innocent. A responsible officer of the Government like the contemner ought to have known - and there is no doubt that he did knowthe serious implications of the said statements. If he did not know of their grave implications”he does not deserve to hold the office he does. If such statements were made by a layman the Court might have probably ignored them and also accepted the apology. Coming as they do from a public functionary, the court will fail in its duty if it does not bring home to him his special obligations to respect the authority of the court. If such trends as are displayed in these proceedings by the contemner are allowed to go scot-free, there is a danger or the erosion of the deference to and confidence in the judicial system. Coming as it does from the executive branch of the State, it has all the potentiality of mischief and if not curbed firmly, may in course of time assume a proportion grave enough to sabotage the rule of law from within. The draft of the affidavit which was settled by an advocate was not the one which was filed and the affidavit was filed without even the Advocate-on-Record having a sufficient opportunity to peruse the same. That makes the action of the contemner doubly suspect with regard to his intentions in filing the affidavit with the offending statements. He did not even take care to have the opinion of his advocates on the said statements. Probably, he did not want their opinion. This conduct of his speaks for itself and aggravates his offence. It is for this reason that it is not possible to accept his apology. The contemner, for reasons which can only be attributed to his misconception of his role and overzealousness to assert himself and his side of the matter, intentionally overstepped his limits and conveniently ignored the above legal position, and abrogated to himself, in substance, the role of a judge in his own cause. The contemner, for reasons which can only be attributed to his misconception of his role and overzealousness to assert himself and his side of the matter, intentionally overstepped his limits and conveniently ignored the above legal position, and abrogated to himself, in substance, the role of a judge in his own cause. He has thus in effect not only challenged the jurisdiction of the court to discharge its functions but also its authority to do so.” 14. In Jaswant Singh v. Virender Singh, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 520 the Supreme Court observed as follows: “Thereafter, the appellant as already noticed, filed a transfer petition in this court which was dismissed on 30th August, 1993. The transfer petition like the application (supra) cast aspersions on the learned Judge in the discharge of his judicial functions and had the tendency to scandalise the Court. It was an attempt to brow beat the learned Judge of the High Court and cause interference in the conduct of a fair trial. Not only are the aspersions derogatory, scandalous and uncalled for but they also tend to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect. The contents of the application seeking stay as also of the transfer petition, bring the Court into disrepute and are an affront to the majesty of law and offend the dignity of the court. The appellant is an Advocate and it is painful that by filling the application and the petition as a party in person, couched in an objectionable language, he permitted himself the liberty of indulging in an action, which ill behaves him and does little credit to the noble profession to which he belongs. As advocate has no wider protection than a layman when he commits an act which amounts to contempt of court. It is most unbefitting for an advocate to make imputations against the Judge only because he does not get the expected result, which according to him is the fair and reasonable result available to him. Judges cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. Only because a lawyer appears as a party in person, he does not get a licence thereby to commit contempt of the court by intimidating the Judges of scandalising the courts. He cannot use language, either in the pleadings or during arguments, which is either intemperate or unparliamentary. Judges cannot be intimidated to seek favourable orders. Only because a lawyer appears as a party in person, he does not get a licence thereby to commit contempt of the court by intimidating the Judges of scandalising the courts. He cannot use language, either in the pleadings or during arguments, which is either intemperate or unparliamentary. These safeguards are not for the protection of any Judge individually but are essential for maintaining the dignity and decorum of the Courts and for upholding the majesty of law. Judges and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy to fair and reasonable criticism of their judgments. Fair comments, even if, out-spoken, but made without any malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice and made in good faith in proper language do not attract any punishment for contempt of court. However, when from the criticism a deliberate, motivated and calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image of judiciary in the estimation of the public or to impair the administration of justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute the courts must bister themselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. The appellant has, undoubtedly committed contempt of the court by the use of the objectionable and intemperate language. No system of justice can tolerate such unbridled licence on the part of a person, be he a lawyer, to permit himself the liberty of scandalising a court by casting unwarranted, uncalled for and unjustified aspersions on the integrity, ability, impartiality or fairness of a Judge in the discharge of his judicial functions as it amounts to an interference with the due course of administration of justice." 15. In Vinay Chadra Mishra In re, (1995)2 S.C.C. 84 the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "We have reproduced the contents of the letter written by the learned Judge and his reply to the affidavits filed by the contemner. The learned Judge’s version is that when he put the question to the contemner as to which provision, the lower court had passed the order in question, the contemner started shouting and said that no question could have been put to him. The contemner also stated that he would get him transferred or see that impeachment motion was brought against him in Parliament. The contemner also stated that he would get him transferred or see that impeachment motion was brought against him in Parliament. He further said that he had "turned up" many judges and created a good scene in the court. The contemner further asked him to follow the practice of the Court. The learned Judge has stated that in sum and substance, it was a matter where except "to abuse of his mother and sister, he had insulted him like anything". The learned Judge has further stated that the contemner wanted to convey to him that admission of every matter was as a matter of course and no arguments were heard at the admission stage. He has reiterated the said version in his reply to the affidavits and in particular, has denied the allegations made against him by the contemner. He has defended his asking the question to the contemner since he was a member of the Bench. The learned Judge has stated that the contemner took exception to his asking the said question as if he had committed some wrong and started shouting. He has further stated that he had asked only the question referred to above and the contemner had created the scene on account of his putting the said question to him, and made it difficult to continue the court’s proceedings. Ultimately, when it became impossible to hear all the slogans and insulting words and threats, he requested the senior learned member of the Bench to list that case before another Bench and to retire to the chamber. Accordingly, an order was made by the senior member of the Bench and both of them retired to the chamber. The learned Judge has denied that he had conveyed to the contemner that he was going to set aside the entire order against a portion of which the contemner had come in appeal. He has stated that it was a case where the contemner did not permit the court proceedings to be proceeded with and both the members of the Bench had ultimately to retire to the chambers. The learned Judge has stated that the defence of the conduct of the contemner in the counter-affidavit "was a manufactured" one. He has then dealt with each paragraph of the contemner’s counter-affidavit. The learned Judge has stated that the defence of the conduct of the contemner in the counter-affidavit "was a manufactured" one. He has then dealt with each paragraph of the contemner’s counter-affidavit. He has also stated that there was no question of his having directed the stenographer to take down the order for setting aside of the whole order since that function was performed by the senior member of the Bench. He has also stated that the contemner has made absolutely wrong allegations when he states that he had made the following remarks: "I am from the Bar and if need be I can take to goondaism." He has also denied that he had said: "I never opted for Allahabad. I had opted for Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh. I do not know why the Chief Justice of India disregarded my options and transferred me to this place, which I never liked." He has stated that the contemner has made false allegations against him. We have, by referring to the relevant portions of the affidavit and the counter affidavit filed by the contemner, pointed out the various statements made in the said affidavits which clearly point to the veracity of the version given by the learned Judge and the attempted rationalisation of his conduct by the contemner. The said averments also lend force and truthfulness to the content of the learned Judge’s letters. We are taking into consideration all the circumstances on record, of the view that the version of the incident given by the learned Judge has to be accepted as against that of the contemner. To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be disrespectful to him, to question his authority to ask the questions, to shout at him, to threaten him with transfer and impeachment, to use insulting language and abuse him, to dictate the order that he should pass, to create scenes in the court, to address him by losing temper are all acts calculated to interfere with and obstruct the course of justice. Such acts tend to overawe the court and to prevent it from performing its duty to administer justice. Such acts tend to overawe the court and to prevent it from performing its duty to administer justice. Such conduct brings the authority of the court and the administration of justice into disrespect and disrepute and undermines and erodes the very foundation of the judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people in the ability of the court to deliver free and fair justice. The stance taken by the contemner is that he was performing his duty as an outspoken and fearless member of the Bar. He seems to be labouring under a grave misunderstanding. Brazenness is not outspokenness and arrogance is not fearlessness. Use of intemperate language is not assertion of right nor is a threat an argument. Humility is not servility and courtesy and politeness are not lack of dignity. Self-restraint and respectful attitude to ards the court, presentation of correct facts and law with a balanced mind and without overstatement, suppression, distortion or embellishment are requisites of good advocacy. A lawyer has to be a gentleman first. His most valuable asset is the respect and goodwill he enjoys among his colleagues and in the Court." .16. A Division Bench of our High Court (Srinivasan and S.M.Abdul Wahab, JJ.) has pointed out as follows: Sumitra Devi Kedia v. XVthe Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras and others, 1996 Writ L.R. 105 at para 14: ."At the outset, we must point out that the language use in the Memorandum of Appeal is hardly befitting an appeal in this Court, particularly "when it is against an order of a learned Judge of this court. The counsel ought to have exercised proper care and restraint before drafting the grounds. To put it mildly, we find that the Memorandum of Appeal has been drafted in a reckless manner and with extreme acussedness." .17. It is also represented by the learned Senior Counsel Mr.R. Krishnamoorthy and Mr.Mohan Parasaran that both parties viz., the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association and the Madras Race Club have amicably settled their disputes by entering into a Memorandum of Understanding dated 24. 1997 In view of Memorandum of Understanding entered into between the parties, namely, the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association and the Madras Race Club, Mr.Mohan Parasaran will withdraw the suits filed by him on behalf of the Madras Race Club, one pending in this Court and the other on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras. 1997 In view of Memorandum of Understanding entered into between the parties, namely, the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association and the Madras Race Club, Mr.Mohan Parasaran will withdraw the suits filed by him on behalf of the Madras Race Club, one pending in this Court and the other on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras. However, both the parties need not wait for the orders either from this court or from other courts and give effect to the Memorandum of Understanding mentioned above. 18. In view of the unqualified apology tendered by the counsel on record and the counsel who drafted the grounds of appeal and reiterated in absolute terms by them at the Bar and being satisfied that the contemner is genuinely repentant and taking a lenient view. I accept his unqualified apology but at the same time issue a warning to them to be more careful in future and let the matters rest there. 19. In the result, the contempt application is closed. No costs.