V. P. MOHAN KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) THE challenge in this writ petition relates to Annexure-A, order made by the respondent under Section 45-A of the E. S. I. Act, 1948. The petitioner is a partnership firm. It was assigned E. S. I. Code 53-4084-09. This establishment is covered under the Act since from 21-1-1962. It is alleged that they are maintaining all records as contemplated under the Act and they are making contribution due from them in accordance with their record. The allegation is that the department has been harassing the petitioner for imaginary dues and has prosecuted them thrice. Several inspections have been held, but at no time any laches were detected. Ultimately, a proceeding was initiated to determine the quantum of contribution payable and Annexure-A order was issued determining the quantum as Rs. 4,59. 767/- payable by the petitioner. According to the petitioner, this order is illegal and void for the following reasons: (I) the authority lacks jurisdiction; (II) while making assessment a reasonable opportunity had been denied; (III) the assessment has been made in violation of principle of natural justice and therefore the order is vitiated, illegal, mala fide; (IV) the order is a non-speaking order, perverse, colourable and mala fide exercise of power and that the burden of proof is cast on the petitioner; (V) that the statutory exemptions eligible has been declined to the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE learned Counsel for the E. S. I. Corporation strenuously contended that this Court cannot entertain the writ petition at this stage. According to her, the proper remedy, if at all, for the petitioner is to move the E. S. I. Court under Section 75 of the e. S. I. Act, seeking adjudication and therefore this writ petition should be dismissed. Besides, she contended that on merits as well, none of the contentions of the petitioner is sustainable. ( 3 ) AS I am examining the contention of the petitioner on the ground of the maintainability, I do not intend to. examine the correctness of the challenge on merit. The said contentions are not adjudicated in this proceeding. ( 4 ) MR. ( 3 ) AS I am examining the contention of the petitioner on the ground of the maintainability, I do not intend to. examine the correctness of the challenge on merit. The said contentions are not adjudicated in this proceeding. ( 4 ) MR. S. S. Ullal, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the remedy provided under Section 75 of the Act is not an efficacious remedy as contemplated, for the short reason is that the amount quantified has to be deposited by the assessee before the assessee can invoke its jurisdiction. Futher, he contended that if the order impugned is bad ab initio this Court can certainly exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution and grant relief sought for by the petitioner. The contention of the petitioner is that the order is totally without jurisdiction and is illegal. According to him, there are material records to show that the assessment made by the Officer is totally incorrect. Therefore, in such circumstances the statute does not debar in exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) ONE cannot treat the remedy contemplated under Section 75 of the Act as an alternate remedy. The scheme of the statute shows that it is the jurisdiction of the respondent Officer to examine the case of the assessee and determine the contribution payable under the Act. He examines the factual position to quantify what would be the amount payable under the Act. The order quantifying the said amount is not declared as final. The statute has constituted a Court which can examine the correctness of the quantification and the grievance of the assessee and decide the respective contentions. That Court by virtue of the provisions of the Statute is made subordinate to the high Court. Thus the affected person can move the Court constituted under the provision of the Act and which Court is subordinate to the High Court. The decision of that Court which examines the factual contentions of the assessee is made amenable to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under section 82 of the Act. The statute itself prescribes for judicial review. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the remedy provided under Section 75 of the Act or under Section 82 of the act is not an alternate remedy as understood in common parlance. The statute itself prescribes for judicial review. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the remedy provided under Section 75 of the Act or under Section 82 of the act is not an alternate remedy as understood in common parlance. The statute itself provides a complete statutory code for judicial review. This remedy created by the statute is intended to scrutinise the orders of the authorities. Therefore, when the validity of the order in question can be examined by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, then this court should withhold its exercising the jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is not as if the orders affecting the person, do not become amenable to judicial review. The orders are not allowed to become final by means of scrutiny by the appellate/revisional authorities created under the Act, other than judicial bodies. The proceedings under article 226 cannot displace the proceedings under Section 75 of the Act before the competent Court. Whatever relief that this court can grant, can be granted by the Court constituted under section 75 of the Act. When that remedy is exhausted, the order in question is subject to review or reconsideration at the hands of this Court in the proceeding to be pursued under the Act. In such circumstances, one cannot hold that this Court should still exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and examine the question of facts and other circumstances pleaded by the petitioner. All the grounds made out by the petitioner would be available for him to assail the order while pursuing the remedy under Section 75 of the Act and all the contentions can be examined by that Court. ( 6 ) ANOTHER contention urged by the petitioner is that it may not be possible for the petitioner to deposit the entire amount quantified by the authority under the impugned order in order to prosecute the remedy under Section 75 of the Act. I do not think this is a serious contention to be urged. Section 75 itself provides that the E. S. I. Court itself can grant relief to the petitioner from the obligation of remitting the amount while proceeding with the remedy under Section 75 of the Act. ( 7 ) MR. I do not think this is a serious contention to be urged. Section 75 itself provides that the E. S. I. Court itself can grant relief to the petitioner from the obligation of remitting the amount while proceeding with the remedy under Section 75 of the Act. ( 7 ) MR. Ullal had brought to my notice several decisions which indicate the jurisdiction that this Court exercised the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the light of the view that I have taken, I do not think that it is essential for me to refer the same. In this behalf, I would like to refer to the following passage in the case of M/s. Escorts Limited v Regional director, E. S. I. C. "10. Sri Ullal submitted that under Section 75, the employer as arbiter litis can decide for himself what he should seek by way of relief and the scope of the proceedings are delimited by what he himself seeks. The proceedings under Section 75, Counsel says, is accusatorial proceedings and not inquisitorial and the Court need go only into what the party invoking that jurisdiction, wants to be decided and nothing more. Sri Ullal, relying upon the language of Section 77 which provides that proceedings under Section 75 shall be commenced by an application, said that what is not so commenced and this according to him, rules out any matter which the Corporation may, as respondent, seek to raise cannot be gone into. Sri Ullal placed strong reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in Ramachandra Keshav Adke (dead) by L. Rs. v Govind Joti Chavare and Others and Sukhdev singh and Others v Bhagatram Sardar Singh raghuvanshi and Another, where applying the denunciation in Taylor v Taylor, it was held that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that the other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. Sri Papanna, learned Standing Counsel for the corporation, however, submitted that the assumption underlying the contentions raised for the appellant are fundamentally unsound. Any such limited concept of the content of this jurisdiction would ignore the nature of the legislation; the mischief sought to be suppressed and the remedy sought to be advanced by it. Sri Papanna, learned Standing Counsel for the corporation, however, submitted that the assumption underlying the contentions raised for the appellant are fundamentally unsound. Any such limited concept of the content of this jurisdiction would ignore the nature of the legislation; the mischief sought to be suppressed and the remedy sought to be advanced by it. Any interpretation, says learned Counsel, must aim at rendering a scheme of the law workable and that which hinders it and renders it unworkable must be eschewed. He submitted that this beneficent and social welfare legislation, brought-forth in realisation of the Directive Principles of State Policy, would attract a purposive construction, and the Courts must not make a fortress out of the dictionary and limit the otherwise lambent benevolence of the statute by semanticity. 11. On a careful consideration of the matter, it appears to us that the contentions advanced by Sri Ullal, if accepted, would put impediments in the way of the working of the statutory-scheme. The argument, in our opinion, also overlooks the correct inter-relationship between the functionaries exercising jurisdiction under section 45-A on the one hand and Section 75 on the other. The jurisdiction of the E. S. I. Court under Section 75 is, it must be emphasised, not in the nature of an appeal against the determination under Section 45-A. Nor does the E. S. I. Court exercise powers of judicial review over the determination. The jurisdiction under Section 45-A is an independent one; though, however, once there is an adjudication under Section 75 that adjudication prevails over the corresponding matters determined under Section 45-A. The jurisdiction under Section 75 is a superior jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Court of Reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, in relation to an award under Section 11 may provide some analogical assistance though we are sensible that the two positions may not, otherwise, be comparable. A Court of Reference under Section 18 does not sit in appeal over an award under Section 11. The proceedings before the Land acquisition Officer are not ipso facto a part of the record in the reference. The Court of Reference does not have the power to set aside the award and remit the award to the land Acquisition Officer for a fresh determination". This indicates that the proper remedy in these cases is to move E. S. I. Court under Section 75 of the Act. The Court of Reference does not have the power to set aside the award and remit the award to the land Acquisition Officer for a fresh determination". This indicates that the proper remedy in these cases is to move E. S. I. Court under Section 75 of the Act. It can be seen from what is stated above that the E. S. I. Court has wide power to examine all issues and come to the conclusion. It is a larger power than that of an Appellate Authority. The exercise of the power is not circumscribed by any restrictions. The Court is not sitting in appeal against the order under Section 45-A of the Act. If such be the power conferred under Section 75 of the Act on the e. S. I. Court, one cannot certainly say that this Court should entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and investigate the correctness or otherwise of the order impugned as if it exercises the power under Section 75-A of the Act. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is not to be enlarged or equated as the power under Section 75 of the E. S. I. Act. The petitioner is free to approach the E. S. I. Court under Section 75 of the Act. ( 8 ) THE petitioner then complains that he does not know as to who are the workers with respect to whom the determination has been made and he cannot therefore move the proper Court in that matter. It is further contended by the petitioner that it is not known as to who are the workers, who are reckoned by the authority in fixing the contribution. He submits that the authority states that the factory has workers in Kuzhithura in tamil Nadu, which according to him is fictitious. This Court cannot readily agree with the submission because it is well known that at one point of time, several industries, more particularly cashew industry, had migrated its activities to tamil Nadu for various factors including advantageous labour forces. Besides, I feel this apprehension is misconceived. The determination is not with respect to the workers in question. The determination is made with respect to the salary paid to the workers as disclosed in the income tax return. According to the department, the petitioner has claimed large amount as having paid to the workers in the income tax return. Besides, I feel this apprehension is misconceived. The determination is not with respect to the workers in question. The determination is made with respect to the salary paid to the workers as disclosed in the income tax return. According to the department, the petitioner has claimed large amount as having paid to the workers in the income tax return. But this is not reflected in the present proceedings. It is on the basis of that, the assessment is made. ( 9 ) NOW for all these reasons, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel in the course of the argument invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil appeal No. 1906 of 1984 wherein their Lordships have held thus:"we are not inclined to express any opinion on the question raised in this appeal in regard to the violation of principles of natural justice because, in the circumstances of the case, it would be very much in the interest of the respondents to contest the case before the Employees' State insurance Court under Section 75 of the Employees' State insurance Act, 1948, where they will have full opportunity of leading evidence and making their submissions in support of their contention that the apprentices taken by them are not 'employees' within the meaning of that Act. We may make it clear that if the respondents file their application before the appropriate Employees State insurance Court within one month from today, the employees State Insurance Court will condone the delay, if any, in filing the application and give full opportunity to the respondents to lead evidence and make submissions in support of their contention that the apprentices taken by them are not 'employees' within the meaning of the Act and after allowing similar opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence and make submissions, in support of its case, dispose of the application by deciding whether the apprentices taken by the respondents are 'employees' within the meaning of the Act so as to attract the applicability of the provisions of the Act. We would direct that until the Employees State Insurance Court arrives at a decision, no coercive steps will be adopted by the petitioner or its servants or agents for recovery of the amount in dispute. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. We would direct that until the Employees State Insurance Court arrives at a decision, no coercive steps will be adopted by the petitioner or its servants or agents for recovery of the amount in dispute. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs". The learned Counsel submits that in the event the writ petition is being dismissed, similar relief may be extended to the petitioner as well. There is no objection from the side of the respondent in this behalf. The petitioner is therefore entitled to file the application under Section 75 of the E. S. I. Act and whatever is stated by the Supreme Court in the above said order will apply to the petitioner especially in regard to the entertainment of Section 75 application and proceedings to recover the amount determined under Section 45-A of the Act. --- *** --- .