Judgment :- 1. The defendants in O.S. No. 305 of 1980 on the file of Sub Court. Chidambaram, who lost before both the Courts below, are the appellants in the above Second Appeal. The 1st respondent herein filed the suit before the trial Court for declaration that the sale consideration for Ex. A-1 dated 25.5.1980 was really Rs. 20,000/- and for recovery of the same from the defendants. 2. There is no controversy over the position that Ex. A-1 has been executed and registered in accordance with the law relating to registration and that possession of the property has also been obtained by the defendants predecessors in interest. The limited controversy in this appeal is with reference to the quantum of consideration said to have been agreed to be paid actually. The case of the defendants was that the agreed consideration was only Rs. 10,000/- as recited in the document and that the same has also been duly passed on to the vendor-the plaintiff and consequently, nothing remains due from the defendants. 3. On the above claims and counter claims, the suit came to be tried, and both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the sale consideration was really Rs. 10,000/- and such an amount was agreed to be the consideration by showing concession to the defendants. In spite of the said finding, a decree for Rs. 10,000/- was granted in favour of the plaintiff on the further finding that no consideration actually passed for the transaction and that the plaintiff has executed and got the sale deed registered on the assurance of payment, but that no amount as such has been paid for the transaction. 4. The defendants filed A.S. No. 219 of 1982 before the District Court, Cuddalore, against the judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge dated 30.6.1982. The learned First Appellate Judge also concurred with the findings of the learned trial Judge and dismissed the appeal by judgment and decree dated 21.4.1983. Hence, the above Second Appeal. 5. At the time of the admission of the Second Appeal, the learned Judge was of the view that a substantial question of law based on the omission of the Courts below in overlooking and ignoring the presumption arising from the endorsement of registration made in Ex. Hence, the above Second Appeal. 5. At the time of the admission of the Second Appeal, the learned Judge was of the view that a substantial question of law based on the omission of the Courts below in overlooking and ignoring the presumption arising from the endorsement of registration made in Ex. A-1, deed of sale, under Section 58(1) of the Registration Act arises for consideration and in that context, the legality and propriety of the conclusions arrived at the by the Courts below was found necessary to be considered. During the pendency of the above Second Appeal, the 1st respondent herein appears to have died and in his place, his legal representatives have been brought on record. 6. Mr. N.K. Ahamed, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended, while placing reliance upon Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872, that when the terms of the contract, in this case Ex. A-1 sale deed, which is required by law to be reduced in the form of a document, has been proved, it is not permissible for either of the parties to such document or their representatives-in-interest to let in any oral evidence or set up any oral agreement for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms. Adverting to Proviso No. 1 to the said provision, the learned counsel also stated that it will have no application and that therefore, the Courts below have committed a serious error of law in decreeing the suit for the sum, as noticed supra. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in K.S. Narasimhachari v. Indo Commr. Bank ( AIR 1965 Mad 147 = (1964) 77 L.W. 622 ) and in Bonam Venugopal Rao v. Tavvala Veerabhadra Rao (AIR 1989 NOC 178 (AP), in support of the said stand. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, while adopting the reasons and findings concurrently recorded by both the Courts below, contended that the conclusions arrived at, are not in any manner opposed to the principles contained in Section 92 of the Evidence Act or the decisions relied upon by the appellants and that therefore, no interference is called for in this appeal. 7. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel on either side. 7. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel on either side. As noticed earlier, the substantial question of law formulated was with reference to Section 58(1) of the Registration Act, 1908 and the presumption said to be arising out of the same. This plea has not been pursued before me, apparently on account of the fact that there is no endorsement as such as to the payment of consideration by Registering Authority in this case and it is only in cases, where the Registering Authority makes an endorsement about the payment of consideration before it, the question of invoking Section 58(1) of the Registration Act would arise for consideration. 8. Learned counsel as noticed earlier, on the other hand, placed reliance upon Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1892 and the decisions referred to above in support of his claim that the plaintiff was precluded from letting in any oral evidence contrary to the recitals contained in Ex. A-1 about the non-receipt or non payment of consideration, as found recited in that document. Section 92 and the Proviso No. 1 thereto, read as follows:— “92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement: When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last Section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives-in-interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms. Proviso (1) :— Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document or which would entitle any person to a decree or order relating thereto, such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want of failure of consideration or mistake in fact or law.” 9. The Division Bench also, while elaborating the scope of the provision with Proviso (1) thereto, has held that under that Proviso it will be competent to the party to a contract to adduce evidence to prove want of consideration or failure of consideration or a different kind of consideration specified in the document. But, at the same time, it will not be competent for him to prove a variation of the consideration recited in the document. But, at the same time, it will not be competent for him to prove a variation of the consideration recited in the document. It was also observed therein that consideration specified in a document will be one of the terms of the contract evidenced by it and that at any rate, when a document is not silent, regarding consideration, oral evidence to prove additional consideration also is not admissible. In the Andhra Pradesh High Court Judgment, from the Notes of Cases, nothing substantial could be made out, except the fact that the head note recites the terms of main section without even any reference to Proviso No. 1 thereto apparently on account of the fact that it was not under consideration before the learned single Judge, who dealt with the case before him. 10. The document Ex: A-1 recited the consideration of Rs. 10,000/- for the transaction and the fact that it has already been received, though the attempt of the plaintiff was to assert the claim for Rs. 20,000/- as being the consideration and both the Courts below have rejected the same and it is in that context, the Courts below accepted the document and the consideration recited in the document, to be the only consideration for the transaction. On the question of actual passing of consideration, the Courts below have concurrently found that it was case of failure of consideration and that actually the vendor had executed the document on the assurance of payment and without actually receiving the consideration recited therein. This aspect of the matter and the findings of the Courts below in this regard, would clearly fit in with the Exception provided in Proviso No. 1 to Section 92 of the Evidence Act and is also in conformity with the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court, referred to supra. In view of the above, learned counsel endeavoured to contend that the case on hand should not be treated as a case of want of consideration or failure of consideration, since according to learned counsel if that be the position, the plaintiff ought to have come to the Court with the relief of annulling the document Ex. A-1 and not for the relief as prayed for. A-1 and not for the relief as prayed for. In my view, the fact that the plaintiff could have sought for the relief of having the sale deed annulled, does not disentitle him to abide by the transaction, but yet seek to recover the consideration recited therein by proving failure of consideration. The plaintiff had a choice of relief and merely because he has chosen to opt for one particular type of relief, the question pertaining to the scope of Section 92, particularly, Proviso No. 1 thereto and its applicability to the case on hand and right to take advantage of the same does not stand in any manner undermined Since both the Courts below have concurrently found as a question of fact that the vendor has executed the sale deed without actually receiving the consideration recited therein and only on the assurance of payment in future, the Courts below could not be accused of having committed any error of law or transgressed the mandate contained in Section 92 of the Evidence Act and particularly, when the question of want of consideration or failure of consideration was permissible to be proved by virtue of the Exception carved out in Proiviso No. 1 to Section 92 of the Evidence Act. In the light of the above, I do not find any merit in the Second Appeal and the Second Appeal shall stand dismissed. No costs.