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1997 DIGILAW 605 (MAD)

Inspector, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Madras. v. S. M. Ramasamy and others

1997-06-14

V.KANAGARAJ

body1997
Judgment : The Employees State Insurance Corporation, Madras represented by its Inspector has filed the above appeal under Sec.378 of Crl.P.C. against the order of the Court of II Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras-8 in its order dated 13. 1989 in C.C.No.5281 of 1987 wherein the said court had ordered the acquittal of the respondents based on an application filed on the part of the respondents/accused in the form of preliminary objections. 2. The case of the E.S.I. Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the “Corporation”) before the lower court in brief is as follows: (i) that the respondents 1 to 5 were partners, and the 6th respondent was the Manager of “M/ s.Moon Traders” located at Gl, Industrial Estate, S.Vellalapatti, Karur. (ii) that the said establishment was covered under the provisions of the E.S.I. Act, 1948 and the other regulations made there-under. That all the accused were the principal employers of the said establishment as per the provisions of the E.S.I. Act. (iii) that the relevant Rules and Regulations became applicable to the said establishment; (iv) that the respondents in their capacity as principal employers of the said establishment were required to submit to the said Corporation a return in respect of the employees employed in the said factory in form No.6 within the time limit specified under Rules and Regulation No.26 of the E.S.I. Regulations, 1950. (v) that the respondents failed to submit the said return and contribution for the period ended with 30.9.1986, which would have been submitted on or before 310. 1986. Hence, the respondents become punishable for an offence committed under Sec.85(e) of the E.S.I. Act, 1948. Hence, praying for issue of processes upon the respondents in order to be punished according to the said penal provision Sec.85(e) of E.S.I. Act on trial, the complaint had been filed by the appellant before the lower court against the respondents as accused therein. 3. During trial, when at a stage the Inspector of the Corporation Legal Cell, namely Ramanujam, who was cited as witness No.3 to the complaint had been examined as P.W.1 on 110. 1988 itself and the matter was kept pending trial for the examination of the other prosecution and defence witnesses and to follow the other procedures for a judgment to be ultimately delivered on merits, the court below, on 13. 1988 itself and the matter was kept pending trial for the examination of the other prosecution and defence witnesses and to follow the other procedures for a judgment to be ultimately delivered on merits, the court below, on 13. 1989, passed the above order acquitting the respondents under pretext that an application preliminarily objecting to the maintainability of the above complaint and proceeding had been filed before it on the part of the respondents citing 2 case laws (i) E.S.I. Corporation v. S.C. Mallick and others, I.L.R. 1979 Cut. 136, (ii) Ashok Kumar Goyal v. Manager, E.S.I. Corporation, Madras, 1987 L.W, (Crl) 285 at 287 and in consideration of the contents and findings of the said judicial pronouncements in its own way, the lower court abruptly ordered the acquittal of the respondents/accused questioning the validity of which, the appellant Corporation has filed the abvoe appeal praying for interference by this Court. 4. On questioning the accused regarding the above charge, since they denied the same, trial had been ordered by the lower court and as aforestated even the evidence of P.W.1 had been recorded and since, at that stage of trial the court below chose to entertain an application filed on. the part of the respondent in the form of preliminary objection questioning the very maintainability of the complaint and abruptly breaking with the trial had started considering the merits of the petition and under pretext of appreciating the judgments cited therein, ordered the acquittal of the respondent. 5. In the above circumstances, this Court is of the view of that it is absolutely not necessary nor warranted to go into the contents of the petition or to dissect the applicability of the said two judgments cited therein to the facts of the case in hand, since the only high question that is to be answered is whether it was either proper or legal on the part of the court below to entertain a petition of that sort and whether it was competent to break with the trial at that stage and order the acquittal of the accused under Sec.255(1) of Crl.P.C. without passing a regular judgment on merits on completion of trial in full consideration of the facts, circumstances, the evidenciary value, the position of law etc. 6. 6. Even though many vital aspects touching the point for consideration have not been pleaded in the grounds of appeal, but many other brought in, in the arguments by the appellant only in consideration of those relevant to the point for determination, the submissions of the appellant could be referred to as under: .(i) that the abvoe case is one to be tried as a summons case and hence the procedures laid down in Chapter XX of Crl.P.C. becomes relevant to the context. .(ii) that section 255 of Crl.P.C. should not be isolated and misconstrued, and this section should be read along with the other two relevant sections namely Secs.251 and 254 of Crl.P.C. to extract the real meaning of Sec.255 and for better appreciation. (iii) once questioning under Sec.251 of Crl.P.C. was over, the duty of the Magistrate is to get on with the trial recording evidence and no acquittal could be ordered without conclusion of trial on hearing both sides and without following the procedures laid down by law. .(iv) any order could be resorted to be passed by the Magistrate under Sec.255(1) of Crl.P.C. only in compliance of the procedures laid down under Sec.254(1) of Crl.P.C. which are mandatory and imposed as conditions precedent to pass any order under Sec.255(1) of Crl.P.C. .(v) any order passed without compliance of the above mandatory provisions of law becomes liable to be set aside. With the above legal contentions besides others, the appellant Corporation prayed for, besides setting aside the order passed by the court below, for a remand of the above case to the trial court for further proceedings to be exhausted with due opportunity for both sides to be heard and to consider the position of law in the right angle in order to deliver the judgment on merits according to law. On the other hand, the contentions of the respondents which are though very many in number, are meagre touching the legal points raised in the above case. On the other hand, the contentions of the respondents which are though very many in number, are meagre touching the legal points raised in the above case. The points put forth by the respondents are referred to hereunder: .(i) To the petition filed by the respondent questioning the maintainability of the complaint after commencement of the trial no serious objections were raised by the appellant either before the lower court or in the grounds of appeal; .(ii) The complaint itself was hopelessly time-barred and the same should not have been entertained at all; (iii) When on facts there was no offence made out, there was no need in the continuance of trial; .(iv) Without payment of contribution, there cannot be an offence under Sec.85(e) for non submission of returns; .(v) In the instant case even the provisions and requirements of Sec.251 of Crl.P.C. had not been complied with and hence any order passed under Sec.255(1) of Crl.P.C. was within the competence of the Magistrate; .(vi) No proper procedure had been adopted by the appellant to comply with the requirements of the relevant provisions of the E.S.I. Act and the Regulation regarding contributions, returns etc., and hence the appellant had no locus standi to prefer the complaint at all. 7. A plain reading of Secs.251, 254 and 255(1) of Crl.P.C. would reveal that under Sec.251, Crl.P.C.,the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or had any defence to make i.e., preliminarily questioning of the accused with regard to material aspects of the case made out against him. If the accused pleads guilty the Magistrate shall record the plea and may in his discretion convict him under Sec.252 of the Crl.P.C. in the event of the accused present before him and the same could be done by the Magistrate in his discretion convicting the accused in his absence as set out under Sec. 253 of Crl.P.C. Sec. 254(1) of Crl.P.C. which is relevant to the case in hand reads: "If the Magistrate does not convict the accused under Sec.252 or under Sec.253, Crl.P.C, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence." Sec.255(1) reads: "If the Magistrate, upon taking the evidence referred to in Sec.254 and such further evidence, if any, as he may, of his own motion, cause to be produced, finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal." From out of the above reading of the sections one could easily understand that without following the requirements of Sec.254(1) of Criminal Procedure Code, no order of acquittal could be recorded by the Magistrate under Sec.255(1) of Crl.P.C. since hearing the prosecution and taking all such evidence that may be produced by the prosecution and the defence have been not only made mandatory but a pre-condition imposed to arrive at any decision either to acquit the accused under Sec.255(1) of Crl.P.C. or convict him as contemplated under Sec.255(2) and (3) of Crl.P.C. In the instant case, invoking the provision of Sec.255(1) of Crl.P.C. since the Magistrate resorted to and ordered the acquittal of the accused without compliance of the mandatory perquisite provision under Sec.254(1) of the Crl.P.C. it has to be held that the order of the Magistrate has become tainted with illegality and become vitiated on account of patent error of law and perversity in approach. The Magistrate, insofar as he has circumvented the procedures laid down by law, in passing the order as he did, has acted in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner against the legal convictions and norms. The same sentiments have been expressed by various judicial decisions delivered by different upper forums of law time and again as, "(i) In 1931 M.W.N. 1050 Cr. The same sentiments have been expressed by various judicial decisions delivered by different upper forums of law time and again as, "(i) In 1931 M.W.N. 1050 Cr. 214, wherein it has been held that "an order of acquittal without examining the complainant and witnesses is illegal" (ii) In 1950 L. 60, it has been categorically held that an order of acquittal cannot be recorded unless the Magistrate has taken evidence; (iii) In L.R. v. Madhablal, 1974 Crl.L.J. 1330 Cal it has been held that "unless under Sec.252 or 253, the Magistrate cannot on any ground drop the proceedings against the other accused. He must proceed under Sec.254 starting with the prosecution evidence." While such being the unshakable position of law on the subject, it is pathetic to note that the court below had not only entertained an application in the midst of trial even when the recording of the evidence of P.W.1 was over, but also in consideration of the contents therein had ordered acquittal of the accused regardless of the warranting procedures which is highly deplorable and the same is hereby depricated. While such being the position of law, and when the court is confined to such substantial questions of law, only the contentions put forth by parties to such points for consideration are answered and the other arguments advanced or facts pleaded get eliminated. Thus in the instant case, the only point for consideration being whether in the course of trial, after questioning of the accused under Sec.251 of Crl.P.C. and on their denial, the lower court having commenced the examination of witnesses by recording their evidence as contemplated under Sec.254 of Crl.P.C. without completing the whole procedure allowing the parties to exhaust their remedy, is it fair or justifiable on the part of the Magistrate to stop the trial abruptly and order the acquittal of the accused under Sec.255(1) of Crl.P.C, under pretext that some preliminary objections were raised by the accused at that stage of trial? While answering that the Magistrate cannot indulge in such exercises, in gross violation of the provisions of law, this Court is of the firm view that the trial court must be allowed to continue with the trial of the case thus affording fair opportunities for both parties to exhaust their remedies so as to deliver the judgment on merits and hence remanding the case to the trial court becomes well-merited and inevitable. In result, .(i) the appeal is allowed; .(ii) the order passed by the Court of II Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, dated 13. 1989 in C.C.No.5281 of 1987 thereby acquitting the accused is hereby set aside; (iii) the case in C.C.No.5281 of 1987 is remanded under Sec.386(a) of Crl.P.C, to the trial court in order to continue with the trial from where it got terminated on account of the interference by the order of acquittal by the court below; and (iv) the trial court is further directed to resume the trial in this matter on priority basis so as to deliver the judgment in six months from the time of receipt of the case bundle since a decade is over from the time the case got numbered and the trial commenced.