Judgment N. Pandey, J. This petitioner under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against an order of the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna, dated 30th April, 1985, whereby the petition filed on behalf of the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation (in short 'Corporation') under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called the Act) has been rejected. 2. Respondent no. 2 while working as conductor in the Corporation, at the stage when an industrial dispute was pending before the tribunal, was discharged from service by the order of the Managing Director. The Corporation, therefore filed an application before the tribunal for approval of its action, taken under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. The tribunal after hearing the parties and having found that there was no simultaneous compliance of the requirement of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, rejected the application. 3. The principal point, which has been raised before, me, is whether the Industrial Tribunal was justified in rejecting its approval under proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. I shall, therefore, before proceeding to adjudicate whether there was simultaneous compliance of the proviso to the aforesaid section as also having regard to the views expressed by the apex court in the case of Strawboard Manufacturing Company Vs. Gobind . (1962-I-LLJ 420 SC), would like to set out the provisions of Section 33(2) of the Act which reads as follows: "(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute- (a) X X X X (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish whether by dismissal or otherwise of that workman : Provided that no such worman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer." 4. In the present case, I am concerned with the interpretation of the proves to clause (b) of Section 33(2) which says that no workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and the application was made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. 5. As per findings of the tribunal, the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act was not maintainable because of less payment to the workmen as also since there was delay of ten days in making an application for approval and no attempt was made to explain the delay. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in fact the application for approval was filed simultaneous to the order of a dismissal but the tribunal had not maintained the registered cover of the letter which was sent for approval and wrong date was mentioned in the record o about the actual date of receipt. Therefore the finding of the tribunal is erroneous that there was no simultaneous compliance. He, however, could not dispute the findings of the tribunal that there was less payment to the workman and, therefore, one month's salary as required under the proviso to Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act was not paid. 7. From the facts noticed above as also having regard to the strict interpretation of the requirement of simultaneous action, in my view, the finding of the tribunal appears to be quite justified. As held by the apex court in the case of Strawboard Manufacturing Company vs. Gobind the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act contemplates three things 0 mentioned therein, namely, (a) dismissal or discharge, (b) payment of wages and (c) making of an application for approval. All the aforementioned three conditions require simultaneous compliance so that the employer when taking action under Section 33(2) of the Act, while dismissing or discharging the employee, should immediately offer to pay him wages for one month and also make an application for approval. There may be delay of a day or two but the employer must show that this has not been deliberate and due to unavoidable circumstances. 8. In support of the views expressed above a reference can also be made to a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Balkrishna Bhiva Vs. There may be delay of a day or two but the employer must show that this has not been deliberate and due to unavoidable circumstances. 8. In support of the views expressed above a reference can also be made to a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Balkrishna Bhiva Vs. Industrial Tribunal (Syed Taki Bilgram) and another (1967-I LLJ 637 Bombay) where having noticed that there was no simultaneous compliance of the three requirements as interpreted by the apex court, in the case of Strawboard the Court set aside the order of the Industrial Tribunal whereby approval was granted. Similar view was taken by the Gauhati High Court in the case of The Manager, Boisahabi Tea Estate vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Dibrugarh and another (1981 Lab I.C. 557). 9. For the reasons stated above and having answered the solitary question, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly this writ application is dismissed as devoid of any merit. But in the circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.