JUDGMENT - D.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---Heard advocates for the plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff is the tenant of the suit premises which consists of a cabin and outer room fully furnished with furnitures, fixtures etc. A plan of the suit premises is filed by the defendant in his affidavit in reply at pages 17, 18 and 23. According to the plaintiff, the defendant who was the plaintiff's advocate since 1979 was allowed by the plaintiff in 1985 to occupy the suit premises i.e. the cabin and the outer room and the defendant was to use the suit premises from 3.00 p.m. onwards on every day from Monday to Friday and till about 1.00 p.m. on Saturday. 2. The disputes between the parties started in 1996-97 regarding right to occupy the suit premises and therefore the present suit is filed for a declaration that the defendant has no right whatsoever in the suit premises, for a mandatory injunction order, the defendant to remove his articles and belongings and for other reliefs. The motion is taken out by the plaintiff for ad-interim reliefs namely for appointment of Receiver, for injunction restraining the defendant from entering into the premises and for restricting the use of the defendant in respect of the suit premises from 3.00 p.m. only on Monday to Friday and 1.00 p.m. on Saturday. Out of the three prayers, prayer (c) was strongly pressed by the Counsel for the plaintiff. 3. The motion is strongly opposed by the defendant on the ground that the defendant is not a gratuitous licencee of the plaintiff but a sub-tenant of the plaintiff from 1985 and that the defendant was in exclusive possession, use and enjoyment of the inner room and the open terrace. According to the defendant, the plaintiff never used the inner room and the open portion. In order to prove the exclusive use of the defendant of the inner cabin and the open terrace, the defendant has filed about 15 affidavits and has relied upon certain documents namely Income Tax Returns and reliance is strongly placed on a letter dated 15-2-1985 which was addressed by the landlord of the plaintiff to the plaintiff. 4. The question is whether the plaintiff succeeds in making out prima facie case that the defendant is a gratuitous licencee and whether the plaintiff is entitled for all the reliefs or any of the relief in the motion. 5. 4. The question is whether the plaintiff succeeds in making out prima facie case that the defendant is a gratuitous licencee and whether the plaintiff is entitled for all the reliefs or any of the relief in the motion. 5. Admittedly, there is no written agreement between the parties regarding the nature of the possession of the defendant. There is no dispute that the plaintiff is the tenant of the premises. There is also no dispute that for quite a number of times i.e. from 1979 the defendant was acting as Advocate or Counsel of the plaintiff in most of the litigations that was required to be filed or fought by the plaintiff in respect of his properties. There is, therefore, no doubt that the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was a professional relationship of advocate and client and in other words it was a mutual relationship of trust and confidence. 6. Since there is no written agreement between the parties, the Court has to find out at this stage whether from the circumstances that are brought on record it could be prima facie held that the defendant was and is in occupation of the premises as a gratuitous licencee. 7. So far as the letter of the landlord filed by the defendant at Exh. 4, dated 15-2-1985 is concerned, Counsel for the defendant strongly contended that the plaintiff was guilty of suppression of material document from the Court at the time of filing of the suit because according to the defendant this document was of great importance in establishing the relationship between the parties and because of suppression of this document from the Court, the plaintiff is not entitled for any relief. It is true that if the party is guilty of suppression of fact or suppression of document, the Court may not grant any relief to such a party. The question is whether it can be said that the plaintiff was guilty of suppression of fact. 8. Document Exh. 4 i.e. letter dated 15-2-1985 is written by the landlord of the plaintiff wherein the landlord has stated that the landlord has no objection for the defendant to occupy the said premises on the basis of lease or sub-letting or otherwise. 8. Document Exh. 4 i.e. letter dated 15-2-1985 is written by the landlord of the plaintiff wherein the landlord has stated that the landlord has no objection for the defendant to occupy the said premises on the basis of lease or sub-letting or otherwise. Counsel for the defendant contended that this letter is sufficient to prima facie held that the relationship of the plaintiff and defendant was that of tenant and sub-tenant i.e. the plaintiff being the tenant and the defendant being the sub-tenant. 9. It is difficult to accept this contention but at the most what is revealed by the letter, Exh. 4 is that the landlord intimated to the plaintiff in writing that the landlord will have no objection if the premises of the plaintiff were occupied by any other person in whatever capacity. Incidentally, the defendant was the person regarding whom the landlord did not raise any objection. But this letter does not in any way indicate or establish even prima facie that the landlord has given sanction or approval to the nature of the contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. What the landlord has done is just to permit the plaintiff, user of the tenanted premises by any third person. 10. So far as the objection regarding suppression of fact is concerned, it is true that the plaintiff did not file this document at initial stage. It is also true the plaintiff should have filed this document but since as per the above observation this document does not indicate in any manner whatsoever as to the nature of the contractual relation that was to exist between the plaintiff and defendant it cannot be said that plaintiff is guilty of deliberate suppression of fact or document. 11. Counsel for the defendant also contended that the defendant has in his possession rent receipts in respect of the suit premises. Plaintiff's Counsel clarified that those receipts are in respect of the rent paid by the defendant to the landlord directly and that there are no receipt issued by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant. 12. 11. Counsel for the defendant also contended that the defendant has in his possession rent receipts in respect of the suit premises. Plaintiff's Counsel clarified that those receipts are in respect of the rent paid by the defendant to the landlord directly and that there are no receipt issued by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant. 12. Only question that is of significance and importance in this case is from the nature of relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff could have granted gratuitous licence to the defendant or the plaintiff having continuously fighting litigation to get back his property from the tenant through the defendant would have granted the suit premises to the defendant as a sub-tenant. My attention in this regard was drawn by the plaintiff's Counsel to paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the affidavit in reply dated 3-10-1997. 13. If the case of the plaintiff and defendant is compared with reference to their pleadings, the difference is of decree and not of a substance. The plaintiff claims right to occupy the premises upto 3.00 p.m. and the defendant claims that the plaintiff can use the outer cabin but not the inner cabin and the open terrace. 14. It was argued by the Counsel for the defendant that the defendant has installed air conditioner, computer and number of telephones etc. In my opinion that would not make any difference once the plaintiff allows the defendant who was his advocate to occupy the premises then it was not expected of the plaintiff to take objection in defendant's installing airconditioner, telephones and other machineries or apparatus. 15. Considering therefore all the circumstances, I am constrained to hold that the plaintiff has succeeded in making a prima facie case for his right to use the premises upto 3.00 p.m. However, so far as other reliefs namely appointment of Receiver is concerned, the plaintiff is not entitled but he is entitled to relief in terms of prayer (c). I, therefore, pass the following order. ORDER There will be order in terms of prayer (c). The defendant if in possession of the only key of the premises will hand over a duplicate key to the plaintiff within 10 days in pursuance of the order in terms of prayer (c). Other prayers (a) and (b) are rejected. Notice of Motion disposed of. After the order was pronounced, Mr. The defendant if in possession of the only key of the premises will hand over a duplicate key to the plaintiff within 10 days in pursuance of the order in terms of prayer (c). Other prayers (a) and (b) are rejected. Notice of Motion disposed of. After the order was pronounced, Mr. Tulzapurkar Counsel for the defendant prays for stay of the order for four weeks. Prayer granted. Prayer allowed partly.