JUDGMENT 1. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against an order dated 28.4.97 passed by the Additional Secretary (Enquiry) Rajasthan, Jaipur suspending the petitioner Smt. Archana Bohra. Sarpanch Gram Panchayat Roopangarh, Panchayat Samiti Kishangarh, Ajmer in exercise of power conferred under Section 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj. Act, 1994, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. The brief facts which are relevant for the purpose of deciding the present case are that the petitioner was elected as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Roopangarh in the election held in the month of January, 1995 defeating one Smt. Shama Devi. It has been stated that the respondent No. 5 Smt. Kamlesh Kumari against whom the petitioner had contested the election earlier and who has been elected as a member of Panchayat Samiti Kishangarh on the ticket of BJP made a false complaint against the petitioner vide letter dated 11.1.96 to the respondent No. 4 i.e. the Block Development Officer Panchayat Samiti Kishangarh. In the said complaint it. has been alleged that the petitioner has committed irregularity in purchase of construction material and also misused the funds of Panchavat and thereby embezzled the funds of the Panchayat. It has been stated in para 6 of the petition that on enquiry made by Kuihva Karvakari Adhikari, Zila Parishad Amer, only some of Rs. 08/- was found short and no other serious irregularities were found. It has been further alleged that all of a sudden the petitioner came to know through a news item published in "Danik Bhaskar" in Ajmer Edition on 3.5 97 that the petitioner has been suspended from the post of Sarpanch Gram Panchavat Roopangarh. It has further been alleged that the petitioner approached the authority but he was not told the reason or ground for suspension, however, he arranged a copy of the suspension order dated 28.4.97 which has been issued under Section 38(4) of the,. Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act. 1994. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order the petitioner has approached this Court. in extraordinary writ jurisdiction with a prayer to quash the suspension order dated 28.4.97. 2. I have heard Mr. Hanuman Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length. Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act. 1994. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order the petitioner has approached this Court. in extraordinary writ jurisdiction with a prayer to quash the suspension order dated 28.4.97. 2. I have heard Mr. Hanuman Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length. The first limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the suspension order has been passed in violation of the provisions of Section 38(1) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj. Act, 1994. In order to test the correctness of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is relevant to mention Section 38(1) and 38(4) of the Act, 1994 in extension. Which runs as under- "38. Removal and suspension - (1) The State Government may, by order in writing and after giving him an opportunity of being heard and making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary, remove from office any member including a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution. Who- (a) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting as such : or (b) is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or any disgraceful conduct: Provided that any enquiry under this sub-section may, even after the expiry of the term of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned be initiated or. if already initiated before such expiry. be continued thereafter and in any such case, the State Government shall, by order in writing, record its findings on the charges levelled. (4) The State Government may suspend any member including a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj. Institution against whom an enquiry has been initiated under sub-section (1) or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a court of law and such person stand debarred from taking part in any act or proceeding of the Panchayati Raj. Institution concerned while being under such suspension." 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the petitioner has been suspended without any opportunity of being heard and the suspension order is liable to be quashed in view of the provisions of the Act. 1994 which provides a reasonable opportunity being given to a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj. Institution. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the petitioner has been suspended without any opportunity of being heard and the suspension order is liable to be quashed in view of the provisions of the Act. 1994 which provides a reasonable opportunity being given to a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj. Institution. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is wholly fallacious on the premises that the present case is not a case of removal but it is a case of suspension. There is no manner of doubt that before passing order of removal a duty is cast upon the authorities concerned to afford reasonable opportunity of being heard. Since the order impugned in the present writ petition is not an order of removal, the provisions of Section 38(1) of the Act 1994 cannot be attracted. As far as the suspension is concerned, the Legislature has not provided any opportunity of being heard before passing order in exercise of power conferred under Section 38(4) of the Act 1994 and the recital made in the impugned order is very emphatic that the suspension order has been passed in exercise of power conferred under Section 38(4) of the Act, 1994. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner being wholly devoid of merit deserves to be rejected. 4. The other limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that assuming the impugned order is legal but in view of the fact that only Rs. 08/- is alleged to have been embezzled by the petitioner. The suspension order should not have been passed for the embezzlement of petty amount. Perusal of Annexure-4 indicates that in view of the embezzlement of a petty amount the enquiry officer did not recommend for initiating the criminal proceedings against the petitioner and it is only on that account the lenient view has been taken by the enquiry officer in not recommending the prosecution of the petitioner. It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no charge sheet has been served on the petitioner till today. The order of suspension has been passed only on 28.4.97 and as such it cannot be said that there has been undue delay in serving the charge sheet on the petitioner. It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no charge sheet has been served on the petitioner till today. The order of suspension has been passed only on 28.4.97 and as such it cannot be said that there has been undue delay in serving the charge sheet on the petitioner. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench's judgment of this court in the case of Kewal Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., RLR Vol. 13, 1990(2) page 779 . 1 have perused the aforesaid judgment of this court and I am of the opinion that the facts of that case and the facts of the present case are entirely different and the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case is not applicable in the instant case. In the case of Kewal Singh the petitioner who was Sarpanch was placed under suspension during the,,, pendency of criminal proceedings pending against him. The suspension order was held to be illegal on the ground that unless a charge is framed, it cannot be said that suspension order was passed by invoking the power under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 whereas, in the present case the suspension order of the petitioner has been passed by invoking power under section 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj. Act, 1994. The other decision on which the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is AIR 1966 Allahabad 158, Babu Nandan Gir v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Salempur and another . In the said case the court was called upon to consider the scope of Section 95(1) (g) of the UP Panchayat Raj. Act, 1947. Perusal of the said decision indicates that the suspension order of Babu Nandan Gir was set-aside on the ground that right to suspend depends on relationship of master and servant and there being no such relationship in the case of Pradhan, the suspension order should not have been passed. Act, 1947. Perusal of the said decision indicates that the suspension order of Babu Nandan Gir was set-aside on the ground that right to suspend depends on relationship of master and servant and there being no such relationship in the case of Pradhan, the suspension order should not have been passed. I have carefully gone through the contents of the case of Babu Nandan Gir (supra) and also the ratio laid down by the Allahabad High Court in the said judgment, but I find myself unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Babu Nandan Gir (supra). 5. No other point has been pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner.After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and perusal of the material on record. I am of the opinion that the petition deserves to be rejected in limine. However, the respondents are directed to complete the enquiry proceedings against the petitioner according to law within a period of one month from the date of presentation of the certified copy of the order of this Court. 6. The petition is accordingly dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.Writ Petition Allowed. *******