JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners are all employees of the Rajasthan State Bridge and Construction Corporation, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation") and are working under the administrative control of their immediate superior viz. respondent No. 2. The petitioners were appointed by the respondent-Corporation on different dates on daily wage basis in the requisite pay-scales as referred to in para-3 of the petition. It has been contended by the petitioners that they were forced, to be party to the dictates of the respondents by filling-in the printed terms of the Contract from time to time since they were given temporary breaks in service, which was done with a view to deprive them of their rights to claim regularisation in service and also the regular pay-scales against which they have been working. 2. The petitioners had raised their grievance before the management several times that they should be fixed in the regular pay-scales against the respective posts on which they have been discharging their duties as daily wagers and they should be paid their regular salaries in the pay- scales to which they are entitled as substantive appointees and since their efforts failed to yield any results, they were constrained to file the instant writ petition. 3. It has further been contended in the petition that the appointing authority of the petitioners is infact the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Corporation and not the Resident Engineer (respondent No. 2), who does not have the power to issue appointment orders beyond the period of three months at a time and in case their services are to be extended beyond the said period, the said exercise cannot be done without prior approval of the Head of the Institution i.e. the Chairman-cum-Managing Director. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended at the bar that in the instant case since all the petitioners have continued in services of the corporation for a period exceeding two years and in some cases, the petitioners have so far been transferred from one unit to another unit as per the exigencies of work, the petitioners cannot be compelled to be a party to execution of such contract forms, which are detrimental to the statutory rights of the petitioners. By way of illustration, the petitioners have also placed on the record of this Court the copies of contract forms vide (Annexures 1 to 6). 5. By way of illustration, the petitioners have also placed on the record of this Court the copies of contract forms vide (Annexures 1 to 6). 5. The petitioners have further assailed the impugned action of the Corporation in having issued a Circular directing all the resident engineers not to retain persons for more than 3 months at a time and if their services are necessary beyond the said period, then notional breaks should be given in their continuous service and thereafter they should be re-employed on the terms and conditions as set-out by the Corporation by execution of a fresh contract. This bargaining power of the Corporation has also been assailed by the petitioner being void as per Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872 and such contracts are not enforceable being opposed to public policy. The petitioner has' raised the following questions for consideration of this Court : (1) Whether Rule 19 of Rajasthan State Bridge Construction Corporation Services Regulation, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as `the Regulation') is ultra-vires of the statutory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such violative of Articles 14, 16 & 21 of the Constitution of India ? (2) Whether the petitioners are entitled to be absorbed/adjusted on other sites in any of the unit of the respondent-Corporation particularly if the work on a particular site is completed ? (3) Whether under the garb of contractual appointment, petitioners can be refused for regularisation of their services and the pay scale of the post ? (4) Whether petitioners are entitled to be reinstated in services particularly when the same came to be terminated during the pendency of the writ petition despite the orders passed by the Hon'ble Court on 12.1.1990 ? 6. Before dealing with the aforesaid contentions of the petitioner, I deem it appropriate to refer to Rule 19(i) of the Rajasthan State Bridge and construction Corporation Ltd. Regulations, 1986 which came into force w.e.f. 1.11.86 which reads as under : "19(i) Unless employment is contracted for a specified period or for a specific job, the employee will be entitled to the following notices, according to category, for termination of services : (a) Permanent 3 months as per rule 8(ii) (b) Probationer One month as per rule 8(ii) (c) Temporary } Casual } Part-time } Trainee } Apprentice } Without notice" 7. From the perusal of the above rule, it is apparently clear that unless the employment is contractual for a specified period or for specific job, the services of an employee whether he is permanent, temporary, probationer, casual or part-time trainee-apprentice shall not be terminated unless he is served with a prior notice of termination in the manner as indicated above which evidently means that the aforesaid employees shall in consonance with Natural justice shall be provided with an opportunity of being heard by the Corporation before their services are terminated. 8. As regards the first question as referred to above, it has been contended by the petitioner that Rule 19 of the Regulations gives unbridled bargaining powers to the employer to dictate its terms to the employee, who in comparison to the employer is in a much weaker position and has no other option but to succumb to his dictates. Hence Rule-19 is ultra-vires of the Constitution and the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. 9. In schedule-B to the writ petition, the petitioners have given various dates, which indicate their temporary extensions in service from time to time during the period 1987-1989. The petitioners have sought the relief of being given regular pay-scales against the posts on which they have been discharging their duties and a direction from this Court to restrain the respondents not to compell the petitioners to fill-up the contract forms, by which they have been given temporary extensions in service. The petitioners have also sought the direction from this Court for quashing Rule 19(1) of the regulations of 1986 being ultravires and also that the respondents be directed to adjust the petitioners on different sites in any un it where the work is going on in the event of work on a particular site, in which they have been working having been completed. Lastly that the respondents be restrained from terminating the services of the petitioners in the event of their non-filling up of the contract forms. 10. Lastly that the respondents be restrained from terminating the services of the petitioners in the event of their non-filling up of the contract forms. 10. In schedule-A the petitioners have given the details of work and the requirement of the workers demanded through tender notices and publication of advertisements in various news-papers during the period July 1988 to 1989.In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and another v. Brojonath Ganguly and another etc. reported in 1986 (3) SCC page 156 : L.J. 1986(2) page 171 , Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra and another etc. reported in 1985 (1) SCC page 479 , Inder Pal Yadav and others v. Union of India and others reported in 1985(2) SCC page 648 , G. Govinda Rajulu v. Andhra Pradesh State Construction Corporation Limited and Another reported in 1986 , Union v. Vazir Sultan Tabacoo Company limited and another reported in 1996 Labour and industriat-Cdses page 738 , Girish Kumar Jain v. U.O.L and others reported in 1994(4) WLR page 875 . 11. In the matter of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr. (supra.) etc. the services of the concerned employees were terminated under Rule 9(1) of the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited Service discipline and appeal rules, which provided for termination of employment of a permanent employee on 3 months notice on either side and the company is to pay 3 months basic pay and dearness allowance in lieu of notice and thus the services of a permanent employee can be terminated on the ground of "services no longer required in the interest of the company" without assigning any reason. The concerned employees were paid 3 months basic pay and dearness allowance in lieu of notice. Allegations of misconduct were made against the concerned employees just prior to the termination of their services. The petitioners challenged the impugned orders of termination before the Calcutta High Court, which held that Rule 9(1) of the rules was ultravires of Article 14 of the Constitution and hence struck down the said rule as being void. 12. Allegations of misconduct were made against the concerned employees just prior to the termination of their services. The petitioners challenged the impugned orders of termination before the Calcutta High Court, which held that Rule 9(1) of the rules was ultravires of Article 14 of the Constitution and hence struck down the said rule as being void. 12. In Special Leave to appeal before the Apex Court preferred by the petitioners, it was held by the apex court that : "If there is an instrumentality or agency of the State which has assumed the garb of a Government company s defined in S. 617 of the Companies Act, it does not follow that it thereby ceases to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. For the purposes of Art. 12 one must necessarily see through the corporation veil to ascertain whether behind that veil is the face of an instrumentality or agency of the State. The Corporation, which is the Appellant in these two Appeals before us, squarely falls within these observations and it also satisfies the various tests which have been laid down. Merely because it has so far not the monopoly of inland water transportation is not sufficient to divest-it of its character of an instrumentality or-agency - of -the State.- It is nothing but the Government operating behind a corporation veil, carrying out a governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance. There can thus be no doubt that the Corporation is `the State' within the meaning of Art. L2 of the Constitution" 13. The Apex Court while dealing with the arguments of the petitioners regarding "inequalities of bargaining power" with reference to Rule 9(1) of the Rules held that : "An adequate means of livelihood cannot be secured to the citizens by taking away without any reason the means of livelihood. The mode of making `effective provision for securing the right to work' cannot be by giving employment to a parson and then without any reason throwing him out of employment. The action-of an instrumentality or agency-of the State, if it frames a service rule such a3.Cl. (a) of Rule 9 or a rule analogous thereto would, therefore, not only be violative of Art. 14 but would also be contrary to the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Cl. (a) of Art. 39 and in Art. 41." 14. The action-of an instrumentality or agency-of the State, if it frames a service rule such a3.Cl. (a) of Rule 9 or a rule analogous thereto would, therefore, not only be violative of Art. 14 but would also be contrary to the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Cl. (a) of Art. 39 and in Art. 41." 14. The Apex Court while affirming the decision of the Calcutta High Court held that the High Court was, therefore, right in quashing the impugned orders terminating the services of the contesting respondents and directing the Corporation to reinstate them and to pay them all arrears of salary. The High Court has, however, not right in declaring Cl. (i) of Rule 9 in its entirety as ultravires of Art. 14 of the Constitution and in striking down the same as being void. What the High Court had overlooked was that the said Rule also confers upon a permanent employee the right to resign from the service of the Corporation. Since by entering into a contract of employment, a person does not sign a bond of slavery and a permanent employee cannot be deprived of his right to resign. The Judgment of the High Court was accordingly affirmed with suitable modifications. 15. In the matter of Lingappa Pochanna Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra and another (supra.) etc. the apex court while dealing with the appeals arising out of the judgment of the Bombay High Court with reference to the interpretation of Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 and the concept of Distributive Justice held as under : "The concept of distributive justice in the sphere of lawmaking connotes, inter alia, the removal of economic inequalities and rectifying the injustice resulting from dealings or transactions between unequals in the society. Law should be used as an instrument of distributive justice to achieve a fair division of wealth among the members of society based upon the principle : `From each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs'. Distributive justice comprehends more than achieving lessening of inequalities by differential taxation, giving debt relief or distribution of property owned by one to many who have none by imposing ceiling on holdings, both agricultural and urban, or by direct regulation of contractual transactions by forbidding certain transactions and, perhaps, by requiring others. Distributive justice comprehends more than achieving lessening of inequalities by differential taxation, giving debt relief or distribution of property owned by one to many who have none by imposing ceiling on holdings, both agricultural and urban, or by direct regulation of contractual transactions by forbidding certain transactions and, perhaps, by requiring others. It also means that those who have been deprived of their properties by unconscionable bargains should be restored their property. All such laws may take the forms of forced redistribution of wealth as a means of achieving a fair division of material resources among the members of society or there may be legislative control of unfair agreements. Distributive fairness can only be achieved by taxation or contractual regulations, at some sacrifice in individual liberty."...... 16. The Apex Court further held that : "It is permissible for the Legislature to make a classification on the basis of time fora law to operate provided there is a reasonable nexus between the basis of classification as to time and the object sought to be achieved. The Act adopts April 1, 1957 for nullification of transfers made by tribals to non-tribals under Sections 3(1) and 4 because that was the "tillers' day" for purposes of the Bombay tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 on the basis of which the non-tribal transferees could apply to the tenancy Courts for purchase of their holdings on the ground that they were in cultivating position thereof. There was therefore a reasonable nexus between the fixation of such date and the object sought to be achieved and the impugned Act is not violative of Article 14," 17. In the matter of Inder Pal Yadav and Others v. Union of India and others (supra), the apex court while deciding the writ petitions, wherein the petitioners, who were casual labour employed on the Railway Projects and had rendered continuous service for more than a year had challenged their termination by the Railways on the ground that their services could not be terminated at the sweet will of the employer. During the pendency of their petitions before the Apex Court, Railway administration formulated a scheme for their absorption in service as temporary workmen on completion of 360 days of continuous employment and the scheme was made applicable to those in service as on 1.1.1984. During the pendency of their petitions before the Apex Court, Railway administration formulated a scheme for their absorption in service as temporary workmen on completion of 360 days of continuous employment and the scheme was made applicable to those in service as on 1.1.1984. Since the choice of the said cut- off date was likely to result in arbitrary discrimination, the said scheme was accepted by the Apex Court subject to modification in the cut-off date from January 1. 1984 to January 1, 1981 with a direction to the Railways that the absorption of the workmen should be in order of length of continuous service on the principle of last cone first go or in the reverse first come last go with reference to Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 18. In the matter of G. Govinda Rajulu v. Andhra Pradesh State Construction Corporation Limited and Another (supra), the apex court while allowing the writ petitions of the employees of the Andhra Pradesh State Construction Corporation Limited, whose services were sought to he terminated on the ground of closure of the corporation gave directions to the Corporation to permit their continuity in service on the same terms and conditions, which were applicable in the Government Departments or in the Corporations. 19. In the matter of Praga tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual and others (supra), the apex court while dealing with an appeal arising out of the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court analysed the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of' the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as against the statutory bodies such as Corporations. The apex court observed that the workmen should be left to have resort to alternative remedy available to them under the Industrial Disputes Act by raising a industrial dispute thereunder. 20. The apex court further observed that no doubt, Article 226 provides that every High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority orders and writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, etc. or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and for any other purpose. But it is well understood that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest. or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and for any other purpose. But it is well understood that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest. Thus, an application for mandamus will not lie for an order of reinstatement to an office which is essentially of a private character nor can such an application be ma intend to secure performance of obligations owed by a company towards its workmen or to resolve any private dispute. 21. In the matter of V.S.T. Industries Canteen Worker's Union v. Vazir Sultan Tabacco Company Limited and another (supra), the Andhra Pradesh High Court while dealing with the dispute between the Management of V.S.T. Industries and the Canteen Workers observed as under : "I am therefore, of the view, when a public duty is called upon to be discharged by a private management, a writ of mandamus under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India could be issued even against a private management. In view of the said decision, the preliminary objection raised by Sri K. Srinivasa Murthy, counsel for the respondent-Company is rejected. Therefore, I hold that the writ petition is maintainable against the first respondent-Company." In the matter or Girish Kumar Jain v. U.O.I. and Ors. (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with a writ petition preferred by a petitioner against the Engineering- Project (India) Limited held as under "That in a case of instrumentality of the State if necessity arises to terminate the services of the employees who are governed by the provisions of the I.D. Act then an effort should be made to rehabilitate them or to provide them alternative employment in other projects ad if it is not possible to accommodate them recourse should be had to dispense with their services after complying with the provisions of the I.D. Act." This Court while allowing the said writ petition further observed as under : "If the amount payable under these sections falls short the order of termination cannot be sustained, as there has been non-compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the I.D. Act." 22. In my view, the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the apex court as relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners are distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the instant case for the reason that the petitioners accepted temporary appointments in services of the Corporation knowing fully well the implications of such appointments. I am of the view that no legal right to claim conformity in service is created in favour of temporary employees unless their services are regularised. The regularisation also cannot be claimed as a matter of right as it depends as various factors germane to service conditions of an employee in accordance with rules. In this case, during the course of hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to demonstrate any specific rule of which violation has been alleged against the respondents.22-A. In reply to the show-cause notice filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 & 2, it has been contended that the petitioners were offered retrenchment compensation keeping in view the provisions of Section 25FFA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and they were not further entitled for any relief in view of the fact that as per their own averments, the services of the petitioners stood automatically terminated and no compensation was payable to them in view of the insertion of the provisions to Section 2(oo) (bb) of the I.D. Act, 1947, 23. For the sake of convenience and ready reference, the provisions of Section 2(oo) and (bb) are referred to as under :2(oo) `retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include : (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein." 24. With regard to the aforesaid provisions of the I.D. Act, 1947, I am of the view that it is not the case of the petitioners that their services were not extended beyond the stipulated period without compliance of the aforesaid provisions by the employer and this fact is also borne-out from the reply, filed by the respondents to the writ petition wherein it has been specifically contended that the petitioners were offered compensation in accordance with Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act and that their termination was as a result of the non-renewal of the period of contractual employment in accordance with Section 2(bb) of the I .D. Act. Hence I am of the view that the petitioners cannot have any grievance on this ground. The petitioners accepted the contractual appointments under the respondent corporation for a short duration of 3 months which were extended from time to time by the sweet will of the corporation. Hence none of the petitions is entitled as of right to claim continuity in service beyond the stipulated period of such contractual appointment unless extended by the corporation. I am further of the view that the terms of contractual appointment are always binding on the parties and it is not open to either of them to wriggle out of the same at their sweet will or option by pleading to the contrary. I am further of the view that such agreements cannot per-se he branded as opposed to Public Policy being hit be section 23 of the Contract Act since their is nothing unconscionable about them. 25. 1 am fortified in my observations from the Judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another v. Krishna Kant and others reported in 1995(5) SCC page 75 , Baba Shri Goswami Shyam Manoharji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in RLR 1991(2) page 1 . 26. 25. 1 am fortified in my observations from the Judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another v. Krishna Kant and others reported in 1995(5) SCC page 75 , Baba Shri Goswami Shyam Manoharji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in RLR 1991(2) page 1 . 26. In the matter of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another v. Krishna Kant and others (supra), the Apex Court while interpreting the scope of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, with particular reference to Sections 7, 7A, 7B, 10, 2(k), 2(A) and Section 13(A) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, held as under: "Whether the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e. where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an `industrial dispute' within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act"...... "Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946-which can be called `sister enactments' to Industrial Disputes Act - and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to civil court is open. In other words, a dispute arising between the employer and the workman/workmen employment Standing Orders is an industrial dispute, if it satisfies the requirements of Section 2(k) and/or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and must be adjudicated in the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act alone. Otherwise, recourse to civil court is open. In other words, a dispute arising between the employer and the workman/workmen employment Standing Orders is an industrial dispute, if it satisfies the requirements of Section 2(k) and/or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and must be adjudicated in the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act alone. This would be so, even if the dispute raised or relief claimed is based partly upon certified Standing Orders and partly on general law of contract." 27. From the above discussion it is clearly apparent that the policy of law emerging from the relevant provisions of the I.D. Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the workman, which is more speedy, inexpensive, informal and is free from the plethora of procedural laws and appeals, revisions etc., which are within the competence of adjudication by the Civil Courts and the aggrieved parties should, therefore, be well advised to invoke the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum instead of invoking the jurisdiction of this Court directly tinder Article 226 of the Constitution. 28. From the perusal of the appointment letters which were issued to the petitioners, it is apparent that the said order does not create any legal right in favour of the petitioners by which they can claim continuity in service beyond the period of one to 3 months i.e. 1.3.1987 to 31.3.1987 or more as the case may be since the contract of employment unless extended by the employer will stand automatically terminated without any further notice to the employee. 29. Since the petitioners had thus accepted their appointments in services of the Corporation fully knowing the implications thereof well in advance and having conveyed their consent after acceptance of its terms, I am of the view that it is nut open to the petitioners to resile from the said terms on the ground of being non-suited by pleading to the contrary. I am further of the view that the services of the petitioners being purely temporary. the Corporation was not bond to continue the services of the petitioners on permanent basis as it does not create any legal or vested right with the petitioners to claim continuity in service. It further creates an estoppel against the petitioners. 30. I am further of the view that the services of the petitioners being purely temporary. the Corporation was not bond to continue the services of the petitioners on permanent basis as it does not create any legal or vested right with the petitioners to claim continuity in service. It further creates an estoppel against the petitioners. 30. From the perusal of the appointment order (Annexures- I), issued- in favour of the' petitioners by the respondent- Corporation it is apparent that the petitioners ,ere given temporary offer of appointment to work on the post of Munshi (Electrical) at the site indicated therein at Jaipur w.e.f. the date of reporting 1.3.1987 on purely temporary basis for a period of one month only ending on 31.3.1987 with clear stipulation that on the said date the contract of employment will automatically stand terminated without any further notice in this behalf. It has further been mentioned in the said order that the services of the petitioner can also be terminated before the said date in case the unit in-charge does not feel satisfied with his performance or for any other reason whatsoever. The appointment was on daily wage basis @ 18 per day with a further stipulation that in case the petitioner was willing to accept the aforesaid conditions, he should return one set of the proforma duly filled in and signed by him, duly attested in token of its acceptance. 31. Moreover, the matter could only be agitated by the petitioner before an appropriate forum i.e. the Labour Court since the disputed questions of facts are invoved, which needs recording of evidence from both the sides and it is not open to the petitioner to agitate these questions by way of filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution since the matter obviously requires appreciation of evidence by an appropriate forum and the controversy in this regard has already been well settled by a full Bench Judgment of this Court in the matter of Gopal Lai Teli v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in 1995(2) WLC page 1 - 1995(1) WLN page 300 . 32. reported in 1995(2) WLC page 1 - 1995(1) WLN page 300 . 32. In the said decision, the learned Single Judge of this court referred the following question for determination by it Larger Bench, which arose in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3011/19% on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition under Article 220 of the Constitution of India on the ground of alternative remedy : "Whether a writ petition for violation of the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or violation of the principles of natural justice, should be directly entertained as a matter of course, ignoring the statutory remedy provided by that Act ?" 33. The learned Full Bench while answering the aforesaid reference of the learned Single Judge held that:- "Even in such cases the normal rule for an employee should he to avail remedies provided under the Act and entertainment of writ petition by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without exhausting the remedies should be with great care and caution and in very exceptional cases". 34. It was further observed by the Full Bench of this Court that : After giving out thoughtful consideration to the facts and submissions made at the Bar and in view of catena of cases decided by the Apex Court on the question referred to us, we are of the opinion that the, answer to the question referred by the learned Single .Judge is in negative and we are further of the view that the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Indu's case (supra) do not lay down correct law and we specifically over rule the aforesaid decisions. We are of the opinion that for violation of the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or violation of the principles of natural justice, the normal course is to pursue the remedy provided under the Act and exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such cases should be sparingly made." 35. 1 am thus of the view that it is not open to the petitioners to agitate the questions, which they have raised before this Court by way of the instant writ petition, since it requires full trial by an appropriate forum viz. 1 am thus of the view that it is not open to the petitioners to agitate the questions, which they have raised before this Court by way of the instant writ petition, since it requires full trial by an appropriate forum viz. the Labour Court and needs the recording of its evidence from both the sides and (hereafter its appreciation by the said forum. 36. With regard to the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners were in it weaker position viz-a-viz the Management on account of inequalities of the bargaining power, I am of the view that such contention is not tenable primarily for the reason that if such contention is allowed to stand, then each and every employee of an institution where he is 'employed will be free to advance this plea against the employer that he is in it weaker position as compared to the employer after accepting the employment and thereafter advancing such plea to defeat the genuine and legitimate claim of the employer that such employee was appointed temporarily and having accepted the terms and conditions of such temporary employment, he is not entitled to claim continuity in service as it matter of right since no legal right has been vested in such an employee to claim continuity, in service as a permanent or it regularly appointed employee. II such an argument is allowed to stand, then the obvious fallacy, which would emerge as a consequence thereof would be that even in case of project based employees, who are appointed for a fixed duration will claim continuity in service notwithstanding such project having been completed and wound up when there is no possibility in such a situation to continue the services of an employee particularly when no alternative avenues of employment may be available with the employer to absorb such employees in another project or scheme which may not be available with the employer. 37. 37. As regards the first contention of the petitioner that Rule 19 of the Regulations is ultra-vires of the statutory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, I am of the view that since the employment of the petitioner was for a fixed duration and the nature of employment being contractual for a specified period and for specified job and which the petitioners had voluntarily and gladly accepted without any coercion, undue influence or under any pressure whatsoever, it is not open to the petitioners to challenge their termination on the said ground and the principles of estoppel are alone attracted to the instant case. Consequently Rule 19 of the Regulations cannot be held to be ultra-vires either of the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947 or violative of Article 14, 16 & 21 of the Constitution and is rather ultra-vires of the said provisions. 38. As regards the second contention of the petitioners that they are entitled as of right to claim absorption/adjustment on other projects and sites of the Corporation, I am of the view that it is not open to the petitioners to claim right of permanent absorption/adjustment on other projects and sites, since it is not open to such employees who accepted temporary appointments on contractual basis to claim right for permanent absorption or adjustment on other projects or sites. 39. As regards the third contention of the petitioners that under the garb of contractual appointments, the petitioners cannot be refused regularisation of their services and pay scales, I am of the view that in view of the answers to contentions 1. and 2 above, their contention of the petitioners does not stand to reason and is not tenable in the eye of law. 40. As regards fourth contention of the petitioners that they are entitled to reinstatement in service, I am of the view that this contention is wholly untenable and since their services have already came to an end on completion of the Projects, though temporarily extended from time to time till the completion of such Projects, they do not get automatic right for permanent absorption/adjustment keeping in view the nature of their contractual appointments which were for a specified period and for specified job in accordance with Rule 19(i) of the Regulations as' referred to above. 41. 41. Consequently in view of the above discussion, the writ petition does not survives for consideration of this Court and the same is dismissed accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.However, in case the petitioners are so advised that they are at liberty to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in accordance with law. In the event of their preferring any claim against the respondent-Corporation before the Labour Court within a period of 90 days from to-day, the Labour Court shall be at liberty to expeditiously deal with & decide the same in accordance with law. The delay or, laches shall not come in their way in pursuing this remedy.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******