H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition, the petitioner has claimed relief of declaration of Rule 151 (2) of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles rules 1989 as ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution of India and for quashing of the order/endorsement bearing No. STA-6/repl. 46/96-97 dated 11-7-1996 marked as Annexure-A and for a writ of mandamus for grant of permission for replacement as prayed for. ( 2 ) THE petitioner had been the holder of a stage carriage permit bearing No. 45/90-91 valid upto 15-1-2001 where under he was authorised to operate on the route Sira to Kunigal and back, covered by stage carriage vehicle bearing No. KA 09/1732 having a seating capacity of 48 + 2. Petitioner's case is that he is also the registered owner of a stage carriage vehicle bearing registration No. TAK 6381 having a seating capacity of 35 + 2 and the wheel-base of the vehicle is 210". Petitioner moved for replacement of stage carriage KA 09/1732 by another vehicle bearing No. TAK 6381 covered by stage carriage permit No. 45/90-91. This application was moved on 11-7-1996. On 11-7-1996, the Secretary, K. S. T. A. , Bangalore, issued an endorsement directing the permit holder to get the seating capacity altered from the Regional Transport Officer concerned so as to conform with the requirements of Rule 151 (2) of Rules 1989 and then produce the document for necessary action and returned the application. The authority wanted the seating capacity altered from 35 + 2 to 48 + 2. The petitioner, as such, filed this petition for the reliefs claimed as mentioned above. ( 3 ) I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri B. R. S. Gupta and the learned Government Advocate Sri B. E. Kotian. ( 4 ) THE first point which has been raised before me that Section 151 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 is ultra vires the power of the State Government to frame that Rule as well as hit by Articles 14 and 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution, being irrational. In my opinion, as per principles of law laid down by me by my order passed in Mohammed Fazalulla v State of karnataka and Another, as well as by the decision of their lordships in the case of State of Mysore and Another v KG. In my opinion, as per principles of law laid down by me by my order passed in Mohammed Fazalulla v State of karnataka and Another, as well as by the decision of their lordships in the case of State of Mysore and Another v KG. Jagannath and the principles of law laid down therein, it cannot be said to have been framed without any authority nor can it be said to be irrational. Instead the rule is covered by section 111 (2) (a) of Act 1988 which is analogous to Section 70 (2) of Act 4 of 1939. It is also not hit by Articles 14 and 19 of the constitution as the Rule is in the best interest of the general travelling public and it has got its own purpose and object as explained in the case of K. G. Jagannath, supra, with reference to rule 216 (2) of earlier rules. Same principle will apply to the question involved in this present case. In view of this matter, rule 151 may not be said to be illegal, null and void, ultra vires either of the power or of Articles 14 and 19 (l) (g ). The contention of the petitioner has been that the application was for replacement under Section 83 of the Act. The learned Counsel for the petitioner made a reference to the provisions of Section 83. The learned Counsel contended that when the question is of replacement, requirement is that replacement may be made by another vehicle of same nature i. e. , of the nature of which the earlier vehicle which is sought to be replaced by the other. The learned Counsel referred to a Single Judge's decision of this court in Yashodhara Kadamba v Karnataka State Transport appellate Tribunal and Another, with reference to the interpretation of Section 83. In the case of Yashodhara, supra, in the context of Section 59 (2) read along with Rule 151, observed as under. "a plain reading of Section 59 (2) of the Act shows that what is permissible is, replacement of any vehicle covered by the permit by any another vehicle of the same nature. The word 'nature' had been retained of sub-section (2) of section 59 of the Act by virtue of amendment which came into effect by 2-3-1970 by Act 56 of 1969 and the word 'capacity' deleted specifically. . . . The word 'nature' had been retained of sub-section (2) of section 59 of the Act by virtue of amendment which came into effect by 2-3-1970 by Act 56 of 1969 and the word 'capacity' deleted specifically. . . . Earlier to the amendment, the words employed were both 'nature' and 'capacity'. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the legislature deliberately omitted the word 'capacity' and retained the word 'nature'. To attribute the meaning of 'capacity' to the word 'nature' in such a circumstance cannot be accepted because that would be contrary to the Legislative intention. Any restriction on the rights of the applicant unless expressly provided by the statute cannot be impliedly imported. The word 'capacity' refers to the seating capacity and the word 'nature' does not mean and include capacity also and it is not permissible to read into the provisions of law a word which has been deliberately excluded by the Legislature itself. The section has to be read as it exists. If the meaning of the words 'capacity' and 'nature' was one and the same, I do not think that the words 'nature and capacity' would have been discontinued by the amendment Act 56 of 1969. The reasonable probability would be that the object of the Legislature was to consider only the nature of the vehicle and not the seating capacity of the vehicle". ( 5 ) SECTION 83 of the new Act appears to be complete reproduction of Section 59 (2) as it stood after its amendment by act 56 of 1969. Had the intention of the Legislature been different, to include the seating capacity, it appears to me that the Legislature would not have enacted Section 83 on same lines of Section 59 (2) of 1939 Act as amended by Act 56 of 1969. Therefore, it appears to me to be just and proper that the legislature when enacted Section 83, enacted with open mind, with full knowledge of meaning and interpretation of expression 'nature'. Same thing has been done by this Court in the case referred to above. ( 6 ) IN this view of the matter, in my opinion, Rule 151 may not control the exercise of power under Section 83 of the Act. Same thing has been done by this Court in the case referred to above. ( 6 ) IN this view of the matter, in my opinion, Rule 151 may not control the exercise of power under Section 83 of the Act. A decision to the contrary had been referred namely decision given by this Court in the case of A. S. Nagaraju v Regional Transport officer, Tumkur, by the learned Government Advocate to the effect that in respect of replacement matters compliance of Rule 151 (2) is necessary and the authority could direct the applicant to alter the seating arrangement to bring it to consonance with rule 151 (2 ). The learned Single Judge had, no doubt, has taken a view in the case of A. S. Nagaraju. I could have referred to this matter to the larger Bench, but I find that specifically in the matter of P. C. Shivanna v Secretary, State Transport Authority, decided by the Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice s. Rajendra Babu and Hon'ble Mr. Justice H. Rangavittalachar a view has been expressed that in view of the decision of this court in the case of Sanjeevaiah v Regional Transport Officer, the Regional Transport Officer could not direct the registered owner to alter the seating capacity under Rule 151 (2) when permission was sought for replacement or registration. The division Bench, as such, laid it down that provisions of Rule 151 did not relate to the matter of the replacement under Section 83. As I am bound by Division Bench decision in the matter of application of replacement of vehicle, requirement made by the transport authority to get the seating capacity altered is unjust. ( 7 ) THUS considered, the writ petition deserves to be allowed in part. Relief No. 1 as prayed for in the petition is rejected and refused. Claim of the petitioner as regards relief No. 1 is dismissed. Claim of the petitioner under relief Nos. 2 and 3 are allowed. Annexure-B to the writ petition namely endorsement dated 11-7-1996 issued by the Secretary of Karnataka State transport Authority, Bangalore is quashed. The authorities are directed to consider the petitioner's application for replacement in accordance with law without proceeding on the question of alteration of seating capacity. Thus this petition is allowed in part and disposed of. Costs are made easy. --- *** --- .