T. N. VALLINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) -THE plaintiff is the appellant. The suit was for specific performance of the contract of sale and in the alternative for the refund of the earnest money, having been decreed by the trial court granting refund of rs. 13,354. 15 paise. On appeal by the plaintiff, again seeking for relief of specific performance, the appellate court not only dismissed the appeal but also set aside the alternative relief granted by the trial court as well. Hence, the plaintiff is before this court. ( 2 ) THE case of the plaintiff was that the lands measuring 18 acres and 18 guntas was owned toy the defendant out of which four acres and 26 1/2 guntas were agreed to be sold to the plaintiffs. The value was settled at rs. 13,987,50 paise and agreement of sale was executed on 30. 5. 1972 and subsequently a sum of Rs. 13,354. 15 was paid and the balance payable was only Rs. 533. 35. As there was no failure on the part of the defendant to perform their part of the contract, the plaintiff sought a decree for specific performance and alternately for refund of the money paid. ( 3 ) IN the written statement it was contended that the agreement of sale is not true; the defendants do not even know the plaintiffs, the defendant got possession of half of the land from out of the tenant under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act only in 1974. Later on an area of 5 acres was acquired by the government and thus the defendants were left in the suit property alone. It was clear that in 1972 the suit land was a separate piece of land. In 1974 defendants came in contract with the plaintiff for the first time when they began to make purchase from the plaintiffs' shop on credit. In view of the good relations between the parties, the defendants also used to take some small amounts from the plaintiff by way of hand loans. In 1975 once defendants 1 and. 2 asked the plaintiff for a loan of Rs. 1,000/ -. The plaintiff wanted some paper to be signed. Therefore the defendant signed blank papers given to them by the plaintiff. Thus the suit document is not a genuine document but the same is forgery. In 1975 once defendants 1 and. 2 asked the plaintiff for a loan of Rs. 1,000/ -. The plaintiff wanted some paper to be signed. Therefore the defendant signed blank papers given to them by the plaintiff. Thus the suit document is not a genuine document but the same is forgery. They also contended alternatively that the agreement of sale in question is void as the same is violative of the Urban areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act. ( 4 ) ON these pleadings the parties went for trial and the trial court held that the suit agreement itself was not executed by the defendant. On the question of applicability of the Act, it has found that the Act was repealed and ultimately the trial court held that the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance, however directed refund of the money received by the defendants viz. , Rs. 13,354. 15 paise. Thus the decree directing refund of the earnest money has become final as the defendant did not file any appeal against them so that decree is final and binding on the defendants as such. However, on appeal filed by the plaintiff, the Appellate Judge confirmed the findings on all the issues but unfortunately did not direct refund of the money. Now the plaintiff is before this court once again trying to specifically enforce the agreement of sale. ( 5 ) IT is seen that the agreement of sale was dated 30. 5. 1972. It is claimed by the plaintiff that on 18. 5. 75 there was an endorsement made in respect of the moneys paid. It is significant to note that even this second agreement dated 18. 9. 1975 and the endorsement is beyond three years. The suit is filed on 25. 7. 81. Prima facie the suit is barred by limitation. The answer by the appellant to the above question of limitation was that there was an attempt made by the defendant to obtain permission of the government in July, 1978. Yet, the question of permission did not arise later. However, it is not clear as to when exactly the position of law regarding permission was changed. In any event, there is no reason for filing the suit after the period of eight years i. e. , on 29. 7. 1981. Yet, the question of permission did not arise later. However, it is not clear as to when exactly the position of law regarding permission was changed. In any event, there is no reason for filing the suit after the period of eight years i. e. , on 29. 7. 1981. Even if the steps taken by the defendant in July 1978, is taken into consideration, a notice is purported to have been issued on 16. 6. 80 and even after the said notice, there was a delay of more than a year and a month for the plaintiff to approach this court. These circumstances are sufficient to attract the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in K. S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, which reads thus"it has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early english decision, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time ts the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. Even where time is not of the essence of the contract, the plaintiffs must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property. While exercising its discretion, the court should also hear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time limit (s) for taking steps by one or the other party, it must have' some significance and that the said time limit (s) cannot be ignored altogether on the ground that time has not been made the essence of he contract (relating to immovable properties ). In the case of urban properties in india, it is well-known that their prices have been going up sharply over the last few decades-particularly after 1973. Court cannot be oblivious to this reality. It is not possible to agree with the decision of the Madras High Court if the said decision is understood as saying that the said factor is not at all to be taken into account while exercising the discretion vested in the court by law. The rigor of the rule evolved by courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case of immovable properties-evolved in times when prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown-requires to be relaxed, if not modified, particularly in the case of urban immovable properties. It is high time, the courts do so. " ( 6 ) IN this view, I am satisfied that in this case there has been unexplainable delays and the delay that cannot be condoned or excused on the part of the plaintiff. Therefore, the relief of specific performance cannot be granted at all. In this regard, the finding of the courts below denying the relief of specific performance is confirmed. However, on the question of refund of money, this is what the appellate court says that-"the defendants have admitted the receipt of the money totalling Rs. 13,354. 15 but they have not admitted anywhere that this amount was towards the payment in pursuance of the agreement. Merely because the defendants have admitted the receipt of the amount, no decree for refund of the same can be granted in the present suit. Unless the plaintiff establishes that the amount was paid as earnest money and that too in pursuance of the suit agreement, no refund can be ordered. Even if it is assumed that the defendants have received certain money under different transactions, the remedy for the plaintiff would have been to seek recovery based upon such transaction. It is true that the payment of earnest money or consideration cannot be only in cash. It can also be in kind, but the payment of such consideration in kind or money in pursuance of the original transaction of the agreement of sale must be proved and then only the question of granting of refund of earnest money would arise. "this view of the first appellate court is prima facie wrong. It can also be in kind, but the payment of such consideration in kind or money in pursuance of the original transaction of the agreement of sale must be proved and then only the question of granting of refund of earnest money would arise. "this view of the first appellate court is prima facie wrong. Once the defendants admit the receipt of the money, they must return the money if they do not want the property to be conveyed. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to have the trial court's decree restored with a condition that such money shall be refunded along with interest at 18% per annum from the date of original payment to the defendants till the date of realisation which shall be a charge over the property. No costs. The second appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above. The judgment and decree of the first appellate court to the extent of dismissing the suit for refund of money is set aside. The suit is decreed only in respect of refund of money. Second appeal partly allowed. --- *** --- .