B. M. LAL, J. This decision rendered in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4477 of 1997, shall govern disposal of Writ Petitions No. 4453 and 4476 of 1997, referred above. 2. By these three writ petitions, the petitioners who claim to be occupants of the controversial Site No. 34 Bungalow No. 30/38, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Civil Lines, Allahabad, have brought an action before this Court seeking exercise of writ jurisdic tion against the Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad and its officers, con tending that they are being unauthorisedly and illegally dispossessed from their premises through coercive process of bulldozing. 3. It appears that aforesaid Site No. 34, Civil Station Allahabad is a Nazul land in respect of which a lease was granted in favour of one Mr. A. Robert Fery Smith by the concerned authorities of the State in the year 1910, which appears to have expired on 31st December, 1958. However, for deter mination of actual controversy involved in these petitions, this Court need not go into that much detailed facts. The said Site No. 34, Civil Station, Allahabad was acquired by the State Government by issuing notifica tions under Sections 4 (1) of the Land Ac quisition Act read with Section 17 (1) of the Act for establishment of Commercial Dis trict Centre under the development Scheme in district Allahabad by the Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad. The said acquisition proceedings were chal lenged before this Court by means of Writ No. 6697 of 1987 and Writ No. 6701 of 1986, which have been dismissed on 19-2-91 and 30-1-1997 respectively. Immediately there after i. e. on 31-1-1997, Allahabad Develop ment Authority came in motion and started demolition in the acquired area and the occupants/petitioners taken shelter of this Court. 4. According to the petitioners, neither they are trespassers nor illegal occupants rather they are occupants of the premises in question by virtue of tenancy created in their favour and therefore, they are residing as well as carrying on their business in the premises in question. 5. 4. According to the petitioners, neither they are trespassers nor illegal occupants rather they are occupants of the premises in question by virtue of tenancy created in their favour and therefore, they are residing as well as carrying on their business in the premises in question. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that without giving notice to the petitioners as required by Section 27 of U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act and without following the principles of Audial-teram Partem and without giving any warn ing, the Allahabad Development Authority started bulldozing their premises in ques tion and therefore, petitioners fundamen tal right to have roofs over their heads have been violated. 6. While filing counter-affidavit the Allahabad Development Authority emerged with the plea that the original lease granted expired on 31st December, 1958 and thereafter it was never extended or renewed, and the petitioners have no legal or fundamental right to remain in posses sion over the premises in question as it has been acquired by the State Government for Allahabad Development Authority under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and the notifications issued under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and Rules framed there under were given due publicity in the newspapers having wide cir culation in the city of Allahabad, such as northern India Patrika & Amrit Prabhat dated 9-3- 1986 and 10-3-86 respectively. The notices under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act were also issued on 9-3-1986. The writ petitions referred above whereby the acquisition proceedings were challenged, have been dismissed by this Court. 7. Learned counsel for the Allahabad Development Authority contended that the petitioners have been properly noticed under the provisions of Section 27 of U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act and the principles of Audi Alterant Partem and all the statutory requirements have been followed and therefore, the petitions as framed and filed have no substance and are liable to be dismissed. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties it appears that since the land acquisition proceedings were challenged by way of different writ petitions which have already been dismissed by this Court hence the only relevant question for determina tion by this Court is as to whether the steps for demolition and possession taken by the Allahabad Development Authority pur suant to acquisition proceedings are viola-tive of the principles of Audi Alteram Par-fem. 9. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners, jlacing reliance on Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, AIR 1989 SC 38 ) and Ramnikalal N, Bhutto and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, JT 1996 10 SC 452, vehemently contended that the petitioners have fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution to live and therefore, if they are thrown out in the man ner the Allahabad Development Authority is likely to do it will be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. 10. In this regard it may be mentioned that the apex Court has ruled in the cases relied upon by the petitioners that it is a human problem that by force of circumstan ces persons are forced to ply their trade by squatting in the open on the pavements and at the same time these pavement squatters create a serious problem to the civil ad ministration and obstruct free flow of traf fic. In Ramniklals case (supra) their Lordships have held that whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the Courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercis ing their power of granting stay injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretion ary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public pur poses, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. 11. In The Municipal Board Manglaur v. Mahadeoji Maharaj, AIR 1965 SC 1147 , their lordships of apex Court ruled that no structures, may be for providing drinking water, can be erected even by the Municipality on public pathway as the right is conferred on the public to pass and re-pass on the highway. 12. In Bombay Hawkers Union and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, AIR 1985 SC 1206 , it is held that no one has any right to do his or her trade or business so as to cause nuisance, annoyance or inconvenience to the other members of the public. Public Streets, by their very nomenclature and definition, are meant for the use of the general public. They are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private trade or business. 13. Public Streets, by their very nomenclature and definition, are meant for the use of the general public. They are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private trade or business. 13. Their lordships of apex Court refused to interfere in the order of demoli tion in Pratibha Co- operative Housing Society Ltd. and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1991 SC 1453 and observed that the tendency of raising unlawful constructions and unauthorised encroachments is increasing in the entire country and such activities are required to be dealt with by firm hands. 14. In the instant case, it is abundantly clear that Allahabad Development Authority is taking the steps in question pursuant to the land acquisition proceed ings and the writ petitions by means of which the land acquisition proceedings were challenged have already been dis missed by this Court. Therefore, it is not that the petitioners did not get any oppor tunity to challenge the land acquisition proceedings on the basis of legal or fun damental rights, if any, they have. Conse quently the only question available for being raised by the petitioners before this Court is whether they were given notices before bulldozing their premises in ques tion. 15. In Olga-Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, AIR 1986 SC 180 , their Lordships of apex Court have observed that though a trespasser may be evicted forcibly yet what is more important is that the trespasser should be asked and given a reasonable opportunity to depart before force is used to expel him. 16. In respect of demolition their Lordships of apex Court in Cantonment Board and another v. Mohanlal and another, (1996) 2 SCC 23 ; held that the respondents having carried on illegal construction, no enquiry required to be conducted after receipt of reply to the notice and oppor tunity having been given by putting on notice of the illegal construction and the respondents reply having been considered, there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. 17. In the instant case a bare perusal of the counter-affidavit filed by the Secretary of Allahabad Development Authority reveals that apart from the notices publish ed in the newspapers having wide circulation in Allahabad, notices were issued under Section 9 (i) of the Land Acquisition Act, copy of which has been filed as Annexure C. A. 3 to the counter-affidavit. In the instant case a bare perusal of the counter-affidavit filed by the Secretary of Allahabad Development Authority reveals that apart from the notices publish ed in the newspapers having wide circulation in Allahabad, notices were issued under Section 9 (i) of the Land Acquisition Act, copy of which has been filed as Annexure C. A. 3 to the counter-affidavit. Vide para 12 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that the notices have also been given by beat of drum on the spot. It is further stated that before proceeding to demolish the unauthorised constructions on the spot the Allahabad Development Authority also gave notice to all such persons to remove their belonging from the premises and the announcements were also made by loudspeakers to that ef fect. Vide para 17 of the counter-affidavit it is specifically submitted that Allahabad Development Authority had already passed orders under Section 27 of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act (for short the Act) after giving due notice and photo stat copies of said notices issued on 30-12-96 are filed as Annexure C. A. 4 to the counter- affidavit. However, these averments made by the Allahabad Development Authority have been denied in the rejoinder-affidavit by the petitioners. 18. But the fact remains that nothing has been brought on record or suggested that the petitioners have got any legal and valid title to remain in occupation of the premises in question. This Court is con scious of the fact that in any organised society, right to live as a human being is not ensured by meeting only the animal needs of man. It is secured only when he is assured of all facilities to develop himself and is freed from restrictions which inhibit his growth. All human rights are designed to achieve this object. The right to shelter is the basic human right. Shelter for a human being therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limb. It is home where he has oppor tunities to grow physically, mentally, intel lectually and spiritually. [see Chameli Singh and others v. State of U. P & another, (1996) 2 SCC 549 . 19. The right to shelter is the basic human right. Shelter for a human being therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limb. It is home where he has oppor tunities to grow physically, mentally, intel lectually and spiritually. [see Chameli Singh and others v. State of U. P & another, (1996) 2 SCC 549 . 19. In the instant case, coming to the plea raised by the petitioners that they are in occupation of the premises in question by virtue of tenancy created in their favour, we do not find any semblance of their title to remain in occupation over the premises in question as by virtues of Notifications is sued under Sections 4, 9, & 17 of the Land Acquisition Act the land vested with the State free from all encumbrances and therefore, retention of possession by virtue of tenancy if any created in favour of petitioners tantamounted only to illegal or unlawful possession. (Sec Bamokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab, JT (1996) 2 SC 68 & Ishwarlal Premchand Shah & other v. State of Gujrat & Others, JT 1996 (4) SC 208]. Therefore, the plea raised by the petitioners that some tenancy is created in their favour by virtue of which they are claiming possession, in the opinion of this Court, has no force. 20. As regards the compliance of the principles of natural justice, the notices under Section 27 of the Act were issued, other notices were published in the local newspapers regarding acquisition of the land and thus reasonable opportunity to depart from the land in question appears to have been given by the Allahabad Development authority before taking steps for demolition. 21. However, in our opinion though the test of Audi Alteram Partem is satisfied in the instant case, yet assuming for the sake of arguments that no opportunity of hearing was given to each and every petitioner individually before proceeding for demolition, the question whch arises is whether at this stage Court should interfere and remand the case for reconsideration after reserving notice again under section 27 of the Act or under any other statutory provision, if required? 22. The petitioners have approached this Court invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of judicial review by setting out total case in the writ petition and this Court has investigated the same by directing the respondents to file counter affidavit. 22. The petitioners have approached this Court invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of judicial review by setting out total case in the writ petition and this Court has investigated the same by directing the respondents to file counter affidavit. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, in judicial review where the whole case is re-opened and the violation of Audi Alteram Partem is raised as one of the defects and for curing the same no further investigation in the shape of leading evidence is required, indeed the defect can be cured or remedied in judicial review by applying the doctrine of Post Facto Hearing. In this regard, this aspect of the matter cannot be lost sight of that the writ Courts are expected to interpret the law in the context of changing needs and values of the socieity, so that the same may render social and public goods for the society. In Ratan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawazjung and others, (1991) 3 SCC 67 , their Lordships of apex Court ruled that the law should always be construed and interpreted in context of changing needs of the socieity. 23. The Court is conscious of the docrine of Audi Alteram Partem that no one should be condemned unheard, but all the same, where everything is re-opened in judicial review and the same is sufficient to satisfy the test of Audi Alteram Partem, on the facts and circumstances of that case, only on account of this deficiency, in the opinion of this Court, the whole case should not be remanded giving vent to the case for decision afresh which undisputedly takes years together, rather applying the doctrine of Post Facto Hearing the case should be decided finally in judicial review itself. In other words, where the issue in question required deeper probe to shift the grain from the chaff, in place of Post Facto Hearing the doctrine of Audi Alteram Partem would come into play even in judicial review but it is not that in each and every case for compliance of Audi Alteram Partem, it is to be remanded for fresh investigation. Therefore, in such cases where some prejudice is caused to the petitioners which ultimately culminates in non-curable or non-rectifiable position even by applying Post Facto Hearing in judical review, only in that event the case can be remanded. Therefore, in such cases where some prejudice is caused to the petitioners which ultimately culminates in non-curable or non-rectifiable position even by applying Post Facto Hearing in judical review, only in that event the case can be remanded. In other cases the Court itself may investigate in judicial review and cure the defect and proceed to decide the issue finally in accordance with law. 24. In view of changing needs and values of the socieity, this concept of Post Facto Hearing deserves to be developed givng new dimensions in the field of constitutional and public laws evolving juristic principles within the framework of law so as to ensure substantial justice between the parties, according to prevalent needs of the socieity Audi Alteram Partem is a part of equity and for doing the substantial justice the maximum Salus Populi Suprema Lacs which means the public welfare is the highest law, cannot be lost sight of. Therefore, taking into consideration the public welfare, for which in the instant case the land is acquired, i. e for raising commercial district centre under development scheme by the Allahabad Development Authority whereby a large section of society will be benefited as compared to the interest of few rank trespassers who without disclosing any semblance of title or legal possession over the land in question raising the plea of Audi Alteram Partem, if the matter is remanded, the same indeed may cause considerable harm to the larger section of the socieity and defeat the principles of Salus Suprema Lacs. Thus, prima facie if it is proved that no opportunity is afforded and the same is not liable to be cured by Post Facto Hearing in judicial review, only in such events, the cases are to be remanded. In this regard, one may not forget that every order passed on administrative side cannot be subjected to the rigours tof the principles of natural justice except where the vested statutory right is jeopardized. [sec AIR 1991 SC 554 Union of India and other v. Ex-constable Amrik Singh]. 25. In Ahmedabad Muncipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan and others, JT 1996 (10) SC 485, no doubt the apex Court ruled that even encroachers are no exceptions to the constitutional right to judicial redressal provided the encroacher establishes that he has right to remedy. [sec AIR 1991 SC 554 Union of India and other v. Ex-constable Amrik Singh]. 25. In Ahmedabad Muncipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan and others, JT 1996 (10) SC 485, no doubt the apex Court ruled that even encroachers are no exceptions to the constitutional right to judicial redressal provided the encroacher establishes that he has right to remedy. Thus it is crystal clear that even the encroacher, before claiming constitutional right, must establish semblance of title that his possession is justified and that he does not come within the category of rank trespassers. 26. We have already held in the preceding paragraphs that the petitioners failed to prove any semblance of title in their favour. Even the ration laid in Olga Tellis case (supra) and Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation case (supra) is that in such cases even trespassers be given reasonable opportunity to depart before the force is used to expel them. That is why full opportunity was afforded to the petitioners and during the course of hearing, time and again prayer made on behalf of the petitioners that considerable time may also be given to them for vacating the premises peacefully, was also taken into account and after hearing the parties and closing the cse, after considerable time judgement is being delivered so that in between the petitioners may make suitable arrangements for their shifting. We hope and trust that in consonance with their prayer, by now the petitioners must have arranged for their shifting. 27. This Court on every hearing provided opportunity to the petitioners to bring some thing on record to justify their possession, but it could be of no avail. Thus, affording opportunity during the process of hearing of this writ petition, further fulfils the requirement of Post Facto Hearing and ensures sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice. [sec (1996) 2 SCC 98 Haryana Warehousing Corporation v. Ram Avtar & another] 28. The last submission made by the learned counsel for petitioners that even after issuance of notice under Section 27 of the Act, the order passed pursuant thereto suffers from inadequacy of independent enquiry, in the opinion of this Court, has no legs to stand, as the petitioners miserably failed to establish that they have raised constructions on the land in question is accordance with law. Therefore, where the trespassers have raised construction other wise than in accordance with law, in the opinion of this Court, no enquiry is required to be made even after receipt of reply of the notice, if nothing has been shown to show the semblance of title in respect of the land over which construction is raised. Thus, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the opportunity afforded by giving statutory notice, is sufficient compliance and the procedure cannot be faulted as violative of the principles of natural justice. [sec (1996) 2 SCC 23 Cantonment Board and another v. Mohan Lal & another] 29. In view of the discussion aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that no interference is called for except to observe that if the petitioners make suitable applications for allotments and are ready and willing to satisfy the requirements of allotemtn, their cases along with others, for the allotment shall be considered sympathetically on utmost humanitarian consideration. 30. With these observation writ petitions are dismissed. Interim orders if any are vacated. The Allahabad Development Authority shall be at liberty to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law. Petition dismissed ORDEr B. M. Laj and Bhagwan Din, JJ.-Heard Sri Vijy Kumar Rai, learned counsel for the applicants. 2. This is an application seeking 15 days time to the applicants/petitioners ena bling them to remove their assets, fixtures & furnitures from their respective shops and houses. 3. Judgment in the present case was reserved on 2-4-1997 and during the course of hearing time and again prayer was made on behalf of the petitioners for grant of time for this very purpose. Their prayer was taken into consideration and at that very stage it was made clear to the petitioners to arrange for their shifting by the time the judgment is delivered and in this way after considerable time the judgment was delivered in this case on 21-5-1997 i. e. after 49 days. This fact does find mention in the judgment itself] 4. This being so, since more than suffi cient time has already been granted, it is not a fit case in which any further time should be granted. 5. The application is therefore rejected. Applicationrejected. .