JUDGMENT Naresh Kumar Sinha, J. 1. The petitioners seek to invoke the inherent powers of this court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter the 'Code') for quashing of their criminal prosecution for offences under sections 14 (1-A) and 14 (1-B) of the Employees Provident Funds and Misc. Provisions Act 1952 hereinafter the 'Act') and Para 76 (d) of Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 read with section 14(2) and 14-A(1) of the Act. The order dated 24.9.90/6.10.90 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of the aforesaid offences and subsequent proceedings pending before the learned judicial Magistrate, Nalanda vide case No. 123C/90 are also sought to be quashed. 2. A complaint (Annexure-1) was filed by the Provident Fund Inspector (O.P No.2) stating that petitioner No.3 M/s. Longia Biri Company (hereinafter the 'Company') is an establishment within the meaning of the Act, and the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 (hereinafter 'P.F. Scheme'), the Employees' Family Pension Scheme, 1971 and Employees' Deposit Linked Insurance Scheme, 1976 (hereinafter 'Insurance Scheme') are applicable to the said establishment with effect from 1.5.1977. The petitioner nos. 1 and 2 were described as employers within the meaning of section 2(e) of the Act and under an obligation to comply with the provisions of the Act and the Schemes framed thereunder. The allegations are contained in para 5 of a cyclostyled complaint petition divided into 7 sub-paragraph Nos. (a) to (g) all of them have been penned through except sub-paragraph(e). Para 5(e) is to the effect that the accused-petitioners failed to pay to the insurance fund the amount of administrative charges for the months of 7/77 to 11/77 within 15 days of the close of the each said month in accordance with the provisions of sections 6C(4) and paragraph 8 of the Insurance Scheme, and thereby committed offences punishable under sections 14(1-B), 14(2) and 14-A of the Act. The complaint petition does not mention in so many words the actual amount of administrative charges the petitioners had failed to pay. However, the order of sanction of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Bihar, Patna (hereinafter the 'RPFC') under section 14-AC of the Act mentions the amount of administrative charges for the period in question as Rs. 539.85 paisa. The said order of sanction was enclosed with the complaint petition and is part of Annexure-1. 3. However, the order of sanction of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Bihar, Patna (hereinafter the 'RPFC') under section 14-AC of the Act mentions the amount of administrative charges for the period in question as Rs. 539.85 paisa. The said order of sanction was enclosed with the complaint petition and is part of Annexure-1. 3. Sri B.K. Sinha learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argues that the casual and mechanical manner in which the complaint petition was filed and the impugned order taking cognizance was passed is evident from the fact that the complaint petition itself mentions that it was a complaint for prosecution for offences committed by the accused persons punishable under section 14(1-A), 14(1-B) of the Act and para 76 (d) of the Provident Fund Scheme read with section 14(2) and 14-A(1) of the Act and to the same effect is the prayer made to the court to take cognizance in para 11 of the complaint petition. The impugned order taking cognizance also refers to the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the Provident Fund Scheme under which the complaint had been filed and to have taken cognizance of the aforesaid offences. The complaint petition thus does not purport to have been filed for taking cognizance of offences punishable under sections 14(1-A), 14(2) and 14-A of the Act and para 8 of the Insurance Scheme read with section 6-C(4) of the Act for which sanction had been accorded by the prescribed authority within the meaning of section 14AC of the Act. Section 14-AC of the Act reads as follows: "Cognizance and trial of offences. - (1) No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act, the Scheme or the Family Pension Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made with the previous sanction of the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorised by the Central Government, by notification in the official Gazette, in this behalf, by an Inspector appointed under Section 13." From what has been stated above there is no room for doubt that the court had taken cognizance for offences for which no sanction had been accorded and had not taken cognizance of offences for which such sanction had been accorded. It is all too evident that as per allegations contained in the complaint petition the petitioners had committed offences under the Act for violation of the provisions of the Insurance Scheme and for which sanction had been accorded but the complaint had been filed with a prayer for taking cognizance for committing offences under the Act for violation of the provisions of the Provident Fund Scheme and the court had also taken cognizance of such offences without any order of sanction. The impugned order taking cognizance is thus liable for being quashed for non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of section 14-AC of the Act. 4. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioners could be prosecuted for the offences under the Act for which the necessary sanction had been accorded and the factual basis for which is already available in the complaint petition, the fact remains that it had been filed on 5th August 1990 for failure to pay the administrative charges to the insurance fund for three months i.e. September, October and November, 1977. As already noticed earlier the complaint petition itself did not disclose the amount of administrative charges and the amount happened to be Rs. 539.85 paisa could be known only from the order of sanction enclosed with the complaint petition. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that all this clearly supported the petitioners' contention that the complaint petition had been filed in a mechanical way and nothing was mentioned therein to indicate as to how the amount of administrative charges of Rs. 539.85 paisa had been worked out. 5. Sri Ram Shankar Pradhan learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties sought to explain the circumstances in which the complaint came to be filed after about 13 years and in that connection he referred to the contents of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of O.P. no.2 and supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of opposite parties. The petitioner-company is said to be one of the three Siri establishments functioning in Biharsharif in the district of Nalanda, Biri industry had been included in Schedule-1 of the Act from June 1977 by notification no. G.S.R. 600 dated 17th May 1977. Consequently the establishment was required to extend the P.F. benefits to Biri rollers including those engaged through contractors and working at their home. G.S.R. 600 dated 17th May 1977. Consequently the establishment was required to extend the P.F. benefits to Biri rollers including those engaged through contractors and working at their home. Several Biri industries and its organisations challenged the aforesaid notification before the Supreme Court of India and the Supreme Court in the year 1978 stayed the operation of the notification while admitting a batch of writ petitions. As stated in the counter affidavit and also conceded at the Bar the stay granted by the Supreme Court remained in force till the writ applications were dismissed on 25th September 1985. It was argued on behalf of the opposite parties that compliance in respect of "home workers" was in dispute in P.M. Patel's case before the Supreme Court and accordingly no action could be taken by the authorities to secure compliance in respect of "home workers" until the disposal of the P.M. Patel's case. After 1985 a good deal of time was lost in the process of digging out and identifying the "home workers" employed by the Biri establishments. Meanwhile the Biri roller owners again approached the Central Government to evade compliance in respect of “home workers” It was only after the Central Govt. had constituted a tripartite body which held prolonged discussions on several occasions that it was finally decided to initiate actions by the provident fund organisation to secure compliance in respect of "home workers" and for taking steps for realisation of the arrears from the petitioners. All this has been referred to explain the filing of the complaint petition in 1990 for a default that took place in 1977. 6. While this applications was pending for hearing it was brought to the notice of this court that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner was likely to finalise the reassessment with regard to the petitioners claim by the end of March 1997. Thereafter a supplementary counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the opposite parties stating that as per direction of the Supreme Court dated 2.11.95 the RPFC had concluded an enquiry under Section 7-A of the Act and had by his order dated 27th March 1997 redetermined the amount of dues. A photo copy of the order dated 27.3.97 was filed as Annexure-C to the supplementary counter affidavit. It was stated on behalf of the petitioners that they accepted the aforesaid order and did not intend to challenge it. A photo copy of the order dated 27.3.97 was filed as Annexure-C to the supplementary counter affidavit. It was stated on behalf of the petitioners that they accepted the aforesaid order and did not intend to challenge it. As stated at the Bar and also mentioned in so many words in the order Annexure-C a proceeding u/s. 7-A of the Act regarding the establishment of the company was concluded on 31.10.88 by assessing the dues for the period 06/77 to 1/88 in different accounts. The establishment filed C.W.J.C. No. 1904 of 1989 before this court to challenge the aforesaid order. The said writ application was dismissed by order dated 1.11.89 copy of which is Annexure-A and the order of the Provident fund authority was upheld. The company challenged the said order before the Supreme Court by preferring a S.L.P vide Civil Appeal No. 10273 of 1995. Though the said S.L.P was dismissed on 2.11.95 certain directions/observations were made by the Apex court and in that view of the matter the case was remanded to the RPFC to follow the above direction and compute the liability of the appellant afresh namely the company. Thus a fresh enquiry u/s. 7-A of the Act for determination of money due from the employer was necessitated on account of the direction of the Supreme Court dated 2.11.95. It may be recalled that section 7-A of the Act provides that any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and other authorities mentioned therein may among other things determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act, the Scheme or the Family Pension Scheme or the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be. The order (Annexure-3) of the RPFC was as a result of a fresh enquiry conducted pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court and as already mentioned earlier learned counsel for the petitioners had stated that the petitioners had no intention to question the aforesaid determination. 7. The order (Annexure-3) of the RPFC was as a result of a fresh enquiry conducted pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court and as already mentioned earlier learned counsel for the petitioners had stated that the petitioners had no intention to question the aforesaid determination. 7. By the order (Annexure-C) the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner had determined the dues in respect of the petitioners-company for the period 6/77 to 01/88 in the various accounts in the following manner: A/C 1 A/C 2 A/C 10 A/C 21 A/C 22 4,86,024.00 20,596.00 1,10,822.00 23,922.00 4,820.00 In terms of the direction of the Supreme Court as well as the directions issued by the Central office the contribution of the employees for the period 06/77 to 09/85 has to be wavied and hence the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner directed the following amount to be reduced from the amount already shown above: Less A/C 10 A/C 1 1,53,972.00 35,115.00 After allowing the reduction the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner directed that the total amount payable by the establishment in different accounts would be as under: A/C 1 A/C 2 A/C 10 A/C 21 A/C 22 3,32.052.00 20,596.00 75 707.00 23,922.00 4,820.00 The total amount thus payable by the establishment came to Rs. 4,57,097.00. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the company had already paid a sum of Rs. 8,00,000.00 on an adhoc basic and the said amount exceeded the claim of Rs. 4,57,097.00 as calculated by the RPFC. The order (Annexure-C) itself mentions the claim of payment of a sum of Rs. 8,00,000.00 on an ad-hoc basic by the establishment. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties did not dispute the payment of the aforesaid amount on ad-hoc basis. As already noticed earlier the present criminal prosecution of the petitioners-company is only in respect of non-payment of administrative charges amounting to Rs. 539.85 to the insurance fund for the period of three months i.e. September, October and November, 1977. The order (Annexure-C) is in respect of period 06/77 to 01/88 and it includes the period covered by the complaint petition. As rightly pointed out by the counsel for the opposite parties the assessment of Rs.4,57,097.00 made by the order (Annexure-C) does not include penal damages. However, there is no dispute whatsoever that the amount of Rs. The order (Annexure-C) is in respect of period 06/77 to 01/88 and it includes the period covered by the complaint petition. As rightly pointed out by the counsel for the opposite parties the assessment of Rs.4,57,097.00 made by the order (Annexure-C) does not include penal damages. However, there is no dispute whatsoever that the amount of Rs. 8,00,000.00 paid by the establishment on an ad-hoc basis exceeds the amount of assessment by more than Rs. 3,00,000.00. 9. The question for consideration is that assuming that the impugned order of cognizance is not bad for non-compliance with the provisions of section 14-AC of the Act, do the interests of justice demand that the criminal prosecution in respect of non-payment of a small amount of Rs.539.85 arising out of a default committed some 20 years ago should be allowed to continue? The circumstances in which the complaint petition was filed in the year 1990 had undergone a sea change by the subsequent events necessitating a fresh assessment under section 7-A of the Act in March 1997 after ignoring the earlier assessment. Even as per re-assessment done in compliance with the directions of the Supreme Court the total amount due from the establishment i.e. the petitioners is far less than the amount already deposited by the company on an ad-hoc basis. In view of the aforesaid undisputed facts as mentioned in the order of assessment of none other than the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (II), Bihar, Patna, it would be sheer waste of time, energy and money on the part of the parties in fighting out a litigation for a small amount of money for a default that occurred two decades ago. Learned counsel for the opposite parties had advanced the argument that an offence has been committed by the company and even if it was a technical breach it was nonetheless an offence and their criminal prosecution could not be quashed for whatever that happened subsequent to the filing of the complaint petition. I am unable to persuade myself to share such a view. The prosecution had been launched not by a private individual but an authority under the Act. I am unable to persuade myself to share such a view. The prosecution had been launched not by a private individual but an authority under the Act. If a complaint is filed by a public authority on the basis of certain materials available at the time of filing of the complaint and subsequently new facts come to light, the public authority ought to consider the desirability of withdrawing such a complaint if its prosecution is not in the interest of anyone including the State. Once the provident fund authority made a fresh assessment u/s. 7-A of the Act pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court, it was incumbent upon the authorities under the Act to consider the desirability of withdrawing the complaint. No such exercise appears to have been done despite an adjournment granted to the opposite parties after the order (Annexure-C) was brought on the record of this case. 10. Be that as it may for the foregoing reasons I am of the considered view that the complaint petition is general and vague and the impugned order taking cognizance is bad for non-compliance with the provisions of section 14-AC of the Act. Otherwise also for the reasons already indicated the criminal prosecution of the petitioners is an abuse of the process of the court and its quashing is necessary to secure the ends of justice. 11. The application is accordingly allowed and the impugned order taking cognizance and the criminal proceedings against the petitioners are quashed.