Honble KHAN, J. – This appeal u/S. 378(i) (iii) Cr.P.C. against the judgment and Order dated 26.4.1995 whereby the learned Civil Judge and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chhabra, District Baran, held the non-petitioner Banshi Lal guilty of the offence u/S. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954(for short `the Act of 1954), convicted him as such, and instead of sentencing him to any kind of punishment at that stage of the proceedings directed his release u/S. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short `the Act of 1958), arises under the following circumstances. (2). A complaint for commission of the offence u/S. 7/16 of the Act 1954 was filed by the Food Inspector Atru against the respondent in the Court of learned trial Magistrate on 6.1.1989. The accusation made against the respondent was that he had been found selling adulterated Milk at Atru on 21.2.1988 and had sold such milk to the Food Inspector. On analysis, the Public Analyst had reported the milk to be adulterated. It appears that after recording the pre-charge evidence, when the respondent was read over and explained charge u/S. 7/16 of the Act, he pleaded guilty to the charge. The learned Magistrate thereupon heard the parties on the point of sentence and on the lone fact of the respondent having faced the trial for 5 years, extended the benefit of the Probation of the Offenders Act, 1958 to him. (3). At the very outset, it may be stated that an order u/S. 3 and /or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is an order appealable u/S. 11 of that Act. An appeal should have, therefore, been filed by the aggrieved party against the order of the learned Magistrate. No such appeal was reportedly filed in the present case by either of the parties. (4). Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act provides that when an order has been made u/S. 3 or Sec. 4 in respect of an offender, the appellate Court or High Court in exercise of its powers of revision may set aside such order and in lieu thereof pass sentence of such offence according to law. The provisions contained in sub-sec. The provisions contained in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 11 of the Act of 1958 confer power of revision upon the High Court and such powers may be exercised by this Court where no appeal was preferred against the order passed u/S. 3 or u/S. 4 of the Act by the aggrieved party. In this context, it may be pointed out that a similar power has been conferred upon the appellate Court under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 11 which provides that in cases where no appeal lies or is not preferred then notwithstanding any thing contained in the Code or any other law, the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentence under the Code may either on its own motion or on an application made to it by the convicted person or the probation officer, call for and examine the record of the case and pass such order thereon as it thinks fit. It is thus clear that in cases where no appeal has been preferred u/S. 11 of the Pro- bation of offenders Act against an order passed u/S. 3 or Sec. 4 of that Act, the Appellate Court as also the High Court may exercise their revisionary powers under sub-Sec. (3) and sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 11 of the Probation Act. That being so, the present appeal is directed to be treated as a revision petition before this Court under sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 11 of the Probation Act. (5). Mr. S.S. Rathore learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the provisions contained in Sec. 20AA of the Act prohibit extending of the benefit of Probation Act to an accused found guilty of an offence punishable u/S. 16(1). Such benefit may be extended to an accused, below 21 years of age at the time of commission of the offence. The learned Public Prosecutor further pointed out that in the present case there was no material to show that the respondent was below 21 years of age at the time of commission of the offence. It was, therefore, submitted that since the order of sentence in the present case has been rendered in contravention of the statutory provisions contained in Sec. 20AA of the Act, the same is illegal and not sustainable at law. Mr. It was, therefore, submitted that since the order of sentence in the present case has been rendered in contravention of the statutory provisions contained in Sec. 20AA of the Act, the same is illegal and not sustainable at law. Mr. Rathore further submitted that in view of the provision con- tained in Sec. 16(1) of the Act, the learned Magistrate was required to impose minimum punishment of 6 months Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/- upon the respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent however, submitted that looking to the fact that the offence was committed in the year 1988 and since then the respondent had been facing ordeal of this litigation, the order of probation in favour of the respondent should not be withdrawn or substituted by an order of imprisonment. The learned counsel further submitted that, in any case, the proviso to Sec. 16(1) of the Act may come into play as looking to the long life of this litigation, sentence exceeding 3 months Rigorous Imprisonment and Rs. 500/- of fine should not be imposed in this case. (6). I have given due consideration to the argument advanced before me. In the case of Ishar Dass vs. State of Punjab (1), it was certainly held that the beneficial protection of the Probation Act may be extended to the offenders under the Act. But their Lordships cautioned that such approach should not lightly and kindly beadopted in the cases involving socio-economic offences. In its 47th Report, the Law Commission of India appears to have taken note of such approach to the penalies to be levied in cases involving socio-economic offences and therefore, it was recommended that such offences being offences against the Society at large affecting the health of community at large should not be considered for kindly application of provision of Offenders Act. The same view was expressed by the Apex Court in the case of P.K. Tejani vs. State of Maharashtra (2), wherein it was held that kindly application of the provision of the Probation Act to the offenders under the Act are unlike to dissuade such offenders from doing such offences against the society at large. Their Lordships further observed that in such cases Jail for minimum period prescribed in the statute and not release on probation must be the general rule. Their Lordships further observed that in such cases Jail for minimum period prescribed in the statute and not release on probation must be the general rule. It is thus, evident that the legislative approach as well as the judicial view on offences like the present one have been against the application of the provision of Probation of Offenders Act. Since the order of conviction recorded by the Magistrate in the present case runs counter to the statutory provision con- tained in Sec. 20AA, that order is obviously illegal and deserves to be set aside. (7). Proviso to Sec. 16(1) directs the imposition of minimum of 6 months and fine of Rs. 1,000/- upon a person found guilty u/S. 16(1). It is a statutory mandate and required to be given full meaning. In the case of Umrao Singh vs. State of Haryana (3), the Apex Court appears to have considered the question of imposing sentence in similar case. Their Lordships observed that in cases falling under the proviso to Sec. 6(1)(a)(i) of the Act attract, for adequate and special reasons, sentence lower than the minimum prescribed may be awarded. In that case their Lordships, taking the age of the convict at 70 years and his suffering from Astma illness into account, reduced the sentence of the appellant in that case to the period already undergone. However, in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. R.S. Rangdappa (4), which was under the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act 1968 and wherein the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had reduced the sentence of the accused to the period already undergone and fine of Rs. 50/-, their Lordships made the follo- wing observations :– ``The statute prescribes a minimum sentence. It does not provide for any exceptions and does not vest the Court with any discretion to award a sentence below the prescribed minimum under the special circumstances. The learned Judge has himself noticed that the sen- tence imposed is the statutory minimum. Having noticed that the statute prescribes a minimum sentence for the offence, the High Court has understandably reduced the sentence of imprisonment to less than the minimum permissible. The High Court was clearly in error in doing so. We think we have said enough to correct the error. It is unnecessary to pursue the matter further by granting Special Leave. The petition is dismissed with the above observations. The High Court was clearly in error in doing so. We think we have said enough to correct the error. It is unnecessary to pursue the matter further by granting Special Leave. The petition is dismissed with the above observations. The above observations though made in the context of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act laid down the proposition that where the statute prescribes a minimum sentence and does not vest the Court with any discretion to award a sentence be- low the prescribed minimum sentence for any special circumstances no reduction in sentence can be made. (8). The view expressed by the Apex Court in the above case seems to have been stressed upon in later decisions. In the case of Punjab & Haryana vs. S.K. Sharma (5), the Apex Court observed that the interest of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice, are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. The principles of natural justice are, simply the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter productive exercise. Speaking in the same tone in the case of Raju vs. State of Rajasthan (6), their Lordships again stressed that it is the nature of the gravity of the crime but not the criminal which are germane for consideration of appropriate punishment in criminal trial. The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awar- ded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society at large to which criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for crime must not be irrelevant, but it should conform to and be consistent with the brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated and the enormity of the crime warranting the public abhorrence and it should res- pond to the societys call for justice against the criminal. (9). In view of the legislative mandate contained in Sec. 16(1) of the Act and the approach made by the Apex Court to the cases involving socio-economic offences, discretion of the Court to be lenient seems to have been considerably taken away. (9). In view of the legislative mandate contained in Sec. 16(1) of the Act and the approach made by the Apex Court to the cases involving socio-economic offences, discretion of the Court to be lenient seems to have been considerably taken away. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Prithichand (7), the Apex Court again stressed that the accused involved in an economic offence destabilises the economy and causes great incursion to the State. In the case of P.K. Tejani (supra) an offence under the Act has been seen as socio-economic offence perpetrated against the consumer public at large to enrich oneself at the cost of the people at large, at the same time, supplying sub-standard food-stuff to them adver- sely affecting their health. In view of such approach, no leniency can be shown to the offenders under the Act. (10). The second proviso to Sec. 16(1) however, gives some discretion to the Court to impose sentence less than the minimum prescribed of 6 months rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 1,000/- fine for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in writing. The Special reasons in the present case, may be the facts that the offence had been committed in the year 1988 and the offender, as was submitted before me, comes from the lower strata of the society and may be having a burden of earning bread for his dependents. But the discretion given to the Court under the said provision has again been restricted to the imposition of minimum sentence of 3 months and fine of Rs. 500/-. The use of the words ``but not less than 3 months imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- used in the phraseology of the proviso lay down a stress that in no case, the punishment should be for less than 3 months imprisonment and Rs. 500/- as fine. It shows the anxiety of the legislature to prescribe minimum punishment for such offences. Misplaced sympathy shown to such offen- ders ultimately leads the legislature to come out with stringent laws against the citizen depriving the Judge of his power to become lenient. Such a state is never good for the health of any civilised society and should, therefore, be avoided. (11). In the final analysis, I am of the opinion that the imposition of sentence of less than 3 months and and fine of Rs. Such a state is never good for the health of any civilised society and should, therefore, be avoided. (11). In the final analysis, I am of the opinion that the imposition of sentence of less than 3 months and and fine of Rs. 500/- on the present respondent is unavoi- dable. At this stage, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent was persuaded to confess his guilt and that against the order of the conviction he could have gone in appeal u/S. 11 of the Probation Act. I have dealt with this aspect of the case at the commencement of this order and have pointed out that the provisions contained in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 11 of the Probation Act con- fer ample powers upon this Court to examine the correctness of the finding made and propriety of the sentence passed. It cannot be said that since the respondent had a right of appeal u/S. 11(ii) or (iii) of the Probation of Offenders Act, hence, he should be given such a right now. Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 11 clearly provides that whereno appeal has been preferred, where an appeal could have been preferred, the appe- llate could either suo-moto or at the instance of the Probation Officer may revise the order passed u/S. 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. In view of such statutory provision and looking to the long life of this litigation wherein the respondent had himself confessed the guilt after recording pre-charge evidence in the case and not at the time of reading over the accusation to him no prejudice, in my opinion, has been caused to the respondent. The objection raised is accordingly overruled. (12). In the result, this petition is allowed. Upholding the conviction of the respondent u/S. 7/16 of the Act, but setting aside the order of the Magistrate passed u/S. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, the petitioner is hereby sentenced to 3 months Rigorous Imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/- or in case of default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. (13). The respondent is directed to surrender to his bail bonds in order to serve out the remaining part of the sentence.