SUDHIR NARAIN, J. The petitioner seeks writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 29-11-1994 passed by the Prescribed Authority allowing the release application and the order dated 10-1-1997 dismissing the appeal against the aforesaid order by respondent No. 1. 2. Respondent No. 3 filed application for release of the shop in question under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the allegation that he is landlord of the disputed shop situate in House No. 1/538-539 Mohalla Thatheri Bazar, Golaghat, Ram Nagar, Varanasi. He is un employed and requires the shop in question for carrying on business. He alleged that the property belonged to Sarottam Seth and after his death it was inherited by his widow, Ramwanti. He is adopted son of Sarottam Seth. 3. The petitioner filed objection stat ing that Smt. Ramwanti had executed a gift deed of the disputed property in favour of the Bhola Nath on 15-12-1977. Smt. Ram wanti and Ganga Shanker filed Original suit No. 238 of 1983 for cancellation of the gift deed dated 15-12-1977 and in the suit the matter was compromised by the parties and easter half portion of this house was given to Bhola Nath. His name was also mutated in the municipal record. The petitioner, after the said compromise, was not entitled to realise any rent. It was further denied that the need of respondent No. 3 was bona fide. It was contended that Deonath is a tenant of the adjoining portion and the respondent No. 2 can file an application as against him. 4. The Prescribed Authority recorded a finding that the petitioner was paying rent to respondent No. 3. There was relationship of landlord and tenant. Respondent No. 3 was unemployed and required the shop in question for his personal use. The applica tion was allowed by order dated 29-11-1994. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by respondent No. 1 on 10-1-1997. These orders have been challenged in the present writ petition. 5. The parties have exchanged their affidavits and the writ petition is being final ly disposed of. 6. I have heard Sri R. S. Maurya, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri S. P. Singh, learned counsel for the respon dent. 7. These orders have been challenged in the present writ petition. 5. The parties have exchanged their affidavits and the writ petition is being final ly disposed of. 6. I have heard Sri R. S. Maurya, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri S. P. Singh, learned counsel for the respon dent. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that respondent No. 3 was not landlord of the petitioner within the mean ing of Section 3 (j) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. It is not denied that respondent No. 3 is the adopted son of Sarottam Seth and his widow Smt. Ramwanti. The contention is that Smt. Ramwanti had executed a gift deed in respect of this property in favour of one Bhola Nath. Subsequently, Suit No. 238 of 1993 was filed for cancellation of the gift deed. The suit was compromised and the eastern half portion of the house in question was given to Bhola Nath. The disputed shop exists in the eastern half portion. 8. The suit is alleged to have been com promised prior to the year 1985. Smt. Ram wanti died in the year 1985. The petitioner always paid rent to respondent No. 3. Bhola Nath himself never claimed any right of pos session. The Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority both recorded a finding that the petitioner paid rent to respondent No. 3. There was relationship of landlord and tenant and he was entitled to file an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that under Section 3 (j) of the Act the "landlord" means, in relation to a building, a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let, would be, payable and includes, except in clause (g), the agent or attorney, or such person. The mere fact that the petitioner paid rent to respondent No. 3, does not create any right in favour of respondent No. 3. He has placed reliance upon the decision Smt. Ved Rani Diwan and another v. Vlllth Additional District Judge, Ghazibad and others, 1996 (2) A. R. C. 14 : 1996 (2) JCLR 311 (All), wherein it was held that if a person is authorised only to realise rent, he cannot be taken as landlord for the purpose of filing an application of release. This case has no application on the facts of the present case. Respondent No. 3 was realising rent on his own behalf and not on behalf of any other person. 9. Reliance has been placed on the decision Ram Nath Misra v. Prescribed Authority and others, 1984 (2) A. R. C. 227, wherein a Division Bench took the view that the Prescribed Authority is under a duty to determine the status of the person making application under Section 21 of the Act. If two persons are claiming to be landlords, it would be fair and proper to consider the case of both the persons before passing any order under Section 21 of the Act. While the Prescribed Authority has no jurisdiction of making any declaration in respect of dis puted question of title to the house but it has ancillary powers to determine the ques tion as to who is the landlord for the pur pose of Section 21 of the Act. This case has no application to the facts of the present case as no other person has claimed to be landlord of the disputed premises. 10. Bhola Nath has not claimed any right as against the present landlord. In MM. Qasim v. Manohar, AIR 1981 SC 1113 , wherein during the pendency of ap peal co-owner lost interest in the property as a result of decree in partition suit the Supreme Court held that in view of the subsequent event the court can mould the relief accordingly. The petitioner alleges that compromise decree was passed in 1985 wherein Bhola Nath was given share in the property towards eastern portion. Admit tedly, Bhola Nath was not claiming any right against the petitioner to realise the rent etc. The petitioner had paid rent to respondent No. 3. The Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate authority has found that the compromise decree was not acted upon and relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 con tinues. Respondent No, 3 was thus entitled to file application for release against the petitioner under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that there was dispute regarding the shop which was in the portion of Bhola Nath and the Prescribed Authority should have impleaded Bhola Nath and only thereafter the case should have been decided. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that there was dispute regarding the shop which was in the portion of Bhola Nath and the Prescribed Authority should have impleaded Bhola Nath and only thereafter the case should have been decided. The petitioner was admittedly paying rent to respondent No. 3 Bhola Nath himself never filed application to contest the release application. It was, in these circumstances, not necessary that Bhola Nath should have been impleaded in the application by Respon dent No. 3 under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act to establish his own title to the property in dispute. There was no dispute before the Prescribed Authority as between respon dent No. 3 and Bhola Nath. It was found that the compromise decree was never acted upon and respondent No. 3 was realising the rent from the petitioner. There was relationship of landlord and tenant between them and the application was maintainable. The view taken by respondent No. 2 does not suffer from any illegality. 12. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the need of respondent No. 3 is not genuine and bona fide. Both the authorities have recorded concurrent finding that Respondent No. 3 is major. It has not been shown that he has got any other accommodation to carry on busi ness. The finding that he bona fide requires the shop in question does not suffer from any manifest error of law. 13. The third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent No. 3 could have filed applica tion against any other tenant. The landlord, if has chosen to file application against a particular tenant, he cannot be asked to file application against any other tenant unless it is shown that his action is malicious or arbitrary. It has not been shown that the accommodation with Deonath was more suitable and was easily available to respon dent No. 3. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the petitioner shall suffer greater hardship in case the petitioner is evicted. The petitioner is carry ing on business of furniture. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 recorded finding that respon dents No. 3 requires the accommodation in question for carrying on business. In case respondent No. 3 is not provided with the accommodation in question, the will suffer a greater hardship. 15. The petitioner is carry ing on business of furniture. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 recorded finding that respon dents No. 3 requires the accommodation in question for carrying on business. In case respondent No. 3 is not provided with the accommodation in question, the will suffer a greater hardship. 15. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that during the pendency of appeal the petitioner had filed an affidavit indicating that Deonath has va cated the accommodation in his tenancy and has handed over its possession to respondent No. 3. This fact has not been denied in the counter- affidavit. It was the duty of the appellate authority to consider this fact. In case Deonath had vacated any shop or any accommodation, respondent No. 1 should have recorded a finding, Firstly whether he has vacated such an accom modation; Secondly if such an accommoda tion is vacated by Deonath whether it is suitable for respondent No. 3 and lastly if it is not suitable to respondent No. 3, can it be offered to the petitioner. 16. These aspects are required to be considered by the appellate authority. As these aspects have not been considered, the matter is directed to be reconsidered on these aspects by respondent No. 1. The writ petition is partly allowed. The order of respondent No. 1 dated 19. 1. 1997 is quashed to the extent of the observation made above and in other respects the find ings recorded by respondent No. 1 is main tained. Respondent No. 1 shall record a finding on the points stated above within three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. Petition partly allowed. .